Minimum wages for domestic workers: Did the Supreme Court miss an opportunity?

On 29 January, a Supreme Court Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, disposed of a public interest petition filed by 10 domestic worker unions from across the country, without granting them any relief. 

The petition in Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v Union of India contended that the failure to pay minimum wages to domestic workers constitutes forced labour, thereby violating the right to life under Article 21 and the prescription against forced labour in Article 23. It also argued against domestic workers’ exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (MWA) in numerous states, as well as from the Code on Wages, 2019. 

The Supreme Court justified its dismissal on the ground that the matter pertained to the executive and legislative domains, while advising state governments to look into the grievances of domestic workers. 

Significance of Article 23

Article 23 prohibits not only trafficking and ‘begar’—unpaid forced labour—but also other exploitative forms of coerced work. What sets it apart from many other fundamental rights is its applicability to private individuals, not just the State. Over the years, the Supreme Court’s wide interpretation has extended its reach to include economic coercion.

In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (1982), the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 23, with Justice P.N. Bhagwati observing that paying below minimum wage could amount to forced labour when workers have no real choice but to accept exploitative terms. This ruling transformed Article 23 from an anti-slavery clause into a labour rights guarantee. 

Subsequent cases on Article 23 reshaped labour jurisprudence. If Article 21 protects life and dignity, Article 23 protects the material conditions necessary for dignity. Article 23 is the clearest judicial acknowledgement that freedom without economic minimums can be illusory. 

Threshold rejection

The Court’s refusal to entertain the petition was tantamount to closing the door on what could have been a transformative constitutional inquiry into one of India’s most invisible labour sectors. The hearing made news for CJI’s Surya Kant’s remark that trade unions were largely responsible for stalling the country’s industrial growth. The comment came in response to Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran’s submission that the petitioners were not “interlopers”, but registered trade unions committed to collective bargaining. Ramachandran was quick to suggest that the CJI might better avoid “generalising”.  

The petitioner unions are distributed across the country from Tamil Nadu to Meghalaya. They decided to petition the Supreme Court after their representations to the Union Ministry of Labour as well as state-specific labour commissioners and departments of labour yielded no results. 

The petition’s contentions

Had the Court chosen to entertain the petition, it could have set in motion a broader national reconsideration of how labour within private households ought to be regulated. During the hearing, however, the Chief Justice voiced a note of caution, observing that extending minimum wage requirements to domestic employment might trigger a surge of litigation while also risking unintended consequences, including the possibility that households could become reluctant to engage domestic workers.

The petition, on its part, challenged the notion that domestic labour is unskilled or an extension of housework performed out of familial obligation. It emphasised that these perceptions overlook the demanding nature of domestic work and argued that denying fair wages based on such stereotypes is inconsistent with constitutional values. 

Without regulation, domestic workers’ wages and work conditions are determined solely at their employers’ discretion. Employers set unreasonably low wages, deduct them arbitrarily, withhold wages, and terminate domestic workers without notice and pay, the petition stated.

The petition claimed that the terms and conditions of domestic work are completely invisible, making workers susceptible to exploitation. Furthermore, the petition argued, the disproportionate impact of such conditions on women amounts to indirect and intersectional discrimination and falls foul of Articles 14 and 15, apart from being forced labour. 

The petition also made the point that domestic work is presently not subject to a central mandate to fix and pay minimum wages. In the absence of a central mandate, only 15 states and two Union Territories have extended minimum wage protection to domestic workers, resulting in arbitrary exclusion across states in violation of Article 14.

The petition noted that despite a 2010 recommendation by its own Task Force on Domestic Workers, the Labour Ministry has yet to include domestic work in the Central List of Scheduled Employments under the MWA.

The Court’s acknowledgement in Ajay Malik

The Supreme Court’s dismissal of the petition is significant when read alongside its own recent engagement with the issue. The petition cited the Court’s verdict in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand (2025).  The criminal appeals in Ajay Malik arose from allegations including wrongful confinement and trafficking of a female domestic worker. After examining the record, the Court found no element of illegal confinement or trafficking and noted that the complainant had herself stated she was not illegally confined. However, the Court had acknowledged the pressing need to establish guidelines safeguarding domestic workers, recognising a broader regulatory vacuum. 

The committee set up pursuant to Ajay Malik recommended strengthening enforcement of existing laws rather than creating a new statutory regime. This, the petition alleged, effectively continued the status quo of little to no wage protections for domestic workers. When the petitioners approached the Union government on the back of the verdict in Ajay Malik, the Centre indicated that states were competent to legislate. But most states had failed to act on representations, the petition claimed, reinforcing the need for judicial recognition of the right to minimum wages. 

Domestic workers remain trapped in a paradox—essential to the functioning of countless Indian households yet excluded from the core protections of labour law. The Supreme Court’s refusal to even hear their plea is a missed constitutional moment. In turning away the petition at the threshold, the Court may have allowed prevailing social hierarchies—steeped in patriarchy and class privilege—to shape the boundaries of enforceable rights.