Analysis

SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 3 | Issue 4

In this Issue, we bring you five important judgements from 16 March to 20 March 2026

Volume 3 Issue 4 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here!

In this Issue, we cover five important judgements from last week regarding;

  •  scope of “state” under Article 12, 
  • appointment of amicus curiae, maternity benefits for adoptive mothers, 
  • disciplinary action on employees after their retirement, and 
  • designation of forest lands. 

Read the full text of these judgements on our SCO.LR page, with assistive mindmaps and citation features. 

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports

SCO.LR | Volume 3 | Issue 4

16 March – 20 March 2026

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Scope of “State” under Article 12

Ravi Khokhar v Union of India

12 March 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 233 | 2026 SCO.LR 3(4)[16]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and V.M. Pancholi

The Supreme Court held that “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution includes the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS). Financial dependency on the Union government is not the only criterion to determine whether an organisation is a “state”. 

Employees of the AFGIS approached the Delhi High Court after its Board of Trustees revised the pay structure and did away with any pay parity and connection with the Central Government Pay Commissions. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition stating that the AFGIS was a private and self-contained society and was not a “state” or “other authority” under Article 12. It reasoned that AFGIS lacked financial dependency and administrative domination of the Union Government. The appellants approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Division Bench and held that the AFGIS carried out a public duty i.e. protection and welfare of Armed Forces personnel. This falls squarely under the collective obligation of “State” under Article 12. 

Keywords/phrases: Air Force Group Insurance Society—Pay Commission—Central Government—Board of Trustees—Division Bench of High Court—AFGIS not State under Article 12—Supreme Court—AFGIS carries out public duty—Qualifies as State under Article 12—High Court decision set aside. 

Read the Judgement here

MIND MAP

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Notice on Appointment of Amicus

Bhola Mahto v State of Jharkhand 

16 March 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 257 | 2026 SCO.LR 3(4)[17]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and S.C. Sharma

The Supreme Court held that it is desirable for courts to serve a notice to an accused upon appointment of an amicus curiae in the absence of a counsel. 

The appellant was granted bail by the Jharkhand High Court in 2003, in a case involving alleged murder. After 20 years, the High Court appointed an amicus to represent the appellant due to absence of his counsel. On the submissions of the amicus, the Court convicted him in a case of culpable homicide with rigorous imprisonment for five years. The appellant approached the Supreme Court alleging “gross injustice” and argued that he was not provided a notice regarding appointment of the amicus. He contended that the amicus had raised a ground that was not in his memorandum of appeal, thus disabling the High Court from granting acquittal. Permission was sought to raise such grounds before the apex court.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not obligated to inform the appellant. However, it would have been desirable to do so. The Court relied on Anokhi Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh and held that attempts to expedite the process should not be at the expense of fairness and opportunity to the accused. The Court remanded the case for hearing.

Keywords/phrases: Culpable Homicide under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860—Five years rigorous imprisonment—High Court appointed amicus in absence of counsel for the accused—SLP alleged lack of notice to accused—Supreme Court remands case

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Maternity Benefit for Adoptive Mothers 

Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India

17 March 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 246 | 2026 SCO.LR 3(4)[18]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan

The Supreme Court held that maternity benefits extend to all forms of motherhood, including adoption and are not confined to biological childbirth. It held that unjustified exclusion of adoptive mothers is discriminatory and unconstitutional under Article 14. Further, adoption constitutes an exercise of reproductive and decisional autonomy under Article 21.

The petitioner, an adoptive mother, challenged Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which restricted maternity benefits to women adopting children below three months of age. She argued the limit bore no rational nexus to the statute’s object and was practically unworkable.

The Court struck down the three-month age limit as violating Articles 14 and 21. It read down Section 60(4) to entitle all adoptive mothers—irrespective of the child’s age—to twelve weeks of maternity benefit from the date of handover. 

Keywords/phrases: Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020—Maternity benefit for adoptive mothers—Age limit of three months on adopted child—Under-inclusive classification—Article 14—Decisional autonomy—Article 21—Maternity benefit extended to all adoptive mothers irrespective of child’s age—12 weeks from date of handover

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Disciplinary Action After Retirement

Virinder Pal Singh v Punjab and Sind Bank

19 March 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 266 | 2026 SCO.LR 3(4)[19]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Manoj Misra

The Supreme Court held that disciplinary action initiated during service can continue after retirement, if permitted by Service Rules. 

In September 2011, the appellant, a bank employee, was served a chargesheet on allegations of irregularities in disbursement on loans. On the same day, the appellant retired from service. The appellant’s pay scale was reduced on a permanent basis after the Disciplinary/Appellant Authority partly proved the charges. The appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court arguing that the master-servant relationship between him and the bank ceased to exist upon retirement. Therefore, the punishment cannot continue. The Single Judge Bench held in his favour. On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the decision, allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue after retirement. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench. It held that disciplinary action initiated during service can be brought to its logical conclusion if Service Rules/ Regulations permit, despite the severance of the master-servant relationship. 

Keywords/phrases: Irregularities in disbursement of loans—Appellant retires on the same day—Disciplinary committee—Pay reduction as Punishment—Master-Servant relationship is not severed after retirement—Subject to Service Rules—Disciplinary action continue if Service Rules permit. 

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Land unrecognised by Master Plan cannot be Deemed Forest 

Naveen Solanki v Rail Land Development Authority 

20 March 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 270 | 2026 SCO.LR 3(4)[20]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih

The Supreme Court held that land cannot be subsequently designated as a “deemed forest” if it was not a deemed forest at the time the Master Plan came into force.

In 2022, the Rail Land Development Authority (RLDA) issued a Request for Proposal of approximately 12.40 hectares of railway land, for mixed use development in Delhi. The land had been acquired in 1986 as agricultural land and incorporated into the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021. An application was filed before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) alleging that there were approximately 1,100 trees on the land, making it a deemed forest under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The NGT dismissed the application due to lack of concrete evidence. 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that historical character of the land must be taken into account to determine whether it classifies as “deemed forest”. The Court observed that the land had been agricultural in nature, and could not become a forest merely due to vegetation growth.

Keywords/phrases: Rail Land Development Authority—Land included in Master Plan—Appeal to National Green Tribunal—Deemed forest—Section 2 of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980—application dismissed—no concrete evidence—Not a deemed forest at the time when Master Plan was put into force—Supreme Court—Appeal dismissed—account for historical character of the land

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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