SCO.LR | 2025 | Volume 9 | Issue 4

Volume 9, Issue 4 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here! This week’s issue features five key judgements in September 2025. This issue covers: the limits of preferential treatment of politicians in criminal trials; maintainability of counter-claims in civil procedure; limits on re-trial in NDPS cases; compensation for acquisition of Bachat land; and the excise liability of partially assembled goods. 

Read them all on our SCO.LR page.

The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports

SCO.LR | Volume 9 | Issue 4

12 September – 20 September 2025

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Right to speedy trial cannot be secured at the cost of fairness

Mamman Khan v State of Haryana

12 September 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 1113 | 2025 SCO.LR 9(4)[16]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan 

The Supreme Court held that an accused cannot be preferentially segregated from a joint trial because they are a member of a legislative assembly. Such preferential segregation violates equality under Article 14.

Mamman Khan, a sitting Member of the Haryana legislative assembly, was one of the accused persons in the 31 July 2023 communal violence in the Nuh district of the state. The Trial Court directed the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant citing his status as an MLA and the need for expeditious disposal of his case. The High Court upheld this segregation. Khan approached the Supreme Court arguing that the offences arose from the same incident. Hence, a joint trials are the rule in such instances

The Supreme Court set aside the Order of the Trial Court and High Court. The Court held that while expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is desirable, it cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The case was remitted to the trial court to conduct a joint trial of the appellant with the co-accused.

Key words/phrases: MLA—joint trial—no preferential segregation for expeditious disposal—Article 14—communal violence—Nuh district—Trial Court order set aside—High Court order set aside—Section 223 of the CrPC applied—case remitted for joint trial with co-accused.

Read the Judgement here

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Counter-Claim Filed Solely Against Co-Defendant Invalid

Rajul Manoj Shah Alias Rajeshwari Rasiklal Sheth v Kiranbhai Shakrabhai Patel

12 September 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 1109 | 2025 SCO.LR 9(4)[17]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi

The Supreme Court held that a counter-claim filed by a defendant under Order VIII, Rule 6A(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), solely against co-defendants is not maintainable. 

Rajul Manoj Shah instituted a suit in 2012 challenging her sister-in-law’s (Defendant 1) 2011 agreement to sell a portion of their jointly owned property to Defendant 2. After her sister-in-law passed away, a Nazir (court official) was appointed as her representative. In 2021, Defendant 2 applied to amend his written statement to include a counter-claim for specific performance against the Nazir and sought partition of the property. The Trial Court noted that the counter-claim was filed in 2021 while issues in the suit were framed in 2019. The High Court reversed the Trial Court’s Order as the cause of action arose only after the Nazir’s appointment in 2020. 

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, confirming that a counter-claim cannot be solely directed against a co-defendant and is typically not permitted after issues have been framed in a suit.

Key words/phrases: Order VIII Rule 6A CPC—Counter-claim solely against co-defendants not maintainable—counter-claim after framing of issues not permitted—Trial Court Order upheld—High Court Order set aside.

Read the Judgement here.

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Re-trial in NDPS Cases Cannot Be Ordered to Cure Procedural Lapses

Kailas v State of Maharashtra

15 September 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 1117 | 2025 SCO.LR 9(4)[18]

Bench: Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan

The Supreme Court held that a re-trial in narcotics cases cannot be ordered merely to cure procedural lapses in proving electronic evidence. When a certificate validating electronic evidence under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is furnished, electronic records are considered admissible.

The case arose from the recovery of 39 kilograms of marijuana during a raid. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), relying on oral testimony, the video recording of the raid, and the forensic report. The Bombay High Court set aside the conviction as the video recording was not narrated by witnesses in Court; no transcript was prepared; the Chemical Examiner had not testified and the representative sample of the seized contraband were not opened before the court. 

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s view that admissibility required witnesses to narrate the video contents in their own words. The Court held that under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the analyst’s report was admissible without the Chemical Examiner’s oral testimony. With the magistrate-certified inventory and sealed samples under Section 52A of the NDPS Act, together with the forensic report, the seizure stood sufficiently proved. The Court said a re-trial is an exceptional course, justified only where there has been no real trial or grave illegality. The criminal appeals were restored before the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

Key words/phrases: Section 65B Evidence Act—Re-trial—NDPS Act—Section 293 CrPC—Section 52A NDPS Act—electronic evidence—Chemical Analyst report—seized contraband—sampling—additional evidence—exceptional circumstances for re-trial.

Read the Judgement here.

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Acquisition without Compensation Invalid for Bachat Land

 State of Haryana v Jai Singh

16 September 2025

 Citations: 2025 INSC 1122 | 2025 SCO.LR 9(4)[19]

 Bench: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justices P.K. Mishra and K.V. Viswanathan

The Supreme Court held that lands given up by owners during consolidation but not set aside for common use (known as Bachat land) do not automatically belong to the Gram Panchayat or the State. Taking over such unutilised land without paying compensation would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1). 

The dispute arose from two laws: the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The 1992 amendment to the 1961 Act allowed lands contributed during consolidation to vest in the Gram Panchayat as common land. Landowners challenged this. In 1995, the High Court struck it down. In 1998, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for reconsideration under Article 31-A. On reconsideration, the High Court clarified that Bachat land remained with the owners but other lands reserved for common purposes vested with the state. 

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s approach and held that land genuinely reserved for public purposes can vest in the Panchayat but the 1992 amendment cannot transfer Bachat land. Hence, Bachat land cannot be acquired from owners without compensation, as this would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1).

Keywords/phrases: Article 31A—no acquisition of Bachat land without compensation—common land vested with the Panchayat—protection of owners’ rights.

Read the Judgement here.

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Two-pronged test to determine if an activity is “manufacture” and liable to Excise Tax

M/S Quippo Energy Ltd. v Commissioner Of Central Excise Ahmedabad – II 

 19 September 2025

Citations: 2025 INSC 1130 | 2025 SCO.LR 9(4)[20]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan 

The Supreme Court clarified when an activity amounts to “manufacture” under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, making goods liable for excise duty. The Court highlighted two factors: whether the process produces a distinct product (Transformation Test) and whether the product is marketable (Marketability Test).

M/s Quippo Energy leased imported gas generators called Power Packs. It placed them in steel containers along with locally sourced parts such as radiators and fans to make them fully operational and easier to transport. In 2008, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise ruled that this assembly amounted to “manufacture.” Quippo’s appeal was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) in 2009 and CESTAT, Ahmedabad in 2015. CESTAT confirmed that the process fell under Section 2(f), which includes any steps incidental or essential to producing a manufactured product.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of CESTAT and the Commissioner (Appeals), noting that the added components were essential parts, not mere accessories. The assembly created a new, distinct, and marketable product, and the company was liable to pay excise duty. All appeals were dismissed.

Keywords/phrases: Central Excise Act, 1944—“manufacture” definition—Section 3—Transformation Test—Marketability Test—Quippo Energy—assembly of imported gas generators with local parts—distinct & marketable product—CESTAT & Commissioner (Appeals) upheld—excise duty payable.

Read the Judgement here.