SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 9 | Issue 4

Volume 9 Issue 4 of the Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR) is here! 

In this issue, we have identified five of the most important judgements, including decisions on:

• Court’s power to declare closure of investigation
• Re-arrest of persons after unconstitutional detention
• Seat of arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
• Power of the Trial Court to suspend remission
• Termination of demise charter 

As always, SCO.LR judgements come with concise and accurate summaries, clean and well-formatted judgements with linking features for better readability and ease of research. 

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports 

SCO.LR | Volume 9 | Issue 4

21 – 25 September 2026

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Power to Declare Closure of Investigation 

State of Maharashtra v Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri 

21 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1021 |2026 SCO.LR 9(4)[16]

Bench: Justices P.K. Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar

The Supreme Court held that the power to investigate a crime rests exclusively within the domain of the executive through the police. Courts cannot curtail statutory investigative powers or prematurely declare an investigation complete. A stray statement indicating that “enough evidence” exists does not mean the investigation has concluded.  

The Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Mumbai registered an FIR against the respondents under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) for engaging in anti-national activities. Following the respondents’ arrest, the Special Judge granted a 30-day extension beyond the standard 90-day period to complete the investigation. A second 15-day extension was subsequently authorised under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA to analyse electronic evidence, voice samples and bank records. The respondents applied for default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), arguing that the investigation was complete, as stated by the prosecution. They contended that an extension could not be granted merely to await sanction for prosecution under Section 45 of the UAPA. The Bombay High Court quashed the second extension and granted default bail, holding that the investigation was complete and the extension for sanction was impermissible.

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgement and upheld the Special Judge’s order granting the 15-day extension to the ATS for filing the charge sheet. The Court held that the High Court erred in misconstruing a solitary statement in the extension application to declare the investigation complete. The Court dismissed the respondents’ default bail application filed under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 43D of the UAPA and ordered the respondents to surrender within 30 days.

Sanction for prosecution—Section 45(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967—Respondent arrested under IPC and UAPA—Anti-national activities—Special Judge grants two extensions to prosecution in filing chargesheet—Respondents apply for default bail—Extension sought to await sanction under Section 45(2)—Bombay High Court grants default appeal—Supreme Court appeal—Courts cannot determine status of investigation—Executive purview—Default bail cancelled—Surrender within 30 days

Read the Judgement here

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Re-arrest After Unconstitutional Detention

Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v State of Punjab

21 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1022 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(4)[17]

Bench: Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and A.S. Chandurkar

The Supreme Court held that a person released due to a breach of Article 22 may be re-arrested for the same offence after receiving prior approval from a Magistrate. The power to re-arrest cannot rest with the authority that violated the constitutional safeguards governing arrests. Any custody plea needs the superior officer’s endorsement.

The Mataur Police Station, SAS Nagar, Punjab, booked Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 for alleged sexual abuse of a minor. Arrested on 17 May 2026, he was produced before a Magistrate over 24 hours later without being given written grounds of arrest. The Magistrate directed his release. A fresh custody plea failed as the grounds remained unfurnished. The Punjab and Haryana High Court refused to bar his re-arrest.

Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the High Court’s order. The Court held that any future custody must follow Mihir Rajesh Shah v State of Maharashtra (2025). The investigation must be moved to another officer. High Courts may award compensation for breaches of Article 22(2).

Key words/phrases: Article 22(1) and 22(2) safeguards—Written grounds of arrest not furnished—Production beyond 24 hours—Magistrate ordered release—Fresh custody application dismissed—Punjab and Haryana High Court permitted lawful re-arrest—Supreme Court—Re-arrest requires prior judicial approval—Reasons and superior officer’s endorsement—Investigation to be transferred—Departmental enquiry against erring officers mandatory—High Court order set aside—Compensation as public law remedy upheld.

Read the Judgement here.

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Seat of Arbitration under the Arbitration Act

Mahanadi Coalfields v GSCO Infrastructure Limited

23 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1038 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(4)[18]

Bench: Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva

The Supreme Court held that in the absence of an arbitration agreement, any Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s statewide territorial jurisdiction is competent to hear petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside arbitral awards.

