Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a remission policy issued under the Governor’s power in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution cannot be superseded by a subsequent statutory policy.

The appellant, convicted of murder in 2009, sought premature release under Haryana’s 2002 remission policy, after completing 14 years of imprisonment. His representation was rejected based on a 2008 policy, requiring 20 years of imprisonment. He approached the High Court arguing that the 2002 Policy had been brought in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, relying on State of Haryana v Raj Kumar, which held that both the 2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy were in exercise of power traceable to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The appellant challenged this before the Supreme Court, arguing that Raj Kumar conflicted with the earlier ruling in State of Haryana v Jagdish, which held that the Governor’s powers under Article 161 are untrammeled and unaffected by the provisions of the CrPC.

The Court held Raj Kumar per incuriam. It ruled that the constitutional origin of the 2002 policy was like its predecessor—the 1993 policy, which was brought in exercise of Article 161. It directed the Haryana government to decide the appellant’s remission application under that policy within four weeks.

The Supreme Court held that non-filing of additional chargesheet copies under Section 193(8) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 does not entitle an accused to default bail, since that right ceases once a compliant chargesheet is filed within the statutory period.

The appellant was arrested in a cyber-fraud investigation involving mule bank accounts used to launder proceeds of digital-arrest and phishing frauds. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a chargesheet within 90 days but did not supply accompanying document copies, as was required under Section 193(8) of the BNSS. He sought default bail, contending that supply of copies was mandatory. The Special Judge, CBI and the Bombay High Court of Judicature rejected the plea.

The Supreme Court upheld the rejection, holding Section 193(8) to be directory rather than mandatory. It clarified that the appellant’s separate application for regular bail remained open for consideration on its own merits.

The Supreme Court held that a candidate’s election affidavit disclosing assets must include property owned solely by the spouse.

The appellant, a Councillor candidate in Gujarat’s 2015 municipal elections, was accused of omitting her husband’s landed properties from her nomination affidavit under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. A Magistrate issued a summons under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), based on a private complaint. She approached the Gujarat High Court seeking that the summons order be quashed, arguing that the disclosure rules did not cover the spouse’s own property. The High Court declined to quash the proceedings.

The Supreme Court held the disclosure obligation extended to the spouse’s separate properties. It noted that declarants were mandated “to give details of the property held by them, their spouse and their dependents, including what is held by them jointly”.

The Supreme Court laid down a standard methodology under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for assessing an injured or deceased claimant’s annual income based on income tax returns. It distinguished salaried claimants from the self-employed for the purpose of computing “just and fair compensation” under Section 166 of the Act.

Manoranjan Pandey, a 39-year-old construction contractor, was granted a compensation of Rs. 2,27,00,064/- based on his income and most recent tax returns. He died after a truck struck his vehicle near Behrampur, Odisha, in May 2018. Pandey had his own construction business with an annual income of Rs. 15,00,000/-. The Orissa High Court averaged two returns and reduced the award to Rs. 1,87,75,150/- after an appeal was filed by the insurance company.

The Supreme Court held that a salaried claimant’s income should be assessed from the immediately preceding year’s return alone, while a self-employed claimant’s income should be averaged over up to three preceding years, weighed against business nature, growth pattern and any negative-income years. Applying this, it fixed the deceased’s annual income at Rs. 14,00,000/- and enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,97,81,505/-.

The Supreme Court held that compensation granted to a disabled accident victim should be determined on the basis of functional disability and not the medically certified figure. The Court must gauge the injury’s effect on the victim’s occupation and earning capacity.

The appellant, a carpenter, had his right leg amputated above the knee after he got into an accident with a jeep in November 2004. The Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,77,823/- as compensation. This was enhanced to Rs. 11,51,423/- by the Uttarakhand High Court, fixing monthly income at Rs. 5000/- and disability at 70 percent. He sought further enhancement under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Supreme Court held that an amputee carpenter, unable to sit or stand to work, suffers 100 percent functional disability. It raised notional monthly income to Rs. 9000/- and enhanced his total compensation to Rs. 35,95,923/-. It further awarded the appellant Rs. 10,00,000 for the prosthetic leg and its lifelong replacement.

