Analysis

SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 10 | Issue 3

In this issue, we identify five important judgements from 12 October to 16 October

Volume 10 Issue 3 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here! In this issue, we have identified five of the most important judgements, including decisions on:

As always, all SCO.LR judgements come with concise and accurate summaries, illustrative mindmaps and citation features for easy understanding and better legal research.

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 10 | Issue 3 

12 October – 16 October 2026 

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Mid-session Fee Revision in Higher Educational Institutions

Dr. B.C. Roy Engineering College v State of West Bengal

14 October 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1120 | 2026 SCO.LR 10(3)[11]

Bench: Justices P.S.Narasimha and Alok Aradhe

The Supreme Court held that the AICTE Regulations, National Education Policy, 2020, coupled with principles of certainty, necessitates the relevant authorities to notify the fee payable for the entire course before a student takes admission. Any variation in the fee during the subsistence of the course is permissible in exceptional instances such as unforeseen increase in the expenditure. 

The respondent students contested the legality and validity of a revised fee structure of the appellant in the High Court of Calcutta for students admitted before and after 16 October 2023. The students were admitted in the 2023-24 Academic Year for the 2023-2027 courses. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions by referring to the prospectus of the appellant college. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge holding that the revised fee notification was not retrospectively applicable to the students admitted before 16 October 2023. The appellant college and self-financing professional colleges filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court upheld the view of the High Court partly and held that the fee fixation committees have a statutory foundation and an important public purpose to serve. It held that the High Courts will exercise due judicial review to ensure that these committees perform their duties with institutional efficiency, expertise and integrity. It balanced the interests of the students for avoiding uncertainties, with that of the private educational institutions for reasonable sustenance and further development. 

Key words/phrases: Fee hiked midstream—Calcutta High Court—Single judge dismissed the Writ petition—Division bench halted retrospective effect of the fee hike—SLP before the Supreme Court—Balanced the interests of Private educational Institutions and the students—Certainty about the fee liability—Variation only permissible in exceptional circumstances—High Court view partly upheld

Read the Judgement here.

Mindmap

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Reservation Benefits for Muslim Converts

Secretary to Government v Sameer Ahamed N.

15 October 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1129 | 2026 SCO.LR 10(3)[12]

Bench: Justices P.K. Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar

The Supreme Court held that a person converted from the Hindu social order to Islam cannot claim reservation under Article 16(4) solely based on pre-conversion social backwardness. Conversion to a different faith does not determine entry into a notified Backward Class Muslim community, an identity rooted in ancestry, endogamy and traditional occupation.

Sameer Ahamed’s certificate for the “Muslim Labbai” community was refused in November 2020 on the ground that he had converted to a religion, not a caste. Tamil Nadu’s Government Order of 9 March 2024 let Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified and Scheduled Caste converts obtain certificates under seven Muslim communities. These communities share the 3.5% quota for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007. On 25 June 2026, the Madras High Court set aside the 2024 Order, and impleaded the state suo moto in Ahamed’s writ petition, before dismissing it. 

The Supreme Court dismissed the Tamil Nadu government’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgement. The Court held that there is no common social link between converts and notified Muslim communities. It held the 2024 Order contrary to Article 14. It upheld the High Court’s review of the unchallenged Order, since the State had been heard.

Key words/phrases: Conversion from Hinduism to Islam—Muslim Labbai community certificate—Government Order of 9 March 2024—Backward Class Muslim quota—Suo motu impleadment of State—Pre-conversion social backwardness—Invalidation of Government Order upheld.

Read the Judgement here.

Mindmap

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Administrator’s Powers to Write Down Additional Tier – 1 Bonds

Yes Bank v Axis Trustee

15 October 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1132 | 2026 SCO.LR 10(3)[13] 

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih 

The Supreme Court held that the Administrator appointed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under Section 36ACA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 lacks the statutory authority to write down Additional Tier 1 (AT-1) Bonds once the Union Government intentionally omits the write-down clause from the final notified Reconstruction Scheme. 

