Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is narrow in scope, restricted to only prima facie evidence. The Court cannot undertake a mini-trial at this stage.

The respondent was accused of kidnapping and sexual assault under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 respectively. The Allahabad High Court granted him interim bail exercising its powers under Section 439, CrPC. It held that there was an inconsistency in the age of the victim and that Section 164-A, CrPC and Section 27, POCSO obligate police to obtain the victim’s medical age report at the start of investigation. On appeal, the Supreme Court heard arguments on whether the scope of Section 439 CrPC was wide enough to issue directions mandating age determination tests under the POCSO Act.

The Supreme Court set aside the Judgement of the High Court without revoking the bail granted to the respondent. It held that High Courts can only take a prima facie view on the age of the victim if the question was raised at the bail stage. Determining the age of the victim is a matter of trial. It held that the determination of age cannot be resorted to as a matter of course.

The Supreme Court held that modifications to admission criteria made midway through the admission process violates principles of fair play in action. Finding a lack of valid justification for the modifications, it highlighted the need for transparency to prevent arbitrariness.

The High Courts of Punjab and Haryana had dismissed three appeals challenging the modification to the admission policy of NEET (UG) candidates seeking admission under the sports quota at Baba Farid University of Health Sciences, Faridkot. The first two appeals challenged modifications to the 2024 academic session which permitted submission of sports achievements from all years/classes rather than limiting it to Class XI and XII. The third appeal challenged extension of this modified criteria into the 2025 session.

The Supreme Court held that there was no valid reason to modify the admission policy. It observed that the modification was made in special circumstances in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and was contrary to the State’s Sports Policy 2023. Further, the University and the State had not acted in accordance with the fair play mandate under Article 14. It pointed out that such modified parameters were not extended to other allied courses in the same university. Moreover, the modification was carried out after representations were made by the father of a candidate who benefitted from the change.

The Supreme Court held that where a public auction has been conducted in accordance with law and the highest bid is above the reserve price, the auctioning authority cannot cancel the bid merely on the expectation that a higher price could be obtained in a future auction. In the absence of fraud, collusion or material irregularity, such cancellation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Golden Food Products India, the appellant, participated in an auction conducted by the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA), the respondent, for allotment of an industrial plot under the Madhuban Bapudham Yojana. The appellant’s technical and financial bids were approved and it was declared the highest bidder at Rs. 29,500 per square metre, which was above the reserve price of Rs.25,600 per square metre. Thereafter, the GDA cancelled the auction on the ground that smaller plots in the same scheme had fetched higher prices per square metre. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the appellant had no indefeasible right to insist upon allotment.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders. It held that the comparison of the appellant’s bid for a large plot with bids received for much smaller plots was an irrelevant consideration. The Court observed that demand for smaller plots is ordinarily higher and that identical reserve prices had been fixed for plots of different sizes. Once the highest bid was found to be above the reserve price, the GDA was under an obligation to proceed with allotment.The cancellation was held to be arbitrary and irrational, and GDA was directed to issue an allotment letter to the appellant.

The Supreme Court held that prolonged pre-trial incarceration under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, violates the right to speedy trial under Article 21. Bail can be granted in cases where the trial shows no realistic prospect of early commencement.

The appellant was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate in July 2025 after he was accused of being the ultimate beneficiary of diversion and siphoning of public funds. Banks alleged a fraud exceeding ₹670 crore. He had remained in custody for over 16 months. His bail plea was rejected by the Special Court and the Delhi High Court, on the ground that he did not satisfy the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and granted bail to the appellant. It held that the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Moreover, economic offences cannot be treated as a homogeneous class warranting a blanket denial of bail.

The Supreme Court held that the executive cannot retain the amount collected under a levy which was imposed without the authority of law. Further, the executive also cannot retrospectively impose tax liability without explicit legislative authority.

The Finance Act 2010 introduced a 16 per cent customs duty on electricity cleared from a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to a Domestic Tariff Area. This was to operate retrospectively from 26 June 2009. In February 2010, the Union government issued a notification (25/2010), which was challenged at the Gujarat High Court. While this petition was pending, the Union issued a notification reducing the rate of tax to 10 paise per unit (91/2010). Later, in 2012, this was reduced to 3 paisa (26/2012). These did not formally undo the 25/2010 notification. In 2015, the Gujarat High Court held that no customs duty could be imposed and the retrospective levy of tax violated Article 265 of the Constitution. The appellant sought a refund of the tax collected under the notifications, stating that customs duty was struck down by the High Court. The High Court rejected the petition and held that the notifications, 91/2012 and 26/2012, were not expressly struck down in the 2015 proceedings.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Judgement. It held the 2010 and 2012 notifications did not create a new levy but only continued the levy in an altered form. Further, it stated that the change in arithmetical rate to the levy of tax does not cure the lack of authority principle. Moreover, it added that the restitution of the amount is necessary when illegality is discovered.

