Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a photocopy of a document constitutes secondary evidence and cannot be admitted or relied on unless the party seeking to produce it accounts for the non-production of the original.

The plaintiff alleged that her brother used a forged Power of Attorney (PoA) to sell her properties in Kozhikode to the defendants. The Trial Court invalidated the sale deeds noting suspicious font differences between the draft PoA and the one used for sale. The First Appellate Court reversed this decision, relying on a photocopy of the PoA used for sale. The High Court of Kerala restored the Trial Court’s decree, finding the photocopy inadmissible as secondary evidence. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court against invalidation of sale.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. It found that in order to introduce secondary evidence, the party must first prove their legal right to do so under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It emphasised that the presumption of valid execution under Section 85 of the Evidence Act and Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908, cannot be triggered if the photocopy has not been legally admitted through the two-step process prescribed for secondary evidence.

The Supreme Court held that “loss of love and affection” is not a separate component of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but is subsumed under the head of “consortium”, which is a tort law term referring to the deprivation of the benefits of a family relationship. It further held that “future prospects” is an integral component of “just compensation” under Section 168 of the Act.

The appeals arose from an accident where a tanker lorry collided with a two wheeler, instantly killing the victim. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai awarded compensation of ₹9.37 lakh. On appeal by the claimants, the Madras High Court modified the award to ₹10.51 lakh, increasing compensation awarded under the head of “loss of love and affection” to the victim’s two minor children. The claimants then appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the denial of future economic prospects.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and modified the award to ₹20.8 lakh. It accepted evidence to support the claimant’s submission regarding monthly income. In view of the Constitution Bench decision in National Insurance v Pranay Sethi, it held that inclusion of “future prospects” is a binding norm under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court also considered a conceptual tension in Pranay Sethi, which recognised anticipated economic progression as a valid loss but denied inclusion of emotional deprivation. It applied United India Insurance v Satinder Kaur to include parental and filial affection under “consortium”.

The Supreme Court held that where the existence of ancestral properties capable of yielding income is established, acquisitions made by the Karta during the subsistence of a Joint Hindu Family are ordinarily regarded as joint family properties. It clarified that the burden of proof lies on the coparcener asserting that such acquisitions are self-acquired.

Doraisamy instituted a suit for partition claiming share in immovable properties, contending that the properties were joint Hindu family properties. Dorairaj, another coparcener, argued that several properties were his self-acquisitions, relying on sale deeds executed in his favour by the Karta and an unregistered Will. The Trial Court included the properties alleged to have been acquired by Dorairaj in its preliminary partition decree. The First Appellate Court and the Madras High Court both affirmed the decree for partition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court decision. It held that Dorairaj had failed to discharge the burden of proving self-acquisition. It further held that alienations made by the Karta in favour of one coparcener must be strictly proved and that vague recitals were insufficient. It observed that separate enjoyment, installation of irrigation facilities or individual borrowings did not establish severance of joint family status in the absence of a clear intention to divide.

The Supreme Court held that further investigations cannot be undertaken by the police/investigating agency without obtaining the leave of the Magistrate once the final report under Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) has been submitted.

In 2013, an FIR was registered against seven persons for alleged rape and sexual assault. Noting no offence was made out, the police filed a closure report which was accepted by the Magistrate in the absence of protest petitions. After three years, the original complainants filed a Criminal Revision Petition and a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) against the closure. In compliance with directions of the NHRC, the Under Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh recommended further investigation in the same FIR under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. The accused’s appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and held that application of mind by the Magistrate/Court is indispensable to ascertain whether further investigation is to be ordered. It found that Section 173(8) confers power solely upon the Magistrate and quashed the directions for further investigation.

The Supreme Court held that employing teachers on a permanently fixed honorarium below minimum wage amounts to ‘begar’, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. It held that teachers on contract are deemed permanent employees if their employment continues beyond expiry of the contract, and if they perform duties equivalent to regular teachers while being barred from taking alternative employment.

In furtherance of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Article 21A, several part-time instructors were appointed in Upper Primary Schools in Uttar Pradesh on contractual basis. Their monthly salary remained ₹7,000 for over a decade. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from March 2017, but the Division Bench restricted this to 2017-18 only. The State appealed against on grounds of financial burden while the teachers appealed against the limited period of enhanced payment.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from 2017-18 onwards, with arrears to be paid within six months. It deemed the teachers to be permanent employees entitled to periodic revision at least once in three years.

The Supreme Court held that project cost and turnover can be taken as a metric for determination of environmental compensation. It emphasised that powers conferred upon the National Green Tribunal (NGT) are wide, flexible and principle-oriented by legislative design.

