Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

Filter By

Search

Year

Volume

Issue

Unexecuted Sales Deed Cannot Exclude Property from Matruka

Vol 10, Issue 3

Zoharbee v Imam Khan

The Supreme Court held that an unexecuted agreement to sell cannot exclude immovable property from a “matruka”—property left behind without a will in Mohammedan law. It stated that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, confers no rights nor vests any interest in another party unless an agreement to sell is executed during the owner’s lifetime.

The litigation began over property Chand Khan left behind when he died without a will. His brother, Imam Khan, argued that the property was a matruka; thus 3/4th of the property belonged to him and 1/4th to Zoharbee, the deceased’s surviving widow. Zoharbee contended that there was nothing to divide as all the property had been transferred to third parties. Notably, the agreement to sell was executed by her after Chand Khan’s death. A Civil Court ruled in her favour and held that the property was not divisible. A First Appellate Court reversed the verdict and stated that the property was matruka as the agreement to sell was not executed before his death. The Bombay High Court dismissed Zoharbee’s appeal.

The Supreme Court upheld the Order of the First Appellate Court and the High Court. It held that immovable property cannot be excluded from the division simply because an agreement exists. Accordingly, Zoharbee was entitled to transfer only her 1/4th share of the property.

Bench:

Sanjay Karol J, P.K. Mishra J

Judgement Date:

16 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Section 54—Transfer of Property Act, 1882—agreement to sell—matruka property—mohammedan law—unexecuted sale deed cannot exclude property from matruka—appellant entitled to only transfer her share—High Court and First Appellate Court Orders upheld

Citations:

2025 INSC 1245 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(3)[15]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Power of Constitutional Courts to Order CBI Investigation

Vol 10, Issue 3

Legislative Council U.P., Lucknow v Sushil Kumar

The Supreme Court held that higher courts should exercise their power of ordering a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations.

Petitioners before the Allahabad High Court alleged favouritism against an external agency which conducted the examination for recruitment to various posts in the Legislative Council. After a Single Judge disposed of the petition, a Division Bench—suo moto—ordered preliminary investigation by the CBI.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s orders for CBI’s preliminary probe, leaving it to the discretion of the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court observed that constitutional courts must exercise some degree of judicial discretion before burdening a specialised central agency with matters that do not satisfy the threshold of an exceptional case.

Bench:

J.K. Maheshwari J, Vijay Bishnoi J

Judgement Date:

16 October 2025

Keyphrases:

High Courts power to order CBI investigation—sparingly and in exceptional circumstances—selection of under secretariat of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council—favouritism—CBI probe based on mere doubt—requires sufficient prima facie material—High Court Judgement set aside

Citations:

2025 INSC 1241 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(3)[14]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Appointment of Waitlisted Candidate after Expiry of Selection List

Vol 10, Issue 3

Union of India v Subit Kumar Das

The Supreme Court ruled that mere placement on the waitlist does not create a vested right to be appointed to a vacancy. It further noted that a waitlist operates for a limited period and cannot be extended after a fresh recruitment process has commenced.

In 1997, a candidate from the Scheduled Caste category was first on the waitlist for the post of technician at All India Radio (AIR). There were three candidates ahead of the aggrieved candidate, and all of them had been appointed. Owing to non-selection, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which directed the candidate’s case to be considered based on a concession by AIR that he would be absorbed as soon as there was a vacancy against the SC quota. In June 2024, the Calcutta High Court didn’t interfere with this decision.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court, on the ground that waitlisted candidates cannot claim appointment after the validity of the selection list has expired. The Court noted that upholding the appointment would extend the life of an expired list.

Bench:

A.S. Chandurkar J, P.S. Narasimha J

Judgement Date:

15 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Waitlisted candidates—Scheduled Caste category—recruitment rules—no vested right of appointment—violation of Recruitment Rules—respondent not entitled to relief—High Court direction set aside.

Citations:

2025 INSC 1235 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(3)[13]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Knowledge of Caste Identity under the Atrocities Act

Vol 10, Issue 3

Shivkumar@Baleshwar Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh

The Supreme Court held that mere knowledge of the victim’s caste identity is sufficient to attract liability under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Personal acquaintance with the victim raises a presumption of such knowledge.

Shivkumar was convicted by a Trial Court for sexually assaulting a minor girl belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. The incident occurred in 2017, when the victim was aged 12. Following her statement and medical examination, Shivkumar—who was her neighbour—was arrested and charged under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the SC/ST Atrocities Act. The Trial Court’s sentence of life imprisonment was upheld by the Chhattisgarh High Court. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Shivkumar contended that there was no evidence to prove he knew the victim’s caste, which was a mandatory element for conviction under Section 3(2)(v).

