Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a constitutional court cannot create or expand criminal offences if there is no legislative sanction.

Thirteen writ petitions, two special leave petitions, and eight contempt matters had accumulated since 2020 alleging rise in hate speech instances after the Covid -19 pandemic. Petitioners sought directions along the lines of introducing provisions to curb speeches as per the 267th Law Commission Report and the registration of suo moto FIRs for instances of hate speech.

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitioners and appeals. It held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not permit the judiciary to create new offences. Further, the existing framework sufficiently covers provisions that deal with speeches that outrage religious sentiments or disturb public tranquillity.

The Supreme Court held that the protection against arbitrary removal of civil servants under Article 311 does not apply to the employees of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR).

The appellant, who is the Assistant Director General of the Agricultural Research Information System, alleged that he was removed from four committees under ICAR’s National Agricultural Technology Project (NATP) after whistleblowing irregularities in the award of contracts. He approached the Delhi High Court, claiming that he is protected against the arbitrariness of his removal and triggered retaliatory action under Article 311. The High Court disposed of the appeal and declined the review. The appellant approached the Supreme Court in a civil appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the protection under Article 311 is not applicable to ICAR since it is an autonomous body under the Department of Agricultural Research and Education and is governed by the rules and by-laws of ICAR. Further, the Court mentioned that the allegations of mala fide must be supported by clean and cogent evidence and cannot be inferred from surrounding circumstances.

The Supreme Court held that free and compulsory education at a “neighbourhood school” under the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE) is a deliberate statutory conception to ensure equality of status and social integration during a child’s formative years.

A student was selected for admission into pre-primary classes in a neighbourhood school by the Basic Education Department of the Uttar Pradesh government under the U.P. RTE Rules, 2011. The school did not permit her to attend classes on the ground that her eligibility was uncertain. The Allahabad High Court held that the school cannot sit in appeal over a decision taken by a state government and directed the school to grant admission to her. The school approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. It affirmed that the fundamental right to education under Article 21A would be an “empty promise” if the RTE mandate is not worked out in letter and spirit.

The Supreme Court held that mitigation reports in death references must be considered at the earliest stage of proceedings. It directed all trial courts and high courts to call for mitigation reports and assign a dedicated legal team in all death reference matters.

In January, the Patna High Court confirmed a death sentence granted to the two appellants. The appellants were sentenced under Sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of three women. The High Court had held that the aggravating factors leave no room for any mitigating factors to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment or a special sentence.

The Supreme Court stayed the sentence pending disposal of appeal and directed the Bihar government and the Jail Superintendent to submit reports regarding the appellants conduct along with a psychological evaluation.

The Court observed that despite directions issued in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2023), trial and high courts often slip into a retributive approach and fail to consider mitigation circumstances. It directed the National Legal Services Authority to formulate guidelines for production of mitigation reports and conduct of fieldwork required to collect necessary information.

The Supreme Court held that adjudicatory efficiency required formal closure of the 1984 M.C. Mehta petition. Pending issues will be split between fresh suo moto proceedings of this Court and the Delhi High Court under Article 226.

The 1984 petition arose from unauthorised heavy and noxious industries in the erstwhile Union Territory of Delhi. Early judgements of 15 May 1992 and 8 July 1996 barred stone crushers and closed 168 highly polluting units. A judgement of 16 February 2006 ordered sealing of misused residential premises. 433 interlocutory applications in the petition remain pending.

The writ petition was formally disposed of. Two new suo moto writ petitions on hazardous industries and water resources were registered. IAs on the Delhi Master Plan, illegal construction and Monitoring Committee appeals were transferred to the Delhi High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a legislation meant for reorganisation and revival, not debt recovery.

The respondent,a money lender, lent ₹4.5 crore to the appellant. Following defaults and dishonoured cheques, the Delhi High Court directed the appellant to pay ₹4.38 crore with interest at 24 per cent per annum. An appeal against the decree was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Without executing the money decree, the respondent initiated insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) dismissed the petition noting the appellant was solvent and functioning. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) set aside the NCLT Order and directed the admission of the Section 7 application observing that a money decree constitutes a “financial debt”.

