Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the five-year limitation to pass an assessment order by tax authorities under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) can only be invoked when allegations concern fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression of facts. The Court held that the foundational facts supporting such an allegation must be evident from the show cause notice and cannot be established by merely reciting the statutory words.

Tata Steel challenged a show cause notice issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act for three financial years, 2018-2019 to 2020-2021, pursuant to an audit objection raised by the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Tata Steel argued that the three-year limitation under Section 73 had expired and that there was no allegation of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to invoke the extended five-year limitation under Section 74. It further submitted that the Assessing Officer was not convinced by the audit objection and had placed the matter in the “call book” (kept in abeyance), before issuing the notice. The Department argued that the proceedings indicated suppression of material facts and wilful misrepresentation. Tata Steel approached the Supreme Court challenging the show cause notice.

The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 can be initiated only after the Assessing Officer records satisfaction. It found that the Department’s decision to contest the audit objection before the Public Accounts Committee itself indicated that there was no such satisfaction. It noted that the show cause notice contained no foundational facts supporting the allegation of suppression and could not sustain the extended limitation under Section 74. The Court set aside the show cause notice. It granted the Department the liberty to initiate proceedings under Section 74, with foundational facts, with an order to be passed before 28 February 2027.

The Supreme Court held that the Customs Act, 1962 confers absolute and independent statutory liability upon the appointed “custodian”, in the absence of any other law pertaining to the recovery of duty leviable on pilfered goods.

In October 2000, the Commissioner of Customs (CoC) appointed the respondent as “custodian” under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act, rendering it liable to recover duty leviable on goods pilfered from its custody between 1996 and 2000. The respondents challenged the CoC’s power of appointment as it was already covered by the Major Ports Trusts Act, 1963 and thus protected by the saving clause under Section 45(1). When the CoC (Appeals) rejected its challenge against this appointment, the respondent moved the Bombay High Court in a Writ Petition. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition. Aggrieved, the Union of India moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Major Port Act protects against the general destruction and deterioration of goods but does not apply to pilferage. It cannot be considered “a law in force for the time being” under Sections 45(1).

The Supreme Court held that once the wife has voluntarily relinquished all monetary claims, including maintenance, in a mutual-consent divorce, revival of such claims during subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted.

The parties obtained a mutual divorce decree after executing a settlement agreement in which the wife agreed not to make any monetary or maintenance claims. Subsequently, the wife initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The respondent sought to quash her claims as extinguished by the agreement. The wife submitted that the agreement was executed under duress and was void as it contained a waiver of statutory rights. The High Court of Kerala dismissed his appeal and he approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and quashed proceedings under the DV Act. It held that proceedings must first be initiated to invalidate the settlement or set aside the divorce decree. As the daughter was not a party to the agreement, the Court clarified that she is at liberty to file fresh proceedings for monetary relief.

The Supreme Court held that an unattested copy of a Form-25 affidavit served to an election candidate for corrupt practices is not a ground to dismiss an election petition under Section 86 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, provided the original affidavit before the Court is properly attested.

The appellant approached the Supreme Court after the Gauhati High Court dismissed his election petition against the 2024 Lok Sabha Election of Kripanath Mallah. The High Court had held that the copies served to the candidate had improperly attested rubber stamps and that the Form-25 copies were unattested.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement and restored the election petition. It held that varying rubber stamps on served petition copies were sufficient and directed the High Court to examine the original court files. If the original affidavit was duly affirmed by the Commissioner of Affidavits, the High Court must hear the full petition on merits.

The Supreme Court held that liability under the polluter-pays principle requires proof of actual environmental damage and a causal link between the activity and the degradation.

Vyakti Vikas Kendra India, the Indian legal entity through which the Art of Living operates, organised the World Culture Festival from 11 to 13 March 2016 on 25 hectares of the Yamuna floodplain after obtaining permission from the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and other authorities. Manoj Misra approached the National Green Tribunal (NGT), alleging that preparations for the event had damaged the floodplain. On 9 March 2016, the NGT permitted the event but imposed ₹5 crore as interim environmental compensation. In its final judgement of 7 December 2017, relying on expert reports, the NGT held the organiser responsible for damage and directed DDA to restore the allotted portion of the floodplain, with additional restoration costs.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the NGT judgement. It found that contemporaneous material showed that the site was already damaged before it was handed over to the appellant and that the evidence did not establish additional environmental damage attributable to the event. The Court also held that the NGT had wrongly treated its interim findings as conclusive and had equated restoration with the wider concept of rehabilitation. It directed DDA to refund ₹5 crore within four weeks, while leaving DDA’s responsibility for rehabilitation of the Yamuna floodplain unchanged.

