SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 4 | Issue 3

Volume 4 Issue 3 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here!

In this issue, we bring you five important judgements from last week with concise summaries, mindmaps, and well-formatted, reader friendly versions of judgements on:

• Air Pollution in the NCR region 
• Rehabilitation and reformation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
• Regularisation of backdoor appointments
• Legal Aid 
• Non-mandatory clauses in Arbitration contracts

This Issue includes the disposed M.C. Mehta v Union of India judgement which directed the registration of five suo moto writ petitions.  

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 4 | Issue 3 

13 April – 17 April 2026 

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Continuing Mandamus and Docket Management

M.C. Mehta v Union of India

12 March 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 383 | 2026 SCO.LR 4(3)[11]

Bench: CJI Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul M. Pancholi

The Supreme Court held that an organised system which enables the Court to deal with each issue in-depth, while having a comprehensive and holistic view is the need of the hour.

M.C. Mehta’s petition, filed in 1985, targeted polluting industries in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). Orders since the mid-1990s curbed vehicular pollution and introduced Bharat Stage emission standards. The Court facilitated the Commission for Air Quality Management, statutorily entrenched in 2021 to administer the Graded Response Action Plan. By order dated 23 February 2026, the Court flagged formal closure of the matter. 

The Court disposed of  the writ petition and directed the Registry to register five fresh suo moto writ petitions. The Court held that the oversight of air pollution in the NCR is better served by closing the parent petition.  They will cover regulatory governance, vehicular emissions, green cover, industrial and construction pollution, and solid waste with crop-residue burning.

Key words/phrases: M.C. Mehta—Air pollution in National Capital Region — Writ Petition of 1985 formally disposed of — Five new suo moto writ petitions registered — Commission for Air Quality Management — Graded Response Action Plan — Continuing mandamus reshaped

Read the Judgement here. 

MIND MAP

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Reformative Approach Under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Milind v State of Maharashtra 

10 April 2026 

Citation: 2026 INSC 355 | 2026 SCO.LR 4(3)[12]

Bench: Justices J.K. Maheshwari and A.S. Chandurkar

The Supreme Court held that the term “release” includes release from payment of fines under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. It held that the Act seeks to rehabilitate offenders as reformed citizens and operates on the principle that man becomes a criminal on account of his circum

Four persons were convicted for voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous weapons under Sections 323 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They were accused of harassment of a 17 year old and assault upon her father. The Bombay High Court upheld their conviction and sentence of 15-30 days of imprisonment and payment of fines. The convicts approached the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal seeking benefit of release after admonition and good conduct under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act. 

The Supreme Court granted the benefit of release for all appellants, subject to a year-long bond for three. It held that Section 3 could only be invoked for specific offences. Further, the appellants were directed to deposit the prescribed fines to be treated as compensation to the victim.

Key words/phrases: Four offenders convicted—Sentenced to brief imprisonment and payment of fine—Appeal for benefit of probation—Section 3 and 4, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958—Reformative framework—Shift away from deterrence approach—“Release” includes release from payment of fine—Appellants directed to pay fine as compensation to victim.

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Timelines For Legal Aid

Shankar Mahto v State of Bihar

16 April 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 369 | 2026 SCO.LR 4(3)[13]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh

The Supreme Court held that Article 21 of the Constitution includes fair legal procedures and access to legal representation. 

A death-sentence appeal from 2017 demonstrated how inordinate delay afflicted legal aid filings before the Supreme Court. Over several years, deliberations took place among the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCSLC), NALSA, High Court Legal Services Committees and jail authorities. The SCLSC submitted data on pendency and delay in response to the Court’s queries. It launched a “Mission Mode” campaign in January 2025 to identify convicts who had not yet filed appeals and to expedite their legal aid applications.

The Court adopted a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the translation, transmission and monitoring of case records in legal aid matters. It set binding timelines and held that timely access to justice is part of the constitutional obligation guaranteed under Articles 21 and 39A. It directed the National Informatics Centre to create a unified digital platform within two months and designated NALSA’s Member Secretary as nodal officer for implementation.

Key words/phrases: Systemic delay in legal aid filings—Supreme Court Legal Services Committee—deliberations with SCLSC, NALSA and High Courts—SCLSC data on pendency and delay—Mission Mode to identify unrepresented convicts—SOP for translation, digitisation and transmission of records—SOP timelines made binding—NIC directed to build unified digital platform

Read the Judgement here. 

MIND MAP

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Regularisation of Backdoor Appointments

Madan Singh v State of Haryana

16 April 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 379 | 2026 SCO.LR 4(3)[14]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar

The Supreme Court held that the regularisation of contractual or ad hoc employees without public advertisement and interview is arbitrary and illegal. 

In June 2014, the General Administration Department of the Government of Haryana, through two notifications, regularised the services of the appellants—contractual and ad hoc employees on the ground that they were deprived of the benefit of a 1996 regularisation policy. A similar notification was issued in July 2014. The Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside all three notifications after writ petitions challenged that the regularisations were done without any public advertisements and interviews. Therefore, they violated Articles 14 and 16. 

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court verdict in part. It held that regularisation under the June notifications  was not illegal, considering that it intended to regularise employees left out in 1996.  Further, the notification from July 2014 was set aside since it permitted recruitment without public advertisement. The Court used its powers under Article 142 to enable continuation of services of the employees. 

Key words/phrases: Regularisation of employees—Contract and ad hoc workers—General Administration Department—Notification of regularisation—Punjab and Haryana High Court—Notifications set aside—Civil Appeal—Recruitment without public advertisement illegal. 

Read the Judgement here. 

MIND MAP

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Use of Phrase “Can” in Arbitration Clause

Nagreeka Indcon Products v Cargocare Logistics

17 April 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 384 | 2026 SCO.LR 4(3)[15]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh

The Supreme Court held that the word “can” in an arbitration clause indicates a possibility of arbitration and does not disclose a determination and obligation to refer disputes to arbitration.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for transportation of goods for a total consideration of Rs. 2,23,550/-. A dispute arose when the respondent delivered the consignment without production of the original bill of lading, resulting in financial loss to the appellant. The bill of lading contained a clause that provided that any dispute “can be settled by arbitration”. The appellant invoked arbitration and filed an application before the Bombay High Court for appointment of a sole arbitrator. The High Court dismissed the application holding that the clause did not make it imperative for the parties to be referred to arbitration. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that arbitration is based on consent and the parties must mutually intend to refer their differences to arbitration. It held that the word “can” indicates a possibility and not a mandate. A clause which requires a further agreement between the parties does not constitute an arbitration agreement. The Court held that the impugned clause indicated merely a future possibility of referring disputes to arbitration and dismissed the appeal.

Key words/phrases: Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996—Section 7—Arbitration agreement—Section 11 application—Appointment of arbitrator—Arbitration clause—Use of word “can”—Possibility of arbitration—Consent of parties—Mutual intent to refer disputes—Further agreement required—Reference to arbitration—Contractual interpretation

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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