The Court, relying on Patan Jamal Vali v State of Andhra Pradesh (2021), clarified that post-amendment, the focus is on knowledge of caste identity rather than motive. Referring to Section 8(c) of the Atrocities Act, it held that when the accused is personally acquainted with the victim or their family, such knowledge is presumed unless rebutted. Since evidence showed that the accused frequently visited the victim’s home, the Court held that he was aware of her caste. The conviction and life sentence were affirmed.

Bench:

B.V. Nagarathna J, K.V. Viswanathan J

Judgement Date:

14 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act—knowledge of caste identity—statutory presumption under Section 8(c)—2016 amendment—Patan Jamal Vali precedent—High Court judgment upheld

Citations:

2025 INSC 1231 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(3)[12]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Parties Dormant during Litigation Cannot Claim Benefits Secured by Others

Vol 10, Issue 3

State of West Bengal v Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd.

The Supreme Court refused to extend the relief granted to cultivators in Kedar Nath Yadav v State of West Bengal (2016) to a private company. Noting that Santi Ceramics falls squarely outside the protective framework of the 2016 Judgement, it added that even procedural principles exclude their claim.

Santi Ceramics had acquired 28 bighas of agricultural land in 2001-2002 and was granted approval for its conversion to industrial use in 2003. The state of West Bengal acquired the land in 2006 for an automobile factory in Singur. Santi Ceramics accepted the compensation allotted. Later, the acquisition was quashed in Kedar Nath Yadav, which was a PIL filed by farming communities. In 2016, Santi Ceramics sought restoration of the land which was accepted by the Calcutta High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the 2018 decision of the Calcutta High Court. It noted the remedial framework of Kedar Nath Yadav was specifically to benefit disadvantaged parties whose livelihoods faced extinction; it was not general restitution to be extended to industrial entities. The Bench added that the relief was granted in personam on the basis of objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not on fundamental grounds applicable to all. It also held the acquisition to be conclusively settled due to Santi Ceramic’s own inaction, voluntary acceptance of compensation and decade of silence.

Bench:

Surya Kant J, Joymalya Bagchi J

Judgement Date:

13 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Land acquisition—Kedar Nath Yadav v State of West Bengal—in personam relief—remedial framework—procedural principles—Section 5-A, Land Acquisition Act, 1894—Singur Project—respondent inaction—distinction between cultivators and business entities.

Citations:

2025 INSC 1222 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(3)[11]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Trustee Liable Under NI Act Without Arraigning Trust as an Accused

Vol 10, Issue 2

Sankar Padam Thapa v Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal

The Supreme Court held that a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is maintainable against a trustee who signs a cheque on behalf of a trust, even though the trust itself is not made an accused.

A cheque issued by the Chairman and authorised signatory of the Orion Education Trust, which was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. A complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was filed against the Chairman in his personal capacity as the signatory of the cheque. He contended that Orion, being a juristic entity, was a necessary party and that failure to name it rendered the complaint defective. The Trial Court took cognisance and summoned him. The Meghalaya High Court quashed the complaint and the summoning order, noting that as the drawer of the cheque the trust should be arraigned as an accused. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging this finding.

The Supreme Court held that a trust is not a legal or juristic person under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 but an entity vested with the obligations attached to the ownership of property. Consequently, it cannot sue or be sued in its own name and functions only through its trustees. Since the cheque had been signed by the Chairman as an authorised representative, he was personally responsible for the transaction and fell within the ambit of Section 141 of the NI Act. The Court overruled contrary High Court rulings that had equated trusts with companies and restored the criminal proceedings.

Bench:

Ahsanuddin Amanullah J, P.K. Mishra J

Judgement Date:

9 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Trust—trustee liability—Section 138 and Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act—no requirement to arraign trust—vicarious liability—dishonoured cheque—High Court order set aside—trust not juristic entity—criminal proceedings restored

Citations:

2025 INSC 1210 | SCO.LR 10(2)[10]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Age-Restriction on Couples Intending to Parent Through Surrogacy

Vol 10, Issue 2

Vijaya Kumari v Union of India

The Supreme Court held that couples who had commenced the surrogacy process cannot be denied their right to parenthood only because of the age bar under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.

Three couples intending to become parents had commenced the surrogacy process, prior to the commencement of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021. They were above the age-limits of 50 for women and 55 for men under Section 4(iii)(c) (I) of the Act. The couples filed a Writ Petition at the Supreme Court, challenging the propriety of the age-restrictions under the Act.

The Supreme Court held that couples intending to have a surrogate child have a constitutional right regulated by statute. The Bench exempted the petitioners from seeking certification on the qualifying age for the purpose of continuing surrogacy procedure, provided they satisfy the other conditions under the Act and the rules.

