Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a private complaint alleging an offence under Section 125-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 is maintainable and is not subject to the bar under Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The appellant lodged a complaint against the respondent, a member of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly, under Section 200 of the CrPC for making a false disclosure in an affidavit accompanying his nomination paper. The Karnataka High Court quashed the complaint in the respondent’s petition after noting that a voter cannot file a private complaint against an elected representative. It held that such a complaint is barred under Section 195 of the CrPC. The appellant moved the Supreme Court arguing that the bar on cognisance under Section 195 is restricted to Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and does not extend to a complaint under Section 125-A of RoPA.

The Supreme Court, while upholding the quashing of the complaint, held that omission of Section 125-A of the RoPA under Section 195 of the CrPC is deliberate and thus, the bar would not be applicable to complaints lodged by a private person.

The Supreme Court held that severance compensation for land acquired under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be calculated as a percentage of the market value of the remaining, unacquired land and not the acquired strip.

The Punjab government had issued notifications under Section 4 of the Act to acquire 18.42 km of land across six villages for construction of the Aspal Extension Drain. The project split agricultural holdings, rendering the remaining, unacquired land on the other side of the canal inaccessible. The Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) awarded a uniform rate of ₹2.25 lakhs per acre for irrigated land across all villages but granted nil compensation for severance charges. The Reference Court under Section 18 enhanced the market value up to ₹5 lakhs per acre and granted 50 per cent severance charges calculated on the value of the remaining unacquired land. The Punjab and Haryana High Court reduced the severance charges to 40 per cent of the acquired land. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s holding and restored the 50 per cent severance charge on the unacquired land. It held that severance charges under Section 23(1) are statutorily designed to compensate for the diminution in value of the remaining, unacquired land rendered inaccessible due to a physical barrier.

The Supreme Court directed that an independent psychiatric evaluation of the child must be considered while arresting and summoning a parent or family member accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) during a matrimonial dispute.

The Bengaluru Family Court granted custody of a daughter to her father in 2022. The Karnataka High Court upheld this decision and granted the mother visitation rights. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. When the father challenged her visitation rights, she lodged a FIR alleging that he sexually assaulted their daughter and that she was mistreated by his family. The Supreme Court transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), who found the allegations unsubstantiated after an inquiry which included an expert evaluation of the child.

The Supreme Court accepted the CBI’s findings and quashed the FIR. It directed that the father have legal custody. The Court made its safeguards applicable to investigations underway on the judgement date and to private complaints under Section 33 of the POCSO Act in which summons had yet to be issued. It permitted exceptions where the material is palpable and reasons are recorded in writing, and held that custody courts must assess the material supporting the allegations case by case.

The Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional courts i.e. High Courts and the Supreme Court have power to direct a reinvestigation as a dynamic component of judicial review, a basic feature of the Constitution.

The original petitioner’s daughter was discovered dead a day after he filed a missing persons complaint. The post-mortem report revealed rape and murder. The petitioner accused three boys in the locality as the culprits. One of the boys handed over Santosh Rao to the local police. Rao was arrested and was identified as the perpetrator by both the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The petitioner maintained that Rao was innocent and in 2023 he was acquitted by a Session Court. The petitioner filed applications for reinvestigation in the Karnataka High Court under Article 226 and 227 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court dismissed the petition while acknowledging the need for reinvestigation, and held that critical evidence was not collected during the “golden hour”. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s dismissal and directed de novo investigation by a state constituted Special Investigation Team as potential witnesses were identified and DNA analysis was still possible. It emphasised the right to a fair trial under Article 21, particularly in cases where the investigation has been conducted in a manner to “help someone escape the clutches of the law.”

The Supreme Court held that a decision of a Single Judge of a High Court under Article 226 cannot be overturned through an appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, which enables an intra-court appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court.

The appellant, the Deputy Registrar of Periyar University, was accused by the respondent-University for amassing wealth disproportionate to his income. The respondent set up a one–member committee after the appellant refused to co-operate with a three-member inquiry committee. The appellant was dismissed after the one-member committee submitted a report that was accepted by the University Syndicate. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, set aside the dismissal and reinstated the appellant’s service on the ground that the inquiry report was made without concrete evidence. The respondent moved under Clause 15 of Letters Patent. The Division Bench set aside the Single-Judge Bench decision, noting that the One-man Commission Report is sufficient to establish charges as it is corroborated by documentary evidence. The appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Division Bench. It held that Courts under Clause 15 of Letters Patent can act only as “Court of Correction” and cannot interfere with a writ court’s decision unless the Single Judge’s decision is glaringly erroneous with errors apparent on the face of the record.

The Supreme Court held that the threshold for satisfying the meaning of “default” to initiate insolvency procedure under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is prima facie finding of financial debt rather than complete adjudication of the claims.

