SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 6 | Issue 4

Volume 6 Issue 4 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here!

In this Issue we shortlist bonus judgements from May and last week. They include: 

• Medical negligence and Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Voting rights of societies holding shares in companies
• Compensation in light of illegal detention 
• Exemptions granted to “certain organisations” under the Right to Information Act, 2005 
• The fundamental right to walk 

Read all judgements on our SCO.LR page in a clean, readable HTML format. Our assistive mind maps will help you navigate the key facts and holdings of the Court.

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports

SCO.LR | Volume 6 | Issue 4

Bonus Judgements from May and June 2026

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Culpability under Section 304-A of IPC

Supriya Kumari v State of Kerala

Date: 25 May 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 537 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(4)[16]

Bench: Justices Pankaj Mithal and P.B. Varale  

The Supreme Court held that criminal culpability for medical negligence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires the accused to act in a manner that “no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do”. 

The appellant was a senior anaesthetist accused of medical negligence for allegedly failing to discharge her responsibility of administering anaesthesia to a patient in the post-operative care unit by delegating the work to an attending nurse, resulting in the patient’s death. Both civil and criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant. The District Consumer Redressal Forum relieved the appellant from all liability. The appellant approached the High Court for her discharge from the criminal accusations. The High Court rejected her plea. The appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and discharged the accused. It found that the appellant was off duty at the time of administration of the anaesthesia. Further, the death was due to a pre-existing coronary blockage. It also held that after exoneration in civil proceedings, continuance of a criminal prosecution constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law.     

Key words/phrases: Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860—Medical Negligence—Gross Negligence—Discharge of Accused if exonerated in Civil Proceedings—Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings 

Read the Judgement here. 

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Voting Rights of Societies Holding Shares in a Company

 Hindustan Medical Institution v Birla Corporation

 26 May 2026

 Citations: 2026 INSC 554 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(4)[17]

 Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta

The Supreme Court held that a decision evidenced in writing by a majority of trustees constitutes a valid authorisation for a society to act on its behalf, affirming that it is not absolutely required to be unanimous. It further held that where rival claims exist over voting authority, the validity of a vote cannot be determined merely by which vote was cast first, but by whether the person casting it was lawfully authorised to do so.

The matter arose from internal governance disputes between three societies—Hindustan Medical Institution, Eastern India Educational Institution, and Belle Vue Clinic— registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, and held shares in Birla Corporation Limited (BCL). Disputes arose regarding the authority to act on behalf of the societies and exercise voting rights attached to those shares. The societies relied on resolutions allegedly passed by circulation by their trustees and sought directions permitting their authorised representatives to attend and vote at BCL’s annual general meeting. The Calcutta High Court declined ad interim relief. In appeal, the Division Bench held that trustees must act in consonance and that if any trustee had not joined in the decision, the same could not be treated as a decision by the board of trustees. The High Court further directed that the vote cast first by the society would be taken into consideration irrespective of whether it was cast by the Managing Committee or the Board of Trustees.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Calcutta High Court and held that Clause 24 of the societies’ by-laws expressly permits delegation by a resolution evidenced in writing under the hands of the majority of the trustees. Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 could not be applied in a manner that deprived the by-laws of their operative force. It found that the High Court erred by placing the Board of Trustees, where the properties vest, on an equal plane with the Managing Committee, which only exercises derivative power circumscribed by delegation. Finally, the Court held that Section 108 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 20 of the 2014 Rules protect an anterior valid vote against subsequent duplication but do not validate an unauthorised act merely due to temporal priority.

Key words/phrases: Societies holding shares in company—Voting rights—Board of Trustees—Managing Committee—Majority of trustees—Clause 24 of societies’ by-laws—Delegation evidenced in writing—Section 48 of Indian Trusts Act, 1882 —Two-tier structure—Properties vest in trustees—Authority to exercise voting rights—Section 108 of Companies Act, 2013—Rule 20 of Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014—Statutory framework governing voting.

Read the Judgement here.

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Compensation for Illegal Detention

Daudayal v State of Rajasthan 

29 May 2026 

Citation: 2026 INSC 599 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(4)[18] 

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and A.G. Masih

The Supreme Court held that the delay in release of a convict after an order granting permanent parole amounts to illegal detention. It affirmed that habeas corpus petitions are maintainable against any form of detention.

The appellant was convicted for four years rigorous imprisonment in 1988. He was arrested in 2021 after his appeal was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court. In 2024, the High Court directed his release on permanent parole, subject to the payment of a personal bond and two sureties. He filed a habeas corpus petition as he was not released by the state authorities despite complying with the conditions. A Division Bench directed immediate release. The appellant then claimed compensation of Rs. 8 lakh for 24 days of illegal detention. The State of Rajasthan opposed compensation and argued that the order releasing him on permanent parole violated Rule 9 of Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958.

The Supreme Court rejected the Rajasthan government’s argument and noted that the extended custody of the appellant amounted to illegal detention. It awarded ₹11 lakhs compensation to the appellant for violation of Article 21. It found that the State ought to have applied the “obey first, appeal later” principle and clarified that operation of the parole order cannot be stayed except by judicial decree.

Key words/phrases: Permanent parole granted—Non-release by State—24 days illegal detention—Habeas corpus filed and compensation claimed—Supreme Court awards compensation—Obey first, appeal later principle applied—Operation of order can only be stayed by judicial decree.

Read the Judgement here.

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Exemption for Organisations under RTI Act

Special Police Establishment v Kamta Prasad Mishra

15 June 2026 

Citation: 2026 INSC 644 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(4)[19] 

Bench: Justices J.K. Maheshwari and A.S. Chandurkar

The Supreme Court held that a constitutional court has the power to test the validity of a subordinate legislation, even in absence of a specific challenge, provided the issuing authority receives a fair opportunity to defend it.

The Special Police Establishment, assisting the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt, booked a Town Inspector at Katni in a corruption trap under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused sought records of the sanction process under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) after sanction for prosecution was granted.The Madhya Pradesh High Court directed that the information be supplied after the State Information Commission initially denied disclosure. The Establishment appealed against the decision arguing that a 2011 notification exempted it from the purview of the RTI Act Section 24(4).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and struck down the 2011 notification for being “excessive”. The Court noted that the Establishment had a statutory mandate for investigating corruption and economic offences. It does not involve itself into intelligence or security matters which are exempted under Section 24(4).

Key words/phrases: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Right to Information Act, 2005—Exemption for “certain organisations”—Intelligence and security matters—Not applicable to Lokayukt Special Police Establishment—Notification exempting Establishment excessive—Validity of subordinate legislation—notification struck down

Read the Judgement here.

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Fundamental Right to Walk

Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v P. Ayyappan

19 June 2026 

Citation: 2026 INSC 647 | 2026 SCO.LR 6(4)[20] 

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar

The Supreme Court formally declared the “right to walk” on safe demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, integral to Articles 19(1)(d) and 21.

A five-year-old child was killed in a road accident after a tanker struck the boy. The father of the child sought a compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT awarded Rs. 7,82,000/-. On appeal the High Court reduced it to Rs. 4,70,000/-. 

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error in reducing the compensation. It enhanced the compensation to Rs. 11,44,628/-. It noted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) is inherently a legislation for “vehicles” and treats “human” interests as incidental. Remedies for restitution and compensation will be independent of the remedies available under the MVA.

Key Phrases: Fundamental right to walk—Article 19(1)(d)—Right to demarcated footpaths—Correlative duty of municipal authorities—Motor accident compensation—Restitutionary remedy independent of Motor Vehicles Act—Statutory framework directed. 

Read the Judgement here.