Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court formally declared the “right to walk” on safe demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, integral to Articles 19(1)(d) and 21.

A five-year-old child was killed in a road accident after a tanker struck the boy. The father of the child sought a compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT awarded Rs. 7,82,000/-. On appeal the High Court reduced it to Rs. 4,70,000/-.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error in reducing the compensation. It enhanced the compensation to Rs. 11,44,628/-. It noted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) is inherently a legislation for “vehicles” and treats “human” interests as incidental. Remedies for restitution and compensation will be independent of the remedies available under the MVA.

The Supreme Court held that a constitutional court has the power to test the validity of a subordinate legislation, even in absence of a specific challenge, provided the issuing authority receives a fair opportunity to defend it.

The Special Police Establishment, assisting the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt, booked a Town Inspector at Katni in a corruption trap under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused sought records of the sanction process under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) after sanction for prosecution was granted.The Madhya Pradesh High Court directed that the information be supplied after the State Information Commission initially denied disclosure. The Establishment appealed against the decision arguing that a 2011 notification exempted it from the purview of the RTI Act Section 24(4).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and struck down the 2011 notification for being “excessive”. The Court noted that the Establishment had a statutory mandate for investigating corruption and economic offences. It does not involve itself into intelligence or security matters which are exempted under Section 24(4).

The Supreme Court held that the delay in release of a convict after an order granting permanent parole amounts to illegal detention. It affirmed that habeas corpus petitions are maintainable against any form of detention.

The appellant was convicted for four years rigorous imprisonment in 1988. He was arrested in 2021 after his appeal was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court. In 2024, the High Court directed his release on permanent parole, subject to the payment of a personal bond and two sureties. He filed a habeas corpus petition as he was not released by the state authorities despite complying with the conditions. A Division Bench directed immediate release. The appellant then claimed compensation of Rs. 8 lakh for 24 days of illegal detention. The State of Rajasthan opposed compensation and argued that the order releasing him on permanent parole violated Rule 9 of Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958.

The Supreme Court rejected the Rajasthan government’s argument and noted that the extended custody of the appellant amounted to illegal detention. It awarded ₹11 lakhs compensation to the appellant for violation of Article 21. It found that the State ought to have applied the “obey first, appeal later” principle and clarified that operation of the parole order cannot be stayed except by judicial decree.

The Supreme Court held that a decision evidenced in writing by a majority of trustees constitutes a valid authorisation for a society to act on its behalf, affirming that it is not absolutely required to be unanimous. It further held that where rival claims exist over voting authority, the validity of a vote cannot be determined merely by which vote was cast first, but by whether the person casting it was lawfully authorised to do so.

The matter arose from internal governance disputes between three societies—Hindustan Medical Institution, Eastern India Educational Institution, and Belle Vue Clinic— registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, and held shares in Birla Corporation Limited (BCL). Disputes arose regarding the authority to act on behalf of the societies and exercise voting rights attached to those shares. The societies relied on resolutions allegedly passed by circulation by their trustees and sought directions permitting their authorised representatives to attend and vote at BCL’s annual general meeting. The Calcutta High Court declined ad interim relief. In appeal, the Division Bench held that trustees must act in consonance and that if any trustee had not joined in the decision, the same could not be treated as a decision by the board of trustees. The High Court further directed that the vote cast first by the society would be taken into consideration irrespective of whether it was cast by the Managing Committee or the Board of Trustees.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Calcutta High Court and held that Clause 24 of the societies’ by-laws expressly permits delegation by a resolution evidenced in writing under the hands of the majority of the trustees. Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 could not be applied in a manner that deprived the by-laws of their operative force. It found that the High Court erred by placing the Board of Trustees, where the properties vest, on an equal plane with the Managing Committee, which only exercises derivative power circumscribed by delegation. Finally, the Court held that Section 108 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 20 of the 2014 Rules protect an anterior valid vote against subsequent duplication but do not validate an unauthorised act merely due to temporal priority.

The Supreme Court held that criminal culpability for medical negligence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires the accused to act in a manner that “no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do”.

The appellant was a senior anaesthetist accused of medical negligence for allegedly failing to discharge her responsibility of administering anaesthesia to a patient in the post-operative care unit by delegating the work to an attending nurse, resulting in the patient’s death. Both civil and criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant. The District Consumer Redressal Forum relieved the appellant from all liability. The appellant approached the High Court for her discharge from the criminal accusations. The High Court rejected her plea. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and discharged the accused. It found that the appellant was off duty at the time of administration of the anaesthesia. Further, the death was due to a pre-existing coronary blockage. It also held that after exoneration in civil proceedings, continuance of a criminal prosecution constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law.

