Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) may issue directions to ensure compliance with regulations while contractual disputes must be decided by Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).

Four local cable operators in Tamil Nadu complained that Polimer Cable Network had disconnected their television signals. The Madras High Court directed TRAI to consider their complaints after hearing both sides. TRAI found a possible breach of the Interconnection Regulations and directed Polimer to restore the signals. After receiving a police report suggesting non-compliance, TRAI issued a show-cause notice asking why a criminal complaint should not be filed. Polimer challenged the direction and notice before the TDSAT. The TDSAT quashed both, holding that TRAI had acted beyond its powers.

The Supreme Court set aside TDSAT’s judgement. It held that TRAI had only sought compliance with its regulations. The show-cause notice also imposed no penalty and decided no final rights.

The Supreme Court held that a criminal trial involving the death penalty is vitiated if the accused is denied effective legal representation and has not consciously waived the right to counsel. It held that a doubtful or retracted confession cannot sustain a conviction without strong independent corroboration.

On 22 May 1996, an explosion inside a Rajasthan Roadways bus near Samleti village killed 14 passengers and injured 37 others. In 2014, the Trial Court convicted Dr. Abdul Hameed and several co-accused for murder, attempt to murder, conspiracy and offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. Hameed was sentenced to death. He had remained unrepresented during the trial and had personally cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. In 2019, the Rajasthan High Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence and acquitted six co-accused for want of reliable evidence. The accused and the State of Rajasthan approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside Hameed’s conviction and death sentence and ordered a de novo trial before a Special Court at Jaipur. It directed that he be provided competent legal representation and a fresh opportunity to cross-examine all prosecution witnesses, while permitting him to seek bail before the Special Court. It also dismissed the State’s appeals and affirmed the acquittal of the six co-accused.

The Supreme Court held that murder punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a “heinous offence” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, as life imprisonment is the implied minimum punishment.

The appellant, aged 16 years at the time of the alleged offence, was accused of slitting the throat of another boy. The Juvenile Justice Board conducted a preliminary assessment and, by a majority opinion, decided that he lacked the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence and should be tried by the Board. The Presiding Magistrate dissented and found that the appellant was capable of understanding his conduct. On an appeal by the deceased’s mother, the Additional District and Sessions Judge set aside the Board’s order and directed that the appellant be tried as an adult. The Patna High Court dismissed the appellant’s revision petition. The appellant approached the Supreme Court arguing that murder was a “serious offence” rather than a “heinous offence” and that the appellate court could not reverse the Board’s decision without obtaining fresh assistance from psychologists and medical specialists.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgement. It held that life imprisonment is the lowest punishment available for murder and that it falls within the definition of a “heinous offence”. The Court found that the Board had relied solely on an expert opinion without considering the Social Investigation Report and Social Background Report. It directed Boards to independently evaluate the child’s mental capacity, physical capacity, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances of its commission, together with the expert report, social reports, witness statements and other relevant material.

The Supreme Court held that the substance and cumulative effect of a commercial agreement determines whether the relationship between the parties is one of sale or agency.

Mahanagar Gas Ltd. (MGL) supplied compressed natural gas through outlets belonging to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL). While MGL installed and owned the equipment, the oil companies provided the sites, infrastructure, utilities and trained personnel required to dispense CNG to vehicle owners. The Service Tax Department treated the corporations as commission agents providing Business Auxiliary Services under Section 65(19) read with Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994, and raised service tax demands for the period between April 2005 and March 2011. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demands. On 4 June 2014, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) set aside the orders, holding that the transactions were sales on a principal-to-principal basis and that the amount retained by the corporations was a profit margin rather than commission.

The Supreme Court held that ownership of CNG never passed to BPCL or HPCL as required for a sale under Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. MGL fixed the retail price, owned and controlled the dispensing equipment, and retained authority over unsold stock, while the corporations received commission according to the quantity sold. The Court concluded that BPCL and HPCL acted as agents facilitating MGL’s sales and that their activities were taxable as Business Auxiliary Services. It allowed the appeals, set aside the CESTAT order and restored the service tax demands confirmed by the adjudicating authority.