The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT order and restored the NCLT’s original order. It held that an insolvency proceeding cannot be a substitute for civil execution. The respondent was directed to pay the appellant a cost of ₹5 lakhs within five weeks.

The Supreme Court held that foreign decrees which are not issued on merits, and are covered under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, shall not be enforceable by Indian Courts.

The appellants discharged a loan liability on behalf of the respondents and demanded reimbursement. When the respondents failed to reimburse them, the appellants moved the English Court and obtained directions for payment of the due amount. The respondents contested that the decision was not made on merits of the case and hence, was not enforceable in India. Subsequently, the appellants moved the English Court to issue a summary judgement on merits, which the Court granted. Further, they approached the Delhi High Court for the enforcement of the judgement, which the Single Judge granted. The respondents appealed before the Division Bench, which found that the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct enforcement. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the Supreme Court in a civil appeal.

The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench, noting that adjudication by the way of summary judgement resulted in a premature adjudication and ‘mini-trial’. It held that the decree of the English Court fell within Sections 13(b), (c), (d) and (f) which specify grounds for non-enforcement.

The Supreme Court held that incarceration cannot dilute constitutional guarantees of dignity and equality under Articles 14 and 21. It held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 applies fully in custodial settings, binding prison authorities to disability-inclusive governance.

The petitioner sought directions securing nationwide rights and institutional safeguards for prisoners with disability. The Bench relied on L. Muruganantham v State of Tamil Nadu (2025), which laid down a framework for provision of access to ramps, accessible toilets, wheelchair-friendly spaces and assistive devices. It extended application of this framework to all States and Union Territories, and applied Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which imposes fines for contravention, to prison establishments.

The Bench observed that only 12 States and UTs had filed compliance affidavits and entrusted compliance monitoring to the High-Powered Committee constituted in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (2026). All States and UTs were directed to file affidavits before it within six weeks. The matter is listed for 1 September 2026.

The Supreme Court held that Sub-Divisional Officers (SDOs) have no statutory authority to change the category of land which falls within the prohibitory ambit of Section 132 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Pattas granted on the basis of the recategorisation were deemed void ab initio.

In 1992, the Gaon Sabha in Hardoi, U.P. resolved to change the subject land from Category 6 (barren/uncultivated) to Category 5 (cultivable) of the U.P. Land Records Manual. The SDO approved this recommendation and subsequently, pattas were granted to the appellants. In 2019, the Consolidation Officer found the land to be public utility land and expunged the name of the appellants. This Order was challenged in the High Court which dismissed the petition and held that the approval granted by the SDO was without statutory authority. The appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It found that the Act only permits the Gaon Sabha to admit a person as the owner of land vested in it if the land does not fall within categories specified under Section 132. While Category-6 land may encompass various forms of land, the land in dispute was specifically recorded as khalihan and pasture land which falls within the ambit of Section 132. The Court clarified that only the State Government is authorised to lift the prohibition, and applied the principle: what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

The Supreme Court registered four suo moto cases and disposed of the Taj Trapezium Zone case—its oldest pending matter.

In 1984, when the marble of the Taj Mahal began to visibly yellow and blacken, the original petition sought directions to concerned authorities to reduce emissions from foundries, brick kilns, chemical units, vehicular traffic, the Mathura Refinery and the Firozabad glass industry. Over four decades, the Supreme Court applied the precautionary and polluter-pays principles and fashioned the continuing mandamus as an instrument of enforcement. More than 150 interlocutory applications accumulated in this period. Amicus Liz Matthew, opposed transfer to jurisdictional High Courts given the Zone’s cross-State geography and proposed categorisation of the IAs.

Finding merit in her submissions, the Supreme Court disposed of the 1984 petition. The Registry was directed to register four new suo moto writ petitions on a Vision Document, green cover, industrial regulation and water bodies. A tabulated proforma chart was mandated for fresh tree-felling petitions.