In December 2017, the appellants, the corporate debtors, extended aggregate term loans worth ₹600 Crores by the respondent, which crystallised in November 2022. In February 2023, the respondent recorded debt defaults with the National E-Governance Services (NeSL) and subsequently, recalled the loan, by which the appellants were asked to pay the remaining loan amount of ₹666 Crores. Not having received the debt amount, the respondent filed a petition to initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai. The NCLT admitted the petitions. In January 2024, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) set aside insolvency proceedings citing failure to consider submissions made by the appellants. In July 2025, the NCLT re-admitted insolvency petitions, which were affirmed by NCLAT in August. The appellants moved the Supreme Court, arguing that insolvency proceedings cannot be admitted since they continued to meet debt obligations.

The Supreme Court upheld the Orders of the tribunals, admitting insolvency proceedings under Section 7. It held that admission of insolvency proceedings depends on the prima facie occurrence of default and authorities are not expected to defer admission because parties dispute the details.

The Supreme Court held that the Administrator appointed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Section 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 lacks the statutory authority to write down Additional Tier 1 (AT-1) Bonds once the Union Government intentionally omits the write-down clause from the final notified Reconstruction Scheme.

In December 2016 and October 2017, the appellant—YES BANK Limited—issued Basel III-compliant AT-1 Bonds worth ₹8415 crore with the respondent—Axis Trustee Services Limited—appointed as the trustee. Facing financial decline, the Union Government placed the appellant under a moratorium on 5 March 2020. The RBI appointed an Administrator under Section 36ACA of the 1949 Act and subsequently, published a Draft Reconstruction Scheme that contained a clause providing for the write-down of AT-1 Bonds. Following objections, the Union dropped the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme, notified on 13 March 2020. The next day, on 14 March 2020, the Administrator issued a “write-down” order, extinguishing the AT-1 Bonds. Bondholders and trustees challenged the Order before the Bombay High Court, which set aside the write-down. The appellant, the RBI and the Union government appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Bombay High Court’s judgement. The Court held that the Union had made a deliberate, conscious decision to drop the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme based on stakeholder objections.

The Supreme Court held that a person converted from the Hindu social order to Islam cannot claim reservation under Article 16(4) solely based on pre-conversion social backwardness. Conversion to a different faith does not determine entry into a notified Backward Class Muslim community, an identity rooted in ancestry, endogamy and traditional occupation.

Sameer Ahamed’s certificate for the “Muslim Labbai” community was refused in November 2020 on the ground that he had converted to a religion, not a caste. Tamil Nadu’s Government Order of 9 March 2024 let Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified and Scheduled Caste converts obtain certificates under seven Muslim communities. These communities share the 3.5% quota for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007. On 25 June 2026, the Madras High Court set aside the 2024 Order, and impleaded the state suo moto in Ahamed’s writ petition, before dismissing it.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Tamil Nadu government’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgement. The Court held that there is no common social link between converts and notified Muslim communities. It held the 2024 Order contrary to Article 14. It upheld the High Court’s review of the unchallenged Order, since the State had been heard.

The Supreme Court held that the AICTE Regulations, National Education Policy, 2020, coupled with principles of certainty, necessitates the relevant authorities to notify the fee payable for the entire course before a student takes admission. Any variation in the fee during the subsistence of the course is permissible in exceptional instances such as unforeseen increase in the expenditure.

The respondent students contested the legality and validity of a revised fee structure of the appellant in the High Court of Calcutta for students admitted before and after 16 October 2023. The students were admitted in the 2023-24 Academic Year for the 2023-2027 courses. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions by referring to the prospectus of the appellant college. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge holding that the revised fee notification was not retrospectively applicable to the students admitted before 16 October 2023. The appellant college and self-financing professional colleges filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court partly and held that the fee fixation committees have a statutory foundation and an important public purpose to serve. It held that the High Courts will exercise due judicial review to ensure that these committees perform their duties with institutional efficiency, expertise and integrity. It balanced the interests of the students for avoiding uncertainties, with that of the private educational institutions for reasonable sustenance and further development.

The Supreme Court held that the expression “personal law applicable to her” in the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 refers to the law in force on the date of the female Bhumidhar’s death (when succession opens). It does not refer to the law in force when the 1954 Act became operative or when the interest was originally inherited.

The Reversioners are male descendants from the family of a woman’s first marriage. She inherited a limited life estate when her first husband and son died. When the 1954 Act came into force, she was declared Bhumidhar and after enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 her limited interest was transformed into absolute ownership. Following her death in 1973, male descendants from her second marriage were granted mutation of the revenue records in their favour. The petitioners challenged the mutation, contending that the property reverted to the last male proprietor’s heir as per Section 50 of the 1954 Act. A single judge of the High Court ruled in their favour but this was set aside by the Division Bench which restored the mutation. The Reversioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Division Bench decision. It held that while the acquisition of interest under the 1954 Act is in the past tense, the trigger point “dies” is in the simple present tense. Thus, the nature of the female Bhumidhar’s right must be evaluated under the personal law applicable on the exact date of her death.