SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 8 | Issue 2

In this issue, we shortlist five important judgements from 3 August to 8 August 2026 

Volume 8 Issue 2 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here!

The Supreme Court delivered 26 judgements between 3 August to 8 August 2026. In this issue, we have identified five of the most important judgements published by the Court during this period. They include: 

• Applicability of cruelty law on live-in relationships
• Compensation for disability of an infant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
• Proprietary rights over common land in villages
• Motor insurance 
• Reopening of evidence and recall of witness under CPC

As always, the judgements are available on our SCO.LR page with concise summaries, clean and readable judgements with citation features and a mindmap.

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 8 | Issue 2

3 August – 8 August 2026

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Cruelty in Live-in Relationships

Dr Lokesh B.H. v State of Karnataka

3 August 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 784 | 2026 SCO.LR 8(2)[6]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh 

The Supreme Court held that the protection against cruelty under Section 498A  of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is applicable to “live-in relationships” that qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage, provided that the parties intend to get married. 

The complainant alleged that she and Dr Lokesh B.H. married in 2010 and lived together in Bengaluru. She filed two criminal complaints in 2016 alleging dowry harassment, physical injury and suppression of Lokesh’s earlier marriage. Lokesh approached the Karnataka High Court to quash the complaint under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He argued that there was no valid marriage between them. The High Court did not entertain the petition holding that Section 498A covers void or voidable marriages, and live-in relationships in the nature of marriage. 

The Supreme Court refused to quash the proceedings and permitted the trial to continue. It held that excluding women in marriage-like domestic relationships from protection would defeat the provision’s social purpose. The interpretation applies only to relationships between consenting adults that are in the nature of marriage and carry an intention to marry. The Court held that there should be a preliminary enquiry before arrest.

Key words/phrases: Cruelty—Section 498A—Indian Penal Code, 1860—Allegation of cruelty, dowry harassment and physical injury—Husband’s plea—Inherent power of High Court—Section 482—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1860—Quashing of proceedings—No existence of marriage alleged—High Court dismisses petition—Supreme Court appeal—Protection against cruelty applicable in void or voidable marriages, or live-in relationships—Relationship in nature of marriage—Trial Court directed to continue proceedings 

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Compensation for Disabled Infant under Motor Vehicles Act

Gayatree Pattnaik v Arundhati Sahoo

3 August 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 785 | 2026 SCO.LR 8(2)[7]

Bench: Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and N.V. Anjaria

The Supreme Court held that children with permanent disability cannot be treated as unskilled labourers for the purpose of calculating motor-accident compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 

The appellant was awarded a total compensation of Rs. 30,12,960 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack after her six-month old daughter suffered 90 per cent permanent disability as result of a motor accident in 2015. The MACT calculated the notional wage of the child as that of an unskilled labourer. The appellant approached the High Court of Orissa arguing that the compensation was inadequate. The High Court enhanced the compensation but continued to calculate the notional income based on that of an unskilled worker. The appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court increased the total compensation to Rs. 83,38,360 based on the income of a skilled labourer. It held that it is incorrect to calculate the notional income of the child as unskilled labour merely because she was not engaged in gainful employment on the date of accident. The Court noted that the resulting loss must not be limited to physical disability since it results in continuous deprivation of dignity. 

Key words/phrases: Compensation—Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—90 percent disability—Six-month old child—Notional Wages—Calculated as that of unskilled labour—High Court enhances compensation based on same notional wag—Supreme Court appeal—Notional wages calculated as that of skilled labour—Enchanced compensation

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Mutation of Common Land to Gram Panchayats 

Suraj Bhan v Ashvarya Estate

03 August 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 786 | 2026 SCO.LR 8(2)[8]

Bench: Justices P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Chandran

The Supreme Court held that mutation of shamilat deh (common land) to the gram panchayat did not require notice to joint proprietors or proof of common use by villagers. No individual co-proprietor can claim or convey exclusive title over such land unless it was partitioned before the statutory cut-off.

A dispute arose over nearly 280 acres of land in an uninhabited village in Gurugram when private individuals contested its 1955 mutation to the gram panchayat. Three individuals claimed ownership for three pattis (land divisions). In 2007, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled in favour of the private claimants, holding that the mutation was invalid as it occurred without notice to the owners and that there was no record of common use by the village community. The matter progressed via three appeals to the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and confirmed the mutation. It vested the ownership of the land to the Municipal Corporation of Gurugram. It held that mutation was the fallout of two revenue acts—the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 and the Pepsu Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954—which automatically extinguished private property rights in the common land to benefit the broader village community. The Court declared all the subsequent sale deeds void.

Key words/phrases: Mutation of common land to Gram Panchayat—the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 and the Pepsu Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954—Individuals claim ownership on basis of pattis—Sales deeds executed in favour of real estate companies—High Court sets aside mutation due to lack of notice, no mention of common use—Supreme Court restores mutation—Land mutated by statutory intervention—No propriety rights unless land was partitioned before statutory cut-off

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Motor Insurance and Coverage for Vehicle Occupants

National Insurance Co. v Thungala Dhana Laxmi

4 August 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 793 | 2026 SCO.LR 8(2)[9]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and P.K. Mishra

The Supreme Court held that a comprehensive or package motor insurance policy covers vehicle occupants and cannot be treated on par with a basic third-party policy. Addressing rampant non-compliance under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Court issued nationwide directions to enforce mandatory third-party coverage and standardise policy structures.

National Insurance Co., the appellant, challenged a judgement of the Telangana High Court, which had awarded Rs. 10,00,500 with 7.5 percent interest to the legal representatives of a car owner who died in a road accident in his own car. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hyderabad, had rejected the claim on the ground that no extra premium was paid to cover the personal risk of the owner. The legal representatives appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal and awarded compensation. Aggrieved by the High Court’s judgement, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the insurer’s appeal. It relied on an IRDA circular dated 16 November 2009 to confirm that package policies cover occupants. To enforce statutory compliance, the Court directed the integration of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras with the Insurance Information Bureau and VAHAN portal for automatic e-challans, and instructed that police be provided real-time verification tools. It mandated a standardized four-layer policy structure (compulsory third-party base, optional occupant cover, optional personal accident cover, and optional own-damage cover) and extended mandatory third-party insurance duration to four years for new cars and six years for new two-wheelers.  

Key words/phrases: Necessity for insurance against third party risk——Section 146—Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Death of car owner in an accident—MCAT dismisses claim—Telangana High Court awards compensation—Appeal by insurer—Supreme Court upholds compensation

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP

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Recall of Witness Under Order XVIII Rule 17 of CPC

Bharathamma v Bandaru Sakku Bai

4 August 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 795 | 2026 SCO.LR 8(2)[10]

Bench: Justices S.V. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria

The Supreme Court held that recalling a witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) is a discretionary power vested exclusively in the court to clarify evidence. It cannot be used by a party at the end of a trial to fill in omissions or embellish evidence.

In a 2010 title suit the plaintiffs filed interim applications during final arguments under Order XVIII Rule 17, Order VII Rule 14, and Section 151 of the CPC to reopen evidence, recall a witness, and submit additional documents regarding house numbers. The trial court allowed the applications. The Telangana High Court modified the order, setting a timeframe for completion of the recall and allowing the defendant to cross-examine the witness.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and held that Order XVIII Rule 17 is intended for judicial clarification, not routine use by litigants to fill gaps or delay proceedings. It noted that the provision does not empower a court to recall a witness for cross-examination by either party.

Key words/phrases: Order XVIII Rule 17—Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—Recall of witness—Final arguments stage—Interim application—Reopening of evidence—Recall of witness—Submission of additional documents—Trial Court allows application—High Court modifies order—Supreme Court sets aside High Court judgement—Order XVIII Rule 17 only for judicial clarification—Judicial Discretion only—Litigants cannot invoke provision 

Read the Judgement here.

MINDMAP