Challenge to Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
Poulomi Pavini Shukla v Union of India
Citation: W.P. (C) 510/2026
The Supreme Court will decide if Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 violates equality and liberty under Articles 14, 15 and 21.
Pending
Parties
Petitioner: Poulomi Pavini Shukla
Lawyers: Nihal Ahmed
Respondents: Union of India, Minister of Minority Affairs
Lawyers: Madhulika Upadhyay
Case Details
Case Number: W.P. (C) 510/2026
Next Hearing: September 9, 2026
Last Updated: July 22, 2026
Key Issues
Does Section 2 of the Shariat Act 1937, pertaining to the application of Shariat principles to intestate inheritance, violate Articles 13, 14 and 15?
Whether the application of Shariat Act 1937 to testamentary rules of property constitutes essential religious practice?
Whether personal laws are excluded from the ambit of Article 13?
Whether statutory personal laws are subject to fundamental rights scrutiny under the Constitution?
Case Description
On 27 November 2025, the petitioner, Poulomi Pavini Shukla, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) petition challenging Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. Shukla contended that the application of the Act to testamentary and non-testamentary property laws are inherently discriminatory and violate principles of gender equality. The petition argues that under intestate succession, the Act assigns women a smaller share of property in comparison to men.
The Indian Succession Act, 1925 governs testamentary and intestate succession for Hindus, Christians and Parsis. However, the Act does not apply to Muslims, who are governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The Act, under Section 2, comes with an overriding clause which provides that where parties are Muslim, matters of testate and intestate succession—nothwidstanding any custom or usage to the contrary—will solely be governed by the Act. This, the petitioner argues, keeps Muslims outside the scope of secular and equitable succession laws.
Under Muslim Personal Law, a Muslim cannot bequeath more than one-third of their net estate by will. Inheritance rights also remain unequal for Muslim women: a daughter can receive only half the share in comparison to a son and a widow is entitled to one-fourth (if childless) or one-eighthed (with children) of her husband’s share. Further, the petitioner contended that the law on divorce, marriage, maintenance and guardianship apply across India, except for Muslims. This, the petitioner contends, underscores the need for an Uniform Civil Code.
The matter in the present case has been tagged with three other matters that seek to question the discrimination inherent in Muslim Personal Laws—one of them being Khuran Sunnath Society v Union of India. In 2016, petitioners moved the top court after the Kerala High Court dismissed the PIL filed under Article 226, holding that personal law reform must come from the legislature and not the judiciary.
Previously, the Supreme Court had heard a similar PIL on the constitutionality of Muslim personal laws and the need for an Uniform Civil Code in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India. It was eventually dismissed by the three-judge Bench of former Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, P.S. Narasimha and J.B. Pardiwala, refusing to entertain the petitions under Article 32. The Bench recalled the settled position of law that mandamus cannot be issued to the legislature to enact a law.
The matter is now listed before a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana. The Court will hear the case on 9 September 2026.