Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a subsequent registered sale transaction based on an unregistered sale agreement does not make the transaction valid.

The Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (TSIIC) claimed that a 53-acre land vested with it under the land ceiling laws. Visweswara Infrastructure claimed ownership on the land through a registered sale deed from a Bhavana Co-operative Housing Society. The Society claimed to have title over the land based on an unregistered sale agreement allegedly executed by the original owners’ General Powers- of-Attorney in 1982. Visweswara Infrastructure sought to restrain the TSIIC from taking possession of the land. A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the respondent’s petition, finding their title and possession unproven. A Division Bench reversed it.

The Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s order, holding that the 1982 agreement was invalid as it was not registered. Therefore, the subsequent sale deed, though registered, lacked legal foundation.

The Supreme Court held that the absence of a strong motive does not automatically result in an acquittal.

Subhash Aggarwal, the accused, was the first person to discover the body of his youngest son. He alleged that his son had killed himself with a screwdriver. However, no blood stains were found on the screwdriver. Further, gunshot residue particles were found in the right hand of the accused. Evidence of family members indicated that the accused had good relations with the deceased.

The Supreme Court held that when the circumstances convincingly provide an unbroken chain of events leading to the guilt of the accused, the total absence of a motive is of no consequence in deciding punishment for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Supreme Court held that the police must “read or hear” the words alleged to promote enmity between groups before registering a First Information Report (FIR) for a cognisable offence under Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

The FIR was filed against Member of Parliament Imran Pratapghari, under Section 196 of the BNS. Pratapghari had recited a poem on social media. It was alleged that the recital incited communal tensions and social disharmony. The Gujarat High Court found that the poem “certainly created disturbance”. Pratapgarhi argued that the poem carried a message of love and non-violence and that the Gujarat High Court missed the message.

The Supreme Court held that no offence under Section 196 could be made out as the poem did not refer to any religious community. It held that Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 states that the officer is duty-bound to inquire if an offence can be made out in a complaint.

The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate cannot take cognisance of a case against a public servant without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC.).

Suneeti Toteja, an officer of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) was the Presiding Officer of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) established to inquire into a sexual harassment complaint. Though not initially named in the FIR filed in 2018, allegations surfaced in 2020 that Toteja had filed a counter-affidavit in the Central Administrative Tribunal, without the complainant’s consent and pressured her to withdraw the case. A chargesheet was filed against her in 2022, but the BIS had explicitly denied sanction for prosecution, stating her actions were within the limits of official duty. Despite this, the Magistrate took cognisance of the matter. The High Court dismissed her plea to quash the chargesheet.

The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against Toteja. The Court emphasised that Section 197 CrPC bars courts from taking cognisance of offences allegedly committed by public servants without prior sanction, provided the acts are in discharge of official duties. The judgment also clarified that there is no “deemed sanction,” under the Cr.PC.

The Supreme Court held that a writ petition under Article 226 cannot be filed against a private company in a High Court, unless it performs a public duty or function.

The dispute arose from a gold loan transaction between S. Shobha and Muthoot Finance Ltd. Shobha filed a writ petition at the Karnataka High Court, which a single-judge Bench entertained. The judge reasoned that Muthoot Finance had breached a previously issued interim order. A Division Bench of the High Court refused to endorse this view. The judges held that Muthoot Finance Ltd. did not fall under the ambit of a “state” under Article 12.

The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench’s view. It rejected petitioners’ arguments that Muthoot Finance, being an RBI-governed non-banking financial institution, is amenable to writ jurisdiction if it breaches RBI rules and regulations. The Court held that the RBI guidelines are only regulatory measures and do not imply control over the company.

The Supreme Court ruled that specific portions of Zudpi jungle land, used for public purposes, would not be classified as forest land under the Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, per recommendations made by a Central Empowered Committee in 2019 and 2025.

In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v Union of India (1996), the Court directed that the Zudpi land across Maharashtra’s Vidarbha region be treated as forests under the 1980 Act. The State of Maharashtra sought to exclude around 86,409 ha of this land as it had been in use for public purposes since before the 1996 judgment.

The Court affirmed its decision in the 1996 case, while carving out an exception for the concerned Zudpi land. It allowed the regularisation of that land for its pre-1996 use without compensatory afforestation. At the same time, it directed the removal of any post-1996 encroachments across the land.

The Supreme Court departed from the criteria set to calculate the degree of a person’s disability under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, to grant swift relief to accident victims.

Kamal Dev Prasad had to amputate four fingers on his left hand due to injuries sustained while operating a forging machine. The Commissioner appointed under the Act declared 100 percent disability. The Bombay High Court reduced the assessed percentage to 34 based on the list of injuries and the percentage of loss of earning capacity in Schedule 1 of the Act.

The Supreme Court increased the disability assessment to 50 percent. It acknowledged that the employee’s functional disability exceeded the scheduled percentage due to the extent of the mutilation to his working hand. The Bench adjusted the final compensation owed by the employer accordingly.

The Supreme Court held that a conviction in a rape case does not expressly hinge on the statement of the minor victim or child witness. It can be secured based on other available evidence.

The Rajasthan High Court had acquitted a person, reasoning that the child witness had submitted no statements upon examination. No other testimony was afforded.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s judgement and convicted the accused. It held that the absence of the prosecutrix’s evidence does not always disadvantage the prosecution’s case. Other evidence, including the medical evidence used to convict in this case, is sufficient to secure a conviction.

The Supreme Court held that a Division Bench of a High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear and decide a writ petition that had not been referred to it by a Single Judge or assigned by the Chief Justice.

Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd.’s (GRSE) Workmen’s Union had challenged the company’s refusal to grant compassionate appointments. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court de-listed the matter, awaiting a Supreme Court decision in a related case. A Division Bench took up the case after GRSE Ltd. agreed to an intra-court appeal filed by the Workmen’s Union. The Bench directed GRSE Ltd. to appoint 48 of the 51 petitioners.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench’s Order was null and void. According to Rule 26 of the Calcutta High Court Rules and Article 225 of the Constitution, only the Chief Justice, as master of the roster, could assign such matters to a Division Bench.

The Supreme Court held that a High Court cannot use its revision jurisdiction to convert a Trial Court’s acquittal into a conviction. A revision application is filed under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

A Trial Court acquitted four persons in a murder case. A victim’s father filed a revision application at the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 2006, which found them guilty of murder. At the Supreme Court, the State of Haryana argued that High Courts can invoke Section 401(5), which allows a revision application to be considered as an appeal in exceptional circumstances, read with the proviso to Section 372. The proviso allows the victim the right to appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that the proviso to Section 372 does not apply retrospectively and the victim’s father did not have the right to appeal in 2006. Therefore, Section 401(5) could not be used. The High Court can direct a retrial in exceptional circumstances under its revision jurisdiction.