SCO.LR | 2025 | Volume 1 | Issue 3

This month, we launched the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR). SCO.LR (pronounced ‘scholar’) curates, summarises and presents five significant judgements each week. 

The first edition covered decisions from the first week of April 2025. But we want  SCO.LR (along with our Case Archive) to be a more complete resource on the Supreme Court for you. To achieve this, we will be releasing back issues from January to March 2025 to complete the annual set. So here we are, presenting Volume 1 Issue 3 of SCO.LR, which covers cases from the third week of January 2025. 

Stay tuned for more updates on how SCO.LR can support your research. Do share feedback to help us build the most accurate and accessible archive of the Indian Supreme Court!

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Supreme Court’s power to expand the scope of appeal under Article 142

Biswajit Das v Central Bureau of Investigation

16 January 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 85 | 2025 SCO.LR 1(3)[11]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan

The Supreme Court held that it is not bound to limit its scope while hearing an appeal. It may expand the merits of the case if required, under its power to do “complete justice” under Article 142.

The Court was hearing an appeal filed by Biswajit Das, a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India, against an order of the Gauhati High Court. In 2009, the High Court had convicted Das of forgery, fraud and criminal conspiracy under the Indian  Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and criminal conduct and abuse of position under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (CPA). He had been instrumental in obtaining a life insurance claim by falsely projecting the insured person’s death. In 2014, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court had issued notice to the parties, but had confined the case to the question of whether Das could be convicted of criminal conduct and abuse of power under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 

The Court held that Article 142 gives it the power to expand the scope of its scrutiny beyond the limited scope set when issuing notice. The Bench held that they were convinced by the appellant’s arguments that there exists a substantial question of law that requires the court’s consideration. “Justice could be a real casualty” if the Court is required to strictly remain within that scope. They clarified that the power under Article 142  may be exercised at the discretion of the judges, if “satisfaction is reached” that the case demands it to do complete justice. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Trial Court and the Gauhati High Court for offences under both the IPC and the PCA. 

Key words/phrase: Fraud—forgery—criminal conduct—abuse of power—public servant—court asked to hear case within limited scope—held scope of appeal may be expanded—Article 142—interest of complete justice

Read the Judgement here. 

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Documentation in litigation

Jyostnamayee Mishra v State of Odisha

16 January 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 87 | 2025 SCO.LR 1(3)[12]

Bench: Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Rajesh Bindal

The Supreme Court held that public recruitments must follow the pre-established rules properly.

A peon in Odisha sought to be promoted from her role to the role of a ‘Tracer’ and approached the Tribunal in Cuttack on three occasions. On the third instance, the Tribunal directed her appointment. The state of Odisha contested this, stating that she was not eligible for the position. The Odisha High Court set aside the Tribunal’s order, relying on a letter issued by the Works Department in February 1980. It endorsed the states’ reasoning that the position of ‘Tracer’ was not to be filled by promotion and relied on the letter from the works department. The petitioner appealed the decision in the Supreme Court, stating that she had the required qualifications.

The Court set aside the High Court’s decision, noting that the “letter” issued by the Works Department was, in fact, a copy of the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979 (1979 Rules) with major discrepancies. It noted that the position of ‘Tracer’ had to be filled by direct recruitment and not by the way of promotion. Moreover, the process of direct recruitment, the Court notes,  was also not followed and only a circular was issued in the department inviting applications from peons. Instead, an advertisement was to be issued in the newspaper and a competitive test. 

Key words/phrases: Post of Tracer—direct recruitment—not by promotion—Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979

Read the Judgment here

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State of Jharkhand v Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath

17 January 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 79 | 2025 SCO.LR 1(3)[13]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

The Supreme Court held that the transfer of a prisoner from one jail to another is an administrative decision. Therefore, Courts must interfere in the matter sparingly. A decision to transfer a prisoner is not arbitrary if a profound rationale supports it. 

The respondent, Vikash Tiwary, a gangster, was serving life imprisonment at Lok Nayak Jai Prakash Narayan Central Jail, Hazaribagh. A memo directed his transfer to Central Jail, Dumka, after the Jail Superintendent of the Hazaribagh jail requested it. The letter stated that the presence of another notorious prisoner, Aman Singh, posed a risk of gang war within the prison premises. Tiwary argued that the apprehension of a gang war was unfounded and the transfer was carried out with a mala fide intention. Further, as he was an undertrial in a few cases, the transfer would prejudice his right to defend himself. The Jharkhand High Court had found merit in Tiwary’s claims and had set aside the transfer order. 

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s judgement. It examined Section 29 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, and Rule 770(B) of the Jharkhand State Jail Manual, 1925, which permit the removal and transfer of a convicted prisoner, respectively. It also observed that a transfer citing security reasons is valid under the Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023. The imminent possibility of a gang war was held to be a substantial rationale to recommend the transfer of a prisoner. It directed the state of Jharkhand to incorporate provisions of the 2016 Manual within its state manual for effective prison administration. 

Key words/phrases: Transfer of prisoner on grounds of security—valid—administrative decision—Prisoners Act 1900—Jharkhand State Manual, 1925—Prison Manual 2016

Read the Judgement here. 

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Framing Substantial Question of Law Essential to Pass Interim Order

Sudheera v C. Yashoda

17 January 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 80 | 2025 SCO.LR 1(3)[14]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

The Supreme Court held that High Courts lacked the jurisdiction to grant an interim order at that stage of the second appeal without framing the substantial question of law as required by Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 

The case originated from a suit filed by C. Yashoda, the respondent, before a Trial Court, seeking a permanent injunction over the disputed property. The Trial Judge passed an order in her favour. Subsequently, the First Appellate Court set aside the Trial Court’s judgement. Challenging this decision, the respondent filed a second appeal before the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Amravati, which passed an interim order without formulating any substantial question of law.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, clarifying that the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the High Court’s jurisdiction in a second appeal. It relied on precedents such as Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v Uttaradi Mutt (2016), which upheld this view. Referring to Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1961), the Court reiterated that the inherent power under Section 151 of the CPC cannot override explicit mandates of the Code.

Keywords/phrase: Inherent powers—Civil Procedure Code, 1908—interim order—substantial question of law—sine qua non—ad interim—Section 100

Read the Judgement here.

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Arrest under PMLA cannot Violate Fundamental Rights

Directorate of Enforcement v Subhash Sharma

21 January 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 141 | 2025 SCO.LR 1(3)[15]

Bench: Justices A.S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan

The Supreme Court held that not presenting a person taken into custody by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) for a crime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, within 24 hours is illegal. 

Subash Sharma, the respondent in the case, was taken into custody by the ED at 11:00 am on 5 March. However, he was not presented before the Magistrate within 24 hours as stipulated by Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. Taking this into consideration, the Chhattisgarh High Court granted Sharma bail. The ED moved the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court. It submitted that Sharma was presented before a Magistrate within 24 hours of making the arrest memo on 6 March 2022. 

The Supreme Court rejected the ED’s argument and upheld the High Court’s decision. The judges held that once a court dealing with the accused has found a fundamental rights violation in the arrest, it is duty-bound to release the accused on bail. The Court clarified that in such cases, the attest is vitiated and bail must be granted even if all the conditions stipulated under the PMLA are not met. 

Key words/phrases: Arrest under Prevention of Money Laundering Act—Article 22 of the Constitution—present accused before Magistrate within 24 hours—fundamental right—grant of bail 

Read the Judgement here.

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This edition of SCO.LR was put together by Advay Vora, Ajitesh Singh, Gauri Kashyap and R. Sai Spandana