Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the procedural safeguards laid down in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v State of Maharashtra (2014) for police encounters are binding and must be enforced regardless of whether the victim or their family initiates the complaint.

A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the Assam High Court sought an independent investigation into alleged fake encounters in the state. It noted that 80 incidents had resulted in 28 deaths and 48 injuries across the state. The State admitted that 171 police encounters occurred between May 2021 and August 2022, causing 56 deaths and 145 injuries. The High Court dismissed the PIL as premature and vague.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order. It directed the Assam Human Rights Commission to conduct an independent inquiry into the allegations. It held that PUCL guidelines (2014) — requiring mandatory FIRs, independent investigation by the CID or other stations, magisterial inquiry for deaths, forensic analysis and informing human rights commissions are not contingent on direct victim participation. Further, encounters resulting in death must be investigated fairly and mere ‘self-defence’ cannot be the only justification.

The Supreme Court held that maternity benefits may not be denied for the claimant’s third child under the Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules (TNFR).

Umadevi, a government English teacher, had applied for maternity leave for the birth of her third child. The District Chief Educational Officer rejected the application as the TNFR grants maternity leave to employees with less than two surviving children. Umadevi had a third child conceived in a second marriage. A Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court found the rejection illegal, as she did not have custody of her first two children. A Division Bench held that she was not entitled to maternity leave as per the Rules.

The Supreme Court adopted a purposive interpretation, giving importance to women’s reproductive rights. It held that the object of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 was to impose a limit on the duration of leave for more than two pregnancies, not to deny it altogether. It found that the State’s objective of population control must go hand in hand with women’s rights.

The Supreme Court set aside the sentence awarded to a Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) convict, reasoning that it would cause further injustice to the victim, who was now committed to the convict.

The Bench had previously overturned a Calcutta High Court decision which had indulged in “victim-shaming” while acquitting the accused in a POCSO case. While deciding the sentence to be awarded to the convict, the Supreme Court noted that there had been grave systemic failures, a lack of support from the victim’s parents and an absence of proper legal aid. They noted that the victim had dedicated herself to building a family with the convict and did not perceive the POCSO offence as a crime.

The Court clarified that this decision is not a precedent—it was a response to the failure of State machinery. The Bench directed the State Government of West Bengal to act as her guardian, provide proper shelter and pay for the victim and her child’s education. They directed the Union government to form a committee to implement the suggestions made by the Amicus Curiae to bring about institutional accountability in POCSO cases.

The Supreme Court held that a warrant is adequate to constitute the grounds for arrest. A reading of the warrant to the detained person is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest.

The accused’s father filed a writ of habeas corpus at the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He alleged that the CID’s arrest warrant for his son was not meaningful and lacked material information. Therefore, it violated Article 22 of the Constitution and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that on the face of it, the reasons proved sufficient.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that for the purpose of Article 22(1), full details of the offence are not necessary. The information should be sufficient for the person to understand the reason for the arrest. They reiterated the ratio in Vihaan Kumar v State of Haryana (2025) that informing a person of the reason for arrest was a constitutional mandate. However, unlike in this case, the arresting authority had furnished no warrant in Vihaan.

The Supreme Court held that direct-to-home (DTH) broadcasting services are not exempt from paying entertainment tax under Entry 62 of the State List merely because they pay service tax to the Central government under Entry 97 of the Union List.

The Court was hearing appeals against 42 judgements from 11 High Courts concerning the issue. The DTH services argued that they are liable to pay only service tax as they only broadcast content through signals. This cannot be construed as “entertainment” under the State List. State governments had argued that the “double aspect theory” allows taxation of DTH providers, as both “service” and “entertainment” taxes are distinct.

The Supreme Court held that broadcasting serves a double purpose—first, the transmission of signals to display content to the subscriber and second, subscribers provide and receive entertainment based on these signals. The content is transferred using signals for entertainment. Therefore, service tax is applicable for the broadcasting activity under the Finance Act, 1994 and the entertainment tax as per the state legislation.

The Supreme Court held that candidates seeking to become a Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practised as an advocate or law clerk for at least three years. The decision overruled the Court’s own Judgement from 2002.

