SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 9 | Issue 3

Volume 9 Issue 3 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here!

The Supreme Court delivered 18 reportable and non-reportable judgements last week. In this issue, we have identified five of the most important judgements, including decisions on: 

• Grant of disability pensions for ex-servicemen
• Presumption of guilt under POCSO Act, 2012
• Validity of methanol regulation
• Interim relief under Section 92, CPC 
• Payment of interest by award-debtor 

As always, all SCO.LR judgements come with concise and accurate summaries, in clean format with easy-citation features and a mindmap for a visual break-down 

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 9 | Issue 3

14 – 18 September 2026

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Grant of Disability Pensions for Ex-servicemen

Union of India v Col. N.C. Isaac (Retd.)

15 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 993 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(3)[11]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

The Supreme Court held that rules governing disability pensions for ex-servicement are claimant-protective. Modifications made thus far do not dismantle the protective structure of the Rules.

Over 270 appeals were filed by the Union against the grant of disability pensions, on the grounds that their disability was “neither attributable to nor aggravated by” military service. The Union argued that the twin presumptions under the 1982 Entitlement Rules—good health at entry in service and; in case of discharge on medical grounds, disability caused/aggravated by military service—were modified in 2008. The respondents contended that the 2008 Rules were merely a cosmetic change. 

The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals while taking note of a 2015 Ministry of Defence report that discouraged denial of disability benefits on hyper-technical grounds. It found that the 2008 Rules had no force of law while clarifying that it did not dismantle the core scheme of the 1982 Rules. 

Key words/phrases: 271 appeals challenging grant of disability pension to ex-servicement—Armed Forces Tribunal and high courts applied presumption of 1982 Rules to hold that disability was caused by military service—Union contested removal of presumption by 2008 Rules—Supreme Court held that 2008 Rules have no force of law—Clarified that they do not dismantle core presumptions of the 1982 Rules—Dismissed all appeals—Disability benefits should not be denied on hyper-technical grounds.

Read the Judgement here. 

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Presumption of Guilt Under POCSO Act, 2012

Deepak IN JC v State Govt. of NCT of Delhi 

17 September 2026 

Citations: 2026 INSC 1008 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(3)[12]

Bench: Justices P.K. Mishra and N.V. Anjaria

The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) is not absolute and is rebuttable. The presumption only operates after the prosecution establishes basic foundational facts constituting an offence beyond reasonable doubt at the threshold. 

The appellant was convicted and sentenced by the trial court under Section 6 of POCSO and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for penetrative sexual assault. The Delhi High Court relied on Section 29 to confirm the conviction and the sentence. The appellant approached the Supreme Court citing material contradictions between the testimonies of the victim’s mother and a private doctor she consulted. Physical examination and FSL reports found no injuries or blood.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that presumptive provisions neither dilute norms of a fair trial nor do they relieve courts from analysing evidence objectively. The Court ordered immediate release of the appellant stating that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption. 

Key words/phrases: Presumption as to certain offences—Section 29—Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012—Trial Court—Conviction for penetrative sexual assault—Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860—Conviction and sentence upheld by High Court—Supreme Court appeal—Contradictory testimonies—Presumption under Section 29 is not absolute—Only applies when prosecution establishes basic foundational facts

Read the Judgement here. 

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Validity of Maharashtra’s Methanol Regulation 

Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v Union of India

18 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1009 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(3)[13]

Bench: Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Chandran

The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation restricting trade is liable to be struck down if it does not bear a reasonable, proportionate nexus with its object.

The Maharashtra government introduced Rule 18A and 18B to the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972. Rule 18A required sellers to verify purchaser licences and add colourant and bitterant to methanol sold to non-drug manufacturers. Rule 18B provided for the confiscation of unlicensed methanol. Manufacturers challenged the rules arguing that they rendered methanol commercially unusable. The Bombay High Court dismissed the challenge. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court struck down Rules 18A and 18B as violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g), holding that the licensing and additive requirements failed to address diversion and pilferage while imposing a substantial, continuing burden on industry. The Bench suggested that the state adopt alternatives such as tighter licensing and stock reconciliation to prevent hooch tragedies.

Key words/phrases: Maharashtra Poisons Rules 1972—Amended in 2011—Rule 18A—Addition of colourant and bitterant to methanol sold for non-drug use—Rule 18B—Confiscation of methanol possessed without Form A licence—Additives made methanol unsuitable for manufacturing—Bombay High Court upheld the amended rules—Supreme Court appeal—Violates Article 14 and 19(1)g) of the Constitution—Rules struck down

Read the Judgement here. 

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Interim Relief Under Section 92 CPC

S. Panchalingu v People’s Education Trust

18 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 1010 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(3)[14]

Bench: Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan

The Supreme Court held that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while an application seeking leave to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is pending. Section 92 mandates the court’s leave for instituting a suit against a public charitable or religious trust.

The appellants alleged financial and administrative mismanagement, breach of trust and irregularities in the day to day functioning of the respondent-trust. They filed a civil suit under Section 92, accompanied by an application for leave to institute it and sought urgent interim protection, asking for appointment of an ad-hoc body to manage the trust’s affairs and properties. A trial court passed an interim order constituting the ad-hoc committee. The Karnataka High Court set aside this order, holding that the Court could not pass an interim order before granting leave to institute the suit.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that Section 92 is both a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword”, protecting public trusts from vexatious litigation while allowing action against their mismanagement. It held that an application for leave is a threshold requirement without which supplemental proceedings cannot be invoked.

Key words/phrases: Section 92—Public charitable and religious trusts—Leave of the Court—Mandatory pre-condition—Threshold proceeding—Protective shield and remedial sword—Protective or preservatory interim orders—Section 94—Order XL Rule 1—Appointment of receiver—Section 151—Inherent powers—Compelling urgency—Ex parte leave

Read the Judgement here.

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Payment of Interest by Award-Debtor 

National Seeds Corporation v National Agro Seed Corporation

18 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1017 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(3)[15]

Bench: Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

The Supreme Court held that when an award-debtor is restricted from unconditionally withdrawing the deposited amount, they are liable under Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to pay post-award statutory interest. 

The appellant was an award-debtor in execution proceedings initiated by the respondent to enforce an arbitral award of ₹1.46 crores plus 12 per cent interest. The Delhi High Court granted an interim stay on the award’s execution, provided that the appellant deposit 50 per cent of the award to the High Court Registry. The respondent’s application seeking release of the funds was opposed by the appellant who cited a pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Eventually, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea and the Executing Court ordered unconditional release of the amount with interest. The appellant moved the High Court against the interest contending that the deposit amounts to satisfaction of the award. The appellant approached the Supreme Court after the plea was dismissed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was liable to pay interest since the payment was not made unconditionally to the respondent. It noted that since the initial deposit was made solely to obtain a stay on execution of the award, it cannot constitute unconditional deposit of the amount. 

Key words/phrases: Award-debtor—Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996—Arbitral award—12 per cent interest—Interim-stay on award—Upon deposit of 50 per cent amount—Appeal against enforcement—Dismissal of appeal—Application for release of amount with interest—Special Leave Petition—Dismissed—Order for deposit of entire amount with interest—Appeal against payment of interest—Supreme Court—Payment of interest mandatory—Payment not made unconditionally available under Order XXI Rule 1—Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

Read the Judgement here.