Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that an unexecuted agreement to sell cannot exclude immovable property from a “matruka”—property left behind without a will in Mohammedan law. It stated that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, confers no rights nor vests any interest in another party unless an agreement to sell is executed during the owner’s lifetime.

The litigation began over property Chand Khan left behind when he died without a will. His brother, Imam Khan, argued that the property was a matruka; thus 3/4th of the property belonged to him and 1/4th to Zoharbee, the deceased’s surviving widow. Zoharbee contended that there was nothing to divide as all the property had been transferred to third parties. Notably, the agreement to sell was executed by her after Chand Khan’s death. A Civil Court ruled in her favour and held that the property was not divisible. A First Appellate Court reversed the verdict and stated that the property was matruka as the agreement to sell was not executed before his death. The Bombay High Court dismissed Zoharbee’s appeal.

The Supreme Court upheld the Order of the First Appellate Court and the High Court. It held that immovable property cannot be excluded from the division simply because an agreement exists. Accordingly, Zoharbee was entitled to transfer only her 1/4th share of the property.

The Supreme Court held that higher courts should exercise their power of ordering a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations.

Petitioners before the Allahabad High Court alleged favouritism against an external agency which conducted the examination for recruitment to various posts in the Legislative Council. After a Single Judge disposed of the petition, a Division Bench—suo moto—ordered preliminary investigation by the CBI.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s orders for CBI’s preliminary probe, leaving it to the discretion of the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court observed that constitutional courts must exercise some degree of judicial discretion before burdening a specialised central agency with matters that do not satisfy the threshold of an exceptional case.

The Supreme Court ruled that mere placement on the waitlist does not create a vested right to be appointed to a vacancy. It further noted that a waitlist operates for a limited period and cannot be extended after a fresh recruitment process has commenced.

In 1997, a candidate from the Scheduled Caste category was first on the waitlist for the post of technician at All India Radio (AIR). There were three candidates ahead of the aggrieved candidate, and all of them had been appointed. Owing to non-selection, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which directed the candidate’s case to be considered based on a concession by AIR that he would be absorbed as soon as there was a vacancy against the SC quota. In June 2024, the Calcutta High Court didn’t interfere with this decision.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court, on the ground that waitlisted candidates cannot claim appointment after the validity of the selection list has expired. The Court noted that upholding the appointment would extend the life of an expired list.

The Supreme Court held that mere knowledge of the victim’s caste identity is sufficient to attract liability under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Personal acquaintance with the victim raises a presumption of such knowledge.

Shivkumar was convicted by a Trial Court for sexually assaulting a minor girl belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. The incident occurred in 2017, when the victim was aged 12. Following her statement and medical examination, Shivkumar—who was her neighbour—was arrested and charged under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the SC/ST Atrocities Act. The Trial Court’s sentence of life imprisonment was upheld by the Chhattisgarh High Court. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Shivkumar contended that there was no evidence to prove he knew the victim’s caste, which was a mandatory element for conviction under Section 3(2)(v).

The Court, relying on Patan Jamal Vali v State of Andhra Pradesh (2021), clarified that post-amendment, the focus is on knowledge of caste identity rather than motive. Referring to Section 8(c) of the Atrocities Act, it held that when the accused is personally acquainted with the victim or their family, such knowledge is presumed unless rebutted. Since evidence showed that the accused frequently visited the victim’s home, the Court held that he was aware of her caste. The conviction and life sentence were affirmed.

The Supreme Court refused to extend the relief granted to cultivators in Kedar Nath Yadav v State of West Bengal (2016) to a private company. Noting that Santi Ceramics falls squarely outside the protective framework of the 2016 Judgement, it added that even procedural principles exclude their claim.

Santi Ceramics had acquired 28 bighas of agricultural land in 2001-2002 and was granted approval for its conversion to industrial use in 2003. The state of West Bengal acquired the land in 2006 for an automobile factory in Singur. Santi Ceramics accepted the compensation allotted. Later, the acquisition was quashed in Kedar Nath Yadav, which was a PIL filed by farming communities. In 2016, Santi Ceramics sought restoration of the land which was accepted by the Calcutta High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the 2018 decision of the Calcutta High Court. It noted the remedial framework of Kedar Nath Yadav was specifically to benefit disadvantaged parties whose livelihoods faced extinction; it was not general restitution to be extended to industrial entities. The Bench added that the relief was granted in personam on the basis of objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not on fundamental grounds applicable to all. It also held the acquisition to be conclusively settled due to Santi Ceramic’s own inaction, voluntary acceptance of compensation and decade of silence.

