Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 21 encompasses rehabilitative justice and dignity for prisoners. Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) are constitutionally mandated instruments for decongesting prisons and facilitating social reintegration, with cost-effectiveness deemed secondary to human dignity.

In 2018, the Supreme Court in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons directed States to implement Model Uniform Rules for OCIs. Human rights activist, Suhas Chakma filed the present writ petition in 2020 highlighting chronic prison overcrowding and seeking permanent decongestion mechanisms. Prisoners are selected for transfer to open prisons on the basis of seniority, conduct and physical and mental ability to work, subject to the completion of a stipulated portion of sentence awarded to them. Inmates are permitted to reside with their families, cultivate land, prepare their own meals and earn wages at rates significantly higher than those in closed prisons.

The Court directed all States to fill existing OCI vacancies within two months, establish new facilities where absent, and constitute Monitoring Committees headed by State Legal Services Authority Chairpersons. A High-Powered Committee under Justice S. Ravindra Bhat was directed to formulate Common Minimum Standards within six months. States were directed to revise eligibility criteria to prioritise reformative potential over incarceration duration and ensure gender-inclusive access by amending exclusionary rules within three months.

The Supreme Court held that “Sharbat Rooh Afza” is classifiable as a fruit drink under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UPVAT) and is taxable at four percent VAT, and not under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5 percent.

The dispute is related to the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 March 2012. The appellant paid four percent VAT, treating the product as falling under Entry 103, which covers processed or preserved vegetables and fruits including fruit jams, jelly, pickle, fruit squash, paste, fruit drink and fruit juice. The Joint Commissioner (Corporate Circle), Commercial Tax, Ghaziabad classified the product under the residuary entry in Schedule V and levied tax at 12.5 percent. The Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Commercial Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad and the Allahabad High Court affirmed that view. “Sharbat Rooh Afza” contained 10 percent fruit juice along with invert sugar syrup and herbal distillates. The Revenue relied upon the clarification dated 31 July 2009 under the Fruit Products Order, 1995 that a fruit syrup must contain a minimum of 25 percent fruit juice.

The Supreme Court held that regulatory enactments operate in a distinct domain and are neither determinative nor conclusive for purposes of fiscal classification. It noted that the expression “fruit drink” not being defined under the Act must be understood in common parlance. The Court further held that where the Revenue seeks to classify a product under the residuary entry, the burden lies upon it. Applying the test of essential character, it held that invert sugar syrup functions as a carrier, sweetening medium and preservative base and does not determine the commercial or beverage identity of the product. The Court allowed the appeals and directed payment of consequential relief including refund or adjustment of excess tax paid, in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court held that each member in an unlawful assembly is equally liable for acts committed in furtherance of a common unlawful object. It emphasised that superficial application of bail parameters in grave offences undermines public faith in justice.

A prior civil dispute existed between the parties over agricultural land. The appellant’s husband was assaulted by six persons with iron rods and sticks. When she and her relatives attempted to intervene, they were attacked and subject to caste-based slurs and obscene acts. Five days later, her husband died while undergoing treatment and the post-mortem identified eight injuries and blunt trauma to the head as a probable cause of death. Charges were framed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The High Court of Bombay granted bail to two respondents, citing the pending dispute as possible motive for false implication, failure to identify individual action of each accused and the time gap between assault and death.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order. It reversed the bail granted to the accused stating that it was erroneously granted without considering the material on record and the gravity of the offence. The Court held that the prior litigation could work as a motive for the attack as well, and observed that medical evidence is a trial-stage inquiry. The accused were directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks.

The Supreme Court held the evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure remains valid and can be further examined by the Court.

The Trial Court had summoned the appellant—a qualified radiologist—and two others after a District Appropriate Authority sting operation revealed that they were illegaly determining the sex of a foetus—barred under the Pre-natal and Pre-conception Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996. While no money was recovered from the appellant, ₹25,000 was recovered from his co-accused, Dr Abdul Kadir. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the complaint arguing that he is a victim of an illegal sting operation. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petition possessed no merit. The accused approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that unless there is an express or implied provision in law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure is not to be discarded. The Court further noted that it was prima facie revealed from the sting operation that the appellant has conducted ultrasonography on the pregnant women. The question as to whether he has disclosed the sex of the foetus is a matter of trial.

The Supreme Court held that missing DNA tests do not invalidate a deceased person’s identification if witnesses who knew them personally provide credible, consistent testimony.

The victim disappeared in July 2009. Based on a Section 27 statement from the appellant under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, her body was discovered inside a well and her vehicle was found at a railway station. Medical evidence revealed homicidal strangulation as the cause of death. The Trial Court and Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for murder and the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed his appeal. The appellant argued before the Supreme Court that there was no DNA identification of the decomposed body.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. It noted that DNA confirmation was unnecessary as the face of the deceased was still recognisable because of clothing and water had preserved the body. The Court found that the prosecution had established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. It noted the appellant spent 15 years in prison and granted him liberty to apply for remission.

