Challenge to the ECI’s Revision of Electoral Rolls in Bihar| Judgement Summary

Whether the ECI has power to conduct SIR?

The petitioners contended that Article 324 could not be invoked in a field already occupied by parliamentary legislation enacted under Article 327, namely RPA 1950 and 1951 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 (1960 Rules). Relying upon Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner (1977) and A.C. Jose v Sivan Pillai (1984), the petitioners argued that Article 324 operates only in areas left unoccupied by legislation and cannot be used to supplant the statutory framework governing electoral rolls.

The ECI argued that Articles 324 and 327 are complementary constitutional provisions and that Article 324 continues to vest broad constitutional authority in the ECI to preserve free and fair elections and maintain accurate electoral rolls. It further relied upon Section 21(3) of the RPA, which authorises a special revision “in such manner as it may think fit.”

Accepting the ECI’s submissions, the Court held that Articles 324 and 327 are not competing repositories of power but are intended to operate in “mutual accommodation, and not mutual destruction.”

The Court dealt extensively with Mohinder Singh Gill, upon which the petitioners had placed substantial reliance. The Bench observed that the petitioners relied only upon the portion of the judgement stating that Article 324 operates in areas “left unoccupied by legislation,” while overlooking the larger constitutional principle articulated in the same decision. The Court noted Mohinder Singh Gill simultaneously describes Article 324 as a “reservoir of power”, enabling the ECI to act in areas where legislation is silent for the purpose of securing free and fair elections. The Court clarified that Mohinder Singh Gill restrains the ECI only from acting in violation of statutory provisions. According to the Court, the judgement supports a position where the ECI’s authority survives but must be exercised consistently with parliamentary law.

The Court distinguished A.C. Jose, observing that the decision arose in the context of introduction of voting machines in a statutory framework that expressly contemplated paper ballots and merely establishes that the ECI cannot substitute a contrary statutory regime under the guise of Article 324. The present controversy, the Court held, stood on a completely different pedestal because Section 21(3) itself expressly authorises a special revision “in such manner as it may think fit.”

On Section 21(3) of the RPA, the Court held that Parliament consciously created a distinct statutory mechanism for special revisions in exceptional situations affecting electoral integrity. The Bench observed that Section 21(3) is materially distinct from the ordinary summary revision framework contemplated under Section 21(2). The Court held that the phrase “at any time” under Section 21(3) removes temporal limitations on the ECI’s authority. It further observed that the expression “for any constituency or part of a constituency” imparts territorial flexibility and that the words “in such manner as it may think fit” vest broad procedural discretion in the ECI.

Rejecting the petitioners’ submission that Section 21(3) is confined to isolated constituencies, the Court clarified that the word “any” before “constituency” is capable of embracing “all” constituencies within a state where the inaccuracies identified by the ECI are systemic in nature. It observed that rapid urbanisation, migration and large-scale additions and deletions over decades furnished a sufficient basis for a state-wide exercise.  It ultimately held that Section 21(3) constitutes an autonomous and enabling provision empowering the ECI to undertake a special revision whenever circumstances warrant, and that the impugned SIR does not supplant the RPA but instead “breathes life into the constitutional mandate under Article 324.”

Was the SIR legitimate and proportionate to the object it sought to achieve? 

The petitioners had argued that the SIR exercise was arbitrary, exclusionary and disproportionate. According to them, the ECI had failed to disclose valid reasons justifying a revision of such magnitude and had imposed a fresh evidentiary burden upon already enrolled electors by requiring them to re-establish their eligibility through a new documentation framework. The petitioners further contended that the requirement of submission of enumeration forms together with supporting documents effectively shifted the burden onto existing electors to freshly validate entries already standing in the electoral roll. They had also challenged the use of the 2003 electoral roll as the baseline for presuming eligibility, arguing that the classification between electors enrolled before and after 2003 lacked any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

The ECI defended the exercise by pointing to the passage of more than two decades since the last intensive revision in Bihar, rapid urbanisation, large-scale migration, duplication of entries and the resulting possibility of inaccuracies in electoral rolls. It further argued that the SIR framework contemplated submission of enumeration forms along with supporting documents as part of a fresh house-to-house verification exercise. It submitted that the 2003 roll itself emerged from an intensive revision involving such house-to-house verification and therefore constituted a rational benchmark.

