Reservation for Civil Judges in Principal District Judge Posts | Judgement Summary

Background and Submissions

The application placed before the Court sought recognition of earlier judicial service as a basis for giving officers awaiting promotion an advantage when seniority in the HJS is determined. The HJS comprises Regular Promotees, officers selected through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination, and Direct Recruits from the Bar. 

Petitioners argued that many Civil Judges, although they begin service much earlier, often do not reach the level of Principal District Judge. The Court had agreed in Order from 7 October, where it stated that officers recruited as Civil Judges “often do not reach the level of Principal District Judge, leave aside reaching the position of a High Court Judge”.

The Amicus Curiae placed four alternative proposals before the Court to improve the progression of promotees. These ranged from introducing a quota at higher grades to granting a fixed amount of seniority for every block of judicial service. 

Promotees argued that their long experience at the level of Civil Judge required recognition. Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) candidates supported the need for fair opportunity within the roster. Direct recruits urged that seniority must follow the roster approved in earlier AIJA decisions and submitted that the source of recruitment becomes irrelevant upon appointment to the HJS.

The States and High Courts supplied data on cadre composition and seniority arrangements. The material demonstrated that the extent of representation of each group varied from State to State. Some States had more promotees in senior posts while others had comparatively more direct recruits. Some had given initial seniority preference to LDCE officers. The Court considered these differences an indication of the absence of a uniform national imbalance.

Constitutional and Institutional Framework

The Court reviewed the line of decisions in the All India Judges Association (AIJA) cases since 1989 and noted that these proceedings had gradually shaped the structure of the judicial services. The introduction of the LDCE, changes in the minimum Bar experience for Civil Judge entry, the ratio between the sources of recruitment, and the use of roster points had all emerged through these decisions. 

The Court affirmed that Articles 233 to 235 place the control of the district judiciary with the High Courts. At the same time, the Supreme Court retains authority under Articles 32, 141 and 142 to issue directions necessary for preserving a coherent national framework. The Bench stated that the present exercise rests on this settled foundation.

The Question of “Heartburn” and the Limits of Classification

A central submission was that civil judges who rise to the HJS after decades of service are overtaken in the seniority list by younger direct recruits. The Court acknowledged the concern but held that such feelings cannot form the basis of altering seniority once officers have entered a common cadre. The Bench observed that experience in judicial service is not inferior to experience at the Bar, referring to its earlier statement in Rejanish K.V v K. Deepa (2025), but noted that this does not warrant a preference within the HJS. The Bench made it clear that dissatisfaction or “heartburn without something more in the form of a legal claim” cannot justify the creation of a separate class within a common cadre. 

The Court noted that the picture is not one of uniform disadvantage. Direct recruits themselves must complete ten years of judicial service before being considered for elevation to a High Court, which places promotees in a comparatively favourable position. Further, the Sixth AIJA decision has introduced faster progression from Junior to Senior Division and then to the HJS. Promotees may now compete in direct recruitment examinations by counting their prior experience. These structural developments, the Court said, make it difficult to accept that promotees are uniformly eclipsed.

The Bench clarified that seniority must be determined on the basis of service within the HJS and not on the strength of past judicial service.

Birthmark, Cadre Fusion and the Principle of Equality

The judgement relied heavily on Roshan Lal Tandon v Union of India (1967), Mervyn Coutindo v Collector of Customs (1966), State of Jammu & Kashmir v Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) and Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra (1990). 

These decisions establish that once officers drawn from different sources enter a common cadre, the pool they come from is no longer relevant for classification. The Court reiterated that members of the HJS “lose their birthmark of the source from which they are recruited” upon appointment and that earlier service cannot be used to confer an advantage at higher grades. Seniority must be based on service in the HJS and performance within that cadre alone. The length of service as a Civil Judge does not create an intelligible differentia for treating officers differently within the HJS.

The Annual Roster

Noting that States follow different roster sequences, the Court concluded that a single national model was needed. It prescribed an annual four point roster that repeats the order of two Regular Promotees, one LDCE and one Direct Recruit. This roster will assign seniority to all appointments arising from recruitment initiated in a particular year. 

The Bench clarified that if the recruitment process is initiated in one year but appointments are completed in the next, the officers appointed may still be placed in the roster of the year of initiation, provided that no appointment for the subsequent year has taken place. If recruitment for a source is not initiated in a given year, officers appointed later cannot claim a place in the roster for that earlier year.

The Court also addressed the problem of unfilled LDCE or direct recruitment vacancies. Such vacancies, if they persist after the conclusion of the process, may be filled by promotees. However, these promotees will be placed only in the subsequent roster positions of the promotee category and cannot occupy the positions reserved for LDCE or direct recruitment in that roster.

Need for a Uniform Approach

The Court reviewed the data placed before it by the states and high courts, which reflected that cadre composition and progression patterns varied significantly and did not indicate any uniform disadvantage to promotee officers. The composition of State judicial services has shifted over the last three decades due to changes introduced by the AIJA decisions. These include the introduction and withdrawal of minimum Bar experience, changes in the age of entry and the restoration of the 50:25:25 ratio in appointments to the Higher Judicial Service.

The Bench held that this flexible set up makes it inappropriate to introduce weightage for earlier service or to create separate seniority lists. Such measures would disturb the existing structure and could undermine the emphasis on merit within the HJS.

Conclusion and Directions

The Court held that seniority in the Higher Judicial Service must be determined only within the cadre of District Judges and with reference to the annual roster prescribed by this judgment. Earlier service as a Civil Judge or in any other feeder post cannot influence seniority once officers enter the HJS. 

The uniform four-point roster must be adopted by every State and Union Territory, and existing seniority positions are not to be reopened. States have been directed to amend their service rules within three months, in consultation with their respective High Courts, to incorporate the new framework. The interlocutory application was disposed of accordingly.