The Supreme Court held that the power to award just and reasonable compensation in a deficient housing service flows from the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and cannot be curtailed by a one-sided clause in a builder-buyer agreement.

The disputes involved delays by a builder to hand over flats to three investors in a Gurugram project. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) directed the developer to complete construction and deliver possession. It also awarded interest compensation at eight percent per annum until possession, extended rebate, awarded costs and fastened post-cut-off stamp duty increases on the developer. The developer appealed, relying on the builder-buyer agreement clause which provided nominal compensation for delays and obligated buyers to pay stamp duty.

The Supreme Court upheld the NCDRC’s directions and dismissed the appeals. Further, it held that the award must be reasonable and proportionate to the delay and hardship caused. It granted the developer six months to secure the Occupancy Certificate and hand over possession in two matters. It clarified interest computation and issued directions for the supply of an Occupancy Certificate in the third.

The Supreme Court held that it is illegal to terminate services of an employee on the ground that their university degree was declared invalid after their graduation.

In 2004, the appellants graduated from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh with a Bachelors of Library Science degree. The University was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Viswavidyalaya Act 2002. The statute was declared invalid by the Supreme Court in 2005, on the ground that the legislative assembly was not competent to enact it. In 2009, the appellants were recruited as librarians by the Bihar government. The challenge to their recruitment was dismissed by the Patna High Court. However, the government terminated their employment in 2015. After a writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, a civil appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reinstated employment, noting that the appellants cannot be at fault merely for studying in a university established under an Act subsequently declared ultra vires.

The Supreme Court held that failed restructuring proposals do not replace or novate original loan agreements. It clarified that the Adjudicating Authority only checks for debt and default at the stage of initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It doesn’t need to determine financial viability or existence of disputes at this stage.

Power Trust took a loan of around ₹2000 crore from the creditor to set up a thermal power plant in Haldia, West Bengal. The loan was classified as a Non-Performing Asset in 2018. Loan restructuring plans were approved subject to fulfilment of pre-conditions. When Power Trust failed to fulfil these conditions, the creditor filed an application to initiate CIRP which was admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata and upheld by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Power Trust moved the Supreme Court, contending that the date of first default fell within the pandemic period barred under Section 10A.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed for the CIRP to continue. It found that the first default was made on the original contract, prior to the pandemic period and held that restructuring plans did not novate the original contract as they were underpinned to preconditions that were not fulfilled. Distinguishing between financial and operational creditors, the Court clarified that applications filed by the former do not provide for a demand notice or determination of dispute. It emphasised that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors cannot be second-guessed by a court.

The Supreme Court held that compensation cannot always be treated as a substitute for a reduced sentence. Sentences cannot be reduced mechanically and should have a visible application of mind.

The accused persons were convicted for offences of attempt to murder (Section 307), voluntarily causing hurt (Section 324) and grievous hurt (Section 326) under the India Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court had ordered three years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5000 each. The High Court upheld the convictions and remitted the sentence to the period already undergone, with an enhanced compensation of ₹50,000 each to the victim’s wife.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Judgement and observed that such compensation was a kind of “blood money”. The Court recognised that Section 395 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 granted monetary compensation to the victim, but only in addition to the sentence awarded and not as an alternative. The Court culled out proportionality, facts and circumstances, societal impact, and aggravating and mitigating factors as basic considerations to be kept in mind when imposing a sentence.

The Supreme Court held that a recovery statement made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not admissible if the accused is not in formal custody of the police when the information was provided.

On 5 October 2018, the appellant engaged in a physical altercation with his second wife, resulting in her hospitalisation. An FIR was subsequently filed against him but conflicting evidence made it unclear whether he was arrested on 5 October or 6 October. A neighbor alleged that the appellant had left on a motorcycle with his stepdaughter following the incident. However, a missing persons report was only registered for the daughter on 11 October. An oral report claimed she disappeared at 9:00 PM on 6 October. On 13 October, the accused provided a Section 27 statement regarding the location of the child’s remains. From that site, the police recovered bones, ashes, a skull and teeth fragments. The vertebrae and teeth matched the child’s biological parents. The police then arrested the accused for murder that same day, and the High Court later upheld his conviction based on the neighbour’s statement and the DNA match.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement and acquitted the appellant stating that there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence. The claim that the appellant had left on a motorcycle could not be corroborated as he was in police custody when the child went missing. Moreover, the neighbour’s statement was recorded seven days after the altercation. The Court did not consider the Section 27 statement as the accused was not in formal custody when it was recorded and was only arrested after the remains were found. It clarified that such statements will be admissible under Section 8 of the Act.