Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

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Pronouncement of Reserved Judgements by High Courts

Vol 6, Issue 1

Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v State of Jharkhand

The Supreme Court held that delay in pronouncement of a reasoned judgement causes irreparable loss to the parties. It issued comprehensive guidelines under Article 142, for the pronouncement of reserved judgements, uploading of judgements, monitoring of delayed matters and remedies available to litigants in cases of prolonged delay before High Courts.

The petitions arose from delays in the pronouncement of criminal appeals reserved by the Jharkhand High Court. The petitioners had been convicted in separate criminal cases and had preferred appeals before the High Court, where arguments were heard and judgements reserved between January and June 2022. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court alleging undue delay in the delivery of the reserved judgements. During the proceedings, the Supreme Court called for reports from High Courts across the country regarding matters in which judgements had been reserved but remained unpronounced, and regarding delays in uploading judgements after pronouncement.

The Supreme Court held that High Courts should endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements within three months of reserving judgement. It observed that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 extends to every stage of a proceeding

Bench:

Surya Kant CJI, Joymalya Bagchi J

Judgement Date:

29 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Delayed pronouncement of reserved judgements—High Courts—Article 21—Article 142—Reserved judgements remained unpronounced for months and years—Reasoned judgements—Three months from date of reserving judgement

Citations:

2026 INSC 604 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(1)[5]

Judgement:

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Goods and Service Tax on Online Gaming

Vol 6, Issue 1

Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence (HQs) v Gameskraft Technologies Private Limited

The Supreme Court held that the character of betting and gambling does not depend on whether the game is of skill or chance but whether there is an existence of stakes. The online gaming activities played on digital platforms constitute betting and gambling for the purpose of the Goods and Service Tax (GST) framework.

Tax authorities issued show cause notices seeking 28 percent GST on the actionable claims arising from betting and gambling. In May 2023, the Karnataka High Court quashed the notice to Gameskraft Technologies, holding that online rummy is a game of skill beyond betting and gambling. The tax authority approached the Supreme Court. Other gaming operators, fantasy sports platforms and casino interests filed challenges to the levy and the 2023 CGST amendments. The Supreme Court heard the batch together.

The Bench set aside the Karnataka High Court judgement. It restored the show cause notice against Gameskraft, and upheld the levy as constitutionally valid. It held the 2023 amendments clarificatory and retrospective.

Bench:

R. Mahadevan J, J.B. Pardiwala J

Judgement Date:

27 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Show cause notice levying 28 percent tax on gambling and betting—Karnataka High Court quashes notice—Authorities appeal to the Supreme CourtStakes amount to Betting and gambling irrespective of games of skill or chance—Levy upheld—Karnataka High Court judgement set aside

Citations:

2026 INSC 595 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(1)[4]

Judgement:

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Betting and Gambling in Games of Skill

Vol 6, Issue 1

State of Tamil Nadu v Junglee Games India

The Supreme Court held that betting on games of skill amounts to gambling and is not protected under Article 19(1)(g).

The respondents — gaming companies — challenged the constitutionality of amendments made to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 and the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, in the Madras and Karnataka High Courts respectively. The amendments prohibit betting and gambling. The High Courts held that states cannot regulate betting on activities based on skill under Entry 34 of State List. The state governments appealed against the judgements on the ground that “betting and gambling” under Entry 34 cannot be read rigidly to invalidate legislative competence.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgements, noting that even a game of skill played with stakes on the outcome amounts to “betting” under Entry 34. Further, Entry 34 does not include protection from betting on games of skill.

Bench:

J.B. Pardiwala J, R. Mahadevan J

Judgement Date:

27 June 2026

Keyphrases:

Betting and gambling—Entry 34 of State List—Seventh Schedule—Protection afforded to games of skill—Amendment to State Legislations—Betting and gambling prohibited—Challenge to amendments—Entry 34 does not include betting on game of skill—Amendments set aside—Civil Appeal—Betting on game of skill amounts to gambling—High Court judgements set aside.

Citations:

2026 INSC 594 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(1)[3]

Judgement:

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Re-opening of Approval for Combination under Competition Act

Vol 6, Issue 1

Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings v Competition Commission of India

The Supreme Court held that when a company notifies a combination, it must present the transaction to the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in substance, listing all inter-connected steps and commercial arrangements. However, the company is not required to adopt the regulator’s preferred characterisation or labelling of those rights or agreements.

In November 2019, Amazon acquired a 49 percent stake in Future Coupons after securing approval from the CCI under Section 31(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. In June 2021, the CCI issued a show cause notice alleging suppression of material facts in the aftermath of the Amazon-Future dispute. The CCI kept the approval in abeyance in December 2021. It imposed penalties on Amazon and directed it to file a fresh application. This was affirmed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).

