Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the refusal to relax qualification requirements for promotions while granting it to other similarly situated employees is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The appellant, an employee of a Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society, was recommended for promotion to the post of Society Manager by the Board of Directors with relaxation in educational qualification on the basis of experience, competence and seniority. The General Body approved the recommendation. The Registrar rejected the proposal without assigning reasons. While the Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the writ petition, the Division Bench reversed the decision holding that relaxation could not be granted. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Division Bench. The Court held that the governing legislation permitted relaxation in educational qualification. It observed that the Registrar’s rejection of the proposal was cryptic and without reasons and noted that denial of relaxation to other employees of the same homogeneous class amounted to discrimination.

The Supreme Court held that borrowers do not have a right to a personal hearing before their account is classified as fraud.

The State Bank of India (SBI) classified Amit Iron’s account as “fraud” in March 2024 after issuing a show cause notice and a reasoned order. SBI did not provide an opportunity for an oral hearing or supply the forensic audit report. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, relying on State Bank of India v Rajesh Agarwal (2023) directed that the borrower must be given a personal hearing and supplied with the Forensic Audit Report (FAR). A Division Bench upheld the decision and a parallel Delhi matter involving Bank of India and Liliput Kidswear produced similar relief. The banks, backed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), appealed, contending that Rajesh Agarwal only mandated notice, reply and a reasoned order.

The Supreme Court clarified that Rajesh Agarwal did not mandate a personal hearing. It held that the RBI’s 2024 Master Directions correctly incorporate principles of natural justice. While it set asid

The Supreme Court held that land allotted at a subsidised rate must serve public objectives, such as employment and economic developments. Non-utilisation of the land can result in the cancellation of an industrial lease.

The appellant acquired lease rights for a 33-acre plot in 2001. The lease deed of the company was forfeited by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) due to non-utilisation and failure to complete the construction of a factory building within a stipulated time period. A writ petition was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court and the matter progressed in appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld UPSIDA’s decision to cancel the lease. It held that the appellant failed to demonstrate its bona fide intent to establish a manufacturing unit. Further, the company did not have an approved layout plan for the said factory and had utilised only 7.68 per cent of the area.

The Supreme Court held that arbitrariness and favouritism in the award and execution of public work contracts violates Article 14.

The petitioner—a civil society organisation—alleged that contracts for projects and public works in the State of Arunachal Pradesh were being illegally and arbitrarily awarded to firms and individuals closely connected to the current Chief Minister. Approaching the top court under Article 32, they demanded an investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) and/or Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), arguing that awards were executed without call for tenders.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. It held that the award of public works is subject to principles of equality and non-arbitrariness guaranteed under Article 14. Further, it held that missing comparative statements are prima facie indication of arbitriness by the State which deems independent investigation.

The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against a doctor holding that medical professionals are placed on a different pedestal from ordinary citizens.

A boy’s father filed an FIR against a doctor alleging that the practitioner had forged his consent for an orchidectomy procedure, and claimed that consent was only given for orchidopexy. The Madras High Court rejected the doctor’s prayer for quashing the proceedings and allowed the father’s petition, directing the constitution of a three-member Medical Board. The investigation continued even after the Board opined in his favour. The doctor filed again for quashing the entire proceeding. Upon dismissal by the High Court, he appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that continuance of criminal proceedings would be nothing but an abuse of law. It relied on Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab and reiterated the importance of Medical Board reports. Finding no material on record to suggest forgery of consent, it held that courts must be loath to examine questions of fact and evidence in summary proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that distinct standards of legality, rationality, and proportionality must be applied when reviewing termination and blacklisting in government contracts. Blacklisting, being stigmatic and exclusionary, requires a specific show-cause notice and cannot follow mechanistically from termination.

The appellant, contracted by Jharkhand’s Drinking Water and Sanitation Department for construction of an Elevated Service Reservoir, faced action after the reservoir’s dome collapsed on 1 June 2024. Multi-level enquiries, drawing inputs from BIT Sindri and IITs, attributed the collapse to negligent construction. The Department issued a combined termination-cum-blacklisting order on 23 August 2024 under the Contractor Registration Rules 2012. The appellate authority and the Jharkhand High Court upheld the order.