After the 2002 Judgement, interested parties approached the Court seeking relief concerning qualification, promotion and selection in the Judicial Services. During these hearings, the Court “found it necessary to decide certain larger issues concerning the administration of justice,” which included the question of whether law graduates could be appointed as judges without practice experience.

The Court reinstated the rule that required three years of practice to become eligible to appear for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The Court also issued reservation-related directions for in-service judicial officers to avail fast-tracked promotions: (a) it introduced 10 percent reservation for the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division); (b) it increased the quota of reserved seats from 10 percent to 25 percent for posts in the Higher Judiciary. To avail these promotions, candidates appear for the Limited Departmental Competitive Examinations (LDCE).

The Supreme Court held that the “One Rank, One Pension” principle should be implemented for providing retirement benefits to High Courts judges, irrespective of their role as additional or permanent judge.

The Court was considering the exclusion of district judiciary stints and breaks during transitions in the calculation of time period for pension payments. It examined whether judges appointed during the New Pension Scheme (NPS) and those who served as additional judges could be denied full or family pension. It also looked into whether Provident Fund benefits could be withheld under the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (HCJ Act).

The Court held that the OROP principle should apply to all judges, irrespective of whether they were elevated from the Bar or the district judiciary. The full pension should be provided to retired judges regardless of any break in service; the same goes for judges who joined the district judiciary after the NPS scheme came into force; family pension should be provided irrespective of whether the judges were additional or permanent; gratuity to the widow or family members should be paid by adding 10 years to the service provided by the judge; all allowances under the HCJ Act to be paid on retirement including leave encashment, Provident Fund and commutation of pensions.

The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s quashing of a state order mandating the creation of a fee corpus from NRIs to subsidise fees for Below Poverty Line (BPL) students.

Kerala’s Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee directed self-financing medical colleges to create a corpus fund for BPL students by collecting ₹5 lakh from each NRI student annually. This was backed by a state government order. KMCT Medical College challenged the directive in the High Court. The High Court struck down the order but directed that the collected funds remain with the colleges for the benefit of economically weaker students.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the executive cannot impose levies or require a corpus fund without a suitable state legislation. The Court found that the Committee under the Kerala Medical Education Act, 2017, can regulate non-exploitative fees but lacks the power to mandate corpus funds or divert fees to the state without an explicit legal provision. The Court further directed that while self-financing medical colleges may retain funds collected as fees from NRIs, they must use them to substantially subsidise BPL students.

The Supreme Court prioritized the interests of depositors under the Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors (MPID) Act. The Court further clarified the treatment of attached assets in relation to moratoriums under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which halt legal proceedings.

National Spot Exchange Ltd (NSEL), an electronic trading platform, was accused of payment default and fraud worth ₹5,600 crores. To repay the affected depositors, NSEL’s assets were attached under the MPID and Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Acts. The Supreme Court established a committee to oversee the recovery and distribution of funds. The Committee’s decisions on the priority of claims and the treatment of assets under different legislations were appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the Committee’s orders and ruled that assets deemed to be “proceeds of crime” under PMLA or attached under the MPID Act to protect depositors’ interests take priority over the claims of secured creditors. The Court found no inconsistency between the provisions of MPID Act and the IBC, and ruled that properties attached under the MPID before an IBC moratorium is imposed can be sold to recover money owed.

The Supreme Court emphasised the need for an impartial investigating agency in cases involving custodial deaths, citing the principle of ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ (‘no one should be a judge in his own cause’).

25-year old Deva Pardhi was taken into custody along with his uncle Gangaram Pardhi in connection with a theft investigation. Both were reportedly subjected to “intense third-degree treatment” and were brutally tortured to force a confession. Deva died in custody. A Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to transfer the investigation to the CBI and denied bail to Gangaram.

Finding that the local police investigation was not “transparent,” the Supreme Court directed the transfer of the investigation to the CBI. It also ordered the arrest of the responsible police officers within a month and completion of the investigation within 90 days. The Court also expressed concern over the safety of Gangaram as the sole eyewitness of the alleged torture, granted him liberty to apply for bail directly in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and directed the State to provide him with witness protection.