The Supreme Court held that a joint trial in distinct offences hinges on the discretion of the Court and is the exception, not the norm. It emphasised that this discretion may be exercised only when such offences form a part of the same transaction and satisfy requirements under Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

The accused were taken into custody in 2020 for assaulting the appellant and his friend, the deceased. Pending investigation, they were enlarged on bail by the Special Court for Protection of Civil Rights, Madurai. While on bail, they murdered the deceased, leading to their arrest under a second FIR. Subsequently, the Trial Court granted bail to the accused in the latest murder case. This was cancelled on appeal by the High Court, after which the accused filed a second application for bail, which was rejected by the Trial Court.. The accused then approached the Madras High Court, which in turn granted bail and directed a joint trial of both cases.

The Supreme Court, on appeal, cancelled bail and set aside the Order for joint trial. It held that a joint trial is not a compulsion but rather hinges on the Court’s judicial discretion, even after the requirements under Section 219 are satisfied. The Court added that in directing a joint trial, two factors are to be considered: 1) whether a joint trial may cause prejudice to the accused, and 2) whether it will lead to wastage of judicial time.

The Supreme Court held that forest land cannot be leased or continued to be used for non-forest purposes such as agriculture without prior approval of the Central Government. It emphasised that any such lease cannot be legitimised through post-facto representations or extensions.

The State of Karnataka had granted a ten-year agricultural lease over 134 acres of forest land to the Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-operative Society in the 1970s. After the lease expired, the State refused renewal and terminated the arrangement. Multiple writ petitions filed by the Society failed. Civil suits and appeals resulted only in protection against forcible dispossession without due process. Eventually, forest authorities initiated eviction proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act and took possession in January 2007. Despite this, the Karnataka High Court directed that the Society be allowed to make a representation to the Central Government for continuation of the lease.

Allowing the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions, and held that the Society was not entitled to further extension of lease as it had enjoyed 10 continuous years of possession. It ordered restoration of the forest land through plantation of indigenous species within twelve months.

The Supreme Court held that forcing a couple to remain legally married is a mere “legal fiction” as it serves no purpose and only perpetuates misery. It is in the best interest of parties if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time.

The parties had married in August 2000, but the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home in November 2001. The Trial Court in Shillong granted divorce in 2010 based on grounds of desertion under 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on a suit filed by the appellant-husband. The Gauhati High Court set aside the divorce decree in 2011, holding that the husband failed to prove that his wife intended to permanently desert him

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to 24 years of separation and failed attempts at mediation. It added that prolonged estrangement without reconciliation constitutes mental cruelty to both spouses. The Court exercised its power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage and ensure complete justice.

The Supreme Court held that once the mandate of an arbitrator has terminated by operation of law under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the continuation of the same arbitrator is impermissible. It clarified that the Court is both empowered and obligated to substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6) while extending time for completion of arbitral proceedings.

The appeals arose from arbitral proceedings between parties to a partnership deed which contained an arbitration clause. In March 2020 the Delhi High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who repeatedly directed deposit of administrative expenses. Petitions seeking termination of his mandate under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act were dismissed in January 2022. Upon expiry of the statutory period for making the award, the appellant moved the High Court under Section 29A(6) seeking substitution of the arbitrator and extension of time. The High Court declined substitution but extended the mandate by four months.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting an extension. It noted that after excluding the period affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, the sole arbitrator remained under an obligation to pass the award within the stipulated time and failed to do so without any extension under Section 29A(3) or Section 29A(4). The Court held that the arbitrator therefore became functus officio under Section 29A(4). It further held that Section 29A(6) empowers and obligates the Court to substitute the arbitrator.

The Supreme Court held that the police and criminal courts must be wary of framing charges in matters where no strong suspicion is made out. It expressed strong disapproval of their failure to take cognizance of a pending civil dispute between the parties.

In March 2020, the appellant-accused was charged with offences of wrongful restraint, voyeurism and criminal intimidation. He was the co-owner of a property under a civil dispute to which the complainant was also a party. The accused’s application for discharge and revision petition were dismissed by the Trial Court and the Calcutta High Court respectively. He approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court found that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained essential ingredients of any of the offences alleged. It also found that a prior injunction had been issued in the pending civil dispute and took note of the complainant’s refusal to make a judicial statement. The Court held that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction and quashed the criminal proceedings.