The Supreme Court set aside NCLAT and CCI’s order. It held that Amazon had notified its combination in substance and provided the CCI with the relevant agreements. Further, the CCI lacked the authority to suspend a concluded approval, there being a limitation barring the reopening of a case after the passage of a year, under Section 20(1) of the Act.

Bench:

Vikram Nath J, Sandeep Mehta J

Judgement Date:

27 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Approval of combination by the Competition Commission of India under Section 31(1)—Show cause notice issued with alleged irregularities—Upheld by NCLAT—Reopening barred under proviso to Section 20(1) after one year has passed—NCLAT and CCI Order set aside

Citations:

2026 INSC 576 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(1)[2]

Judgement:

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Regularisation of Wrongfully Allotted Plot

Vol 6, Issue 1

K. Raheja Corp. Private Limited v State of Maharashtra

The Supreme Court held that it is better for public interest to regularise wrongly allotted public land by charging the market value rather than demolishing it, as it has created long-term social and economic benefits.

In 2003, the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) allotted a 3,611 sq metre plot in Sector 30A, Vashi, Navi Mumbai to K. Raheja Corp. at Rs. 10,250 per sq metre on an individual application. Subsequently, the appellant invested Rs. 450 crore and made a fully operational shopping mall and hotel. The Bombay High Court in 2014 held the allotment illegal and directed that the land be restored to its “original condition”, requiring that the shopping mall and hotel be demolished. The appellant then filed an application for regularisation and an appeal before the Supreme Court. The state government set up a committee to examine the feasibility and terms of regularisation.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It applied the recommendations of the committee stating that the appellant is liable to pay the market value of the land, as it was in 2014—Rs. 54,400 per sq.meter. The Bench noted that the mall has 150 retailers with 8000 individuals employed.

Bench:

P.S. Narasimha J, Alok Aradhe J

Judgement Date:

26 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Irregular allotment of land—Land developed with commercial establishments—High Court directs land to be converted to its original condition—Demolition of land—Regularisation application—Supreme Court directs regularisation at market value—Livelihoods and employment—High Court judgement set aside

Citations:

2026 INSC 551 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(1)[1]

Judgement:

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Arbitrariness in Regularisation of Contract Workers

Vol 5, Issue 4

Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v State of Assam

The Supreme Court held that denial of regularisation benefits to contract workers who are situated identically to regular employees violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

In 1995, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam issued an Office Memorandum (OM), regularising muster roll workers engaged in service prior to 1 April 1993. In 2005, the State Cabinet issued an Order in compliance, creating over 30,000 posts for regularisation. A large number of muster roll workers were left out due to clerical lapses and omissions. Subsequently, vide OM dated 12 June 2012, it was decided that no further regularisation would be undertaken. The appellants challenged the validity of the 2012 OM before the Gauhati High Court, where the Single Judge quashed the OM and allowed regularisation. The respondent challenged the Order before a Division Bench. Consequently, in 2017, the Division Bench set aside the Order. The appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the Order of the Division Bench, holding that once a benefit is conferred upon a particular class, the State cannot arbitrarily deny the benefit to similarly placed but left out workers since this would treat equals unequally under Article 14.

Bench:

Vikram Nath J, Sandeep Mehta J

Judgement Date:

21 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Muster roll workers—Office Memorandum (OM)—Regularisation of workers—30,000 posts—Clarical errors—Workers left out—2012 OM—No further regularisation—Challenge before Single Bench—OM set aside—Appeal—Division Bench—Single Judge Order set aside—Civil appeal—Division Bench Order set aside—OM violates Article 14.

Citations:

2026 INSC 523 | 2026 SCO.LR 5(4)[20]

Judgement:

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Cognisance of Complaint under PMLA

Vol 5, Issue 4

Parvinder Singh v Director of Enforcement

The Supreme Court held that cognisance under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) cannot be taken without hearing the accused under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). An order taking cognisance without complying with the proviso would be void ab initio.

An Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) was registered against the appellant in July 2023. He was arrested in April 2024. A prosecution complaint under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA was filed before the Special Court on 24 June 2024. The Special Court registered the complaint as a miscellaneous case and took cognisance on 2 July 2024 after the BNSS came into force on 1 July 2024. The appellant challenged the cognisance order contending that he was not heard before cognizance was taken under Section 223(1) of the BNSS. The Special Court dismissed the application. The High Court of Uttarakhand upheld the cognisance order holding that proceedings initiated before commencement of the BNSS would continue under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS. The appellant challenged this before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court and the cognisance order passed by the Special Court. It held that Sections 223 to 228 of the BNSS apply to proceedings under the PMLA and that mere registration of the complaint before commencement of the BNSS would not amount to an “inquiry” under Section 2(1)(k). Since cognisance was taken after the BNSS came into force, the Court observed that the appellant was entitled to a hearing before the Special Court.

