SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 9 | Issue 1

Volume 9 Issue 1 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here! In the first issue of September 2026, we have identified five important judgements from the top court on 

• Power of District Magistrates to recall closure orders 
• Discretion of Courts in imposing penalties
• Juvenility as defence after disposal of case
• Power of regulators to enforce accountability 
• Powers of the Reserve Bank of India over multi-state co-operative banks 

As always, the judgements are available on our SCO.LR page with assistive mindmaps, sharp summaries and citation features.

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 9 | Issue 1

31 August – 4 September 2026

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District Magistrate’s Power to Recall Closure Order

Vijay Kumar Rajpoot v State of Chattisgarh

31 August 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 926 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(1)[1]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu

The Supreme Court held that administrative authorities such as a District Magistrate (DM) do not have the power to review closure orders unless explicitly provided by a statute. 

In April 2019, the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh recommended the externment of the appellant—an alleged habitual offender—directing his removal from Raipur District for one year under Sections 5(a) and (b) of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990. In October 2025, following the acquittal of the accused in several criminal cases, the DM closed pending proceedings against the appellant and let him off with a warning. Soon after the closure, fresh FIRs were registered against the appellant, including one under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989. The DM recalled the closure order and passed an order of externment ex parte. The appellant moved the Chattisgarh High Court, contending that such order, being ex parte, violated the principles of natural justice. The High Court dismissed his appeal. Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the DM exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law. The Court held that breach of the warning given with the closure order does not grant the DM the power to revive a closed case. 

Key words/phrases: Inherent power to review—Order of externment—Acquittal of the accused—Closure report—Fresh FIR—Ex parte passing of externment order—Appeal to High Court—Dismissed—Supreme Court—No power to revive a closed case unless explicitly provided by statute. 

Read the Judgement here. 

MINDMAP

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Court’s Discretion in the Imposition of Penalty

Saudi Arabian Airlines v Union of India 

1 September 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 933 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(1)[2]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan

The Supreme Court held that mere delay in depositing Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) to the Government does not attract a penalty for failure to pay under Section 38(3) of the Finance Act, 1979  (“Act”). 

The appellant—an airline company—was issued show-cause notices seeking an explanation as to why it delayed the deposit of collected Foreign Travel Tax to the Government, as required by the Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979. The appellant moved the Bombay High Court challenging the imposition of penalty and the constitutional validity of Section 38(3) of the Act. The appellant argued that the delays in payment were the result of genuine administrative and security reasons, which should not be equated with absolute “failure to pay” under Section 38(3). The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition, holding that there is no distinction under the Act between “failure to pay” and “delay in payment”. Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision, holding that “failure to pay” under Section 38(3) implies absolute non-payment whereas belated deposits constitute delayed payment. Further, the Court held that penalty is not automatically attracted in the instance of the breach; discretion is vested on the officer of customs to adjudicate whether penalty is imposable. 

Key words/phrases:  Foreign Travel Tax (FTT)—Finance Act, 1979—Delay in payment—Show-cause notice—Penalty under Section 38(3)—Appeal—Bombay High Court—Dismissed—Surpreme Court—Delayed payments does not automatically attract penalty—Discretion to decide whether penalty is applicable.

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Claim of Juvenility under Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 

Mahavir @ Avnish v State of Madhya Pradesh 

2 September 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 942 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(1)[3] 

Bench: Justices P.K. Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar

The Supreme Court held that a claim of juvenility under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 can be raised before any forum and any stage of the proceedings, even after the final disposal of the case. The High Court’s inherent power Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) allows the High Court to recall or review decisions passed without jurisdiction or in violation of natural justice. 

The Trial Court had acquitted an accused in a murder and dowry death case after prosecution witness turned hostile. The appellant was convicted for causing disappearance of evidence, sentencing him to three years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed as withdrawn. The appellant approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC pleading for juvenility based on primary school records. A Juvenile Justice Board affirmed the claim. The High Court, however, dismissed his petition on the grounds that Section 482 CrPC could not be used to reopen a matter that had attained finality up to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the matter had not reached irrevocable finality in the top court as the appeal  was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court further held that the High Court erred in acting with over-cautious restraint and failing to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC to recall its judgement and extend statutory juvenile protections. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and High Court, quashed the conviction and sentence, and fully discharged the appellant.

