Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that contracts for booking guest speakers for an event do not amount to “event management service” under the Finance Act, 1994. Further, laying down the modalities of their participation does not constitute planning, promotion, organisation or presentation of an event within the meaning of the statutory definition.

HT Media organised the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit and entered into contracts with overseas booking agencies to secure the participation of international speakers. Show cause notices were issued proposing levy of service tax by classifying the payments made to the booking agencies as event management service under Section 65(105)(zu) read with Sections 65 (40) and 65 (41) of the Finance Act, for the period from October 2009 to March 2012, by invoking the extended period of limitation on the allegation of suppression. The Commissioner confirmed the demand. The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), New Delhi, set aside the invocation of the extended period of limitation but sustained the demand for the normal period.

The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s order. It held that the tenor of the contracts showed that the booking agents were engaged only to secure speakers for the event and not to manage the event itself. The Court noted that participation in an event cannot be equated with management of the event. It observed that taxing provisions must be construed strictly and the statutory definition of event management service could not be extended to cover contracts for booking speakers.

The Supreme Court held that a Joint Committee of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha can be constituted only p if the motion for the removal of a judge, filed on the same day, is admitted by both houses under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

On 21 July 2025, members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha filed motions for the removal of Justice Yashwant Varma, Allahabad High Court, after burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered in his official residence in Delhi. While the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha rejected the motion, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted it and proceeded to set up a three-member committee. Justice Varma approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Speaker’s action was unlawful and that Section 3(2) mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee when a motion is filed on the same day.

Rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court held that the mere act of filing notices in both Houses on the same day does not mandate a Joint Committee if one House refuses to admit the motion. It further clarified that where one House admits the motion and the other rejects it, the Presiding Officer of the House that admitted the motion retains the independent authority to constitute a three-member Committee.

The Supreme Court issued directions to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to address high rates of student suicides across the country. The directions were based on recommendations made by a National Task Force (NTF) constituted by the Court last year.

In March 2025, the Supreme Court directed the Delhi Police to register FIRs in the deaths of two IIT Delhi students. Family members alleged caste-based discrimination by the faculty and staff. The Court had set up an NTF led by former Supreme Court Judge S. Ravindra Bhat after noting the “disturbing pattern” of student suicides.

The Supreme Court reiterated that HEIs must mandatorily report all student suicides or unnatural deaths to the police. It mandated disbursement of all pending scholarship dues within four months. It observed that these suicides are not solely a mental and public health concern but may occur due to social, economic and other factors. It remarked that a myopic focus on quantitative expansion of higher education in India has resulted in shortcomings in provision of qualitative support systems for students.

The Supreme Court held that denying maintenance to a widowed daughter-in-law from the estate of her deceased father-in-law would offend her right to live with dignity.

Geeta Sharma sought maintenance from Dr. Mahendra Prasad’s estate under Section 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 (HAMA). The South-East Delhi Family Court dismissed her petition, reasoning that she did not qualify as a dependant under Section 21(vii) of the HAMA as she became a widow after Prasad’s death. The Delhi High Court set aside that order, directing the Family Court to decide the claim on merits. Prasad’s family members approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “any widow of his son” used in Section 21(vii) includes a widowed daughter-in-law irrespective of the time she becomes a widow, so long as she does not re-marry.

The Supreme Court held that the rights of persons with disability must be a facet of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to achieve “true” equality at the workplace.

In 2019, the appellant was selected for an interview for the post of Management Trainee at Coal India Limited (CIL) under the “Visually Handicapped” category. The appellant approached the Calcutta High Court after she was declared unfit on grounds of suffering from multiple disabilities—visual disability and residuary partial hemiparesis. The recruitment process had concluded by then. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed her to participate in the recruitment process. In an appeal by CIL, a Division Bench set aside the judgement on account that the petition was filed after the recruitment process had concluded. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgement. It held that it would be unfair to deny employment to the appellant merely because the recruitment process had concluded and the panel had expired. The Court held that persons with disabilities have to be reasonably accommodated and viewed from the prism of CSR. The Court exercised its powers under Article 142 and directed CIL to post the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields Coal India.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is narrow in scope, restricted to only prima facie evidence. The Court cannot undertake a mini-trial at this stage.

The respondent was accused of kidnapping and sexual assault under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 respectively. The Allahabad High Court granted him interim bail exercising its powers under Section 439, CrPC. It held that there was an inconsistency in the age of the victim and that Section 164-A, CrPC and Section 27, POCSO obligate police to obtain the victim’s medical age report at the start of investigation. On appeal, the Supreme Court heard arguments on whether the scope of Section 439 CrPC was wide enough to issue directions mandating age determination tests under the POCSO Act.