Bench:

M.M. Sundresh J, N.K. Singh J

Judgement Date:

19 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002—Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023—Special Court—Cognisance—Complaint under Section 44—Opportunity of hearing before cognizance—Section 223(1) BNSS—Fair trial—Article 21—Inquiry under Section 2(1)(k)—Cognisance order set aside

Citations:

2026 INSC 519 | 2026 SCO.LR 5 (4)[19]

Judgement:

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Re-enactment of Crime under Article 20

Vol 5, Issue 4

State of Tamil Nadu v Ponnusamy

The Supreme Court held that a broad re-enactment of a crime scene by an accused does not per se amount to testimonial compulsion or self incrimination under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

The respondents were accused of the murder of a doctor working in Chennai owing to disputes over ownership of a land parcel. Consequently, the accused were charged under Sections 120-B, 109, 341, 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. The accused were convicted by the Trial Court. The Madras High Court set aside the conviction based on a re-enactment of the occurrence by the accused to the investigative agency. The Court held that this was inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and against the right to self-incrimination under Article 20(3). The State approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that re-enactment of occurrences is not invalid since it is not based on personal testimony and is merely used for the purpose of identification of the accused. Further, the Court held that re-enactment does not constitute direct form of evidence and only has corroborative value.

Bench:

M.M. Sundresh J, S.C. Sharma J

Judgement Date:

19 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Conspiracy—Murder—Trial Court convicted—Conviction based on re-enactment of evidents—Self-incrimination—Article 20(3)—Sections 25 and 26 of Indian Evidence Act—High Court set aside—Criminal appeal—Re-enactment not personal testimony—Not direct evidence—Only corroborative value.

Citations:

2026 INSC 507 | 2026 SCO.LR 5(4)[18]

Judgement:

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Balancing Public Safety and Animal Welfare

Vol 5, Issue 4

RE: “CITY HOUNDED BY STRAYS, KIDS PAY PRICE”

The Supreme Court held that the State’s obligation to protect life and safety under Article 21 prevails over ordinary statutory animal welfare regulations. It held that the balance must tilt in favour of preserving human life and safety.

On 28 July 2025, the Court took suo motu cognisance following media reports highlighting a rise in dog-bite incidents across the country. On 11 August 2025, the Court issued interim directions concerning the management of stray animals in public and sensitive spaces. Animal welfare groups challenged the directions, particularly concerning relocation and a restriction on re-releasing dogs after sterilisation. The matter was placed before a new Bench which considered the scope and implementation of its earlier directions.

The Supreme Court held that the State bears an “affirmative, non-negotiable and continuing duty” to protect citizens from preventable threats to life and safety. The Bench held that stray dogs in institutional areas such as schools, hospitals and transport hubs cannot be re-released after sterilisation.

Bench:

Sandeep Mehta J, Vikram Nath J, N.V. Anjaria J

Judgement Date:

19 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Suo Motu Cognisance—Rising Stray Dog Attacks—Dog-Bite Incidents—Administrative Inaction— Interim Relocation Directions — Challenges by Animal Welfare Groups — Right to Life and Safety — Article 21 — Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023

Citations:

2026 INSC 506 | 2026 SCO.LR 5(4)[17]

Judgement:

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Prolonged Incarceration as Grounds for Bail under UAPA

Vol 5, Issue 4

Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v National Investigation Agency, Jammu

The Supreme Court held that the statutory embargo restricting bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) must be subject to liberty granted under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution. “Bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is applicable under UAPA too. Bail can be denied based on the facts of the case.

Andrabi, a government servant at Kupwara, was arrested in June 2020 after heroin and cash was discovered in an intercepted vehicle bound to Handwara. The NIA alleged narco-terror links with operatives across the border and registered a chargesheeted under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, UAPA and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. His bail plea was rejected by a Special NIA Court in August 2024 and the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in August 2025. By then he had spent over five years and eleven months in custody.

The Supreme Court granted bail to Andrabi. It held that the Supreme Court’s three-judge bench decision in Union of India v K.A. Najeeb (2021) “will apply with full force” and bail under UAPA can be granted on grounds of prolonged incarceration, gross delay in conclusion of trial, and the absence of any realistic possibility of the trial concluding in the near future.

Bench:

B.V. Nagarathna J, Ujjal Bhuyan J

Judgement Date:

18 May 2026

Keyphrases:

Prolonged custody of UAPA accused—Special NIA Court rejected bail—Bail rejected by High Court—Narco-terror links—Supreme Court grants bail—Five years 11 month long custody—Union of India v K.A. Najeeb (2021)—prolonged incarceration as grounds of bail under UAPA—Article 21

Citations:

2026 INSC 503 | 2026 SCO.LR 5(4)[16]

Judgement:

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