Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the State government could not require cooperative societies to obtain an additional recommendation from the Assistant Registrar before availing stamp duty exemption under Section 9A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended in Bihar/Jharkhand). Once a society is registered, the certificate issued under Section 5(7) of the Jharkhand Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act, 1996, is conclusive proof of its existence, and no further verification can be imposed.

Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society, a housing cooperative, challenged a 2009 directive of the State of Jharkhand that conditioned the Section 9A exemption on obtaining a recommendation from the Assistant Registrar. The Jharkhand High Court upheld the directive, holding that the additional step ensured scrutiny and prevented improper claims of exemption.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement. It held that neither Section 9A of the Stamp Act nor the 1996 Cooperative Societies Act contemplates an additional certification requirement. The registration certificate is conclusive evidence of the society’s legal status, and the State cannot introduce an extra-legal condition that restricts the statutory exemption. The directive was found to be arbitrary, unsupported by statute and an impermissible administrative overreach.

The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be rendered irrelevant merely because death was not imminent at the time of recording the statement.

The appellant (brother of the deceased) was informed by his niece (daughter of the deceased) that the deceased was shot down by her husband at the instigation of his relatives. The chargesheet filed against the husband did not name the relatives in the FIR. The appellant applied to the trial court, praying for the summoning of the additional accused based on the dying declaration under Section 161 of the CrPC. The trial court dismissed the appeal, stating that Section 161 of the CrPC cannot be treated as a dying declaration since the death occurred after a substantial period from the recording of the statement. The High Court affirmed the order.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that these statements cannot be treated as a dying declaration, noting that the law does not require the declarant to be under the imminent assumption of death for a dying declaration to be considered valid. Conclusively, the Supreme Court held that, based on the dying declaration of the deceased, the remaining accused shall be summoned under the powers of Section 319.

The Supreme Court held that a rented residential dwelling does not lose its character as a residential lease merely because the lessee sub-lets the premises as a hostel for students or working professionals. The GST exemption for residential use depends on the nature of the property, not on the identity or residential status of the lessee.

Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish leased a multi-room residential property in Bengaluru to a private company that provided long-term hostel accommodation to students and working women. The Authority for Advance Ruling and the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling denied the GST exemption, treating the arrangement as commercial hostel accommodation. The Karnataka High Court reversed the orders, holding that the property retained its character as a residential dwelling and that the exemption could not be denied because the lessee was a corporate entity.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgement. It held that residential dwellings used for long-term stay continue to fall within the exemption, regardless of whether the occupant resides under a direct lease or through a sub-letting arrangement. The Court rejected the view that the lessee must personally use the premises as a residence, and clarified that a later amendment restricting the exemption cannot operate retrospectively.

The Supreme Court held that rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.

Mission Accessibility filed a writ petition seeking the modification of the timeline for scribe registration in the Civil Services Examination and for permitting the use of laptops equipped with the Screen Reader Software (SRS) along with accessible digital question. The UPSC resolved to introduce the SRS for visually impaired candidates, but conceded it lacks the necessary infrastructure for implementing it.

The Court directed that the Union Public Service Commission shall include a clear provision permitting candidates eligible for a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days prior to the exam. The Court directed the UPSC to file a comprehensive compliance affidavit within a period of two months formulating uniform guidelines and protocols for the use of SRS and other assistive technologies to ensure standardisation, accessibility and security of the examination process.

The Supreme Court held that divorced Muslim women are entitled to recover gifts given to the husband at the time of marriage under The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Court held that the Act concerns securing the dignity and protection of Muslim women post-divorce, which directly aligns with the rights guaranteed under Article 21.

The appellant approached the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur, under Section 3 of the Muslim Women Act 1986, seeking the return of a total of Rs 17.67 Lacs–including 30 bhories of gold and articles that were given to the bridegroom, the respondent. The Court ordered the return of the mehr amount of Rs 1 lac alongside Rs 7 lacs, and 30 bhories of gold given as a gift to the bridegroom. Both parties preferred a revision petition, following which the matter was remanded for a fresh trial. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) ordered the return of gifts given to the respondents. Aggrieved by the order of the ACJM, the respondent approached the High Court. The High Court set aside the ACJM’s direction. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court and held that gifts given to the bridegroom at the time of marriage are eligible to be recovered on divorce. The Court observed that the interpretation of the Muslim Women Act 1986 must keep in view the equality and autonomy of women.

