Justice Varma’s Challenge | Judgement Summary
Justice Yashwant Varma’s challenge to in-house procedureJudges: Dipankar Datta J, A.G. Masih J
On 7 August, a Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih dismissed Justice Yashwant Varma’s petition challenging the in-house committee’s report.
Former Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna had formed a three-member committee after wads of burnt currency were found in the then Delhi High Court Judge’s official residence during a fire incident in March 2025. The Judge (transferred later to the Allahabad High Court following a Collegium’s decision) moved the top court after the committee concluded that he had “tacit or active control” of the store room where wads of burnt currency were found.
In his writ before the Supreme Court, Justice Varma concealed his identity as XXX. Although the Union of India and others are shown as the respondents in this case, the Bench had reserved judgement on 30 July after hearing only the petitioner, who was represented by Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal and Mukul Rohatgi.
Respecting Justice Varma’s option to conceal his identity, the Supreme Court, in its judgement dated 7 August 2025, did not name him, but described him as “a deeply anguished Judge of the Allahabad High Court”. The Bench also chose to be cautious, stating that it would refer only to the bare facts which are absolutely necessary for its decision, so that the petitioner is not denied a level playing field in any future proceedings that he might face.
We summarise the 57-page judgement.
Belated approach, not bona fide
The Bench questioned why Justice Varma had submitted to the jurisdiction of the in-house committee, and once having done so, why the Court should not infer that he was expecting a favourable outcome but chose to file the writ petition only after receiving an adverse report. It observed that had he approached the Court at an earlier stage, his challenge might have been seen as bona fide, rather than one that warranted refusal.
On the issue of uploading photographs and video footage of the burnt cash recovered from his residence, the Bench held Justice Varma responsible for having acquiesced to it and rejected his claim that this vitiated the in-house inquiry. While agreeing that the uploading was improper, the Bench refused to grant him any relief, noting that a duly constituted committee had found evidence of his failure to adhere to the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life.
The Bench disagreed with Justice Varma that the In-House Procedure is a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for the removal of a Judge. The power, competence, authority and jurisdiction of Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of the nation is left untrammelled by the Procedure, it held.
The in-house procedure is legal
Besides challenging the in-house committee’s report dated 3 May 2025 against him, Justice Varma’s petition sought a direction to declare Paragraphs 5(b) and 7 of the In-House Procedure dated 15 December 1999 unconstitutional. These provisions enable the in-house committee to enquire and comment on the existence of “serious misconduct warranting removal” and the CJI to intimate the same to the President and the Prime Minister.
The Bench admitted that the process of removal of a Judge, accused of proven misbehaviour, is cumbersome and because of this, many a Judge, who faced allegations of misconduct, could have escaped unscathed. However, they acknowledged that the Constitution is silent with regard to any disciplinary measure, short of removal by impeachment. Therefore, the in-house procedure was a valid gap-filling mechanism.
They relied on Section 3(2) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, to buttress their view. The Court stated that the Act provides a full legal sanction to the In-House Procedure, when read in the light of guidance provided by Article 141 of the Constitution. The Bench reasoned that the Act does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take action against a Judge of a High Court judge who has indulged in misconduct.
The CJI’s role
Justice Varma had challenged the CJI’s recommendation for the initiation of proceedings for removal. He argued that CJI has no such authority and that such an opinion would prejudice the Members of Parliament and violate the spirit of separation of powers.
The Bench observed that the CJI holds a significant moral responsibility as the foremost judicial officer. The Chief has to ensure that the judiciary of the country functions in a transparent, efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner. It further clarified that the CJI is not a mere post office between the in-house committee and the President and the Prime Minister. He is tasked with the larger scheme of maintaining institutional interest and credibility to ascertain whether a Judge has indulged in misconduct.
The Bench held that if the in-house committee finds the allegations against the Judge to be serious, the CJI is under an obligation to forward the report to the President and the Prime Minister. When doing so, the Bench clarified, the CJI has the authority, in a fit and proper case, to endorse such a finding while forwarding the report of inquiry.
On Justice Varma’s plea that the former CJI, Sanjiv Khanna, did not give him a personal hearing after the in-house committee submitted its report, the Bench pointed out that there is no such express obligation in the Procedure.
The Court disagreed with Justice Varma that the Members of either or both Houses of the Parliament could be influenced by the CJI’s opinion, since it is not forwarded either to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
According to the Bench, the report of the in-house committee, being preliminary in nature, ad hoc and not final, does not affect the Judge facing the Parliamentary proceedings for his removal. If the report is relied upon at the inquiry initiated by Parliament, the judge would be free to exercise his rights.
Withdrawal of judicial work
The Bench held that once the ball is set rolling by the CJI, it must end with his recommendation or advice to the President and the Prime Minister, depending on what the Committee records as its findings.
The judges acknowledged that the withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure but was permitted by the procedure.
Judicial accountability
Judicial independence, the Bench reasoned, signifies flexibility of judicial thought and the freedom to adjudicate without external and internal pressure, and not unfettered liberty to act as one might wish. Just as judicial independence is fundamental, so too is judicial accountability; compromising one compromises the other, the Bench added.
The Constitution’s silence on cases that do not rise to the level of proven misbehaviour creates a significant structural vulnerability, which has since been addressed by the in-house procedure, the Bench explained.
Fact-finding inquiry
The in-house procedure is designed to be a fact-finding rather than a guilt-finding inquiry. It is, therefore, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee.
The Bench suggested that if any reliance is placed by the committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, upon the report of the In-House Committee, the Judge charged could challenge it. The lack of opportunity for a fair hearing in the in-house procedure does not prejudice the concerned Judge, given the nature of the inquiry.
The Constitutional silence on internal mechanisms cannot be seen as a prohibition. Rather, it provided a space for responsible judicial innovation, which has stood the test of time, the Bench suggested.
Therefore, the Bench dismissed Justice Varma’s writ petition.