The Supreme Court held that a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is maintainable against a trustee who signs a cheque on behalf of a trust, even though the trust itself is not made an accused.

A cheque issued by the Chairman and authorised signatory of the Orion Education Trust, which was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. A complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was filed against the Chairman in his personal capacity as the signatory of the cheque. He contended that Orion, being a juristic entity, was a necessary party and that failure to name it rendered the complaint defective. The Trial Court took cognisance and summoned him. The Meghalaya High Court quashed the complaint and the summoning order, noting that as the drawer of the cheque the trust should be arraigned as an accused. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging this finding.

The Supreme Court held that a trust is not a legal or juristic person under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 but an entity vested with the obligations attached to the ownership of property. Consequently, it cannot sue or be sued in its own name and functions only through its trustees. Since the cheque had been signed by the Chairman as an authorised representative, he was personally responsible for the transaction and fell within the ambit of Section 141 of the NI Act. The Court overruled contrary High Court rulings that had equated trusts with companies and restored the criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that couples who had commenced the surrogacy process cannot be denied their right to parenthood only because of the age bar under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.

Three couples intending to become parents had commenced the surrogacy process, prior to the commencement of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021. They were above the age-limits of 50 for women and 55 for men under Section 4(iii)(c) (I) of the Act. The couples filed a Writ Petition at the Supreme Court, challenging the propriety of the age-restrictions under the Act.

The Supreme Court held that couples intending to have a surrogate child have a constitutional right regulated by statute. The Bench exempted the petitioners from seeking certification on the qualifying age for the purpose of continuing surrogacy procedure, provided they satisfy the other conditions under the Act and the rules.

The Supreme Court held that the failure to file a written statement within the time stipulated under Rule 1(1) of Order VIII Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot result in denial of the substantial right of defence through cross-examination.

M/s. Aroush Motors was appointed as a dealer and paid over ₹171,00,000 toward inventory, security, fit-out, etc. When BS-IV vehicles got banned in 2020, the Defendant-M/s. Avnita Auto Tech failed to upgrade stock, stalling business for its dealers. Aroush Motors terminated the dealership in 2020 and sued for damages. The defendant appeared when summons was served in July 2021, but failed to file a written statement within the 120 days mandated for commercial suits. The trial court rejected multiple applications filed by Avnita Auto Tech for extension of time. It excluded the written statement, recorded the examination-in-chief of PW1, and marked the defendant’s cross-examination as Nil. A decree was accordingly passed against the defendant and upheld by the High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. The Bench held that citing procedural lapses for denial of the defendant’s right to cross-examination was “absolutely perverse” and violated the defendant’s right of defence. Further, it noted that a series of Orders passed by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 (March 2020 and February 2022) excused the application of limitation period. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court.

The Supreme Court extended the doctrine of public trust, which mandates government protection of natural resources for public use, to include man-made objects that promote the environment.

The Swacch Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the Bombay High Court against constructions developed near Futala Lake, Nagpur. They argued that the lake was a wetland and construction activities in the area violated the restrictions found under Rule 4(2)(vi) of the Wetlands (Conservation & Management) Rules, 2017. The High Court disposed of the PIL holding that Futala Lake did not fall under the definition of a ‘wetland’ under Rule 2(1)(g) of the 2017 Rules, as it was man-made. However, the Court recognised the status of Futala Lake as a wetland as declared by the National Wetland Inventory and Assessment (NWIA). Further, it noted that the Supreme Court had held that wetlands recognised by the NWIA should be protected as per Rule 4 of the 2017 Rules.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It reasoned that the doctrine of public trust compels the state to protect the lake and prohibit permanent constructions, even if the Futala Lake is man-made. It observed that much of the construction in and around the Futala lake was not permanent and met the criteria set in Rule 4.

The Supreme Court held that a tender condition which required bidders to have previously supplied goods to state government agencies in Chhattisgarh was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Vinishma Technologies, a supplier of sports kits to several states, challenged a clause in tender notices issued by the Chhattisgarh Government for the supply of sports kits to government school students. The condition required bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least six crores to state government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the three preceding financial years. The Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the clause, reasoning that it ensured reliable and timely delivery by suppliers familiar with the State’s geography.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. It held that while the State has discretion to frame tender criteria, such discretion is subject to the constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom of trade. The Court observed that linking eligibility to past supply within Chhattisgarh created an artificial barrier that curtailed competition and excluded qualified bidders, contrary to the doctrine of level playing field.