The Supreme Court held that a co-accused cannot seek bail solely on the basis that other accused persons were granted bail in the same offence. Bail based on parity should only be granted to co-accused who are suspected of committing similar actions.

The accused was charged with the murder, while his father, the co-accused, was charged with instigating the crime. The Allahabad High Court granted bail to his father after considering that he had a strong alibi. Subsequently, the High Court granted bail to the accused on the sole ground of parity since his father was granted bail by the same Court. The appellant-complainants prayed for his bail to be set aside.

The Supreme Court stressed that bail based on parity must consider the specific circumstances of every individual accused of the alleged crime. The Court must examine the unique role each person played in the offence and not just treat the fact that they are involved in the same crime as a common factor. The bench also stated that no one has a right to claim bail based purely on parity.

The Supreme Court held that complaints of cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must be tried by the court within the territorial jurisdiction of the payee’s home branch. The Court ruled that even if a cheque is deposited at a different branch of the same bank, legally, it counts as being delivered to the customer’s home branch when determining which court has jurisdiction.

A Cheque drawn by Jai Balaji Industries Limited in the name of the complainant company, M/s HEG Limite,d was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The Cheque, drawn in Kolkata, was deposited in Bhopal. A statutory notice of dishonour was sent to the accused company, and subsequently, a complaint was filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. Later, the Court, upon request by the complainant, returned the case, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under Section 142 of the NI Act. Following this, a complaint was registered with the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Bhopal, which Balaji Industries objected to. The JMFC Court rejected the objection. This was challenged in a criminal revision application before the Sessions Court, Bhopal, pending adjudication. The matter was taken up by the Supreme Court under its Criminal Original Jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathord v State of Maharashtra and held that the question of jurisdiction must strictly arise from the lens of territoriality of the offence. The Court held that Section 142(2) of the NI Act confers jurisdiction to the Court within whose limits the payee’s bank is situated.

The Supreme Court held that it is fundamental to the rule of law to maintain the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts. Public confidence in the judiciary is maintained if the finality of verdicts is upheld.

In January 2025, the Supreme Court granted bail to SK. Md. Anisur Rahaman, who faced trial for the murder of his political rival. The bail conditions restricted him to Kolkata. In May 2025, his plea seeking a modification of the bail condition was rejected by the Supreme Court. Rahman subsequently approached the Court once again, seeking a modification of the bail condition. Another petition was filed seeking the cancellation of his bail by the brother of the deceased rival.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application and the plea seeking the cancellation of his bail. The Court noted that the condition requiring him to stay in Kolkata would be frustrated if it was modified. Moreover, the Court held that Rahaman’s fresh application was an attempt to acquire a new verdict from the Court as the presiding Judge who granted him bail and dismissed his application for modification had retired.

The Supreme Court held that debtors cannot challenge an auction sale if they knew about the process to seize and sell their property and had a chance to raise objections before the final sale notice (sale proclamation) was issued.

To fulfill a debt, property attached from K.J. Prakash Kumar and other debtors was scheduled for auction. Prakash Kumar and the other judgement debtors appeared before the executing court on multiple dates, sought adjournments, filed counters and later chose not to participate. The sale was confirmed in favour of G.R. Selvaraj. Both the executing court and the appellate court upheld the sale. The Madras High Court set it aside on the ground that selling a smaller portion of the property might have covered the debt.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Order and restored the sale. It held that any objection to selling only part of the property should have been raised by Prakash Kumar and the other judgement debtors before the proclamation of sale. Since they had full notice and failed to act at the appropriate stage, they were barred from challenging the sale belatedly under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

The Supreme Court held that any challenge against the appointment or the continuation of an arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, will be waived if the parties jointly apply for an extension of time under Section 29A of the Act.

Hindustan Construction Company and Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd (BRPNNL) were involved in an arbitration proceeding relating to claims arising from the extended period of a bridge project. The Patna High Court appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. Both sides participated in more than seventy sittings and jointly sought multiple extensions under Section 29A. After final arguments began, BRPNNL filed a review petition against the appointment of the arbitrator. The Patna High Court recalled the Section 11 Order, putting a stop to the arbitration proceedings.

The Supreme Court restored the arbitral process. It held that BRPNNL’s participation and its joint Section 29A applications amounted to a clear waiver of any objection to the arbitrator’s appointment. Since there was no claim of ineligibility under Section 12(5), the High Court had no basis to recall the earlier Section 11 order. The arbitration was directed to continue before a substitute arbitrator was appointed under the contract.