Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a decision of a Single Judge of a High Court under Article 226 cannot be overturned through an appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, which enables an intra-court appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court.

The appellant, the Deputy Registrar of Periyar University, was accused by the respondent-University for amassing wealth disproportionate to his income. The respondent set up a one–member committee after the appellant refused to co-operate with a three-member inquiry committee. The appellant was dismissed after the one-member committee submitted a report that was accepted by the University Syndicate. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, set aside the dismissal and reinstated the appellant’s service on the ground that the inquiry report was made without concrete evidence. The respondent moved under Clause 15 of Letters Patent. The Division Bench set aside the Single-Judge Bench decision, noting that the One-man Commission Report is sufficient to establish charges as it is corroborated by documentary evidence. The appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Division Bench. It held that Courts under Clause 15 of Letters Patent can act only as “Court of Correction” and cannot interfere with a writ court’s decision unless the Single Judge’s decision is glaringly erroneous with errors apparent on the face of the record.

The Supreme Court held that the threshold for satisfying the meaning of “default” to initiate insolvency procedure under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is prima facie finding of financial debt rather than complete adjudication of the claims.

In December 2017, the appellants, the corporate debtors, extended aggregate term loans worth ₹600 Crores by the respondent, which crystallised in November 2022. In February 2023, the respondent recorded debt defaults with the National E-Governance Services (NeSL) and subsequently, recalled the loan, by which the appellants were asked to pay the remaining loan amount of ₹666 Crores. Not having received the debt amount, the respondent filed a petition to initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai. The NCLT admitted the petitions. In January 2024, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) set aside insolvency proceedings citing failure to consider submissions made by the appellants. In July 2025, the NCLT re-admitted insolvency petitions, which were affirmed by NCLAT in August. The appellants moved the Supreme Court, arguing that insolvency proceedings cannot be admitted since they continued to meet debt obligations.

The Supreme Court upheld the Orders of the tribunals, admitting insolvency proceedings under Section 7. It held that admission of insolvency proceedings depends on the prima facie occurrence of default and authorities are not expected to defer admission because parties dispute the details.

The Supreme Court held that the Administrator appointed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Section 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 lacks the statutory authority to write down Additional Tier 1 (AT-1) Bonds once the Union Government intentionally omits the write-down clause from the final notified Reconstruction Scheme.

In December 2016 and October 2017, the appellant—YES BANK Limited—issued Basel III-compliant AT-1 Bonds worth ₹8415 crore with the respondent—Axis Trustee Services Limited—appointed as the trustee. Facing financial decline, the Union Government placed the appellant under a moratorium on 5 March 2020. The RBI appointed an Administrator under Section 36ACA of the 1949 Act and subsequently, published a Draft Reconstruction Scheme that contained a clause providing for the write-down of AT-1 Bonds. Following objections, the Union dropped the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme, notified on 13 March 2020. The next day, on 14 March 2020, the Administrator issued a “write-down” order, extinguishing the AT-1 Bonds. Bondholders and trustees challenged the Order before the Bombay High Court, which set aside the write-down. The appellant, the RBI and the Union government appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Bombay High Court’s judgement. The Court held that the Union had made a deliberate, conscious decision to drop the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme based on stakeholder objections.

The Supreme Court held that a person converted from the Hindu social order to Islam cannot claim reservation under Article 16(4) solely based on pre-conversion social backwardness. Conversion to a different faith does not determine entry into a notified Backward Class Muslim community, an identity rooted in ancestry, endogamy and traditional occupation.

Sameer Ahamed’s certificate for the “Muslim Labbai” community was refused in November 2020 on the ground that he had converted to a religion, not a caste. Tamil Nadu’s Government Order of 9 March 2024 let Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified and Scheduled Caste converts obtain certificates under seven Muslim communities. These communities share the 3.5% quota for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007. On 25 June 2026, the Madras High Court set aside the 2024 Order, and impleaded the state suo moto in Ahamed’s writ petition, before dismissing it.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Tamil Nadu government’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgement. The Court held that there is no common social link between converts and notified Muslim communities. It held the 2024 Order contrary to Article 14. It upheld the High Court’s review of the unchallenged Order, since the State had been heard.

The Supreme Court held that the AICTE Regulations, National Education Policy, 2020, coupled with principles of certainty, necessitates the relevant authorities to notify the fee payable for the entire course before a student takes admission. Any variation in the fee during the subsistence of the course is permissible in exceptional instances such as unforeseen increase in the expenditure.

The respondent students contested the legality and validity of a revised fee structure of the appellant in the High Court of Calcutta for students admitted before and after 16 October 2023. The students were admitted in the 2023-24 Academic Year for the 2023-2027 courses. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions by referring to the prospectus of the appellant college. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge holding that the revised fee notification was not retrospectively applicable to the students admitted before 16 October 2023. The appellant college and self-financing professional colleges filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court partly and held that the fee fixation committees have a statutory foundation and an important public purpose to serve. It held that the High Courts will exercise due judicial review to ensure that these committees perform their duties with institutional efficiency, expertise and integrity. It balanced the interests of the students for avoiding uncertainties, with that of the private educational institutions for reasonable sustenance and further development.

The Supreme Court held that the expression “personal law applicable to her” in the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 refers to the law in force on the date of the female Bhumidhar’s death (when succession opens). It does not refer to the law in force when the 1954 Act became operative or when the interest was originally inherited.

The Reversioners are male descendants from the family of a woman’s first marriage. She inherited a limited life estate when her first husband and son died. When the 1954 Act came into force, she was declared Bhumidhar and after enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 her limited interest was transformed into absolute ownership. Following her death in 1973, male descendants from her second marriage were granted mutation of the revenue records in their favour. The petitioners challenged the mutation, contending that the property reverted to the last male proprietor’s heir as per Section 50 of the 1954 Act. A single judge of the High Court ruled in their favour but this was set aside by the Division Bench which restored the mutation. The Reversioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Division Bench decision. It held that while the acquisition of interest under the 1954 Act is in the past tense, the trigger point “dies” is in the simple present tense. Thus, the nature of the female Bhumidhar’s right must be evaluated under the personal law applicable on the exact date of her death.

The Supreme Court held that Government employees appointed in accordance with due procedure must rank senior to those who were appointed on a temporary or exceptional basis. Among the latter, seniority must be based on their date of regularisation.

Three different categories of recruits to the Tamil Nadu public services challenged the rules determining their inter se seniority. Direct Recruits contended that candidates selected through competitive examinations cannot rank below “back-door appointees”, particularly when their appointments were delayed due to occupation of posts by those hired on a temporary basis. Special appointees challenged the Special Absorption Rules, 1987 to seek recognition of their service pre-regularisation. Compassionate appointees relied on a 1984 executive order to be placed among Direct Recruits on the basis of their date of joining. The Madras High Court held that date of appointment may form the basis for determining seniority of Compassionate appointees but will not be considered for Special appointees who rank below other employees irrespective of their date of joining.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision regarding Special appointees but set aside the holding on Compassionate appointees as they form a separate class of exception to Articles 14 and 16. It found that delay in appointment of Direct Recruits was adequately explained and affirmed that the employer has a right to frame rules on seniority which cannot then be challenged merely to be framed differently.

The Supreme Court directed the constitution of a three-member Committee to examine existing regulations on pharmaceutical marketing and their adequacy for curbing unethical practices.

In 2021, the petitioner trade union approached the Supreme Court through Article 32 petition, seeking a binding statutory framework to curb unethical marketing and promotional practices adopted by pharmaceutical companies to influence the prescriptions of drugs. Referring to the Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP), 2015, the petitioners argued that the existing framework is in the nature of guidelines which lack binding statutory and regulatory mechanisms. In 2022, a High-Level Committee dismissed the need for a new statutory framework and recommended strengthening the existing code, which was then formulated as the UCPMP 2024. In 2026, the Union proposed the constitution of a three-member committee.

The Supreme Court noted that while the matter falls in the legislative and executive domain, the Court cannot remain indifferent to a public health concern. Exercising its powers under Article 142, it directed that the Committee be constituted within two weeks and submit its final recommendation within two months of its meeting.

The Supreme Court reiterated that an election petitioner must personally present the petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Non-compliance is incurable and mandates dismissal at the threshold.

Pon. Paneerselvam challenged S. Regupathy’s election from Tamil Nadu’s Thirumayam Assembly constituency in 2026, alleging that Regupathy had concealed his spouse’s assets. The Madras High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was presented by his counsel. It relied on Rule 7 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions Rules, 1967, which requires personal presentation. Paneerselvam filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, claiming personal presentation on the basis of his entry pass and CCTV footage.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court found that the evidence only established Paneerselvam’s presence on the premises, not his personal presentation of the petition. It held that the High Court is empowered to authorise an officer to receive election petitions.

The Supreme Court held that the nature of a good is determined by its form at the time of taxable event and sale, and not by the manner in which it may later be consumed.

The respondents had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh against a commercial tax order which classified “GRD Powder” and “GRD Mix” as “Non-Alcoholic Drinks and Beverages” under Entry 20(ii), Part IV, Schedule II of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994, attracting a 10 per cent tax. When the High Court held that the goods fall under the residuary entry and attract an eight per cent tax, the appellants filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision and dismissed the appeal. It held that since the goods existed in the form of powder and biscuit at the time of taxable event, they cannot be considered ‘beverages’. It reiterated the principle of strict interpretation for taxing statutes and applied the rule of ejusdem generis to hold that beverages must be in liquid form.