The Supreme Court held that psychological evaluation of a child in custody or visitation disputes cannot be ordered routinely, as it risks causing secondary trauma to the minor. Courts must record detailed reasons demonstrating the absolute necessity of such an evaluation and should ordinarily appoint a single independent expert.

In 2019, the appellant returned to India from the USA with her minor daughter, subsequently registering cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the respondent-father, alleging domestic violence and child sexual abuse. To re-establish contact with the child, the father sought an expert psychological evaluation of the minor. The Family Court, Pune rejected the application, but the Bombay High Court subsequently directed the appointment of a four-member expert panel that included specialists suggested by the father, including one based in the USA. The appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s direction for a four-member panel and modified the order. It directed that a comprehensive psychological assessment of both parents be conducted first to evaluate their parental suitability and mental state. The matter was then remitted to the Family Court to determine the necessity of any future child evaluation based on those parental reports and the child’s best interests.

The Supreme Court held that deficiencies, omissions, or blank columns in Form F records prescribed under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) cannot be treated as trivial clerical or technical errors. A compromise in maintaining these mandatory records constitute an offence as they are vital in preventing illegal pre-natal sex determination.

Criminal charges were initiated against the appellant after a search and seizure operation by an inspecting authority at his sonography centre. The doctor challenged the order taking cognisance before the Bombay High Court, arguing that the inspecting Civil Surgeon was not the legally competent “Appropriate Authority” to file the complaint and that the uncompleted sections in Form F were merely inadvertent clerical errors lacking criminal intent. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting that a state notification explicitly designated the District Civil Surgeon as the Appropriate Authority and that record-keeping flaws constitute a substantive statutory breach. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the criminal proceedings against the doctor. It observed that any record-keeping deficiencies in Form F must be strictly scrutinised at trial rather than dismissed as clerical oversights.

The Supreme Court held that compensation for the death of a homemaker must include a new head of ‘loss of domestic care’, fixed at ₹30,000 per month and revisable by ten percent every three years. Where the homemaker has no proven income, this sum stands in as notional monthly income.

The claimant’s wife, a homemaker, died on 25 November 2001 in a road accident while travelling from Sirsa to Fatehabad. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sirsa, awarded ₹2,42,000 in December 2003. The claimants’ appeal remained pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for twenty years, the case file having been destroyed in a 2011 fire. In December 2024, a Single Judge enhanced the compensation to ₹8,43,400 with 7.5 percent interest.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and awarded ₹62,77,900, computed by taking ₹30,000 as the deceased’s notional monthly income, and directed High Courts to prioritise appeals pending beyond four years.

The Supreme Court held that a third referee judge under Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when referred a case due to a split opinion in a Division Bench, is strictly confined to the specific points of disagreement. The referee judge cannot independently reopen, re-evaluate or overturn the concurrent findings of fact or guilt unanimously reached by both judges of the original bench.

In 2001, three siblings were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow for unlawful assembly and murder. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction of two brothers but differed on one of the siblings’ guilt. A third referee judge not only agreed that the third sibling should be acquitted, but also re–evaluated the finding of guilt for the two brothers and acquitted them. The complainant moved the Supreme Court along with the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The Supreme Court set aside the referee judge’s findings on acquitting the two convicted siblings. It referred the correctness of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Sajjan Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh (1998) to a larger bench. The larger bench is expected to decide the exact limits of a referee judge, noting that Sajjan Singh had earlier held that a third judge is required to examine the whole case independently, including issues on which the Division Bench was unanimous.

The Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain writ petitions from Central Armed Police Forces.

Baksish Ahmad, an enrolled member of the Border Security Forces (BSF), was dismissed from service without pensionary benefits after an Inquiry found he had entered a second marriage without permission from the Central Government, thereby violating Rules 7 of the BSF Rules, 1969. His petition for reinstatement was rejected by the Inspector General, BSF, Jammu. Ahmad challenged his dismissal by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The petition was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi and that the appropriate forums were the High Courts of Calcutta or Jammu & Kashmir. Ahmad approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court and revived the appellant’s writ petition. It ruled that because the head offices of the necessary respondents are situated in New Delhi, the Delhi High Court cannot refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court directed the respondents to file their counter-affidavit within two months to facilitate an early disposal on the merits.