Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, imposed in place of death penalty, and barring early release, is constitutionally valid. Judicial review of the President’s clemency power under Article 72 is confined to narrow grounds; the Court cannot sit in appeal over its exercise.

Ramasrey @ Fakkad and five other convicts, sentenced to death for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), filed four writ petitions under Article 32. The convicts had previously filed individual demonstrations to High Courts and the President and got their sentence modified to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. They argued that Sections 45 and 53 of the IPC permit only death or life imprisonment, and that such a sentence defeats remission under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions as misdirected. The Court held that the issue was foreclosed by Union of India v V. Sriharan and Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka. Two of the convicts had not sought remission. The Court found no grounds for judicial review of the President’s orders.

The Supreme Court held that a post-facto environmental clearance scheme may be created only through a properly issued, narrowly tailored and time-bound notification serving a larger public interest. A prior clearance under the EIA Notification, 2006 is mandatory.

In May 2025, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court struck down a 2017 Notification and a 2021 Office Memorandum which permitted projects commenced without prior clearance to seek approval later. A Bench of three-judges, in November 2025, in Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v Vanashakti, recalled that judgement and restored the matters for a fresh hearing.

The Supreme Court upheld the 2017 Notification as valid delegated legislation issued under Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. It found that the notification created a limited, one-time process for dealing with existing violations. It quashed the 2021 Office Memorandum prospectively, stating that an administrative order could not replace the prior-clearance regime with an open-ended post-facto process. It barred any fresh applications and directed that existing clearances will remain valid and pending applications may be decided.

The Supreme Court held that recovery of information under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 alone cannot lead to a conviction unless backed by credible corroborative evidence.

A Trial Court acquitted an accused in a 1988 murder case noting that all evidence—eye witnesses, dying declaration and discovery—recovered under Section 27 were based on ‘sketchy premises’. The Bombay High Court remitted the matter to the trial court and directed it consider the evidence afresh after the brother of the deceased filed a criminal revision petition. Aggrieved, the accused moved the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition.

The Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the trial court. It held that without the chain of evidence leading to the hypothesis of guilt, discovery under Section 27 alone cannot be ground for conviction.

The Supreme Court held that Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates against the corporate debtor alone and cannot be extended to subsidiary companies, promoters, directors, personal guarantors and more.

The appellants had filed a consumer complaint against seven respondents over non-delivery of possession of an apartment despite substantial payment of the sale consideration. While the complaint remained pending, the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process was initiated against the developers and a Section 14 moratorium was imposed against Respondent 1. The appellants moved the Supreme Court after the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) adjourned the complaint against the remaining respondents on grounds of Section 14.

The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC’s decision and directed continuation of proceedings against the remaining respondents. It clarified that Section 14 operates against Respondent 1 alone and in the absence of a legal bar, cannot be extended to Respondents 2-7.

The Supreme Court held that conditions imposed during police custody must be such that they protect the rights of an accused without making investigation ineffective.

A police officer was arrested after a man allegedly died in police custody and his body was hidden. The Magistrate granted eight days of police custody to the SIT, adding that he may only be interrogated inside the Central Prison at Rajamahendravaram, recorded continuously, and be interrogated only in the presence of a lawyer. The conditions were challenged at the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which upheld all of them and permitted the SIT to take the respondent to the alleged crime scene. The State challenged these restrictions before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court modified the conditions. It held that Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 does not contemplate the continuous presence of a counsel, while it permits the accused to meet a lawyer during interrogation. Further, Section 187 permits an enlarged window for seeking police remand. There cannot be an absolute, non-extendable cap on police custody. Lastly, uninterrupted recording of the accused’s travel between locations is unnecessary and unworkable.

The Supreme Court held that Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) may issue directions to ensure compliance with regulations while contractual disputes must be decided by Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).

Four local cable operators in Tamil Nadu complained that Polimer Cable Network had disconnected their television signals. The Madras High Court directed TRAI to consider their complaints after hearing both sides. TRAI found a possible breach of the Interconnection Regulations and directed Polimer to restore the signals. After receiving a police report suggesting non-compliance, TRAI issued a show-cause notice asking why a criminal complaint should not be filed. Polimer challenged the direction and notice before the TDSAT. The TDSAT quashed both, holding that TRAI had acted beyond its powers.