The Supreme Court upheld the termination but set aside the blacklisting, holding that the show-cause notice failed to indicate the proposed blacklisting. Due to the passage of over 18 months, the Court moulded relief by directing that the blacklisting cease with immediate effect.

The Supreme Court held that the grant of bail is strictly contingent upon the bonafide and substantial fulfillment of bail conditions in both letter and spirit. It clarified that the unlawful sourcing of funds to satisfy a bail deposit constitutes a fundamental breach of trust and legal integrity.

Satinder Singh Bhasin, director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Private Limited (BIIPL), faced approximately 190 FIRs alleging siphoning of funds and non-delivery of units in the ‘Grand Venice’ project. In 2019, the Supreme Court granted him interim bail under Article 32, on the condition that he deposit an amount of ₹50 crore to the Court Registry and make “genuine attempts” to settle investor claims. Allottees filed applications to cancel his bail, arguing that Bhasin used BIIPL’s money to pay for his deposit. This violated Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 which mandates special resolution for such loans.

The Supreme Court cancelled Bhasin’s bail and forfeited the entire deposit. It agreed with the respondents that the deposit of ₹50 crore cannot be sustained without a special resolution. It noted that Bhasin’s conduct reflected no intention to settle pending investor claims as he had not provided any details on allottees and the project was not in a condition to be handed over.

The Supreme Court held that a departmental inquiry stands vitiated if there is no leading evidence to justify the denial of charges.

The appellant, employed with the U.P. Cooperative Federation and posted as in-charge of a paddy procurement centre, was charge-sheeted for short delivery of paddy and embezzlement. He denied the charges. The enquiry proceeded on the basis of documentary material, but no witness was examined. When the enquiry resulted in his dismissal from service, the appellant challenged the dismissal and recovery on the ground that the enquiry violated the extant service rules and the principles of natural justice. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with law.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal and recovery. It observed that a departmental charge-sheet is not a plaint and clarified that a witness would have to be examined to corroborate the documentary evidence. The employer was granted liberty to hold a de novo enquiry within six months, failing which the appellant would be entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service and arrears of salary, subject to adjustment of suspension allowance.

The Supreme Court held that a subsequent bar on sanction to prosecute a public servant under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C) does not invalidate cognisance already taken by the Court.

The accused-appellant is a police officer who was implicated with others for the murder of the respondent’s husband during a lathi charge after violent clashes broke out on an election day. The Magistrate took cognisance and summoned the accused. One of the co-accused approached the Calcutta High Court contending that cognisance cannot be taken without sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. Dismissing the petition, the High Court held that a charge of such gravity does not qualify for immunity under Section 197. When a criminal appeal by the co-accused was allowed in the Supreme Court, the respondent moved the High Court with a criminal revision petition. The High Court allowed the petition noting that the order of the Supreme Court applied only to one of the co-accused and not the accused-appellant in question. Consequently, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the validity of the Court’s cognisance as it was taken on a date when there was no bar. It noted that there is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which nullifies a valid cognizance order.

The Supreme Court held that a child’s testimony cannot be rendered unreliable due to minor inconsistencies and human lapses of memory that do not compromise the factum of the prosecution’s narrative.

A nine-year old girl from a Scheduled Caste family returned home from the shop with bloodstains on her clothes and informed her mother that she had been raped by their neighbour’s son. The boy was charged with Sections 376 (rape) and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 3(xii) SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Trial Court convicted the boy on the basis of the victim’s testimony, corroborated by parents, the shopkeeper and medical evidence. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the boy citing inconsistencies in reporting timelines, prior quarrel between the families and late addition of the SC/ST Act charges. The victim’s family appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement and directed the accused to surrender and serve the Trial Court’s sentence. Disturbed by the public disclosure of the victim’s identity in this matter, the Bench directed that a copy of its judgement be sent to all High Courts mandating strict adherence to Section 228-A IPC which prohibits disclosure.