Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a validly issued termination notice under a bareboat charterparty is sufficient to bring the demise charter to an end, even if the owner has not physically repossessed the vessel.

The registered owner of M.V. Nereus Progress had let the vessel out on a bareboat charter to Nereides Marine Services. Nereides defaulted on the payment of hire, following which the owner terminated the charterparty and issued a notice seeking repossession of the Vessel. Before the owner could take physical possession, Om Freight Forwarders obtained an ex-parte order from the Madras High Court for the arrest of M.V. Nereus Progress. Om Freight’s claim arose from Nereides’ separate charter of another vessel, M.V. Bharadwaj. It sought to arrest M.V. Nereus Progress as a sister ship under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, on the ground that Nereides continued to be the demise charterer of M.V. Nereus Progress. The Madras High Court later sustained the arrest, holding that the demise charter ordinarily continued until physical re-delivery of the vessel to its owner.

The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s judgement and vacated the arrest. The Court held that the High Court had erred in treating physical re-delivery as necessary to bring the demise charter to an end. It held that Clause 32 of the BIMCO BARECON 2017 charterparty treated repossession as a consequence of termination, rather than a condition for termination. The Court further held that, after termination and pending physical repossession, Nereides held the vessel only as a “gratuitous Bailee” and not as a demise charterer. It therefore held that Nereides was no longer the demise charterer when the vessel was arrested and that the requirements for arrest under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Act were not satisfied.

The Supreme Court held that a Sessions Court lacks the jurisdiction to impose a “special category” life sentence that restricts remission by directing a convict to remain in prison for the remainder of their natural life. The power to issue such a sentence by curtailing the possibility of early release under Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is exclusively vested in constitutional courts i.e. the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Trial Court in Ludhiana convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment until death. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the Sessions Court’s authority to bar remission.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement to the extent of the sentencing direction. It held that a Sessions Court cannot supplement punishments under Section 302 IPC or curtail executive remission powers. The Court modified their sentence to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment without statutory remission.

The Supreme Court held that in the absence of an arbitration agreement, any Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s statewide territorial jurisdiction is competent to hear petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside arbitral awards.

In 2012, the appellants executed a contract with the respondent which did not contain any arbitration clause. The respondent moved to the Odisha High Court at Cuttack after disputes arose over completion of the assigned work. The High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who passed an award in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the appellants filed petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award before the District Court, Sundargarh. The respondent moved the High Court opposing the petition on the ground that the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked jurisdiction to hear petitions since the “seat of arbitration” was at Cuttack. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court. It held that mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at Cuttack does not constitute the “seat of arbitration”. The Court further noted that the “seat of arbitration” must be expressly designated by the parties, in the absence of which all Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction are competent to hear matters.

The Supreme Court held that a person released due to a breach of Article 22 may be re-arrested for the same offence after receiving prior approval from a Magistrate. The power to re-arrest cannot rest with the authority that violated the constitutional safeguards governing arrests. Any custody plea needs the superior officer’s endorsement.

The Mataur Police Station, SAS Nagar, Punjab, booked Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 for alleged sexual abuse of a minor. Arrested on 17 May 2026, he was produced before a Magistrate over 24 hours later without being given written grounds of arrest. The Magistrate directed his release. A fresh custody plea failed as the grounds remained unfurnished. The Punjab and Haryana High Court refused to bar his re-arrest.

Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the High Court’s order. The Court held that any future custody must follow Mihir Rajesh Shah v State of Maharashtra (2025). The investigation must be moved to another officer. High Courts may award compensation for breaches of Article 22(2).

The Supreme Court held that the power to investigate a crime rests exclusively within the domain of the executive through the police. Courts cannot curtail statutory investigative powers or prematurely declare an investigation complete. A stray statement indicating that “enough evidence” exists does not mean the investigation has concluded.

The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Mumbai registered an FIR against the respondents under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) for engaging in anti-national activities. Following the respondents’ arrest, the Special Judge granted a 30-day extension beyond the standard 90-day period to complete the investigation. A second 15-day extension was subsequently authorised under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA to analyse electronic evidence, voice samples and bank records. The respondents applied for default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), arguing that the investigation was complete, as stated by the prosecution. They contended that an extension could not be granted merely to await sanction for prosecution under Section 45 of the UAPA. The Bombay High Court quashed the second extension and granted default bail, holding that the investigation was complete and the extension for sanction was impermissible.