Accepting the ECI’s justification, the Court held that the object sought to be achieved by the SIR bears a direct nexus to the constitutional goal of free and fair elections. It held that the ECI’s reasons: the passage of more than four decades since the previous intensive revision, large-scale additions and deletions, urbanisation and migration, were all directed toward preserving the foundational integrity of electoral rolls. The Court noted that the SIR process required submission of enumeration forms together with supporting documents to facilitate fresh verification of electoral entries that had largely been carried forward through successive summary revisions after 2003, and held that the use of the 2003 roll as the baseline was neither arbitrary nor irrational. The Bench noted that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 (CAA) introduced a statutory framework requiring additional citizenship-related conditions for persons born after 7 January 2004.

On proportionality, the Court held that the validity of the exercise could not be assessed in the abstract but had to be examined in the manner in which it is implemented. It observed that even a process which initially appears exclusionary may become constitutionally compliant if accompanied by adequate safeguards. It further noted that measures adopted by the ECI bore a reasonable nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, were not “manifestly excessive” and were accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary exclusion.

Whether the procedure adopted by ECI violates the ROPA and the 1960 Rules?

On Lal Babu Hussein

The petitioners contended that electors whose names already appear on electoral rolls enjoy a presumption of citizenship and that such presumption could not be displaced except through the procedure prescribed by law. In support of this submission, the petitioners relied heavily upon Lal Babu Hussein v Electoral Registration Officer (1995) and Inderjit Barua v Election Commission of India (1984). According to the petitioners, these decisions recognised that once a person’s name appears on the electoral roll, a presumption attaches to the validity of that entry and cannot be disturbed through a broad re-verification exercise such as the SIR.

The Court accepted that Lal Babu Hussein recognises a presumption operating in favour of persons whose names already exist on electoral rolls. However, the Bench clarified that the presumption is neither absolute nor irrebuttable. It observed that calling upon electors to furnish supporting material during an SIR does not amount to negation of the presumption. Rather, the process merely reflects the procedural mechanism through which the ECI seeks to “reaffirm or, where necessary, correct existing entries.”

Examining the factual context in which Lal Babu Hussein was decided, the Bench observed that the decision arose during a period when special intensive revisions were being periodically undertaken and electoral entries were subjected to repeated intensive verification. According to the Court, the observations in Lal Babu Hussein could not be extended to attach an unqualified or permanent presumption of eligibility to entries carried forward through decades of summary revisions without comparable scrutiny. Accepting the petitioners’ submission, the Court held, would effectively disable the ECI from correcting inaccuracies in electoral rolls even where the ECI had recorded reasons relating to migration, duplication and systemic inaccuracies. It observed that constitutional obligation flowing from Articles 324, 325 and 326 to maintain accurate electoral rolls cannot be defeated merely because an entry was previously made and thereafter carried forward through successive summary revisions. Distinguishing between re-verification and adjudication, the Court held that an intensive revision is fundamentally an inquisitorial and verification exercise directed toward systemic oversight rather than a final adjudicatory process determining citizenship in the strict sense. The Bench observed that the ECI is not disabled from undertaking meaningful verification merely because an entry already exists in the electoral roll.

On Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules

The petitioners also contended that the SIR framework violated Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules because names could be excluded without adequate notice and hearing. The ECI in response had argued that the SIR framework incorporated multiple safeguards including house-to-house enumeration, publication of draft rolls, notice in doubtful cases, speaking orders by Electoral Registration Officers and a two-tier appellate mechanism under Section 24 of the RPA and Rule 27 of the 1960 Rules.

The Court accepted the ECI’s submissions. Rejecting the petitioners’ challenge under Rule 21A, the Court held that the safeguards embedded in Rule 21A were not displaced but instead operationalised within the SIR framework. The Bench observed that what Rule 21A contemplates as a singular, event-specific exercise of deletion was, under the SIR framework, distributed across multiple procedural stages beginning with enumeration, followed by publication of draft rolls and culminating in claims and objections proceedings. The Court emphasized that the safeguards contemplated under Rule 21A became operational at the stage of claims and objections, where electors received notice, inquiries were conducted and reasoned determinations were passed. The Bench therefore held that the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to show cause stood fully integrated into the SIR process. It further clarified that non-inclusion in the draft roll does not result in automatic or final deletion. According to the Bench, the draft roll is “by design, provisional” and merely triggers a participatory process through which electors may assert entitlement, produce material and contest exclusion.

