Governor and President’s Powers |‘Prolonged, unexplained, indefinite inaction will invite limited judicial scrutiny’: SC settles scope of Governor’s powers

Presidential Reference on Powers of the Governor and President

Judges: B.R. Gavai J, Surya Kant J, Vikram Nath J, P.S. Narasimha J, A.S. Chandurkar J

Today, a five-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai delivered its advisory opinion on the Presidential Reference concerning the powers of Governors and the President when Bills are presented for assent. President Droupadi Murmu had issued the reference under Article 143 a month after the Court’s decision in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025). The Court in Tamil Nadu Governor had set timelines on the President and the Governor for granting assent and had deemed assent on pending bills through Article 142.

The Court answered the reference unanimously. It held that the Governor has only three options under Article 200; the Court cannot deem assent to pending bills under the constitutional scheme; judicial timelines cannot be introduced; and that prolonged, unexplained, indefinite inaction by a Governor may attract a limited judicial scrutiny.

Options under Article 200

Addressing the first set of questions, the Bench held that the Governor cannot simply withhold bills. Article 200 contains only three distinct actions: grant assent, reserve the bill for the President, or withhold assent and send it back to the state legislature with comments according to the first proviso of Article 200. The first proviso does not enlarge the Governor’s choices; it binds the Governor to return the Bill, except in the case of Money Bills. The Court preferred an interpretation that preserves dialogue between the Governor and the Legislature and avoids rendering the legislature powerless when assent is withheld.

Aid, advice and discretion

The Court held that the Governor has discretion under all options available to him within Article 200. The Court referred to Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab (1974) and  Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker (2016) and reiterated that the Constitution contemplates circumstances in which the Governor exercises discretion. The words “in his discretion” in the second proviso of Article 200 reflect this. The second proviso relates to the reservation of a Bill for the President’s consideration. The Court rejected the argument that discretion is confined to only one part of Article 200, but also observed that discretion does not justify inaction.

Timelines and deemed assent

The Bench held that the Court cannot create timelines since the Constitution does not prescribe any timelines within its scheme for assent, reservation or return. It also rejected the concept of deemed assent. Referring to its earlier judgement, the Bench observed that deeming assent by judicial order results in the Court substituting the constitutional authority charged with acting on the Bill. Article 142, the Court said, cannot be invoked to supplant constitutional provisions.

Justiciability and inaction

The Bench reaffirmed that the Governor’s and President’s decisions under Articles 200 and 201 are not justiciable on merits. Judicial review becomes available only after a Bill becomes law. Courts cannot adjudicate upon a Bill during the legislative process.

However, the Court distinguished between reviewing a decision and examining a failure to act. Where the Governor’s inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite, a limited mandamus may be issued directing the Governor to act. The Court noted that such a direction ensures that constitutional processes continue to operate, without interfering in the substance of the Governor’s choice.

The President’s role under Article 201

The same principles, the Bench held, apply to the President. The President’s decision under Article 201 is not justiciable and is not subject to judicially imposed timelines. The President is not required to seek an advisory opinion under Article 143 whenever a Bill is reserved; such a reference may be made only if the President independently considers it necessary.

The Court declined to answer Question 14 of the reference, which asked whether disputes between the Union and the States can be resolved outside Article 131. It held that the question was irrelevant to the nature of an Article 143 reference.