Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that reserve category candidates who score above the cut-off mark for open category candidates cannot be denied equality of treatment merely on account of their caste or community.

The Rajasthan High Court had advertised 2756 vacancies for Junior Judicial Assistants, involving a written test followed by a typewriting test. Several reserved candidates outscored general candidates. The reserved candidates were excluded because their marks were lower than their specific reserved category’s cut-off. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the general category list for qualifying examination should include meritorious candidates of the reserved categories to avoid discrimination against them.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It held that the “Open” category was not a quota and was accessible to all based on merit. Exclusion of such candidates violates the principles of equality, as merit remains the primary benchmark for unreserved posts.

The Supreme Court held that the benchmark for adjudging medical negligence is the lowest standard of professional skill and competence expected of a medical practitioner. It clarified that “deficiency in service” in patient care is distinct from “medical negligence” and that the two concepts must not be enmeshed.

The case involved an appellant who alleged negligence and deficiency in diagnosis at the respondent hospital. The West Bengal Clinical Establishment Regulatory Commission awarded ₹20 lakh in compensation, noting that an unqualified doctor had performed critical procedures. While a Single Judge upheld this, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision, holding that negligence and deficiency are intertwined and require a specialised body for assessment.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s ruling, confirming that the doctor lacked minimum qualifications. The Court held that the Commission acted within its authority under Section 38 of the West Bengal Clinical Establishments (Registration, Regulation and Transparency) Act, 2017 by focusing on deficiencies in patient care. It held that under Sections 29 and 33 of the Act, hospitals are liable to pay compensation where their actions cause imminent danger, injury or death.

The Supreme Court held that timelines imposed by High Courts to conclude investigations are the exception rather than the norm. It held that Courts must respect the practical realities of investigations and should only impose deadlines in situations where inaction would lead to adverse consequences.

In this case, three individuals approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 seeking to quash accusations of forging documents and filing false affidavits to procure arms licenses under the Arms Act, 1959, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Relying on Shobhit Nehra v State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), the Allahabad High Court directed investigative agencies to conclude the probe within 90 days and granted the accused protection from arrest until the court took cognisance. The State appealed, arguing that the timeline was unjustified, risked prejudicing a serious criminal investigation and ignored the distinct factual context of Shobhit Nehra.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order. It noted that Shobhit Nehra arose from a family dispute, unlike the present case involving allegations of serious criminal conduct. The Court held that directions for time-bound investigation must not be issued routinely or as a matter of course. It clarified that relying on judicial precedent is not a mechanical exercise; it must reflect an application of mind to the specific facts of the case.

The Supreme Court held that a cheque bounce case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) cannot be quashed at the pre-trial stage by carrying out an enquiry on the disputed question of fact.

The appellant corporation lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the NIA, alleging that the cheque of Rs 20,00,000 issued by the respondent was declined owing to insufficient funds. After legal notice was issued, the respondent denied having issued the cheque and refused to make the payment. Subsequently, the trial court took cognisance of the complaint. Aggrieved by the summoning order of the trial court, the respondent appealed to the Patna High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceeding, holding that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of debt or any other liability.

The Supreme Court held that at the pre-trial stage, the Court is only required to examine whether the material placed on record make out a prima facie case. It cannot carry out a detailed inquiry into the nature of debt or liability. Further, the Court stated that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 by conducting an inquiry at the pre-trial stage.

The Supreme Court held that a cheque bounce case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) cannot be quashed at the pre-trial stage by carrying out an enquiry on the disputed question of fact.

The appellant-corporation lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the NIA, alleging that the cheque of Rs 20,00,000 issued by the respondent was declined owing to insufficient funds. After legal notice was issued, the respondent denied having issued the cheque and refused to make the payment. Subsequently, the trial court took cognisance of the complaint. Aggrieved by the summoning order of the trial court, the respondent appealed to the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 where the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceeding, holding that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of debt or any other liability.

The Supreme Court stated that at the pre-trial stage, the Court is only required to examine whether the material placed on record make out a prima facie case. It cannot carry out a detailed inquiry into the nature of debt or liability. Further, the Court stated that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 by conducting an inquiry at the pre-trial stage.

The Supreme Court held that in cases of child trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation, the evidence of minor victims must be appreciated with sensitivity and realism. It held that the credible testimony of a minor victim can, by itself, sustain a conviction and cannot be rejected on the basis of minor inconsistencies.