In 2012, the appellants executed a contract with the respondent which did not contain any arbitration clause. The respondent moved to the Odisha High Court at Cuttack after disputes arose over completion of the assigned work. The High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who passed an award in favour of the respondent. Consequently, the appellants filed petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award before the District Court, Sundargarh. The respondent moved the High Court opposing the petition on the ground that the District Judge, Sundargarh lacked jurisdiction to hear petitions since the “seat of arbitration” was at Cuttack. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court. It held that mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at Cuttack does not constitute the “seat of arbitration”. The Court further noted that the “seat of arbitration” must be expressly designated by the parties, in the absence of which all Commercial/ District Court within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction are competent to hear matters. 

Key words/phrases: Section 34—Setting aside of arbitral award—Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Contract without an arbitration clause—Disputes—High Court appoints arbitrator—Award passed—Petition to set aside award—District Judge—Petitions opposing setting aside of award—High Court—District Court lacks jurisdiction—Seat of Arbitration at Cuttack—Supreme Court set aside judgement—Commercial/ District Courts have jurisdiction—Conduct of arbitral proceedings does not determine seat of arbitration

Read the Judgement here. 

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Trial Court’s Power to Suspend Remission

Naval Kishore v State of Punjab 

24 September 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 1048 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(4)[19]

Bench: Justices Aravind Kumar and V.M. Pancholi

The Supreme Court held that a Sessions Court lacks the jurisdiction to impose a “special category” life sentence that restricts remission by directing a convict to remain in prison for the remainder of their natural life. The power to issue such a sentence by curtailing the possibility of early release under Sections 432 to 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is exclusively vested in constitutional courts i.e. the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Trial Court in Ludhiana convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment until death. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the Sessions Court’s authority to bar remission.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement to the extent of the sentencing direction. It held that a Sessions Court cannot supplement punishments under Section 302 IPC or curtail executive remission powers. The Court modified their sentence to 25 years of rigorous imprisonment without statutory remission. 

Key words/phrases: Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Power to suspend or remit sentences—Trial Court—Murder—Section 302—Indian Penal Code, 1860—Life sentence without remission—Imprisonment till remainder of natural life—High Court affirms conviction and sentence—Supreme Court appeal—Session Court lacks jurisdiction—Power vested in constitutional courts—High Court judgement set aside on the aspect of sentence—Supreme Court directs 25 years of rigorous imprisonment 

Read the Judgement here.

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Requirement of Physical Repossession for Termination of Demise Charter

Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v Om Freight Forwarders

25 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 1055 | 2026 SCO.LR 9(4)[20]

Bench: Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana

The registered owner of M.V. Nereus Progress had let the vessel out on a bareboat charter to Nereides Marine Services. Nereides defaulted on the payment of hire, following which the owner terminated the charterparty and issued a notice seeking repossession of the Vessel. Before the owner could take physical possession, Om Freight Forwarders obtained an ex-parte order from the Madras High Court for the arrest of M.V. Nereus Progress. Om Freight’s claim arose from Nereides’ separate charter of another vessel, M.V. Bharadwaj. It sought to arrest M.V. Nereus Progress as a sister ship under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, on the ground that Nereides continued to be the demise charterer of M.V. Nereus Progress. The Madras High Court later sustained the arrest, holding that the demise charter ordinarily continued until physical re-delivery of the vessel to its owner.

The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s judgement and vacated the arrest. The Court held that the High Court had erred in treating physical re-delivery as necessary to bring the demise charter to an end. It held that Clause 32 of the BIMCO BARECON 2017 charterparty treated repossession as a consequence of termination, rather than a condition for termination. The Court further held that, after termination and pending physical repossession, Nereides held the vessel only as a “gratuitous Bailee” and not as a demise charterer. It therefore held that Nereides was no longer the demise charterer when the vessel was arrested and that the requirements for arrest under Section 5(1)(b) read with Section 5(2) of the Act were not satisfied.

Key words/phrases: Bareboat charterparty—Demise charter—Termination—Physical repossession—Clause 31—Clause 32—Repossession—Gratuitous bailee—Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017—Section 5(1)(b)—Section 5(2)—Sister-ship arrest—Maritime claim—Vessel arrest—Termination and repossession are distinct incidents—Arrest vacated

Read the Judgement here. 

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