Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a judgement once signed cannot be altered or reviewed, except to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes.

The Khosla Group filed a company petition at the Company Law Board (CLB) against the Bakshi Group after a dispute over a resort project in Kasauli. The Khosla group had filed a separate petition alleging perjury at the Delhi High Court. In 2014, the Supreme Court directed that the High Court could not hear the matter and it would be decided by the CLB/NCLT. The petition was disposed of by the High Court in 2018 after the top Court’s direction. Despite this, the Khosla group filed another perjury plea at the High Court in 2019. The High Court initially declined to intervene but later recalled its 2018 Order after learning that the petition before the NCLT had been withdrawn.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s recall was an impermissible review under Section 362 CrPC and set it aside. It stated that a recall “undermines the finality of the judicial proceedings.”

The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate must take direct cognisance of a case is under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) when a public servant is obstructed from performing their duty if the complaint is filed by the public servant themselves. A separate police investigation is not always necessary.

A process server had alleged that police officials and petitioner Devendra Kumar misbehaved with him while he was serving a warrant. The civil judge under whom the server worked filed a private complaint against the police officials under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) directed a police investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, which Devendra Kumar challenged. The Delhi High Court dismissed his plea.

The Supreme Court held that the CMM wrongly directed a police investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, as the judge is a public servant. Instead, the CMM should have taken immediate cognisance of the matter under Section 204 of the CrPC.

The Supreme Court held that denying long-serving workers regular employment is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21.

Dharam Singh and others were engaged as daily-wage employees at the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (UPHESC) between 1989 and 1992. Despite continuous service for decades, their plea for regularisation of employment was rejected by the state government on the grounds of financial strain. The High Court rejected their plea on the ground that they were engaged only as daily-wage workers and that there were no rules for regularisation of employment in the UPHESC. Further, no sanctioned vacancies existed.

The Supreme Court quashed the state’s refusals to regularise employment as arbitrary and unsustainable. The Court reiterating that outsourcing and “ad-hocism” cannot replace fair public employment and directed that Dharam Singh and other employees be regularised with effect from 24 April 2000.

The Supreme Court held that while determining alimony, courts must balance the husband’s capacity to pay with the wife’s long-term security.

The Family Court had granted the wife Rs. 15,00,000 as permanent alimony and Rs. 10,000 as monthly maintenance from her husband. The Karnataka High Court had upheld the alimony and increased the monthly maintenance to Rs. 25,000. The wife then moved the top court.

The Supreme Court assessed the income, profession and level of education of both parties. The Bench noted that the husband, a doctor, was in a position to pay more. However, though presently unemployed, the wife was not in a stage of complete “economic hardship” as she had M.Tech and LLB degrees. Emphasising that determining alimony must be a balanced approach, they ordered that Rs. 50,00,000 be paid as a one-time settlement, to secure the wife’s future with a commensurate standard of living.

The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved party’s right to appeal can be carried forward by their legal heirs.

A Sessions Court in Haridwar had convicted three persons, accused of murder and causing injury during a dispute. The High Court acquitted three accused who were sentenced to life imprisonment. Khem Singh, who had moved the Supreme Court against the acquittal, died during the pendency of the case. His son, Raj Kumar, moved the Court to be substituted in his place in the legal proceedings.

The Supreme Court allowed the substitution and remanded the case to the High Court. It held that the expression “the right to prefer an appeal” in Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (CrPC) meant the appellant has the right to actively pursue it until a final order is passed. Further, the expression “victim” under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC included a guardian or the legal heir of a victim.

The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a summons under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, does not amount to the formal initiation of proceedings under the Act.

M/S Armour Security received a show cause notice under Section 73 of CGST. Subsequently, CGST conducted a search and issued two separate summons to directors of the company. The petitioner approached the Delhi High Court challenging the two summons, arguing that the SGST investigated same “subject matter”. The petitioner argued that under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, one authority is barred from initiating proceedings if the “subject matter” of that proceeding is already being handled by the other authority. The High Court dismissed the petition and held that the summons is merely a precursor to gather information.

The Court upheld the High Court Order. The Court laid down a two-fold test to determine if the subject matter is the same: whether the authority has already acted on an identical tax liability on similar facts and whether the relief sought is identical. It held that overlapping aspects of inquiries do not make “subject matter” identical unless a show cause notice specifies the liability.

The Supreme Court held that rival marks in a trademark dispute must be assessed in their entirety rather than dissecting composite trademarks into isolated components.

The appellant, Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. had sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondent, Karanveer Chhabra, on the ground that his brand “London Pride” infringed the trademark of their label, “Blenders Pride” and “Imperial Blue”. The Indore Commercial Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to grant an interim injunction. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Commercial Court and the High Court. It held that the applicable standard is that of an average consumer with imperfect recollection. No deceptive similarity was found between the marks.

The Supreme Court used its plenary powers under Article 142 to vest custody of minor children to their “adoptive parents”, even when the legality of adoption is in question. considering the existing bonding between the “adoptive parents” and the children.

On 22 May 2024, the police had taken custody of minor children from several adoptive parents based on an FIR that the adoptions were unlawful. The parents moved the Telangana High Court. A Single-Judge Bench ruled in favour of the adoptive parents having custody. A Division Bench reversed the Order, directing that the children remain in the custody of the Child Welfare Committee while proper adoption procedures were followed.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s Order under Article 142, relying on the “best interest of the child” principle. They considered the existing bond between adoptive parents and the child. The Bench further imposed safeguards by directing the State Legal Services Authority or District Legal Services Committee to obtain quarterly reports on the children’s welfare and progress, and allowing them to depute a Child Welfare Expert for home inspections.

The Supreme Court held that a convict sentenced to life imprisonment for a fixed term is entitled to immediate release upon completing the term, without having to apply for remission. Detention beyond this period violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

Sukhdev Yadav was serving a sentence of life imprisonment for 20 years without the scope of remission. In November 2024, the Delhi High Court dismissed his petition seeking furlough, i.e. release for a short term. In March 2025, he completed 20 years of his sentence, while his petition remained pending. The Supreme Court permitted him to seek immediate release based on the completion of his sentence. The State of Delhi argued that Yadav had to seek remission.

The Supreme Court held that the bar on remission was applicable while he was serving his sentence. After its completion, he was not required to seek remission. The Court directed all prisons to release prisoners whose jail terms were complete. The Registry was directed to circulate a copy of the Order to all the Home Secretaries of the States or Union Territories.

The Supreme Court held that pre-Independence documents have higher probative value in caste claim verification and that the affinity test cannot be applied as a litmus test to reject such claims.

Yogesh Madhav Makalwad’s caste certificate as “Koli Mahadev” Scheduled Tribe, was invalidated by the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad. The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Scrutiny Committee. The High Court rejected school admission records of Makalward’s father from 1943 and other family records as unreliable. They relied on Makalwad’s inability to clear the affinity test instead.

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment. It found the 1943 school admission record as genuine. The Court relied on Anand v Committee for Scrutiny & Verification of Tribe Claims (2011), and reiterated that the affinity test is not an essential part of the process of determining the correctness of a caste or tribe claim in every case.