The Supreme Court modified its 2025 Judgement by reducing the mandatory eligibility requirement for Civil Judge (Junior Division) from three years’ of Bar practice to one year of actual practice. The Court held that while prior exposure is essential for entry into the judicial service, practical experience can be combined with structured institutional training and supervised clerkship.

Bhumika Trust, an NGO representing several persons with disabilities, approached the Supreme Court with a review petition seeking a recall of the 2025 judgement which mandated three years of practice as an eligibility requirement. The Court sought the views and suggestions of all High Courts, Law Universities and National Law Schools before considering the challenge.

The Court established a transitional scheme for recruitments notified up to 31 March 2027, deeming candidates to have completed one year of practice upon selection, followed by one year of intensive training at a State Judicial Academy and a one-year Law Clerkship divided between the District Judiciary and the High Court. For recruitments notified on or after 1 April 2027, candidates must possess one year of actual practice in the District Courts before undergoing the identical two-year training and clerkship structure. The scheme will operate for five years and will be revisited based on empirical performance data. Justice K.V. Chandran dissented, finding no ground for review and holding that Bar experience remained indispensable.

The Supreme Court held that a mother’s independent income cannot automatically justify halving the father’s financial obligation to maintain his minor children. The Court observed that daily caretaking by the residing parent constitutes a real and significant non-monetary contribution.

The appellant-wife (a gynaecologist earning ₹1,50,000 per month) filed a petition under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) seeking maintenance from the respondent-husband (a pediatrician earning ₹2,00,000 per month). The Family Court denied interim maintenance to the wife but ordered the husband to pay ₹30,000 per month to each of their two minor daughters (aged 9 and 8). On revision, the Allahabad High Court reduced the interim maintenance to ₹15,000 per month per child, reasoning that the employed wife must share the maintenance burden. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement and restored the Family Court’s maintenance order. It stated that the obligation to maintain the children cannot be divided by arithmetic alone.

The Supreme Court held that the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 is a stillborn statute as it metes out punishment without first creating an offence.

Two advocates challenged the validity of proceedings initiated against them for offences under Section 2 of the U.P. Act, on the basis of Gang Charts prepared under the corresponding Rules, 2021. The advocates argued that Section 2 merely defines “gang” and lists offences already penalised under other criminal law. The Rules provide for gang charts to be prepared by administrative officers, while the Act stipulates special procedures such as summary trials and special courts, overriding safeguards provided under ordinary criminal law.

The Supreme Court quashed all proceedings under the Act. It held that the determination of a person’s status through a gang chart empowers the Executive in an “unbridled and unfettered” manner, violating Article 20 and running the risk of double jeopardy. Addressing the likelihood of unsubstantiated preventive detention, it held that any trial under the Act would be a foregone conclusion.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of execution by hanging under Section 354(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Bench held that alternative execution methods like lethal injection lack sufficient scientific proof of being less painful.

In 2017, Rishi Malhotra filed a public interest petition challenging Section 354(5) of the CrPC, now corresponding to Section 393(5) of the BNSS. He argued that execution by hanging violated Articles 14 and 21, as it is barbaric and inhumane causing severe physical and mental agony. The petition sought alternate methods such as lethal injection or shooting.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition based on binding precedents such as Deena v Union of India (1983), which upheld the constitutional validity of hanging as a mode of execution. The Court held that a smaller bench cannot depart from a binding judgement delivered by a larger bench. It declined to refer Deena to a larger Bench. The Court observed that statutory execution methods will remain open to future judicial scrutiny and expert evaluation.

The Supreme Court framed nationwide guidelines to prevent the use of black money in the election process. It held that monetary gratification in the electoral process undermines democracy.

The case stems from the 2014 Lok Sabha Bye-Election. The Election Commission of India’s flying squad raided the respondent’s premises and seized large amounts of counterfeit currency, alleged to be used to bribe voters. The respondent’s plea to quash the FIR against him was granted by the Karnataka High Court. The Karnataka government moved the Supreme Court, and suggested that guidelines should be made to prevent the use of black money in the election process.

The Supreme Court framed a seven-point directive for search and seizure of counterfeit currency and/or other assets which are likely to be used to induce electors. The Court placed timelines on reporting seized materials, completion of investigation and directed that seizures exceeding Rs. 10 Lacs must be reported to Income Tax authorities.