Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a remission policy issued under the Governor’s power in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution cannot be superseded by a subsequent statutory policy.

The appellant, convicted of murder in 2009, sought premature release under Haryana’s 2002 remission policy, after completing 14 years of imprisonment. His representation was rejected based on a 2008 policy, requiring 20 years of imprisonment. He approached the High Court arguing that the 2002 Policy had been brought in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, relying on State of Haryana v Raj Kumar, which held that both the 2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy were in exercise of power traceable to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The appellant challenged this before the Supreme Court, arguing that Raj Kumar conflicted with the earlier ruling in State of Haryana v Jagdish, which held that the Governor’s powers under Article 161 are untrammeled and unaffected by the provisions of the CrPC.

The Court held Raj Kumar per incuriam. It ruled that the constitutional origin of the 2002 policy was like its predecessor—the 1993 policy, which was brought in exercise of Article 161. It directed the Haryana government to decide the appellant’s remission application under that policy within four weeks.

The Supreme Court held that non-filing of additional chargesheet copies under Section 193(8) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 does not entitle an accused to default bail, since that right ceases once a compliant chargesheet is filed within the statutory period.

The appellant was arrested in a cyber-fraud investigation involving mule bank accounts used to launder proceeds of digital-arrest and phishing frauds. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a chargesheet within 90 days but did not supply accompanying document copies, as was required under Section 193(8) of the BNSS. He sought default bail, contending that supply of copies was mandatory. The Special Judge, CBI and the Bombay High Court of Judicature rejected the plea.

The Supreme Court upheld the rejection, holding Section 193(8) to be directory rather than mandatory. It clarified that the appellant’s separate application for regular bail remained open for consideration on its own merits.

The Supreme Court held that a candidate’s election affidavit disclosing assets must include property owned solely by the spouse.

The appellant, a Councillor candidate in Gujarat’s 2015 municipal elections, was accused of omitting her husband’s landed properties from her nomination affidavit under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. A Magistrate issued a summons under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), based on a private complaint. She approached the Gujarat High Court seeking that the summons order be quashed, arguing that the disclosure rules did not cover the spouse’s own property. The High Court declined to quash the proceedings.

The Supreme Court held the disclosure obligation extended to the spouse’s separate properties. It noted that declarants were mandated “to give details of the property held by them, their spouse and their dependents, including what is held by them jointly”.

The Supreme Court laid down a standard methodology under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for assessing an injured or deceased claimant’s annual income based on income tax returns. It distinguished salaried claimants from the self-employed for the purpose of computing “just and fair compensation” under Section 166 of the Act.

Manoranjan Pandey, a 39-year-old construction contractor, was granted a compensation of Rs. 2,27,00,064/- based on his income and most recent tax returns. He died after a truck struck his vehicle near Behrampur, Odisha, in May 2018. Pandey had his own construction business with an annual income of Rs. 15,00,000/-. The Orissa High Court averaged two returns and reduced the award to Rs. 1,87,75,150/- after an appeal was filed by the insurance company.

The Supreme Court held that a salaried claimant’s income should be assessed from the immediately preceding year’s return alone, while a self-employed claimant’s income should be averaged over up to three preceding years, weighed against business nature, growth pattern and any negative-income years. Applying this, it fixed the deceased’s annual income at Rs. 14,00,000/- and enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,97,81,505/-.

The Supreme Court held that compensation granted to a disabled accident victim should be determined on the basis of functional disability and not the medically certified figure. The Court must gauge the injury’s effect on the victim’s occupation and earning capacity.

The appellant, a carpenter, had his right leg amputated above the knee after he got into an accident with a jeep in November 2004. The Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,77,823/- as compensation. This was enhanced to Rs. 11,51,423/- by the Uttarakhand High Court, fixing monthly income at Rs. 5000/- and disability at 70 percent. He sought further enhancement under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Supreme Court held that an amputee carpenter, unable to sit or stand to work, suffers 100 percent functional disability. It raised notional monthly income to Rs. 9000/- and enhanced his total compensation to Rs. 35,95,923/-. It further awarded the appellant Rs. 10,00,000 for the prosthetic leg and its lifelong replacement.

The Supreme Court held that land transfers restricted under Section 154 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 are voidable and not void ab initio i.e. void from the beginning.

In 1991, the appellants were granted mutation of 15 bighas of land in Haridwar on the basis of a 1957 sale deed. The mutation was subsequently set aside by the Consolidating Officer after the seller-respondents raised objections. When their application for restoration was rejected, the appellants preferred a civil writ before the Allahabad High Court. The writ was rejected on the grounds that the sales deed was rendered void under Section 154. The appellant moved the Supreme Court, contending that provision merely renders the transfer voidable at the discretion of Gaon Sabha. The respondents claimed that the 1981 amendment to the Act rendered the transfer void ab initio.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement and held that transfers restricted under Section 154 were not void but merely voidable. It denied retrospective operation of the 1981 amendment as it would create new disabilities and obligations.

The Supreme Court upheld the power of courts to condone a late appeal due to sufficient cause, even beyond the deadline set by a special law.

The appellant was externed from the Balodabazar-Bhatapara district for one year under the Chhattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh) Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990. He challenged the order by way of a writ petition, alleging violation of Articles 19 and 21. The High Court of Chhattisgarh dismissed the appeal as it was filed around 20 days after the 30-day statutory limitation period under the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Supreme Court held that Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not bar the application of Section 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act which permit condonation of delay. It restored the appeal to be decided on its own merits.

The Supreme Court held that a corporate insolvency resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is binding and irrevocable. The applicant cannot withdraw from the plan after consenting to it.

The CoC approved the applicant’s resolution plan by a 99.9 per cent majority and issued three successive Letters of Intent (LoI) subject to pending third-party applications for resolution. When the applicant refused to accept the LoIs, his one crore earnest money deposit was forfeited, and the creditors voted to liquidate the debtor. The National Company Law Tribunal and the appellate tribunal dismissed his appeals.

The Supreme Court upheld the tribunal decisions and found that the stipulations did not render the LoIs conditional. It applied the principle of estoppel and confirmed the validity of the forfeiture and liquidation.

The Supreme Court held that the selection of an employee cannot be cancelled on grounds of moral turpitude if the prosecution has led no evidence.

Provisionally selected as a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constable, the appellant disclosed criminal antecedents involving charges of cheating and fraud. When asked to show cause, he submitted that the case was compounded before a Lok Adalat. He approached the Telangana High Court after his explanation was rejected and selection cancelled. A Single Judge set aside the cancellation. The cancellation was later restored by the Division Bench.

The Supreme Court found the cancellation arbitrary and restored the Single Judge’s order. It held that the parties had settled the matter as consenting adults without placing any material to prove commission of the alleged offence. It clarified that a compromise is not an admission of guilt.

The Supreme Court held that a sentence below the statutory minimum is illegal. Raising it to the prescribed minimum is not barred by Section 386(b)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, even in the accused’s own appeal.

The appellants were convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for committing gang rape. They were sentenced only for 12 years rigorous imprisonment despite the provision mandating a minimum 20-year sentence. On appeal, the High Court of Sikkim confirmed the conviction and, in suo motu revision, raised the sentence to 20 years.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court corrected a patent illegality rather than enhancing a lawful sentence. It added that an accused gains no vested right to retain a sentence the law forbids. The appeals were dismissed.