Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be rendered irrelevant merely because death was not imminent at the time of recording the statement.

The appellant (brother of the deceased) was informed by his niece (daughter of the deceased) that the deceased was shot down by her husband at the instigation of his relatives. The chargesheet filed against the husband did not name the relatives in the FIR. The appellant applied to the trial court, praying for the summoning of the additional accused based on the dying declaration under Section 161 of the CrPC. The trial court dismissed the appeal, stating that Section 161 of the CrPC cannot be treated as a dying declaration since the death occurred after a substantial period from the recording of the statement. The High Court affirmed the order.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that these statements cannot be treated as a dying declaration, noting that the law does not require the declarant to be under the imminent assumption of death for a dying declaration to be considered valid. Conclusively, the Supreme Court held that, based on the dying declaration of the deceased, the remaining accused shall be summoned under the powers of Section 319.

The Supreme Court held that a rented residential dwelling does not lose its character as a residential lease merely because the lessee sub-lets the premises as a hostel for students or working professionals. The GST exemption for residential use depends on the nature of the property, not on the identity or residential status of the lessee.

Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish leased a multi-room residential property in Bengaluru to a private company that provided long-term hostel accommodation to students and working women. The Authority for Advance Ruling and the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling denied the GST exemption, treating the arrangement as commercial hostel accommodation. The Karnataka High Court reversed the orders, holding that the property retained its character as a residential dwelling and that the exemption could not be denied because the lessee was a corporate entity.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgement. It held that residential dwellings used for long-term stay continue to fall within the exemption, regardless of whether the occupant resides under a direct lease or through a sub-letting arrangement. The Court rejected the view that the lessee must personally use the premises as a residence, and clarified that a later amendment restricting the exemption cannot operate retrospectively.

The Supreme Court held that rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.

Mission Accessibility filed a writ petition seeking the modification of the timeline for scribe registration in the Civil Services Examination and for permitting the use of laptops equipped with the Screen Reader Software (SRS) along with accessible digital question. The UPSC resolved to introduce the SRS for visually impaired candidates, but conceded it lacks the necessary infrastructure for implementing it.

The Court directed that the Union Public Service Commission shall include a clear provision permitting candidates eligible for a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days prior to the exam. The Court directed the UPSC to file a comprehensive compliance affidavit within a period of two months formulating uniform guidelines and protocols for the use of SRS and other assistive technologies to ensure standardisation, accessibility and security of the examination process.

The Supreme Court held that divorced Muslim women are entitled to recover gifts given to the husband at the time of marriage under The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Court held that the Act concerns securing the dignity and protection of Muslim women post-divorce, which directly aligns with the rights guaranteed under Article 21.

The appellant approached the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur, under Section 3 of the Muslim Women Act 1986, seeking the return of a total of Rs 17.67 Lacs–including 30 bhories of gold and articles that were given to the bridegroom, the respondent. The Court ordered the return of the mehr amount of Rs 1 lac alongside Rs 7 lacs, and 30 bhories of gold given as a gift to the bridegroom. Both parties preferred a revision petition, following which the matter was remanded for a fresh trial. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) ordered the return of gifts given to the respondents. Aggrieved by the order of the ACJM, the respondent approached the High Court. The High Court set aside the ACJM’s direction. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court and held that gifts given to the bridegroom at the time of marriage are eligible to be recovered on divorce. The Court observed that the interpretation of the Muslim Women Act 1986 must keep in view the equality and autonomy of women.