The Supreme Court recognised the right to mental health as an integral component of the right to life under Article 21. It laid down binding guidelines for educational institutions and coaching centres across India.

A 17-year-old student was undergoing coaching for the National Eligibility-cum Entrance Test (NEET) examination. She died under suspicious circumstances while residing in a hostel. Dissatisfied with the conduct of the police and the forensic classification of the death as suicide, the parent moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court through multiple writ petitions, seeking transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The High Court rejected these petitions.

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court after identifying lapses in the investigation. It allowed the transfer to CBI. Exercising its powers under Article 32, the Supreme Court laid down mental health guidelines for all educational institutions, coaching centres and student-centric environments. It also directed states and Union Territories to notify the rules within two months and also form district-level monitoring committees.

The Supreme Court held that a second quashing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is generally not maintainable if it relies on grounds already available at the time of the first petition.

The case arose out of a loan dispute between the complainant, MC Ravikumar and the accused-respondent, D.S. Velmurugan. Ravikumar alleged that Velmurugan failed to return the original property documents after he had repaid the loan. When one of the accused, P. Jothikumar, later produced these documents in a civil suit, Ravikumar filed a criminal complaint. The first quashing petition filed by the accused was dismissed by the High Court. A second petition was later allowed.

The Supreme Court held that the second petition raised no new or unavailable grounds and amounted to a disguised review of the earlier order by a co-ordinate bench. It rejected the respondent’s arguments of a change in circumstances resulting from the quashing of a similar complaint. It noted that this event took place before the filing of the first quashing petition and the ground had been available for the respondent to take at the time.

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of merger—which states that a lower court’s judgement is subsumed by the higher court’s verdict—will not apply where the order obtained in the lower court was a result of fraud and suppression of material facts.

The dispute arose over compensation for land acquired by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. The respondent, being one among three owners, asserted sole ownership and obtained a substantial compensation award from the Allahabad High Court. He failed to disclose prior proceedings that acknowledged joint ownership. The appellant approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 to challenge the order. Earlier, in related proceedings, the Supreme Court had partly allowed a civil appeal filed by the respondent and set aside the deduction of development charges ordered by the High Court.

The Supreme Court found that the respondent’s failure to disclose material facts and the trajectory of inconsistent claims amounted to fraud, rendering the impugned order a nullity. It rejected the challenge to maintainability on the ground of intra-court appeal, holding that fraud is an exception to the doctrine of merger and procedural limitations.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Will, if registered, carries a presumption of genuineness. The burden to prove otherwise lies on the party challenging the Will, who must demonstrate that it was not executed properly or that suspicious circumstances cast doubt on its validity

Metpalli Ramanna died intestate prior to 1949 and his legal heir, Metpalli Rajanna, passed in 1983. After Rajanna’s death, a dispute arose between Lasum Bai, his second wife, and Metapalli Muthaih, his son from his first marriage. Lasum Bai claimed ownership of land based on a registered Will and an oral family arrangement made by Rajanna, while Muthaih contended the land was ancestral property and that Rajanna had died intestate. The Trial Court upheld the Will and Lasum Bai’s claim, but the Andhra Pradesh High Court partly reversed this, granting Muthaiah a 3/4th share and Lasum Bai only 1/4th.

The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s ruling, observing that Muthaiah had admitted his father’s signature on the Will and acknowledged Lasum Bai’s possession of the land. The Court further reaffirmed the persuasive nature of oral family settlements when supported by consistent evidence and the fact of possession.

The Supreme Court held that while bail granted may not be cancelled ordinarily, courts are not powerless to cancel bail where the facts shock the conscience and where cancellation is needed to ensure a fair trial.

A woman superintendent in a protection home was accused of administering intoxicating medicines and injections to women inmates to expose them to influential men for sexual favours. The High Court granted her bail after she challenged a Trial Court order denying it.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court had overlooked Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, which mandates a hearing of the victim before granting bail. The Court agreed with the contention that the accused was in a position to influence witnesses. Calling it an exceptional case, the Court found that the High Court’s order was cryptic and unreasoned. It exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 to direct the cancellation of bail.