Supreme Court Review 2025: Governance on trial

In 2025, the Supreme Court’s engagement with governance and democracy was marked by a sustained focus on the functioning of institutions. The Court confronted structural distortions arising from delay, institutional inertia and the strategic use of its own discretion. 

Across federal relations, anti-defection adjudication, electoral administration, tribunal governance, investigative independence and legislative privilege, the Court treated procedural breakdowns themselves as constitutional problems.  

The most consequential articulation of this approach came through the combined effect of the two-judge Bench decision in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu and the advisory opinion rendered in Special Reference No. 1 of 2025 under Article 143. Together, they addressed the prolonged withholding by the Governors of their assent to Bills duly passed by elected State legislatures. 

The Court rejected the notion that Articles 200 and 201 confer an unstructured or absolute discretion on Governors or the President, clarifying that constitutional silence on timelines cannot be read as permission for indefinite inaction. The advisory opinion, though, faced criticism for neutralising the Court-imposed timelines for the Governor and the President in granting or withholding assent to the State Bills, besides undermining scope for judicial review of Governor’s and President’s discretion.

Another major governance intervention occurred in Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, where the Court confronted the persistent failure of Speakers to decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule within a reasonable time. The Judgement decisively held that Speakers do not enjoy immunity from judicial review while exercising powers under the anti-defection law and that prolonged inaction defeats the constitutional purpose of curbing political defections. 

The significance of the ruling lies less in the Court’s acknowledgement  that delay can be as corrosive to democratic accountability as an erroneous decision. By mandating time-bound adjudication, the Court sought to restore the representative logic of electoral mandates that have been systemically distorted by defections and procedural stalling. 

The Court’s concern with institutional independence was further evident in its Judgment in Union of India v Madras Bar Association, which revisited the governance of tribunals. Continuing its long-standing scrutiny of tribunal schemes, the Court invalidated executive practices that diluted the independence of adjudicatory bodies through appointment processes, tenure insecurity and administrative control. 

The Judgement reaffirmed that tribunals, though creatures of statute, perform core judicial functions and must therefore be insulated from executive dominance. In governance terms, the decision underscored that efficiency-driven institutional redesign cannot come at the cost of adjudicatory autonomy and that separation of powers operates as a functional safeguard, not merely a formal doctrine.

The Court’s engagement with electoral governance took a more restrained form in Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India, arising from challenges to the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls. While the Court did not pronounce on the larger political or citizenship-related controversies surrounding the revision exercise, it issued binding directions on procedural transparency. By requiring publication of lists of deleted voters with reasons and expanding the range of acceptable identity documents for inclusion claims, the Court focused on the mechanics of electoral administration rather than electoral outcomes. 

In Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, the Supreme Court set aside the expulsion of Rashtriya Janata Dal legislator Sunil Kumar Singh from the Bihar Legislative Council as disproportionate punishment for misconduct in the House. The Court held that legislative decisions, especially when they affect the representation of constituents and remove a legislator from office, are amenable to judicial review.  It clarified the scope of legislative privilege under Article 212, distinguishing between mere proceedings in the Legislature and legislative decisions with effects on representation.  

In Periammal (Dead) v V. Rajamani, a two-Judge Bench directed all High Courts to ensure that their respective district judiciaries decide the pending execution petitions within six months. The long and inordinate delay in deciding execution petitions prevent the litigants from reaping the fruits of the courts’ decrees, and this was noted with concern by the Supreme Court in this case. 

Taken together, these interventions illustrate a Supreme Court in 2025 that was more attentive to systemic distortions in constitutional functioning. The unifying theme across these cases is the Court’s insistence that constitutional offices and institutions cannot use delay, discretion or procedural opacity to frustrate democratic accountability.