The appeals arose from disposal of two original applications by the NGT, Pune. In both cases, local residents alleged that the appellant companies had exceeded the bounds of environmental clearance (EC) that was granted to them. Joint Committees were constituted to determine facts, and in both cases established the alleged violations. Acting upon the Committees’ recommendations, the NGT quantified compensation in a manner commensurate to the scale and impact of the projects in question.

The Supreme Court dismissed appeals and upheld the compensation imposed by the NGT. It noted that the compensation barely extended to 1.49 per cent of the project cost, reminding that Goel Ganga Developers v Union of India had laid down that the outer limit of damages could extend up to 5 per cent. Additionally, the Court observed that linking scale to impact sends a crucial message to bigger players. It clarified that turnover is not a universal and inflexible metric but rather one permissible indicium and may be applied depending on the facts of the case.

The Supreme Court held that menstrual health is an aspect of right to life and the right to free and compulsory education under Article 21 and 21A respectively.

Dr. Jaya Thakur filed a writ petition under Article 32 requesting the Court to direct all states and union territories to provide free sanitary pads and separate toilet facilities for girls studying from 6th to 12th standards. Other demands concerned sensitization programs on menstrual health. The petition cited staggering drop-out rates and absenteeism among menstruating school girls.

The Supreme Court held that although the right to education is a non-derogable right, it loses its spirit due to lack of affirmative action to “barrier-free” access for menstruating girls. Further, the Court issued directions, in a continuing mandamus, for all States and Union Territories to ensure availability of toilets and menstrual absorbents while directing strict compliance within a period of three months.

The Supreme Court held that a voluntary option to undergo a medical procedure does not constitute a valid consent if it is based on inadequate information. It held that offering unproven therapy fails the standard of care owed by medical professionals.

The Supreme Court heard a writ petition challenging the administration of stem cell therapy for treating Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Petitioners argued that the therapy has an experimental status and allegedly violates the regulatory framework—the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 promulgated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research, 2017. The Union and the National Medical Commission relied on expert recommendations concluding that the therapy lacked proven efficacy and should not be offered as standard treatment. Clinics argued that stem cell therapy does not fall within the definition of “drug” as it involves autologous procedures—performed using the patients’ own cells.

The Court held that stem cell therapy for ASD cannot continue as a commercial endeavour. One would have the liberty to participate in an approved and regulated research/clinical trial. The Court suggested a Pan-Indian Authority for regulating stem cell therapy research and enacting legislation. The Secretary of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was directed to re-route patients already undergoing therapy to clinical trials within four weeks.

The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of time for making an arbitral award under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. The mere fact that an arbitrator was appointed by a High Court does not confer jurisdiction on it to entertain applications under Section 29A.

Arbitration proceedings were invoked in a family dispute between Jagdeep Chowgule and Sheela Chowgule. An application seeking extension of time was filed before the Commercial Court. Meanwhile, the Bombay High Court appointed an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act. The parties challenged the order of the Commercial Court which extended the mandate of the tribunal. The Bombay High Court held that only the High Court may grant extensions since the arbitrator was appointed by them.

The Supreme Court set aside the Judgement of the High Court. The Court held that the High Court becomes functus officio after appointing an arbitrator. Matters relating to the continuation of the arbitral proceedings, including extension of time under Section 29A, fall within the jurisdiction of the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e). The Court restored the Order of the Commercial Court and observed that it had original jurisdiction to entertain the Section 29A application.

The Supreme Court held that Section 175(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which deals with complaints against public servants, is not a stand-alone provision and must be read in conjunction with Section 175(3). A Magistrate receiving a complaint under Section 175(4) must ensure it is supported by a written affidavit, as mandated under Section 175(3). In the absence of such an affidavit, a complainant cannot approach a Magistrate.

The appellant alleged sexual assault by three police officers on separate occasions during the course of a property dispute investigation at her residence. She filed a complaint under Section 175(4) of the BNSS, which obligates a Magistrate to order an investigation against a public servant for acts committed during the discharge of official duties. This is hinged upon receipt of a report detailing the facts and circumstances of the incident from a superior officer. She subsequently approached the Kerala High Court, arguing that the procedural requirements of Section 175(4) were inapplicable as the police officers were not acting in the discharge of their official duties. A Single Judge agreed, observing that the offence of rape could not be committed by a public servant in the discharge of official duties. However, a Division Bench set aside this order, ruling that the Single Judge should not have intervened when a complaint was already pending before a Magistrate under Section 175(4). Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench’s judgement, holding that the Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction since the Magistrate had already initiated the process. The Court directed the Magistrate to ensure the complainant’s application is supported by the statutorily mandatory affidavit before proceeding with any further inquiry.