Bench:

B.V. Nagarathna J, K.V. Viswanathan J

Judgement Date:

9 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021—date of commencement—upper age limit—50 for female—55 for male—No retrospective application of the Act—if intending couples had begun surrogacy process before commencement of the Act—Right to have child through surrogacy—constitutional right regulated by statute—Other couples similarly placed and aggrieved with age-restriction may approach jurisdictional High Court.

Citations:

2025 INSC 1209 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(2)[9]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Procedural Failure Cannot Result in Denial of Substantial Right of Defence

Vol 10, Issue 2

M/s. Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v M/s. Aroush Motors

The Supreme Court held that the failure to file a written statement within the time stipulated under Rule 1(1) of Order VIII Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot result in denial of the substantial right of defence through cross-examination.

M/s. Aroush Motors was appointed as a dealer and paid over ₹171,00,000 toward inventory, security, fit-out, etc. When BS-IV vehicles got banned in 2020, the Defendant-M/s. Avnita Auto Tech failed to upgrade stock, stalling business for its dealers. Aroush Motors terminated the dealership in 2020 and sued for damages. The defendant appeared when summons was served in July 2021, but failed to file a written statement within the 120 days mandated for commercial suits. The trial court rejected multiple applications filed by Avnita Auto Tech for extension of time. It excluded the written statement, recorded the examination-in-chief of PW1, and marked the defendant’s cross-examination as Nil. A decree was accordingly passed against the defendant and upheld by the High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. The Bench held that citing procedural lapses for denial of the defendant’s right to cross-examination was “absolutely perverse” and violated the defendant’s right of defence. Further, it noted that a series of Orders passed by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 (March 2020 and February 2022) excused the application of limitation period. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court.

Bench:

Aravind Kumar J, N.V. Anjaria J

Judgement Date:

8 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Rule 1(1) of Order VIII Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Commercial Suits—limitation period—delay in filing written statement—denial of damages due to expiration of limitation period—Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2024)—Procedural Flexibility—COVID-19 Limitation Exclusion—right of defence—High Court decision set aside

Citations:

2025 INSC 1202 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(2)[8]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Application of the Doctrine of Public Trust on Artificial Bodies

Vol 10, Issue 2

Swacch Association, Nagpur v State of Maharashtra

The Supreme Court extended the doctrine of public trust, which mandates government protection of natural resources for public use, to include man-made objects that promote the environment.

The Swacch Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the Bombay High Court against constructions developed near Futala Lake, Nagpur. They argued that the lake was a wetland and construction activities in the area violated the restrictions found under Rule 4(2)(vi) of the Wetlands (Conservation & Management) Rules, 2017. The High Court disposed of the PIL holding that Futala Lake did not fall under the definition of a ‘wetland’ under Rule 2(1)(g) of the 2017 Rules, as it was man-made. However, the Court recognised the status of Futala Lake as a wetland as declared by the National Wetland Inventory and Assessment (NWIA). Further, it noted that the Supreme Court had held that wetlands recognised by the NWIA should be protected as per Rule 4 of the 2017 Rules.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It reasoned that the doctrine of public trust compels the state to protect the lake and prohibit permanent constructions, even if the Futala Lake is man-made. It observed that much of the construction in and around the Futala lake was not permanent and met the criteria set in Rule 4.

Bench:

B.R. Gavai J, K.V. Chandran J, N.V. Anjaria J

Judgement Date:

7 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Doctrine of Public Trust—Rule 4(2)(vi) of the Wetlands (Conservation & Management) Rules, 2017—protection of wetlands—applicable to artificial water bodies or any object important for ecology and environment protection—High Court judgement upheld

Citations:

2025 INSC 1199 | 2025 SCO.LR 10(2)[7]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map

Mandatory Experience Clause in Tender Violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g)

Vol 10, Issue 2

Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v State of Chhattisgarh

The Supreme Court held that a tender condition which required bidders to have previously supplied goods to state government agencies in Chhattisgarh was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Vinishma Technologies, a supplier of sports kits to several states, challenged a clause in tender notices issued by the Chhattisgarh Government for the supply of sports kits to government school students. The condition required bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least six crores to state government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the three preceding financial years. The Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the clause, reasoning that it ensured reliable and timely delivery by suppliers familiar with the State’s geography.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. It held that while the State has discretion to frame tender criteria, such discretion is subject to the constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom of trade. The Court observed that linking eligibility to past supply within Chhattisgarh created an artificial barrier that curtailed competition and excluded qualified bidders, contrary to the doctrine of level playing field.

Bench:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar J, Alok Aradhe J

Judgement Date:

6 October 2025

Keyphrases:

Judicial review of tender conditions—Articles 14 & 19(1)(g)—level playing field—arbitrary and discriminatory restriction—cartelisation—public procurement—fair competition

Citations:

Citations: 2025 INSC 1182 | SCO.LR 10(2)[6]

Judgement:

HTML | PDF

Mind Map:

View Mind Map