The Supreme Court set aside TDSAT’s judgement. It held that TRAI had only sought compliance with its regulations. The show-cause notice also imposed no penalty and decided no final rights.

The Supreme Court held that a criminal trial involving the death penalty is vitiated if the accused is denied effective legal representation and has not consciously waived the right to counsel. It held that a doubtful or retracted confession cannot sustain a conviction without strong independent corroboration.

On 22 May 1996, an explosion inside a Rajasthan Roadways bus near Samleti village killed 14 passengers and injured 37 others. In 2014, the Trial Court convicted Dr. Abdul Hameed and several co-accused for murder, attempt to murder, conspiracy and offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. Hameed was sentenced to death. He had remained unrepresented during the trial and had personally cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. In 2019, the Rajasthan High Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence and acquitted six co-accused for want of reliable evidence. The accused and the State of Rajasthan approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside Hameed’s conviction and death sentence and ordered a de novo trial before a Special Court at Jaipur. It directed that he be provided competent legal representation and a fresh opportunity to cross-examine all prosecution witnesses, while permitting him to seek bail before the Special Court. It also dismissed the State’s appeals and affirmed the acquittal of the six co-accused.

The Supreme Court held that murder punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, as life imprisonment is the implied minimum punishment.

The appellant, aged 16 years at the time of the alleged offence, was accused of slitting the throat of another boy. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted a preliminary assessment and, by a majority opinion, decided that he lacked the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence and should be tried by the Board. The Presiding Magistrate dissented and found that the appellant was capable of understanding his conduct. On an appeal by the deceased’s mother, the Additional District and Sessions Judge set aside the Board’s order and directed that the appellant be tried as an adult. The Patna High Court dismissed the appellant’s revision petition. The appellant approached the Supreme Court arguing that murder was a “serious offence” rather than a “heinous offence” and that the appellate court could not reverse the Board’s decision without obtaining fresh assistance from psychologists and medical specialists.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgement. It held that life imprisonment is the lowest punishment available for murder and that it falls within the definition of a “heinous offence”. The Court found that the Board had relied solely on an expert opinion without considering the Social Investigation Report and Social Background Report. It directed Boards to independently evaluate the child’s mental capacity, physical capacity, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances of its commission, together with the expert report, social reports, witness statements and other relevant material.

The Supreme Court held that the substance and cumulative effect of a commercial agreement determines whether the relationship between the parties is one of sale or agency.

Mahanagar Gas Ltd. (MGL) supplied compressed natural gas through outlets belonging to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL). While MGL installed and owned the equipment, the oil companies provided the sites, infrastructure, utilities and trained personnel required to dispense CNG to vehicle owners. The Service Tax Department treated the corporations as commission agents providing Business Auxiliary Services under Section 65(19) read with Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994, and raised service tax demands for the period between April 2005 and March 2011. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demands. On 4 June 2014, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) set aside the orders, holding that the transactions were sales on a principal-to-principal basis and that the amount retained by the corporations was a profit margin rather than commission.

The Supreme Court held that ownership of CNG never passed to BPCL or HPCL as required for a sale under Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. MGL fixed the retail price, owned and controlled the dispensing equipment, and retained authority over unsold stock, while the corporations received commission according to the quantity sold. The Court concluded that BPCL and HPCL acted as agents facilitating MGL’s sales and that their activities were taxable as Business Auxiliary Services. It allowed the appeals, set aside the CESTAT order and restored the service tax demands confirmed by the adjudicating authority.

The Supreme Court held that a Court must impose an appropriate sentence within the statutory range under Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 after balancing the gravity of the offence, the interests of the victim and society with the offender’s age, antecedents, conduct and prospects of reformation.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, convicted an autorickshaw driver for gang rape under Section 376D and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, along with a fine of ₹25,000. On 1 November 2017, the Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The appellant-convict approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court declined to reopen the conviction question and confined itself to the quantum of sentence. It found that the convict, who was 25 years old when the offence was committed, had no criminal antecedents and had maintained good conduct in prison. The State had also placed no material on record to establish that he was incapable of reformation. The Court modified the sentence from imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life to 20 years’ imprisonment, with the benefit of remission, if available.