Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that an accused person does not have an indefeasible right to seek a narco-analysis test to lead the evidence. The decision brings clarity to the law following several conflicting High Court judgements on the issue.

The Patna High Court had allowed narco-analysis tests for all the accused persons in a dowry harassment and kidnapping case. The High Court was hearing a plea for the grant of regular bail by the accused persons.

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had exceeded the scope of a bail hearing by approving a narco-analysis test. Further, they reiterated Selvi v State of Karnataka (2010), where the Court had held that a narco-analysis test cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

The Supreme Court held that Section 66(4) of the Railways Act 1989 permits the levy of a punitive charge against the owner/consignee, be it before or after the delivery.

The railway authorities raised demand notices against the respondents for misdeclaration of goods with a punitive charge. The charge was imposed after the goods had been delivered. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the Gauhati High Court agreed with the respondents that a charge could not be levied after the delivery of goods.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. As Section 66(4) was silent on the issue, the Court concluded that charges could be levied both before and after the delivery of goods.

The Supreme Court held that developers must refund the principal with interest for delays in delivering homes, but are not liable to pay interest on personal loans taken by buyers to finance their properties.

Anupam Garg had secured a flat allotment under the Greater Mohali Area Development Authority’s (GMADA) 2011 housing scheme. Possession was due by May 2015. As GMADA failed to deliver on time, Garg opted out and sought a refund as per the Letter of Intent, which promised the return of all deposited amounts with 8 percent compounded interest, without any further liability. Garg filed a consumer complaint. Both the State and National Commissions directed GMADA to refund the amount with interest and with interest that Garg paid on his loan.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 8 percent interest paid on the refund amount already covered the consequences of delay; additional damages under separate heads, such as loan interest, were impermissible.

The Supreme Court held that an application to close down an industrial establishment can only be approved by the Labour Minister. If no order is communicated within 60 days, closure is deemed approved.

Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited applied for closure after its job work agreement with Britannia Industries Limited ended. They filed an application under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Deputy Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, sought resubmission twice, citing incomplete details. The Bombay High Court ruled that the deeming provision under Section 25-O did not apply, as the applications lacked reasons for closure.

The Supreme Court found the applications to be complete and the closure reasons genuine. It held that the right to close a business is protected under Article 19(1)(g), subject to reasonable restrictions. The Deputy Secretary’s letters lacked independent application of mind and did not qualify as valid orders.

The Supreme Court held that a loanee cannot take advantage of their own breach to nullify a transaction. Only the aggrieved party could seek to set aside such a sale.

Machhindranath secured a loan from a co-operative society by putting his ancestral land as security. During the course of the loan, he signed a formal sale agreement in favour of his nephew for another loan, alongside a private agreement promising return of the land upon repayment. The nephew sold part of the land to a third party. Machhindranath filed a civil suit claiming that the sale was a security arrangement and argued that the sale deed would be void under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Trial Court ruled in his favour, but the High Court reversed it.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the provision on the voidability of the sale agreement could be invoked only by the aggrieved party, the co-operative society. As Machhindranath had broken the terms himself, he could not claim that the sale was void.

The Supreme Court held that preventive detention is not the appropriate remedy for a detaining authority if an accused violates their bail conditions.

The appellant, who was the wife of the detenu, had filed an appeal against a Kerala High Court judgement which had upheld the detention of her husband under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007. The husband was described as a “notorious goonda” who had several criminal cases pending against him. The detaining authorities said that he had violated his bail conditions and that his release would threaten “public order” .

The Supreme Court reiterated that preventive detention should be exercised in rare instances and was an exception to the protection of life and liberty under Article 21. The Bench pointed out that no application was made to cancel the bail granted to the detenu. They pointed out that the detaining authority did not clearly make a case for needing preventive detention.

The Supreme Court held that delivery of property is not necessary to charge a person under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for “putting a person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.” The Court clarified that Section 387 criminalises a step prior to the actual extortion where property delivery is essential.

The complainant and the accused run companies with the same name, M/S Balaji Traders and are involved in an ongoing intellectual property dispute. The complainant claimed that the accused threatened him with rifles, asking him to close down his business or pay five lakh rupees every month. The Trial Court found a prima facie offence under Section 387 and issued summons. The Allahabad High Court found that for a Section 387 offence to be made out, the victim must have transferred property or security to the accused.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision. The Bench held that Sections 385, 387, and 389 IPC are designed to punish the accused for an act committed for the purpose of extortion and not extortion itself.

The Supreme Court held that to calculate the limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint, not when the Magistrate takes cognisance.

The complainant filed a dowry harassment complaint against her husband and his family in 2002, alleging physical and mental abuse in 1999. An FIR was registered under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in 2002. The Magistrate took cognisance in 2004. The Sessions Court discharged the accused stating that the magistrate had taken cognisance of the case five years, whereas the limitation period was three years. The Delhi High Court held that the complaint was within time.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court order, and held that the complainant was not late in approaching the Court.

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence in cases where the appeal is filed by the accused.

The appellant trespassed into the house of his neighbour and hugged her. Shelater committed suicide. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 354 and 448 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and acquitted him of the charge under Section 306 of IPC. The High Court dismissed his appeal against his conviction. Using its suo moto Criminal Revision Petition, it convicted the appellant under Sections 306 and sentenced him with rigorous imprisonment for five years.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused. No appellant, by filing an appeal, can be made worse-off than what he was.

The Supreme Court held that in cases where a court has relied on circumstantial evidence, it must compare the prosecution’s evidence with that of the defence. A finding of conviction must be made out beyond a reasonable doubt. Where two views exist, the one favouring the accused should be taken.

Vaibhav, the accused, claimed that he found Mangesh, the deceased, in a pool of blood along with his father’s pistol. Thereafter, he admittedly disposed of the dead body and concealed the death. The prosecution claimed that this was an act of homicidal death, whereas Vaibhav claimed it was a case of accidental death. The Bombay High Court upheld Vaibhav’s conviction.

The Court overturned the decision of the High Court as it did not test Vaibhav’s version of events against the surrounding facts and circumstances. The Court set aside Vaibhav’s conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5 read with Section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959. It sustained the conviction on Section 201 of the IPC for causing the disappearance of evidence.