Recruitment of Judicial Officers as District Judges | Judgement Summary

Rules of interpretation and the inclusion of in-service candidates

Drawing from precedent, the judgement found it pertinent to recall that a statute is best interpreted when it is read as a whole and viewed with “the glasses of the statute-maker”. In other words, it noted the importance of both a textual and contextual reading of the impugned provision. Cautioning against pedantic interpretations, the judgement advocated for a more organic and purposeful approach. 

The Bench found that clause (1) of Article 233 deals with all aspects relating to appointment, promotion and posting to the post of District Judge. Contrary to preceding interpretations, it is not limited to promotions alone. Subsequently, clause (2) expands rather than restricts the provision to enable, in addition, advocates and pleaders with seven years’ practice.

The judgement affirmed the decision in Rameshwar Dayal which directed the inclusion of in-service candidates whose names were not factually on the roll of advocates at the time of their application. 

Supporting the view of the Shetty Commission, the Court opined that there is no reason as to why merited serving judges should be excluded from consideration. It held that Article 233 must be interpreted in a manner that furthers competition and inclusivity rather than narrowing the field. Noting that the Commission made recommendations when Satya Narain Singh still held the field, it clarified that a third clause to enable inclusion of serving judges would not be required as under the current interpretation, clause (1) already provides for the same. 

Eligibility of judicial officers

The judgement observed that “the object of Article 233 is to ensure that the best talent is drawn into the district judiciary,” and such an object cannot be fulfilled if a class of otherwise qualified candidates is kept out. It upheld Chandra Mohan and clarified that the word ‘service’ in the provision could only mean ‘judicial service’, thereby consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other subordinate civil judicial posts.

Addressing the question of whether no qualifications would be necessary for in-service candidates, the Court emphasised that recruitment rules must be framed by respective High Courts in a manner as uniform as possible. It deemed it appropriate for the said rules to mandate combined experience of seven years as an advocate and a judicial officer for in-service candidates. To ensure a level playing field, the Court followed recommendations of the Shetty Commission and opined that 35 years be set as a minimum age as on the date of application for all candidates.

As to the calculation of this period, the Court noted that on appointment as a judge, an advocate’s right to practice is only suspended but not terminated. Thus, prior Bar experience continues to count towards the seven-year eligibility threshold. The Court stressed that this interpretation was necessary to maintain continuity. 

No quota for advocates

The Court rejected the contention that Article 233(2) sets aside a fixed quota exclusively for practicing advocates. It explained that while the 75:25 ratio between service candidates and Bar recruits was recognised in All India Judges’ Association v Union of India (2002), this could not be read as creating an exclusive reservation for advocates. Rather, it was intended to preserve a balance between different sources of recruitment. The Bench cautioned that treating the provision as a quota for advocates would effectively exclude judicial officers with Bar experience, and would thus violate the right to equality under Articles 14 and 16.

Stare decisis cannot perpetuate error

On the argument of settled precedent, the Court stated that the doctrine of stare decisis cannot be invoked to sustain an incorrect constitutional interpretation. It observed that earlier decisions such as Rameshwar Dayal and Chandra Mohan had been misunderstood in later cases, leading to an erroneous narrowing of eligibility. The Bench reiterated that while consistency in law is desirable, it cannot come at the cost of constitutional fidelity. The Court therefore held that it was bound to correct the misinterpretation, even if it had been followed for a considerable period.

Justice Sundresh’s concurring opinion

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Sundresh noted that the word “eligible” in Article 233(2) was never meant to restrict, but to recognise those qualified for higher judicial service. He said the Constitution’s silence on in-service eligibility must be understood as a call for inclusivity, merit and the evolving needs of society. Any attempt to exclude judicial officers, he cautioned, would erode institutional excellence, risk creating a “culture of mediocrity” in appointments and violate Article 14. 

Conclusion and Directions

The Court emphasised prospective application of its interpretation, clarifying that ongoing and past recruitments will not be disturbed unless interim orders had been passed by High Courts. It quashed all rules or notifications that conflict with the present judgement and directed state governments, in consultation with their respective High Courts, to make necessary amendments within three months.