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgement and upheld the Special Judge’s order granting the 15-day extension to the ATS for filing the charge sheet. The Court held that the High Court erred in misconstruing a solitary statement in the extension application to declare the investigation complete. The Court dismissed the respondents’ default bail application filed under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 43D of the UAPA and ordered the respondents to surrender within 30 days.

The Supreme Court clarified when an activity amounts to “manufacture” under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, making goods liable for excise duty. The Court highlighted two factors: whether the process produces a distinct product (Transformation Test) and whether the product is marketable (Marketability Test).

M/s Quippo Energy leased imported gas generators called Power Packs. It placed them in steel containers along with locally sourced parts such as radiators and fans to make them fully operational and easier to transport. In 2008, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise ruled that this assembly amounted to “manufacture.” Quippo’s appeal was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) in 2009 and CESTAT, Ahmedabad in 2015. CESTAT confirmed that the process fell under Section 2(f), which includes any steps incidental or essential to producing a manufactured product.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of CESTAT and the Commissioner (Appeals), noting that the added components were essential parts, not mere accessories. The assembly created a new, distinct, and marketable product, and the company was liable to pay excise duty under Section 3. All appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that lands given up by owners during consolidation but not set aside for common use (known as Bachat land) do not automatically belong to the Gram Panchayat or the State. Taking over such unutilised land without paying compensation would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1).

The dispute arose from two laws: the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The 1992 amendment to the 1961 Act allowed lands contributed during consolidation to vest in the Gram Panchayat as common land. Landowners challenged this. In 1995, the High Court struck it down. In 1998, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for reconsideration under Article 31-A. On reconsideration, the High Court clarified that Bachat land remained with the owners but other lands reserved for common purposes vested with the state.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s approach and held that land genuinely reserved for public purposes can vest in the Panchayat but the 1992 amendment cannot transfer Bachat land. Hence, Bachat land cannot be acquired from owners without compensation, as this would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1).

The Supreme Court held that a re-trial in narcotics cases cannot be ordered merely to cure procedural lapses in proving electronic evidence. When a certificate validating electronic evidence under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is furnished, electronic records are considered admissible.

The case arose from the recovery of 39 kilograms of marijuana during a raid. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), relying on oral testimony, the video recording of the raid, and the forensic report. The Bombay High Court set aside the conviction and directed a re-trial. It reasoned that the video recording was not narrated by witnesses in court, no transcript was prepared, the Chemical Examiner had not been examined and the representative samples of the seized contraband were not opened before the court.

The Supreme Court found these reasons untenable. It rejected the High Court’s view that admissibility required witnesses to narrate the video contents in their own words. The Court held that under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the analyst’s report was admissible without the Chemical Examiner’s oral testimony. With the magistrate-certified inventory and sealed samples under Section 52A of the NDPS Act, together with the forensic report, the seizure stood sufficiently proved. The Court said a re-trial is an exceptional course, justified only where there has been no real trial or grave illegality. The criminal appeals were restored before the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Supreme Court held that as per Order VIII, Rule 6A(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), a counter-claim filed by a defendant directed solely against co-defendants is not maintainable.

Rajul Manoj Shah instituted a suit in 2012 challenging her sister-in-law’s (Defendant 1) 2011 agreement to sell a portion of their jointly owned property to Defendant 2. After her sister-in-law passed away, a Nazir (court official) was appointed as her representative. In 2021, Defendant 2 applied to amend his written statement to include a counter-claim for specific performance against the Nazir and sought partition of the property. The Trial Court dismissed the counter-claim as non-maintainable against a co-defendant and impermissibly delayed, as issues were framed in 2019. The High Court reversed this, holding that the cause of action arose only after the Nazir’s appointment in 2020.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, affirming that a counter-claim cannot be solely directed against a co-defendant and is typically not permitted after issues have been framed in a suit.

The Supreme Court held that an MLA’s status alone does not justify deviation from the rule of joint trials under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Preferential segregation violates the equality principle enshrined in Article 14.

Mamman Khan, a sitting Member of the Haryana legislative assembly, was one of the accused persons in the 31 July 2023 communal violence in the Nuh district of the state. The Trial Court directed the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant citing his status as an MLA and the need for expeditious disposal of his case. The High Court upheld segregation. Khan approached the Supreme Court arguing that the offences arose from the same transaction and that joint trials are the rule in such instances

The Supreme Court set aside the Trial Court’s order as affirmed by the High Court. The Court held that while expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is desirable, it cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The top court remitted the case to the trial Court with a direction to conduct a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused.