Analysis

Supreme Court stays 2026 UGC equity regulations

Challenged for being “unfair” to general category students, the Bench found that the Regulations were prima facie vague and easy to misuse

On 29 January, a Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi stayed the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026. The Regulations, which were notified on 13 January, had stirred a controversy for allegedly being “unfair” to students belonging to the general category. 

The outrage is centred on the definition clause. Clause 3(c) defines “caste-based discrimination” as discrimination only based on caste or tribe against the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Petitioners argued that the exclusion of the general category from the definition would lead to harassment. Moreover, the Regulations contain no mechanism to penalise “false complaints” against them. 

The 2026 Regulations came out of Abeda Salim Tadvi v Union of India, a case which is pending in the Supreme Court. A Bench of Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan had directed the University Grants Commission (UGC) to notify new regulations to address caste-based discrimination and student suicides in higher educational institutions. The case was filed in 2019 by parents of two students who had committed suicide, allegedly after facing caste-based discrimination. Their petition assailed the failure of authorities to implement the UGC’s 2012 equity regulations

Petitioners: General category students excluded

Advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain, opposing the 2026 Regulations, stated that Clause 3(c) was “completely exclusive”. He contrasted this with Clause 3(e), which he described as a wider provision defining “discrimination” in the new regulations. Clause 3(e), he submitted, includes discrimination on grounds of “religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, disability, or any of them.”

“What is the need for Clause 3(c)?” Jain asked, stating that the provision presumes that only a particular section of society faced caste-based discrimination. Referring to the proceedings in Abeda Salim Tadvi, Jain stated that the Court did not intend to provide an exclusionary provision in the 2026 Regulations. “This will create further divisions in society,” he stated. Jain suggested that the Abeda Salim Tadvi petition had only provided a one-sided picture on caste-based discrimination in institutions. 

Interestingly, today’s matter was not tagged with Abeda Salim Tadvi—so, in effect, Jain was responding to a petition filed in a different proceeding. When CJI Surya Kant noted that the 2026 Regulations will only be examined on the threshold of constitutionality, Jain, while pressing for a stay on the Regulations, stated that Clause 3(c) violates the equality clause under Article 14 and had “no reasonable nexus with the object, and no intelligible differentia.” 

Bench raises concerns over segregation 

At this juncture, the Chief inquired whether students belonging to different geographical backgrounds, such as those from North and South India, would be protected under the regulations. The petitioners responded that Clause 3(e) will cover it, since it includes discrimination on the basis of place of birth. 

A counsel submitted that “ragging” did not find mention in the 2026 Regulations, adding that it was the most prevalent form of discrimination in educational institutions. Attempting to paint a picture, he submitted that a fresher student who resists ragging from a senior belonging to a Scheduled Caste background may face false accusations of caste discrimination. Since there is no provision for anticipatory bail in SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cases, the student could be imprisoned. He concluded that this hypothetical student’s career would come to an end on his “first day, first month and first year”. 

CJI Surya Kant asked the counsel if the 2026 Regulations cover caste-based discrimination by reserved categories that are better situated than other reserved groups. The counsel stated that there was no protection under the regulations. The Chief asked, “Has anybody examined this aspect?” 

On the aspect of separate hostels the Chief stated, “For gods sake, please don’t do that.” The CJI was referring to Regulation 7(d) which states that “HEIs shall ensure that any selection, segregation, or allocation for the purpose of hostels, classrooms, mentorship groups, or any other academic purposes is transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory.” Notably, the petitioners had not touched upon this aspect. The petitioners jumped at this observation: “We can propose a [sic] better draft than this…this entire regulation must be quashed”.

The petitioners went on to add that certain political parties have favoured the 2026 Regulations. “What is the future of the general category?” one counsel thundered. The Chief then asked Solicitor General Tushar Mehta to file a response and directed him to constitute a committee of eminent jurists approved by the Court to examine the issues raised. 

Jaising: An attempt to overreach the Abeda Salim Tadvi proceedings 

As calls for staying the 2026 Regulations grew louder, Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, who appears for the petitioners in Abeda Salim Tadvi, requested to make submissions. The petitioners immediately stated that Jaising was not a party in the case. The CJI was quick to shut down the protests. 

Jaising stated that the matter cannot be heard without taking into account the directions and the issues determined in Abeda Salim Tadvi. She added that the objective of the 2026 Regulations was to create an inclusive society. Jaising noted that she can argue on merits of the provisions once the matter was tagged with Abeda Salim Tadvi. 

She attempted to show the relationship between “caste-based discrimination” under Clause 3(c) with “discrimination” under Clause 3(e). This prompted the petitioners to interrupt, stating that the provision has already been read. The Bench was quick to chastise the petitioners, with Jaising adding that she was prepared for the “heckling”. 

Justice Bagchi asked Jaising whether Clause 3(c) was redundant in light of Clause 3(e). He added that the definitions should be studied on the basis of their impact, which will determine if the constitutional vision of Article 15 is achieved. He observed that excluding ragging reduced the scope of discrimination addressed by the Regulations. Jaising stated that there was a 2009 Regulation which deals with ragging. 

Notably, in September 2025, the Court had directed the UGC to consider specific aspects about discriminatory practices, non-segregation, scholarship disbursal, etc. These, according to Jaising, had been implemented. 

2026 equity rules stayed

The Court issued notice to the UGC and tagged it with Abeda Salim Tadvi. The Bench then placed the 2026 Regulations in abeyance and directed for the 2012 Regulations to continue to operate until further directions. Jaising argued that the stay on the 2026 Regulations was unwarranted. Interestingly, Mehta, appearing for the UGC and the Union, had made no arguments against the petitioner’s submissions. 

Jaising continued her defence of the e 2026 Regulations, suggesting that persons from any quota or any class can file complaints—a contention not accepted by the Bench. CJI Surya Kant clarified that his concern was not the general category but the need for an effective mechanism to protect marginalised candidates. Jaising reminded the Bench that the 2012 Regulations had been repealed. This prompted the Bench to make an addition to its Order: “In exercise of our powers under Article 142, we further direct that the 2012 Regulations will continue in force till further orders.” 

The Chief then turned to the petitioners, cautioning them against turning the matter “into a political issue.” “We are again warning,”he remarked as the proceedings concluded.

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