Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a joint trial in distinct offences hinges on the discretion of the Court and is the exception, not the norm. It emphasised that this discretion may be exercised only when such offences form a part of the same transaction and satisfy requirements under Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

The accused were taken into custody in 2020 for assaulting the appellant and his friend, the deceased. Pending investigation, they were enlarged on bail by the Special Court for Protection of Civil Rights, Madurai. While on bail, they murdered the deceased, leading to their arrest under a second FIR. Subsequently, the Trial Court granted bail to the accused in the latest murder case. This was cancelled on appeal by the High Court, after which the accused filed a second application for bail, which was rejected by the Trial Court.. The accused then approached the Madras High Court, which in turn granted bail and directed a joint trial of both cases.

The Supreme Court, on appeal, cancelled bail and set aside the Order for joint trial. It held that a joint trial is not a compulsion but rather hinges on the Court’s judicial discretion, even after the requirements under Section 219 are satisfied. The Court added that in directing a joint trial, two factors are to be considered: 1) whether a joint trial may cause prejudice to the accused, and 2) whether it will lead to wastage of judicial time.

The Supreme Court held that forest land cannot be leased or continued to be used for non-forest purposes such as agriculture without prior approval of the Central Government. It emphasised that any such lease cannot be legitimised through post-facto representations or extensions.

The State of Karnataka had granted a ten-year agricultural lease over 134 acres of forest land to the Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-operative Society in the 1970s. After the lease expired, the State refused renewal and terminated the arrangement. Multiple writ petitions filed by the Society failed. Civil suits and appeals resulted only in protection against forcible dispossession without due process. Eventually, forest authorities initiated eviction proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act and took possession in January 2007. Despite this, the Karnataka High Court directed that the Society be allowed to make a representation to the Central Government for continuation of the lease.

Allowing the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions, and held that the Society was not entitled to further extension of lease as it had enjoyed 10 continuous years of possession. It ordered restoration of the forest land through plantation of indigenous species within twelve months.

The Supreme Court held that forcing a couple to remain legally married is a mere “legal fiction” as it serves no purpose and only perpetuates misery. It is in the best interest of parties if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time.

The parties had married in August 2000, but the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home in November 2001. The Trial Court in Shillong granted divorce in 2010 based on grounds of desertion under 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on a suit filed by the appellant-husband. The Gauhati High Court set aside the divorce decree in 2011, holding that the husband failed to prove that his wife intended to permanently desert him

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to 24 years of separation and failed attempts at mediation. It added that prolonged estrangement without reconciliation constitutes mental cruelty to both spouses. The Court exercised its power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage and ensure complete justice.

The Supreme Court held that once the mandate of an arbitrator has terminated by operation of law under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the continuation of the same arbitrator is impermissible. It clarified that the Court is both empowered and obligated to substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6) while extending time for completion of arbitral proceedings.

The appeals arose from arbitral proceedings between parties to a partnership deed which contained an arbitration clause. In March 2020 the Delhi High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who repeatedly directed deposit of administrative expenses. Petitions seeking termination of his mandate under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act were dismissed in January 2022. Upon expiry of the statutory period for making the award, the appellant moved the High Court under Section 29A(6) seeking substitution of the arbitrator and extension of time. The High Court declined substitution but extended the mandate by four months.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting an extension. It noted that after excluding the period affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, the sole arbitrator remained under an obligation to pass the award within the stipulated time and failed to do so without any extension under Section 29A(3) or Section 29A(4). The Court held that the arbitrator therefore became functus officio under Section 29A(4). It further held that Section 29A(6) empowers and obligates the Court to substitute the arbitrator.

The Supreme Court held that the police and criminal courts must be wary of framing charges in matters where no strong suspicion is made out. It expressed strong disapproval of their failure to take cognizance of a pending civil dispute between the parties.

In March 2020, the appellant-accused was charged with offences of wrongful restraint, voyeurism and criminal intimidation. He was the co-owner of a property under a civil dispute to which the complainant was also a party. The accused’s application for discharge and revision petition were dismissed by the Trial Court and the Calcutta High Court respectively. He approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court found that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained essential ingredients of any of the offences alleged. It also found that a prior injunction had been issued in the pending civil dispute and took note of the complainant’s refusal to make a judicial statement. The Court held that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction and quashed the criminal proceedings.