The Supreme Court set aside the Judgement of the High Court without revoking the bail granted to the respondent. It held that High Courts can only take a prima facie view on the age of the victim if the question was raised at the bail stage. Determining the age of the victim is a matter of trial. It held that the determination of age cannot be resorted to as a matter of course.

The Supreme Court held that modifications to admission criteria made midway through the admission process violates principles of fair play in action. Finding a lack of valid justification for the modifications, it highlighted the need for transparency to prevent arbitrariness.

The High Courts of Punjab and Haryana had dismissed three appeals challenging the modification to the admission policy of NEET (UG) candidates seeking admission under the sports quota at Baba Farid University of Health Sciences, Faridkot. The first two appeals challenged modifications to the 2024 academic session which permitted submission of sports achievements from all years/classes rather than limiting it to Class XI and XII. The third appeal challenged extension of this modified criteria into the 2025 session.

The Supreme Court held that there was no valid reason to modify the admission policy. It observed that the modification was made in special circumstances in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and was contrary to the State’s Sports Policy 2023. Further, the University and the State had not acted in accordance with the fair play mandate under Article 14. It pointed out that such modified parameters were not extended to other allied courses in the same university. Moreover, the modification was carried out after representations were made by the father of a candidate who benefitted from the change.

The Supreme Court held that where a public auction has been conducted in accordance with law and the highest bid is above the reserve price, the auctioning authority cannot cancel the bid merely on the expectation that a higher price could be obtained in a future auction. In the absence of fraud, collusion or material irregularity, such cancellation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Golden Food Products India, the appellant, participated in an auction conducted by the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA), the respondent, for allotment of an industrial plot under the Madhuban Bapudham Yojana. The appellant’s technical and financial bids were approved and it was declared the highest bidder at Rs. 29,500 per square metre, which was above the reserve price of Rs.25,600 per square metre. Thereafter, the GDA cancelled the auction on the ground that smaller plots in the same scheme had fetched higher prices per square metre. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the appellant had no indefeasible right to insist upon allotment.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders. It held that the comparison of the appellant’s bid for a large plot with bids received for much smaller plots was an irrelevant consideration. The Court observed that demand for smaller plots is ordinarily higher and that identical reserve prices had been fixed for plots of different sizes. Once the highest bid was found to be above the reserve price, the GDA was under an obligation to proceed with allotment.The cancellation was held to be arbitrary and irrational, and GDA was directed to issue an allotment letter to the appellant.

The Supreme Court held that prolonged pre-trial incarceration under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, violates the right to speedy trial under Article 21. Bail can be granted in cases where the trial shows no realistic prospect of early commencement.

The appellant was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate in July 2025 after he was accused of being the ultimate beneficiary of diversion and siphoning of public funds. Banks alleged a fraud exceeding ₹670 crore. He had remained in custody for over 16 months. His bail plea was rejected by the Special Court and the Delhi High Court, on the ground that he did not satisfy the proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and granted bail to the appellant. It held that the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Moreover, economic offences cannot be treated as a homogeneous class warranting a blanket denial of bail.

The Supreme Court held that the executive cannot retain the amount collected under a levy which was imposed without the authority of law. Further, the executive also cannot retrospectively impose tax liability without explicit legislative authority.

The Finance Act 2010 introduced a 16 per cent customs duty on electricity cleared from a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to a Domestic Tariff Area. This was to operate retrospectively from 26 June 2009. In February 2010, the Union government issued a notification (25/2010), which was challenged at the Gujarat High Court. While this petition was pending, the Union issued a notification reducing the rate of tax to 10 paise per unit (91/2010). Later, in 2012, this was reduced to 3 paisa (26/2012). These did not formally undo the 25/2010 notification. In 2015, the Gujarat High Court held that no customs duty could be imposed and the retrospective levy of tax violated Article 265 of the Constitution. The appellant sought a refund of the tax collected under the notifications, stating that customs duty was struck down by the High Court. The High Court rejected the petition and held that the notifications, 91/2012 and 26/2012, were not expressly struck down in the 2015 proceedings.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Judgement. It held the 2010 and 2012 notifications did not create a new levy but only continued the levy in an altered form. Further, it stated that the change in arithmetical rate to the levy of tax does not cure the lack of authority principle. Moreover, it added that the restitution of the amount is necessary when illegality is discovered.