Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a validly issued termination notice under a bareboat charterparty is sufficient to bring the demise charter to an end, even if the owner has not physically repossessed the vessel.

The registered owner of M.V. Nereus Progress had let the vessel out on a bareboat charter to Nereides Marine Services. Nereides defaulted on the payment of hire, following which the owner terminated the charterparty and issued a notice seeking repossession of the Vessel. Before the owner could take physical possession, Om Freight Forwarders obtained an ex-parte order from the Madras High Court for the arrest of M.V. Nereus Progress. Om Freight’s claim arose from Nereides’ separate charter of another vessel, M.V. Bharadwaj. It sought to arrest M.V. Nereus Progress as a sister ship under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, on the ground that Nereides continued to be the demise charterer of M.V. Nereus Progress. The Madras High Court later sustained the arrest, holding that the demise charter ordinarily continued until physical re-delivery of the vessel to its owner.

The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s judgement and vacated the arrest. The Court held that the High Court had erred in treating physical re-delivery as necessary to bring the demise charter to an end. It held that Clause 32 of the BIMCO BARECON 2017 charterparty treated repossession as a consequence of termination, rather than a condition for termination. The Court further held that, after termination and pending physical repossession, Nereides held the vessel only as a “gratuitous Bailee” and not as a demise charterer. It therefore held that Nereides was no longer the demise charterer when the vessel was arrested and that the requirements for arrest under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Act were not satisfied.

The Supreme Court held that a Sessions Court lacks the jurisdiction to impose a “special category” life sentence that restricts remission by directing a convict to remain in prison for the remainder of their natural life. The power to issue such a sentence by curtailing the possibility of early release under Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is exclusively vested in constitutional courts i.e. the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Trial Court in Ludhiana convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment until death. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the Sessions Court’s authority to bar remission.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement to the extent of the sentencing direction. It held that a Sessions Court cannot supplement punishments under Section 302 IPC or curtail executive remission powers. The Court modified their sentence to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment without statutory remission.

The Supreme Court held that in the absence of an arbitration agreement, any Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s statewide territorial jurisdiction is competent to hear petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside arbitral awards.

In 2012, the appellants executed a contract with the respondent which did not contain any arbitration clause. The respondent moved to the Odisha High Court at Cuttack after disputes arose over completion of the assigned work. The High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who passed an award in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the appellants filed petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award before the District Court, Sundargarh. The respondent moved the High Court opposing the petition on the ground that the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked jurisdiction to hear petitions since the “seat of arbitration” was at Cuttack. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court. It held that mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at Cuttack does not constitute the “seat of arbitration”. The Court further noted that the “seat of arbitration” must be expressly designated by the parties, in the absence of which all Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction are competent to hear matters.

The Supreme Court held that a person released due to a breach of Article 22 may be re-arrested for the same offence after receiving prior approval from a Magistrate. The power to re-arrest cannot rest with the authority that violated the constitutional safeguards governing arrests. Any custody plea needs the superior officer’s endorsement.

The Mataur Police Station, SAS Nagar, Punjab, booked Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 for alleged sexual abuse of a minor. Arrested on 17 May 2026, he was produced before a Magistrate over 24 hours later without being given written grounds of arrest. The Magistrate directed his release. A fresh custody plea failed as the grounds remained unfurnished. The Punjab and Haryana High Court refused to bar his re-arrest.

Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the High Court’s order. The Court held that any future custody must follow Mihir Rajesh Shah v State of Maharashtra (2025). The investigation must be moved to another officer. High Courts may award compensation for breaches of Article 22(2).

The Supreme Court held that the power to investigate a crime rests exclusively within the domain of the executive through the police. Courts cannot curtail statutory investigative powers or prematurely declare an investigation complete. A stray statement indicating that “enough evidence” exists does not mean the investigation has concluded.

The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Mumbai registered an FIR against the respondents under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) for engaging in anti-national activities. Following the respondents’ arrest, the Special Judge granted a 30-day extension beyond the standard 90-day period to complete the investigation. A second 15-day extension was subsequently authorised under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA to analyse electronic evidence, voice samples and bank records. The respondents applied for default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), arguing that the investigation was complete, as stated by the prosecution. They contended that an extension could not be granted merely to await sanction for prosecution under Section 45 of the UAPA. The Bombay High Court quashed the second extension and granted default bail, holding that the investigation was complete and the extension for sanction was impermissible.

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgement and upheld the Special Judge’s order granting the 15-day extension to the ATS for filing the charge sheet. The Court held that the High Court erred in misconstruing a solitary statement in the extension application to declare the investigation complete. The Court dismissed the respondents’ default bail application filed under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 43D of the UAPA and ordered the respondents to surrender within 30 days.

The Supreme Court held that when an award-debtor is restricted from unconditionally withdrawing the deposited amount, they are liable under Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to pay post-award statutory interest.

The appellant was an award-debtor in execution proceedings initiated by the respondent to enforce an arbitral award of ₹1.46 crores plus 12 per cent interest. The Delhi High Court granted an interim stay on the award’s execution, provided that the appellant deposit 50 per cent of the award to the High Court Registry. The respondent’s application seeking release of the funds was opposed by the appellant who cited a pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Eventually, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea and the Executing Court ordered unconditional release of the amount with interest. The appellant moved the High Court against the interest contending that the deposit amounts to satisfaction of the award. The appellant approached the Supreme Court after the plea was dismissed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was liable to pay interest since the payment was not made unconditionally to the respondent. It noted that since the initial deposit was made solely to obtain a stay on execution of the award, it cannot constitute unconditional deposit of the amount.

The Supreme Court held that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while an application seeking leave to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is pending. Section 92 mandates the court’s leave for instituting a suit against a public charitable or religious trust.

The appellants alleged financial and administrative mismanagement, breach of trust and irregularities in the day to day functioning of the respondent-trust. They filed a civil suit under Section 92, accompanied by an application for leave to institute it and sought urgent interim protection, asking for appointment of an ad-hoc body to manage the trust’s affairs and properties. A trial court passed an interim order constituting the ad-hoc committee. The Karnataka High Court set aside this order, holding that the Court could not pass an interim order before granting leave to institute the suit.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that Section 92 is both a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword”, protecting public trusts from vexatious litigation while allowing action against their mismanagement. It held that an application for leave is a threshold requirement without which supplemental proceedings cannot be invoked.

The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation restricting trade is liable to be struck down if it does not bear a reasonable, proportionate nexus with its object.

The Maharashtra government introduced Rule 18A and 18B to the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972. Rule 18A required sellers to verify purchaser licences and add colourant and bitterant to methanol sold to non-drug manufacturers. Rule 18B provided for the confiscation of unlicensed methanol. Manufacturers challenged the rules arguing that they rendered methanol commercially unusable. The Bombay High Court dismissed the challenge. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court struck down Rules 18A and 18B as violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g), holding that the licensing and additive requirements failed to address diversion and pilferage while imposing a substantial, continuing burden on industry. The Bench suggested that the state adopt alternatives such as tighter licensing and stock reconciliation to prevent hooch tragedies.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) is not absolute and is rebuttable. The presumption only operates after the prosecution establishes basic foundational facts constituting an offence beyond reasonable doubt at the threshold.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced by the trial court under Section 6 of POCSO and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for penetrative sexual assault. The Delhi High Court relied on Section 29 to confirm the conviction and the sentence. The appellant approached the Supreme Court citing material contradictions between the testimonies of the victim’s mother and a private doctor she consulted. Physical examination and FSL reports found no injuries or blood.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that presumptive provisions neither dilute norms of a fair trial nor do they relieve courts from analysing evidence objectively. The Court ordered immediate release of the appellant stating that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption.

The Supreme Court held that rules governing disability pensions for ex-servicement are claimant-protective. Modifications made thus far do not dismantle the protective structure of the Rules.

Over 270 appeals were filed by the Union against the grant of disability pensions, on the grounds that their disability was “neither attributable to nor aggravated by” military service. The Union argued that the twin presumptions under the 1982 Entitlement Rules—good health at entry in service and; in case of discharge on medical grounds, disability caused/aggravated by military service—were modified in 2008. The respondents contended that the 2008 Rules were merely a cosmetic change.

The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals while taking note of a 2015 Ministry of Defence report that discouraged denial of disability benefits on hyper-technical grounds. It found that the 2008 Rules had no force of law while clarifying that it did not dismantle the core scheme of the 1982 Rules.