Key words/phrases: Section 482—Inherent powers of the High Court—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Trial court conviction upheld by the High Court—Plea in Supreme Court dismissed as withdrawn—Claim of Juvenility under Section 482—Juvenile Justice Board affirms claim—High Court dismisses petition as matter reached finality—Supreme Court appeal—Claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage—After disposal—Conviction quashed

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Regulator’s Power to Enforce Accountability

National Council for Teacher Education v Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust 

3 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 953 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(1)[4]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

The Supreme Court held that statutory regulators possess inherent, incidental and ancillary powers to enforce or secure accountability from institutions it oversees, even in the absence of express statutory provisions. A Court must review the regulator’s actions within its wider statutory mandate, rather than  viewing such measures technically or pedantically.

In February 2019, the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) approved a Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) system and replaced the “Annual Renewal of Recognition” regime. In September 2019, the Member Secretary of the NCTE issued a Public Notice directing all Teacher Education Institutes (TEIs) to submit their PAR with a fee, warning that non-compliance would attract action under Section 17 of the NCTE Act, 1993. An association of NCTE-approved colleges challenged the notice, arguing that the Member Secretary lacked proper delegation and authorisation from the Council to issue such a mandate. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed the challenge. A Division Bench quashed the notice, holding that the proforma had not been approved or delegated by the Council. The NCTE approached the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court allowed the NCTE’s appeal and set aside the Division Bench’s judgement. It upheld the Public Notice, holding that the Council and its Executive Committee had ample power under Section 12(k) to call for annual PARs.  The Court held that the High Court’s technical approach had impaired NCTE’s regulatory jurisdiction and its ability to enforce accountability among  TEIs.

Key words/phrases: National Council for Teacher Education Act 1993—NCTE’s regulatory powers—Public Notice issued—Teacher Education Institutes to upload reports and pay fee—Failure to comply to attract action under Section 17(1)—Colleges challenged Notice—Single Judge of Delhi High Court dismissed challenge—Division Bench quashed Notice—Supreme Court sets aside Division Bench’s judgement—Public Notice upheld and appeal allowed.

Read the Judgement here. 

MINDMAP

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RBI’s Power to Supersede Multi-State Co-operative Bank Boards

Sandeep S. Ghandat v Reserve Bank of India

3 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 955 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(1)[5]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

The Supreme Court held that the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) power to supersede the Board of a multi-State co-operative bank under Section 36AAA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (BRA) is not subject to the six-month limit under Article 243ZL(1) and can be extended beyond the term for which the board was originally elected, subject to an aggregate limit of five years.

The appellants were elected to the Board of Directors of Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Limited for a five-year term. The RBI subsequently superseded the board under Section 36AAA of the BRA and appointed an administrator, citing the Bank’s deteriorating financial health, the need to protect depositors and the need for expert management. The appellants challenged the supersession before the Bombay High Court, contending that the RBI’s power was subject to the six-month limit under Article 243ZL. The High Court upheld the RBI’s power under Section 36AAA and dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the provision continued to apply to multi-State co-operative banks. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1), which states that the provisions of the BRA “shall also apply” to a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, makes the BRA applicable to multi-State co-operative banks. The six-month limit under Article 243ZL(1) does not apply to the RBI’s power under Section 36AAA. The Court further held that Section 36AAA permits the period of supersession to be extended from time to time, subject to a total period of five years, and that the expiry of the original term of the board has no consequence for the exercise of that power.

Keywords/phrases: Multi-State co-operative bank—RBI—Supersession of Board—Section 36AAA Banking Regulation Act—Article 243ZL—Six-month limit—243ZL(1)—Protection of depositors—Sound financial health—Supersession extended from time to time—Five-year aggregate limit—Expiry of Board’s statutory term—Consultation requirement not applicable to multi-State co-operative bank—Appeals dismissed.

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP