Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court modified its 2025 Judgement by reducing the mandatory eligibility requirement for Civil Judge (Junior Division) from three years’ of Bar practice to one year of actual practice. The Court held that while prior exposure is essential for entry into the judicial service, practical experience can be combined with structured institutional training and supervised clerkship.

Bhumika Trust, an NGO representing several persons with disabilities, approached the Supreme Court with a review petition seeking a recall of the 2025 judgement which mandated three years of practice as an eligibility requirement. The Court sought the views and suggestions of all High Courts, Law Universities and National Law Schools before considering the challenge.

The Court established a transitional scheme for recruitments notified up to 31 March 2027, deeming candidates to have completed one year of practice upon selection, followed by one year of intensive training at a State Judicial Academy and a one-year Law Clerkship divided between the District Judiciary and the High Court. For recruitments notified on or after 1 April 2027, candidates must possess one year of actual practice in the District Courts before undergoing the identical two-year training and clerkship structure. The scheme will operate for five years and will be revisited based on empirical performance data. Justice K.V. Chandran dissented, finding no ground for review and holding that Bar experience remained indispensable.

The Supreme Court held that a mother’s independent income cannot automatically justify halving the father’s financial obligation to maintain his minor children. The Court observed that daily caretaking by the residing parent constitutes a real and significant non-monetary contribution.

The appellant-wife (a gynaecologist earning ₹1,50,000 per month) filed a petition under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) seeking maintenance from the respondent-husband (a pediatrician earning ₹2,00,000 per month). The Family Court denied interim maintenance to the wife but ordered the husband to pay ₹30,000 per month to each of their two minor daughters (aged 9 and 8). On revision, the Allahabad High Court reduced the interim maintenance to ₹15,000 per month per child, reasoning that the employed wife must share the maintenance burden. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement and restored the Family Court’s maintenance order. It stated that the obligation to maintain the children cannot be divided by arithmetic alone.

The Supreme Court held that the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 is a stillborn statute as it metes out punishment without first creating an offence.

Two advocates challenged the validity of proceedings initiated against them for offences under Section 2 of the U.P. Act, on the basis of Gang Charts prepared under the corresponding Rules, 2021. The advocates argued that Section 2 merely defines “gang” and lists offences already penalised under other criminal law. The Rules provide for gang charts to be prepared by administrative officers, while the Act stipulates special procedures such as summary trials and special courts, overriding safeguards provided under ordinary criminal law.

The Supreme Court quashed all proceedings under the Act. It held that the determination of a person’s status through a gang chart empowers the Executive in an “unbridled and unfettered” manner, violating Article 20 and running the risk of double jeopardy. Addressing the likelihood of unsubstantiated preventive detention, it held that any trial under the Act would be a foregone conclusion.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of execution by hanging under Section 354(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Bench held that alternative execution methods like lethal injection lack sufficient scientific proof of being less painful.

In 2017, Rishi Malhotra filed a public interest petition challenging Section 354(5) of the CrPC, now corresponding to Section 393(5) of the BNSS. He argued that execution by hanging violated Articles 14 and 21, as it is barbaric and inhumane causing severe physical and mental agony. The petition sought alternate methods such as lethal injection or shooting.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition based on binding precedents such as Deena v Union of India (1983), which upheld the constitutional validity of hanging as a mode of execution. The Court held that a smaller bench cannot depart from a binding judgement delivered by a larger bench. It declined to refer Deena to a larger Bench. The Court observed that statutory execution methods will remain open to future judicial scrutiny and expert evaluation.

The Supreme Court framed nationwide guidelines to prevent the use of black money in the election process. It held that monetary gratification in the electoral process undermines democracy.

The case stems from the 2014 Lok Sabha Bye-Election. The Election Commission of India’s flying squad raided the respondent’s premises and seized large amounts of counterfeit currency, alleged to be used to bribe voters. The respondent’s plea to quash the FIR against him was granted by the Karnataka High Court. The Karnataka government moved the Supreme Court, and suggested that guidelines should be made to prevent the use of black money in the election process.

The Supreme Court framed a seven-point directive for search and seizure of counterfeit currency and/or other assets which are likely to be used to induce electors. The Court placed timelines on reporting seized materials, completion of investigation and directed that seizures exceeding Rs. 10 Lacs must be reported to Income Tax authorities.

The Supreme Court held that protection of main residence property under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 only applies to the judgement-debtor and does not extend to their legal representatives.

In 1983, a malt manufacturing unit ceased to function, leading to irregularities in loan repayment. The Punjab and Sind Bank filed a recovery suit for ₹3.84 crores, resulting in a compromise decree. The Bank filed an execution petition against the legal representatives of the judgement-debtor after he passed away in 1994. The proceedings were transferred to the newly established Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Jabalpur in 1998. The DRT ordered an auction of property in Delhi, which was later upheld by the appellate tribunal (DRAT) in 2007. The legal representatives filed a writ petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court arguing that the property was exempt from attachment for sale under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the CPC. When the High Court remitted the matter for fresh inquiry, the DRAT held that the respondents had failed to raise the plea at an earlier stage. The DRAT’s decision was set aside by the High Court, holding that the respondent was entitled to raise the plea as a mixed question of law and fact.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision. It upheld the validity of the sale, stating that mixed questions of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in a writ petition.

The Supreme Court held that a punishment introduced by a later amendment cannot be applied retrospectively. Article 20(1) of the Constitution requires the sentence to be determined under the law applicable when the offence was committed.

In 2016, Balesh Kumar Kuraiti was accused of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a three-year-old girl. The Trial Court convicted him under Section 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), and sentenced him to life imprisonment under both provisions. The Chhattisgarh High Court affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment. It referred to the enhanced punishment introduced by the 2019 amendment to the POCSO Act and Section 42 of the POCSO Act. Kuraiti approached the Supreme Court, which confined the appeal to the sentence.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s modification of the sentence and restored life imprisonment under both provisions. It held that the High Court could not rely on the 2019 amendment for an offence committed in 2016. The Court directed that the sentences run concurrently. It clarified that the life sentence under Section 376(2)(i) would not carry a stipulation that Kuraiti remain imprisoned for the rest of his natural life.

The Supreme Court held that a court cannot grant interim protection against arrest while dismissing an application for pre-arrest bail as non-maintainable. Further, it held that a prerequisite for seeking anticipatory bail is communication of an arrest order under Section 69 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act).

The respondent was issued three summonses under Section 70 of the CGST Act during an investigation by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI). The respondent sought anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court and subsequently the Bombay High Court. The High Court rejected his application noting that no arrest order was issued under Section 69 of the CGST Act. It granted the respondent one week of protection from arrest from the date of intimation if a Section 69 order was passed. The Union appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’ judgement. It stated that all interim protections will cease upon the dismissal of a pre-arrest bail application. On Section 69, the Court held that the order authorising arrest must carry sufficient “reasons to believe” and be communicated to the accused electronically or through other permissible modes.

The Supreme Court held that an award debtor can invoke Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 post-award to prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the efficacy of a Section 34 challenge, though under a higher threshold for interim relief.

In 2002, National Projects Construction Corporation (NPCC) awarded Ishvakoo (India) ₹3.5 crore as an advance against bank guarantees for a project in Agra. Following disputes, Ishvakoo initiated arbitration and sought a Section 9 injunction to restrain NPCC from invoking the guarantees. In September 2017, after Ishvakoo failed to renew the guarantees, NPCC encashed them. The arbitrator ultimately dismissed Ishvakoo’s claims, while NPCC raised no counterclaims. Ishvakoo challenged the award under Section 34 and filed a fresh Section 9 application seeking a refund of the encashed amount. The Delhi High Court ordered NPCC to deposit ₹3.5 crore with its Registry, a decision upheld by its Division Bench.

The Supreme Court found that Ishvakoo had fulfilled “in ample measure” the necessary parameters for obtaining relief under Section 9. It noted that NPCC had filed no counterclaim. Further, the arbitral award had made no finding that Ishvakoo misutilised the advance. Allowing NPCCC to retain the funds during the Section 34 proceedings would result in unjust enrichment. It granted NPCC four weeks to deposit ₹3.5 crores with the Registry of the Delhi High Court, where the amount was to be kept in a fixed deposit until disposal of the Section 34 application.

The Supreme Court held that intention is irrelevant in determining charges of insider-trading under Section 4(1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations 2015.

In 2020, the respondents—the management of the Tara Jewels Limited—were issued an Order-cum-Show Cause Notice by SEBI for jointly selling more than 30,00,000 shares during the Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) period in violation of Section 4(1) of the 2015 SEBI Regulation, resulting in the avoidance of a loss of ₹1.38 crores. In 2021, SEBI found the respondents guilty under the 2015 Regulations. The respondents challenged the Order at the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), Mumbai. SAT allowed the appeal and held that the trading of shares was done with the intention to avoid the company being downgraded as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA). Subsequently, SEBI moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court allowed SEBI’s appeal and restored the Order. The Court held that the sale of securities during the UPSI period is presumed to be a motivated act under the 2015 Regulation, making intention to trade irrelevant.