K.P. Kirankumar and another accused were prosecuted for offences relating to procuration, buying and selling of a minor for prostitution and commercial sexual exploitation under Sections 366A, 372, 373 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; read with Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. A minor girl was rescued after a police raid based on information provided by NGO workers. The Trial Court convicted the accused, and the Karnataka High Court dismissed their appeal, holding that the testimony of the minor victim was reliable and sufficiently corroborated.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and held that a minor victim of sex trafficking is not an accomplice and her testimony, if found credible and convincing, can form the basis of conviction as that of an injured witness. Finding the victim’s age established by school records and her testimony consistent on material particulars, the appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) includes Corporate Environmental Responsibility. The Court ruled that the definition of “community” under the CSR framework explicitly includes the natural world, as there is a fundamental link between social welfare and environmental health.

The petitioner approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 in 2019 to seek protection for the Great Indian Bustard (GIB), a species found primarily in Gujarat and Rajasthan. The Court subsequently tagged connected proceedings seeking the deployment of bird flight diverters along the GIB’s migration path. By an interim order in 2021, the Court restricted the installation of overhead transmission lines on the migration path and established a committee to consider the feasibility of high-voltage underground power lines. Responding to an Interlocutory Application from the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change, the Ministry of Power and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, the Court stated that there was no basis to impose a total prohibition on the installation of transmission lines. The Court appointed an expert committee to suggest recommendations that strike a balance between conservation and development. This committee submitted reports for Rajasthan and Gujarat, identifying priority and non-priority areas where the states would implement in-situ and ex-situ conservation measures.

The Court held that entities engaged in power generation and transmission in both priority and non-priority areas in Rajasthan and Gujarat must remember that they share the environment with the GIB. It reiterated the “species best interest” standard, placing the survival of the species as the top priority. Further, the Court held that the “polluter pays” principle mandates that those responsible should bear the cost of the species’ recovery. Accepting the committee’s report, the Court issued directions to Gujarat and Rajasthan for their implementation.

The Supreme Court held that decisions relating to the sittings of the High Court, allocation of judicial work, or the organisation of judicial access are integral to the Chief Justice’s administrative responsibilities.

A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the administrative notification issued by the Bombay High Court in exercise of powers under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, appointing Kolhapur as an additional place of sitting with effect from 18 August 2025 The petitioner contended that the power under Section 51(3) could not be used to create what was, in effect, a permanent additional Bench, and that the decision was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21.

The Supreme Court held that districts proposed to be served by the Kolhapur sitting constitute a contiguous region, and the decision therefore bears a clear and reasonable nexus with the object of facilitating access to justice for litigants from that region. It dismissed the petition, holding that no material had been placed on record to suggest that the decision was vitiated by mala fides or influenced by any extraneous consideration.

The Supreme Court held that whether an individual member of a consortium can invoke arbitration under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 depends on the terms of the contract and the consortium arrangement.

Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation (APGENCO) awarded an EPC contract for works at its thermal power project to a consortium of companies, including Tecpro Systems. The General Conditions of Contract contained an arbitration clause. Disputes arose during execution and Tecpro Systems invoked arbitration in its individual capacity. APGENCO objected before the Telangana High Court, contending that arbitration could be invoked only by the consortium as a whole. The High Court rejected the objection and constituted an arbitral tribunal under Section 11.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order. It held that once the court is satisfied that an arbitration agreement prima facie exists, it should not undertake a detailed enquiry at the Section 11 stage. It noted that questions relating to the authority of a consortium member to invoke arbitration, the continuance of the consortium or the maintainability of claims must be decided by the arbitral tribunal. The appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that leading questions are permissible in cross-examinations and that answers elicited in response do not, for that reason alone, lose probative value. The Court further noted that omissions in examination-in-chief can be fixed at the time of cross-examination.

In 1998, the appellant executed a will bequeathing his properties to eight of his nine children, excluding his daughter, who had married outside the community. In 2011, the daughter filed a suit seeking partition of the property. The trial court ruled in her favour, noting that the testimony of the sole surviving attesting witness did not satisfy the requirement for valid execution of the will, owing to the material omission of certain facts during examination-in-chief. The verdict was upheld by the High Court, noting that answers elicited through leading questions in cross-examination could not cure omissions in examination-in-chief.

The Supreme Court held that the probative value of answers given in cross-examination cannot be denied merely because the questions were leading. The Court further noted that the standard of proof required for a will that excludes one legal heir is less stringent than lower than that applicable to a will that divests all legal heirs.