In December 2016 and October 2017, the appellant—YES BANK Limited—issued Basel III-compliant AT-1 Bonds worth ₹8415 crore with the respondent—Axis Trustee Services Limited—appointed as the trustee. Facing financial decline, the Union Government placed the appellant under a moratorium on 5 March 2020. The RBI appointed an Administrator under Section 36ACA of the 1949 Act and subsequently, published a Draft Reconstruction Scheme that contained a clause providing for the write-down of AT-1 Bonds. Following objections, the Union dropped the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme, notified on 13 March 2020. The next day, on 14 March 2020, the Administrator issued a “write-down” order, extinguishing the AT-1 Bonds. Bondholders and trustees challenged the Order before the Bombay High Court, which set aside the write-down. The appellant, the RBI and the Union government appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Bombay High Court’s judgement. The Court held that the Union had made a deliberate, conscious decision to drop the write-down clause from the final Reconstruction Scheme based on stakeholder objections.

Key words/phrases: Appointment of Adminsitrator—Section 36ACA—Banking Regulation Act, 1949—Yes Bank issued AT-1 Bonds—₹8415 crore—Moratorium due to financial difficulties—Administrator appointed by the Reserve Bank of India—Writing down of Bonds in Draft Reconstruction Scheme—Writing down clause removed by Union—Administrator extinguishes AT-1 bonds—Bombay High Court sets aside the write-down—Supreme Court appeal—Bombay High Court judgement upheld

Read the Judgement here.

Mindmap

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Evidentiary Threshold for “Default” under IBC

Deepak Raheja v Omkara Assets Reconstruction

15 October 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1134 | 2026 SCO.LR 10(3)[14]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih

The Supreme Court held that the threshold for satisfying the meaning of “default” to initiate insolvency procedure under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is prima facie finding of financial debt rather than complete adjudication of the claims. 

In December 2017, the appellants, the corporate debtors, extended aggregate term loans worth ₹600 Crores by the respondent, which crystallised in November 2022. In February 2023, the respondent recorded debt defaults with the National E-Governance Services (NeSL) and subsequently, recalled the loan, by which the appellants were asked to pay the remaining loan amount of ₹666 Crores. Not having received the debt amount, the respondent filed a petition to initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 before National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai. The NCLT admitted the petitions. In January 2024, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) set aside insolvency proceedings citing failure to consider submissions made by the appellants. In July 2025, the NCLT re-admitted insolvency petitions, which were affirmed by NCLAT in August. The appellants moved the Supreme Court, arguing that insolvency proceedings cannot be admitted since they continued to meet debt obligations. 

The Supreme Court upheld the Orders of the tribunals, admitting insolvency proceedings under Section 7. It held that admission of insolvency proceedings depends on the prima facie occurrence of default and authorities are not expected to defer admission because parties dispute the details. 

Key words/phrases: Insolvency proceedings—Section 7—Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code—Debt default—Debt crystallisation—Recall of loan—Proceeding for insolvency—National Company Law Tribunal—Admission of petitions—National Company Law Appellate Tribunal—Petitions set aside—Fulfilment of debt obligations not taken into consideration—NCLAT—Re-admitted insolvency proceedings—Appeal—NCLAT and NCLT order upheld—Prima facie proof of debt. 

Read the Judgement here.

Mindmap

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Scope of Letters Patent Appeals

Saravanan v Periyar University

16 October 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1136 | 2026 SCO.LR 10(3)[15]

Bench: Justices P.K. Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar 

The Supreme Court held that a decision of a Single Judge of a High Court under Article 226 cannot be overturned through an appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, which enables an intra-court appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court. 

The appellant, the Deputy Registrar of Periyar University, was accused by the respondent-University for amassing wealth disproportionate to his income. The respondent set up a one–member committee after the appellant refused to co-operate with a three-member inquiry committee. The appellant was dismissed after the one-member committee submitted a report that was accepted by the University Syndicate. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, set aside the dismissal and reinstated the appellant’s service on the ground that the inquiry report was made without concrete evidence. The respondent moved under Clause 15 of Letters Patent. The Division Bench set aside the Single-Judge Bench decision, noting that the One-man Commission Report is sufficient to establish charges as it is corroborated by documentary evidence. The appellant moved the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Division Bench. It held that Courts under Clause 15 of Letters Patent can act only as “Court of Correction” and cannot interfere with a writ court’s decision unless the Single Judge’s decision is glaringly erroneous with errors apparent on the face of the record. 

Key words/phrases: Dismissal of service—One-man inquiry committee report—Writ petition—Madras High Court—Article 226—Reinstatement of service—Clause 15—Letters Patent Appeal—Set aside Single Judge decision—Supreme Court—Letters Patent is “Court of Correction”—Cannot set aside judgement under Article 226

Read the Judgement here.

Mindmap