Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that psychological evaluation of a child in custody or visitation disputes cannot be ordered routinely, as it risks causing secondary trauma to the minor. Courts must record detailed reasons demonstrating the absolute necessity of such an evaluation and should ordinarily appoint a single independent expert.

In 2019, the appellant returned to India from the USA with her minor daughter, subsequently registering cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the respondent-father, alleging domestic violence and child sexual abuse. To re-establish contact with the child, the father sought an expert psychological evaluation of the minor. The Family Court, Pune rejected the application, but the Bombay High Court subsequently directed the appointment of a four-member expert panel that included specialists suggested by the father, including one based in the USA. The appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s direction for a four-member panel and modified the order. It directed that a comprehensive psychological assessment of both parents be conducted first to evaluate their parental suitability and mental state. The matter was then remitted to the Family Court to determine the necessity of any future child evaluation based on those parental reports and the child’s best interests.

The Supreme Court held that deficiencies, omissions, or blank columns in Form F records prescribed under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) cannot be treated as trivial clerical or technical errors. A compromise in maintaining these mandatory records constitute an offence as they are vital in preventing illegal pre-natal sex determination.

Criminal charges were initiated against the appellant after a search and seizure operation by an inspecting authority at his sonography centre. The doctor challenged the order taking cognisance before the Bombay High Court, arguing that the inspecting Civil Surgeon was not the legally competent “Appropriate Authority” to file the complaint and that the uncompleted sections in Form F were merely inadvertent clerical errors lacking criminal intent. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting that a state notification explicitly designated the District Civil Surgeon as the Appropriate Authority and that record-keeping flaws constitute a substantive statutory breach. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the criminal proceedings against the doctor. It observed that any record-keeping deficiencies in Form F must be strictly scrutinised at trial rather than dismissed as clerical oversights.

The Supreme Court held that compensation for the death of a homemaker must include a new head of ‘loss of domestic care’, fixed at ₹30,000 per month and revisable by ten percent every three years. Where the homemaker has no proven income, this sum stands in as notional monthly income.

The claimant’s wife, a homemaker, died on 25 November 2001 in a road accident while travelling from Sirsa to Fatehabad. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sirsa, awarded ₹2,42,000 in December 2003. The claimants’ appeal remained pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for twenty years, the case file having been destroyed in a 2011 fire. In December 2024, a Single Judge enhanced the compensation to ₹8,43,400 with 7.5 percent interest.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and awarded ₹62,77,900, computed by taking ₹30,000 as the deceased’s notional monthly income, and directed High Courts to prioritise appeals pending beyond four years.

The Supreme Court held that a third referee judge under Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when referred a case due to a split opinion in a Division Bench, is strictly confined to the specific points of disagreement. The referee judge cannot independently reopen, re-evaluate or overturn the concurrent findings of fact or guilt unanimously reached by both judges of the original bench.

In 2001, three siblings were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow for unlawful assembly and murder. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction of two brothers but differed on one of the siblings’ guilt. A third referee judge not only agreed that the third sibling should be acquitted, but also re–evaluated the finding of guilt for the two brothers and acquitted them. The complainant moved the Supreme Court along with the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The Supreme Court set aside the referee judge’s findings on acquitting the two convicted siblings. It referred the correctness of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Sajjan Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh (1998) to a larger bench. The larger bench is expected to decide the exact limits of a referee judge, noting that Sajjan Singh had earlier held that a third judge is required to examine the whole case independently, including issues on which the Division Bench was unanimous.

The Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain writ petitions from Central Armed Police Forces.

Baksish Ahmad, an enrolled member of the Border Security Forces (BSF), was dismissed from service without pensionary benefits after an Inquiry found he had entered a second marriage without permission from the Central Government, thereby violating Rules 7 of the BSF Rules, 1969. His petition for reinstatement was rejected by the Inspector General, BSF, Jammu. Ahmad challenged his dismissal by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The petition was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi and that the appropriate forums were the High Courts of Calcutta or Jammu & Kashmir. Ahmad approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court and revived the appellant’s writ petition. It ruled that because the head offices of the necessary respondents are situated in New Delhi, the Delhi High Court cannot refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court directed the respondents to file their counter-affidavit within two months to facilitate an early disposal on the merits.