Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that preventive detention is not the appropriate remedy for a detaining authority if an accused violates their bail conditions.

The appellant, who was the wife of the detenu, had filed an appeal against a Kerala High Court judgement which had upheld the detention of her husband under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007. The husband was described as a “notorious goonda” who had several criminal cases pending against him. The detaining authorities said that he had violated his bail conditions and that his release would threaten “public order” .

The Supreme Court reiterated that preventive detention should be exercised in rare instances and was an exception to the protection of life and liberty under Article 21. The Bench pointed out that no application was made to cancel the bail granted to the detenu. They pointed out that the detaining authority did not clearly make a case for needing preventive detention.

The Supreme Court held that delivery of property is not necessary to charge a person under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for “putting a person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.” The Court clarified that Section 387 criminalises a step prior to the actual extortion where property delivery is essential.

The complainant and the accused run companies with the same name, M/S Balaji Traders and are involved in an ongoing intellectual property dispute. The complainant claimed that the accused threatened him with rifles, asking him to close down his business or pay five lakh rupees every month. The Trial Court found a prima facie offence under Section 387 and issued summons. The Allahabad High Court found that for a Section 387 offence to be made out, the victim must have transferred property or security to the accused.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision. The Bench held that Sections 385, 387, and 389 IPC are designed to punish the accused for an act committed for the purpose of extortion and not extortion itself.

The Supreme Court held that to calculate the limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint, not when the Magistrate takes cognisance.

The complainant filed a dowry harassment complaint against her husband and his family in 2002, alleging physical and mental abuse in 1999. An FIR was registered under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in 2002. The Magistrate took cognisance in 2004. The Sessions Court discharged the accused stating that the magistrate had taken cognisance of the case five years, whereas the limitation period was three years. The Delhi High Court held that the complaint was within time.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court order, and held that the complainant was not late in approaching the Court.

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence in cases where the appeal is filed by the accused.

The appellant trespassed into the house of his neighbour and hugged her. Shelater committed suicide. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 354 and 448 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and acquitted him of the charge under Section 306 of IPC. The High Court dismissed his appeal against his conviction. Using its suo moto Criminal Revision Petition, it convicted the appellant under Sections 306 and sentenced him with rigorous imprisonment for five years.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused. No appellant, by filing an appeal, can be made worse-off than what he was.

The Supreme Court held that in cases where a court has relied on circumstantial evidence, it must compare the prosecution’s evidence with that of the defence. A finding of conviction must be made out beyond a reasonable doubt. Where two views exist, the one favouring the accused should be taken.

Vaibhav, the accused, claimed that he found Mangesh, the deceased, in a pool of blood along with his father’s pistol. Thereafter, he admittedly disposed of the dead body and concealed the death. The prosecution claimed that this was an act of homicidal death, whereas Vaibhav claimed it was a case of accidental death. The Bombay High Court upheld Vaibhav’s conviction.

The Court overturned the decision of the High Court as it did not test Vaibhav’s version of events against the surrounding facts and circumstances. The Court set aside Vaibhav’s conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5 read with Section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959. It sustained the conviction on Section 201 of the IPC for causing the disappearance of evidence.

The Supreme Court held that the procedural safeguards laid down in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v State of Maharashtra (2014) for police encounters are binding and must be enforced regardless of whether the victim or their family initiates the complaint.

A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the Assam High Court sought an independent investigation into alleged fake encounters in the state. It noted that 80 incidents had resulted in 28 deaths and 48 injuries across the state. The State admitted that 171 police encounters occurred between May 2021 and August 2022, causing 56 deaths and 145 injuries. The High Court dismissed the PIL as premature and vague.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order. It directed the Assam Human Rights Commission to conduct an independent inquiry into the allegations. It held that PUCL guidelines (2014) — requiring mandatory FIRs, independent investigation by the CID or other stations, magisterial inquiry for deaths, forensic analysis and informing human rights commissions are not contingent on direct victim participation. Further, encounters resulting in death must be investigated fairly and mere ‘self-defence’ cannot be the only justification.

The Supreme Court held that maternity benefits may not be denied for the claimant’s third child under the Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules (TNFR).

Umadevi, a government English teacher, had applied for maternity leave for the birth of her third child. The District Chief Educational Officer rejected the application as the TNFR grants maternity leave to employees with less than two surviving children. Umadevi had a third child conceived in a second marriage. A Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court found the rejection illegal, as she did not have custody of her first two children. A Division Bench held that she was not entitled to maternity leave as per the Rules.

The Supreme Court adopted a purposive interpretation, giving importance to women’s reproductive rights. It held that the object of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 was to impose a limit on the duration of leave for more than two pregnancies, not to deny it altogether. It found that the State’s objective of population control must go hand in hand with women’s rights.

The Supreme Court set aside the sentence awarded to a Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) convict, reasoning that it would cause further injustice to the victim, who was now committed to the convict.

The Bench had previously overturned a Calcutta High Court decision which had indulged in “victim-shaming” while acquitting the accused in a POCSO case. While deciding the sentence to be awarded to the convict, the Supreme Court noted that there had been grave systemic failures, a lack of support from the victim’s parents and an absence of proper legal aid. They noted that the victim had dedicated herself to building a family with the convict and did not perceive the POCSO offence as a crime.

The Court clarified that this decision is not a precedent—it was a response to the failure of State machinery. The Bench directed the State Government of West Bengal to act as her guardian, provide proper shelter and pay for the victim and her child’s education. They directed the Union government to form a committee to implement the suggestions made by the Amicus Curiae to bring about institutional accountability in POCSO cases.

The Supreme Court held that a warrant is adequate to constitute the grounds for arrest. A reading of the warrant to the detained person is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest.

The accused’s father filed a writ of habeas corpus at the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He alleged that the CID’s arrest warrant for his son was not meaningful and lacked material information. Therefore, it violated Article 22 of the Constitution and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that on the face of it, the reasons proved sufficient.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that for the purpose of Article 22(1), full details of the offence are not necessary. The information should be sufficient for the person to understand the reason for the arrest. They reiterated the ratio in Vihaan Kumar v State of Haryana (2025) that informing a person of the reason for arrest was a constitutional mandate. However, unlike in this case, the arresting authority had furnished no warrant in Vihaan.

The Supreme Court held that direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasting services are not exempt from paying entertainment tax under Entry 62 of the State List merely because they pay service tax to the Central government under Entry 97 of the Union List.

The Court was hearing appeals against 42 judgements from 11 High Courts concerning the issue. The DTH services argued that they are liable to pay only service tax as they only broadcast content through signals. This cannot be construed as “entertainment” under the State List. State governments had argued that the “double aspect theory” allows taxation of DTH providers, as both “service” and “entertainment” taxes are distinct.

The Supreme Court held that broadcasting serves a double purpose—first, the transmission of signals to display content to the subscriber and second, subscribers provide and receive entertainment based on these signals. The content is transferred using signals for entertainment. Therefore, service tax is applicable for the broadcasting activity under the Finance Act, 1994 and the entertainment tax as per the state legislation.