Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that an accused person does not have an indefeasible right to seek a narco-analysis test to lead the evidence. The decision brings clarity to the law following several conflicting High Court judgements on the issue.

The Patna High Court had allowed narco-analysis tests for all the accused persons in a dowry harassment and kidnapping case. The High Court was hearing a plea for the grant of regular bail by the accused persons.

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had exceeded the scope of a bail hearing by approving a narco-analysis test. Further, they reiterated Selvi v State of Karnataka (2010), where the Court had held that a narco-analysis test cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

The Supreme Court held that Section 66(4) of the Railways Act 1989 permits the levy of a punitive charge against the owner/consignee, be it before or after the delivery.

The railway authorities raised demand notices against the respondents for misdeclaration of goods with a punitive charge. The charge was imposed after the goods had been delivered. The Railway Claims Tribunal and the Gauhati High Court agreed with the respondents that a charge could not be levied after the delivery of goods.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. As Section 66(4) was silent on the issue, the Court concluded that charges could be levied both before and after the delivery of goods.

The Supreme Court held that developers must refund the principal with interest for delays in delivering homes, but are not liable to pay interest on personal loans taken by buyers to finance their properties.

Anupam Garg had secured a flat allotment under the Greater Mohali Area Development Authority’s (GMADA) 2011 housing scheme. Possession was due by May 2015. As GMADA failed to deliver on time, Garg opted out and sought a refund as per the Letter of Intent, which promised the return of all deposited amounts with 8 percent compounded interest, without any further liability. Garg filed a consumer complaint. Both the State and National Commissions directed GMADA to refund the amount with interest and with interest that Garg paid on his loan.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 8 percent interest paid on the refund amount already covered the consequences of delay; additional damages under separate heads, such as loan interest, were impermissible.

The Supreme Court held that an application to close down an industrial establishment can only be approved by the Labour Minister. If no order is communicated within 60 days, closure is deemed approved.

Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited applied for closure after its job work agreement with Britannia Industries Limited ended. They filed an application under Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Deputy Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, sought resubmission twice, citing incomplete details. The Bombay High Court ruled that the deeming provision under Section 25-O did not apply, as the applications lacked reasons for closure.

The Supreme Court found the applications to be complete and the closure reasons genuine. It held that the right to close a business is protected under Article 19(1)(g), subject to reasonable restrictions. The Deputy Secretary’s letters lacked independent application of mind and did not qualify as valid orders.

The Supreme Court held that a loanee cannot take advantage of their own breach to nullify a transaction. Only the aggrieved party could seek to set aside such a sale.

Machhindranath secured a loan from a co-operative society by putting his ancestral land as security. During the course of the loan, he signed a formal sale agreement in favour of his nephew for another loan, alongside a private agreement promising return of the land upon repayment. The nephew sold part of the land to a third party. Machhindranath filed a civil suit claiming that the sale was a security arrangement and argued that the sale deed would be void under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Trial Court ruled in his favour, but the High Court reversed it.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the provision on the voidability of the sale agreement could be invoked only by the aggrieved party, the co-operative society. As Machhindranath had broken the terms himself, he could not claim that the sale was void.