Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the usage of the phrase “may be sought through Arbitration” in an agreement does not mandate arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution.

BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV) invoked arbitration proceedings under Clause 13 of its General Terms and Conditions (GTC) after a dispute with Eastern Coalfields Ltd. The Clause stated that disputes “may be sought” through the Arbitration Act, 1996. The Calcutta High Court held that the word “may” indicated no clear intention to arbitrate.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, noting that Clause 13 of the GTC did not amount to an arbitration agreement between the parties. It was merely a provision that left the option open.

The Supreme Court held that High Courts should ordinarily refrain from passing strictures against judicial officers in their judgements while deciding matters.

The Rajasthan High Court had found a bail order by a District Judge-cadre officer to be “grossly inappropriate and cavalier” and accused him of negligence and disobedience. The bail order did not include the criminal antecedents of the accused persons.

The Supreme Court expunged the remarks against the officer. It held that the remarks were uncalled for and were made without providing the officer an opportunity to explain.

The Supreme Court held that a tribal woman is entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property. The Court held that the withholding of inheritance rights violated the principle of equality under Article 14.

The appellants sought the partition of their maternal grandfather’s property, claiming their mother had an equal share in it. The Trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the Chhattisgarh High Court dismissed this application stating that the applicants had failed to establish their right over the property.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that the defendants had provided no proof of a custom which prohibited female succession. There was no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property.

The Supreme Court held that a mitigation report prepared to determine the facts and circumstances of the crime warranting the death penalty should be considered in its entirety before confirming the sentence.

A Trial Court had imposed the death penalty on the appellant for the murder of his wife, sister-in-law and his three children. The punishment and the conviction were confirmed by the Karnataka High Court, which found that the crime had been pre-planned and executed.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but set aside the death penalty. It relied on the mitigation report, which found the appellant to have a “good moral character” and showed “good conduct” with co-prisoners and prison officials. The Court also factored in that the convict was mildly depressed and that he had lacked proper parental care due to the death of his parents. He had also attempted suicide on two occasions. The Court reasoned that the “sum-total of circumstances” that drove him to commit the “reprehensible crime” did not warrant the death penalty and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment without the scope of remission.

The Supreme Court held that a secretly recorded phone conversation between spouses is admissible as evidence and does not violate their right to privacy.

A Family Court in Bathinda had allowed an application by the husband seeking permission to submit memory cards of phones and transcripts of recorded conversations as evidence. The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the Bathinda Court Order stating that the conversations were recorded without the wife’s knowledge, which invaded her right to privacy.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. It stated that the recording cannot be considered inadmissible merely because it was “illegally obtained”. The Court clarified that privacy of communication between husband and wife granted under Section 122 of the Evidence Act did not extend to cases of dispute between them.

The Supreme Court held that those accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) are entitled to a list of documents and materials which were collected by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) during investigation and form the basis of cognizance, even if the prosecution does not end up entering or relying upon them during the trial. The Court observed that this right flows from Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees a fair trial, including the right to defend.

In 2017, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered an FIR against the appellants for offences of cheating and corruption under the PMLA. The accused argued that they were entitled to copies of documents seized by the ED to prepare their defence. The Special Courts and High Courts rejected their applications, holding that only relied-upon documents had to be furnished at the pre-trial stage.

The Supreme Court set aside the orders insofar as they denied the accused copies of seized documents. It directed the ED to provide true copies of seized records and a list of unrelied materials. The Court noted that Section 24 of the PMLA places a “huge negative burden” on the accused, and therefore considered it “necessary” that Section 233(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 256 of the BNSS), which allows the summoning of witnesses or documents, should be “liberally construed” in favour of the accused.

The Supreme Court held that High Courts erred in quashing FIRs and criminal proceedings on the ground of violation of natural justice in related administrative actions. The FIRs and proceedings were restored, and the matters remitted for fresh consideration.

In 2016, the Reserve Bank of India released the Master Directions on fraud detection, under which banks classified certain borrower accounts as fraudulent and initiated criminal proceedings. The respondents challenged both actions, and the High Courts quashed them jointly, holding that the absence of a prior hearing vitiated the entire process.

The Court held that State Bank of India v Rajesh Agarwal (2023) was misread. While administrative actions affecting civil rights require a hearing, no such hearing is needed before lodging an FIR. It clarified that criminal law operates independently of administrative decisions, and the principles of natural justice do not apply at the stage of lodging an FIR.

The Supreme Court upheld the compensation awarded under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, based on the circle rate under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and dismissed the Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation’s appeals.

The case arose from land acquired in 2014 for widening National Highway 12-A in Jabalpur. The Competent Authority awarded partial compensation using both agricultural and residential rates. On appeal by landowners, the Commissioner enhanced compensation using the circle rate. The enhancement was upheld by the District Court and the High Court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that under Section 26(1) of the 2013 Act, which lays down criteria for determination of market value by the Collector, the highest among three criteria must be adopted. Once the circle rate is binding, adjustments like deduction apply only if reasons are recorded. It held that the “theory of deduction” applicable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for undeveloped land cannot be used to reduce compensation when circle rates are decided under the 2013 Act. If the State finds circle rates excessive, the proper course is revision through a statutory process.

Finding that legislative decisions are amenable to judicial review, the Supreme Court held that the Petitioner’s expulsion from the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) was disproportionate and excessive.

The Petitioner was expelled from the BLC for remarks made against the Chief Minister in the House. The expulsion was challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution. During the pendency of the petition, the Election Commission of India declared a bye-election for the vacant seat. The Supreme Court stayed the declaration of the result.

Invoking its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court quashed the expulsion, holding that constitutional courts can review the proportionality of punishments imposed by the House. It reasoned that legislative decisions are not immune from judicial review under Article 212(1) as they do not constitute a mere procedure of the House. The Court, having found the decision to be excessive and disproportionate to the act, directed his reinstatement.

Reiterating the obligation of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court set aside the Appellant’s conviction.

The Appellant was convicted of murdering his brother, sister-in-law and their four children, allegedly over a land dispute. The Trial Court convicted the Appellant and imposed the death penalty. The Allahabad High Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. The prosecution relied on three incriminating circumstances: motive, last seen, and recoveries made at the instance of the accused.

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to lead credible evidence to prove any of the incriminating circumstances. It cited the lackadaisical approach of the investigation and noted the lack of care in adhering to mandatory procedural requirements while conducting the trial. The Court relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v State of Maharashtra (1984), which crystallised the duty of the prosecution to prove the chain of circumstances beyond all manner of doubt. Finding that the High Court failed to address the improbabilities and infirmities in the prosecution’s case, the Court set aside the conviction.