Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that land cannot be subsequently designated as a “deemed forest” if it was not a deemed forest at the time the Master Plan came into force.

In 2022, the Rail Land Development Authority (RLDA) issued a Request for Proposal of approximately 12.40 hectares of railway land, for mixed use development in Delhi. The land had been acquired in 1986 as agricultural land and incorporated into the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021. An application was filed before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) alleging that there were approximately 1,100 trees on the land, making it a deemed forest under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The NGT dismissed the application due to lack of concrete evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that historical character of the land must be taken into account to determine whether it classifies as “deemed forest”. The Court observed that the land had been agricultural in nature, and could not become a forest merely due to vegetation growth.

The Supreme Court held that disciplinary action initiated during service can continue after retirement, if permitted by Service Rules.

In September 2011, the appellant, a bank employee, was served a chargesheet on allegations of irregularities in disbursement on loans. On the same day, the appellant retired from service. The appellant’s pay scale was reduced on a permanent basis after the Disciplinary/Appellant Authority partly proved the charges. The appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court arguing that the master-servant relationship between him and the bank ceased to exist upon retirement. Therefore, the punishment cannot continue. The Single Judge Bench held in his favour. On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the decision, allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue after retirement. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench. It held that disciplinary action initiated during service can be brought to its logical conclusion if Service Rules/ Regulations permit, despite the severance of the master-servant relationship.

The Supreme Court held that maternity benefits extend to all forms of motherhood, including adoption and are not confined to biological childbirth. It held that unjustified exclusion of adoptive mothers is discriminatory and unconstitutional under Article 14. Further, adoption constitutes an exercise of reproductive and decisional autonomy under Article 21.

The petitioner, an adoptive mother, challenged Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which restricted maternity benefits to women adopting children below three months of age. She argued the limit bore no rational nexus to the statute’s object and was practically unworkable.

The Court struck down the three-month age limit as violating Articles 14 and 21. It read down Section 60(4) to entitle all adoptive mothers—irrespective of the child’s age—to twelve weeks of maternity benefit from the date of handover.

The Supreme Court held that it is desirable for courts to serve a notice to an accused upon appointment of an amicus curiae in the absence of a counsel.

The appellant was granted bail by the Jharkhand High Court in 2003, in a case involving alleged murder. After 20 years, the High Court appointed an amicus to represent the appellant due to absence of his counsel. On the submissions of the amicus, the Court convicted him in a case of culpable homicide with rigorous imprisonment for five years. The appellant approached the Supreme Court alleging “gross injustice” and argued that he was not provided a notice regarding appointment of the amicus. He contended that the amicus had raised a ground that was not in his memorandum of appeal, thus disabling the High Court from granting acquittal. Permission was sought to raise such grounds before the apex court.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not obligated to inform the appellant. However, it would have been desirable to do so. The Court relied on Anokhi Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh and held that attempts to expedite the process should not be at the expense of fairness and opportunity to the accused. The Court remanded the case for hearing.

The Supreme Court held that “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution includes the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS). Financial dependency on the Union government is not the only criterion to determine whether an organisation is a “state”.

Employees of the AFGIS approached the Delhi High Court after its Board of Trustees revised the pay structure and did away with any pay parity and connection with the Central Government Pay Commissions. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition stating that the AFGIS was a private and self-contained society and was not a “state” or “other authority” under Article 12. It reasoned that AFGIS lacked financial dependency and administrative domination of the Union Government. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Division Bench and held that the AFGIS carried out a public duty i.e. protection and welfare of Armed Forces personnel. This falls squarely under the collective obligation of “State” under Article 12.

The Supreme Court held that excluding the creamy layer from Other Backward Classes is a constitutional imperative to ensure that reservation benefits reach the genuinely backward sections. It further held that creating artificial distinctions between similarly placed government and Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) employees for this determination violates the equality mandate under Article 14.

Several candidates who cleared the Civil Services Examination were denied OBC reservation benefits because their parents were PSU employees. The government relied on a 2004 letter, which counted salary income of PSU employees when determining whether their posts were equivalent to government posts. This position contradicted the 1993 Office Memorandum, which explicitly excluded salary from the income test for determining creamy layer status. The candidates secured favourable rulings from various High Courts, prompting the Union’s appeals.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, ruling that the 2004 letter cannot override the substantive framework laid down in the 1993 Office Memorandum. It directed authorities to reassess the candidates’ eligibility and create additional posts in excess of sanctioned strength to accommodate them.

The Supreme Court held that Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) is a “medical treatment” as opposed to primary care. Doctors may exercise clinical judgement to determine if CANH treatment can be withheld for the purpose of passive euthanasia.

A fall had left Harish Rana in a permanent vegetative state for 13 years. His plea for passive euthanasia was dismissed by the Delhi High Court in 2024. The same year, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision that withholding CANH treatment through PEG tubes would result in Rana starving to death. In a miscellaneous application, filed in 2025, Rana’s parents sought a declaration that CANH should be classified as “medical treatment” for the purpose of passive euthanasia.

The Court permitted Rana’s plea for passive euthanasia, holding that it would be in his “best interest” to withhold or withdraw CANH. It held that administering CANH requires clinical judgement and routine checks from medical professionals. It is not on the same level as spoon or oral feeding. The Court observed that Rana’s medical condition was irreversible and that continued CANH treatment was not improving it.

The Supreme Court held that the State has an obligation under Article 21 to ensure a mechanism of redressal for affected families when a grave harm is alleged to have occurred in the course of a State-led public health intervention. It observed that the absence of a structured framework to address adverse events following immunisation (AEFI) raises constitutional concerns.

A writ petition was instituted before the Supreme Court by parents of young individuals who had received COVID-19 vaccination and are stated to have died thereafter. The petition sought constitution of an independent expert medical board to inquire into such deaths, formulation of protocols for early detection and treatment of AEFI, and grant of compensation. The petition was taken as the lead case along with appeals against the Kerala High Court’s interim directions for formulation of a policy on AEFI cases by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and the National Disaster Management Authority.

The Court held that Article 21 is not limited to protection against unlawful deprivation of life but includes a wide range of rights, including the right to health and bodily integrity. Asserting that the State bears a positive obligation to safeguard the health of its people, it clarified that questions of causality between vaccination and deaths involve complex scientific assessment and are best left to domain experts. The Court directed the Union of India, through the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, to expeditiously formulate and place in the public domain an appropriate no-fault compensation framework for serious adverse events following COVID-19 vaccination.

The Supreme Court held that the conduct of parties is significant in determining their bona fide intent at the time of executing an agreement in a suit for specific performance. It observed that “even a slight doubt” regarding the plaintiff’s manner or possibility of material facts being withheld could result in denial of equitable and discretionary relief.

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 4 June 2002 for a total sale consideration of ₹13 lakhs. The defendants received ₹6 lakhs as advance and as per the agreement, the remaining amount was to be paid within 11 months. The defendants contended that the advance was in fact a hand loan with the agreement of sale executed as security. They relied on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 4 June 2002 which stated that upon return of the advance amount within 12 months, the plaintiff would cancel the registered agreement and return the original title deeds. When the Trial Court decreed the suit in the plaintiff’s favour, the defendants appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the suit and held that the agreement of sale appeared to be a sham and nominal document.

The Supreme Court noted that the MoU was executed on the same day as the agreement of sale. It found that both the MoU and the No Objection letter from the defendant’s son were executed on non-judicial stamp paper purchased from the same stamp vendor on the same date. The witnesses to both the documents were also the same. The Court observed that these circumstances made out a very strong case that the agreement of sale was a nominal document executed as security for a loan transaction. Holding that the plaintiff approached the Court with unclean hands, it dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court held that a valuation report is not mandatory for reduction of share capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013.

The respondent, Bharti Telecom, decided to reduce its share capital under Section 66 of the Companies Act by cancelling equity shares held by its minority shareholders. The minority shareholders approached the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) arguing that the reduction in the value per share was mala fide since the valuation of the company was conducted by an internal auditor–an interested party. Further, they alleged that the company failed to disclose the valuation report to the shareholders. The appellants approached the Supreme Court after the NCLAT dismissed the plea.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeals. It held that a valuation report under Section 66 is not a statutory requirement and that reduction of share capital can be achieved through a special resolution approved by shareholders and confirmed by the tribunal. The Court further observed that non-disclosure or mis-disclosure of a valuation report does not invalidate the reduction process under Section 66 of the Act.