On the documentary framework

The petitioners further challenged the exclusion of previously accepted documents and the grant of broad powers to Booth Level Officers. The Bench observed that the ECI had progressively expanded the list of acceptable documents rather than restricting it. This was in reference to the inclusion of the Aadhaar Card. The Court also upheld the exclusion of the Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) as proof during re-verification, and observed that EPIC is itself a derivative document issued on the basis of inclusion in the electoral roll. According to the Court, permitting EPIC to be used for verification of the very entry from which it derives would render the exercise “nugatory.” The Court similarly upheld the exclusion of ration cards, observing that unlike passports or birth certificates, ration cards are not conclusive proof of citizenship and the choice of documents and their evidentiary standards falls within the ECI’s discretionary domain while conducting an SIR.

Whether the ECI is empowered to scrutinise citizenship of persons seeking inclusion or continuation in the electoral roll?

The petitioners had argued that questions of citizenship fall exclusively within the domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Citizenship Act and the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 (1961 Rules). According to them, the ECI lacked constitutional competence to undertake citizenship verification during the SIR process. They contended that the impugned exercise, in effect, enabled a broad-based scrutiny of the citizenship of persons already included in the electoral roll, which was constitutionally impermissible. Relying upon Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, they asserted that questions concerning citizenship fall exclusively within the domain of the Central Government.

The ECI argued that Articles 325 and 326 read with Section 16 of the RPA necessarily require scrutiny of citizenship because non-citizens are disqualified from enrolment. ECI clarified that the SIR exercise did not involve final adjudication of citizenship under the Citizenship Act but only an inquiry into electoral eligibility. The ECI further contended that the petitioners’ reliance on Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act was misconceived because the provision is confined to termination of citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship and does not constitute an exhaustive framework governing all inquiries into citizenship.

The Court agreed with the ECI’s submissions and held that while formal adjudication of citizenship falls exclusively within the domain of the competent authority under the Citizenship Act, the ECI is nonetheless empowered to undertake a limited inquiry into citizenship for purposes of electoral enrolment, which expressly disqualifies non-citizens from enrolment. The Bench observed that citizenship is a “condition precedent” for inclusion in the electoral roll and held that the ECI cannot maintain a valid electoral roll without satisfying itself that persons included therein meet this threshold requirement. The Bench accordingly held that the ECI is “undoubtedly empowered” to examine questions bearing upon citizenship, though such inquiry must remain confined to electoral consequences alone and undertaken with due regard to the presumption operating in favour of existing electors. The Court further held that where the material furnished by an individual does not inspire confidence or give rise to doubt, the ECI would be within its authority to decline enrolment or initiate deletion proceedings in accordance with law, though such action would not amount to a declaration that the individual is not a citizen of India.

Directions by the Court

1. The Court directed inclusion of Aadhaar Card as a valid identity document for the limited purpose of establishing identity under Section 23(4) of the RPA, while clarifying that Aadhaar does not constitute proof of citizenship.
2. The Bench directed that where the ECI is not satisfied regarding a person’s eligibility for inclusion in the electoral roll on citizenship grounds, such cases must be referred to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act for adjudication in accordance with law.
3. Persons deleted from the 2003 Bihar electoral roll on citizenship grounds were directed to be referred by the ECI within 4 weeks to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act. The competent authority was directed to decide such claims, preferably before the next Parliamentary, Assembly or local body elections, after issuing notice and affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned individuals.
4. The Bench further directed that where such deleted individuals are ultimately found to be citizens, their names shall be restored to the electoral rolls.
5. The Court also clarified that persons domiciled in Bihar whose names may have been erroneously deleted on grounds such as absence, death, shifting or duplication would remain entitled to challenge the ECI’s decision through judicial review.