The Supreme Court held that a Court must impose an appropriate sentence within the statutory range under Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 after balancing the gravity of the offence, the interests of the victim and society with the offender’s age, antecedents, conduct and prospects of reformation.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, convicted an autorickshaw driver for gang rape under Section 376D and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, along with a fine of ₹25,000. On 1 November 2017, the Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The appellant-convict approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court declined to reopen the conviction question and confined itself to the quantum of sentence. It found that the convict, who was 25 years old when the offence was committed, had no criminal antecedents and had maintained good conduct in prison. The State had also placed no material on record to establish that he was incapable of reformation. The Court modified the sentence from imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life to 20 years’ imprisonment, with the benefit of remission, if available.

The Supreme Court held that continued incarceration of elderly and terminally ill prisoners without a structured, transparent and humane release mechanism violates the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Article 21.

The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) filed a writ petition under Article 32 after it conducted a nationwide Special Campaign for Old Prisoners & Terminally ill Prisoners between 10 December 2024 and 10 March 2025. It identified 5393 prisoners in vulnerable categories, including 1886 undertrial prisoners and 3507 convicts. NALSA argued that continued incarceration of such prisoners in medically inadequate prison conditions infringed Articles 14 and 21.

The Supreme Court held that advanced age and terminal illness are constitutionally relevant considerations in criminal justice and directed all States and Union Territories to formulate policies for early, premature or compassionate release within three months.

The Supreme Court held that an Arbitral Tribunal’s rejection of jurisdiction challenges under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot ordinarily be challenged under Article 227. It clarified that such orders are ordinarily amenable to challenge only under Section 34 after the final arbitral award.

A Trial Court and the Gauhati High Court had refused to refer a case of alleged mismanagement and financial irregularities to arbitration noting that several defendants were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court in 2024 referred the dispute to arbitration with the consent of the parties. The respondents sought deletion from the proceedings on the ground that they were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. The Tribunal rejected the applications treating them as jurisdictional objections under Section 16. The respondents filed a revision petition under Article 227, which the Gauhati High Court held to be maintainable and stayed the notices issued by the Tribunal. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed that Section 16 embodies the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, empowering the arbitral tribunal to decide questions concerning its own jurisdiction, including whether non-signatories are bound by the arbitration agreement. The Court held that Article 227 jurisdiction may be invoked only where there is a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction and that High Courts should record a prima facie finding to that effect before entertaining such petitions.

The Supreme Court held that the Children’s Court under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is mandated to independently pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1), deciding whether the child should be tried as an adult. Its non-compliance vitiates the entire trial.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant and six others intercepted and assaulted a man in October 2018, causing his death. The appellant was aged 16 at the time. The Juvenile Justice Board transferred the case to the Children’s Court, which tried him as an adult, convicted him of murder and sentenced him to 14 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Children’s Court did not pass an independent order under Section 19. The Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed the conviction.

The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. It held that the absence of a Section 19(1) determination affected the jurisdiction, procedure and possible punishment applicable to the appellant. Since he was already 24 years old and had undergone more than six years’ incarceration, the Court found that remanding the matter for a fresh assessment would serve no useful purpose.

The Supreme Court held that the Foreigners Tribunal, in an ex parte proceeding, must independently satisfy itself that notice was duly served, that the main grounds of the allegation were disclosed and that the material supports the conclusion before declaring a person a foreigner.

The appellants were declared foreigners in ex parte or effectively ex parte references that arose from Foreigners Tribunals in Assam, and some erstwhile Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunals. The Gauhati High Court had affirmed the Tribunals orders. Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 places the burden of proving non-foreigner status on the proceedee, while Paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 requires service of the main grounds, a reasonable opportunity to represent and lead evidence, and a reasoned opinion.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgements and the Tribunal’s opinions. The Court held that the statutory burden on the proceedee does not convert non-appearance into proof, and the guarantees of fair procedure under Articles 14 and 21 extend to every person, citizen or not. The Court remitted every matter for fresh adjudication as a single, time-bound final opportunity.

The Supreme Court held that Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 imposes a positive obligation on the employer not to dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires disability during service. The employer must shift the employee to a suitable post on the same pay scale, or a supernumerary post until superannuation.

A Single Judge and Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court had ordered the reinstatement of Bali Ram after he was invalidated from the CRPF after a Medical Board found him permanently incapacitated in March 1998. Ram, a CRPF constable driver enrolled in 1985, lost sight in one eye and part of the other to an ophthalmic condition in 1996. Years after his removal, a notification exempted CRPF combatant personnel from Section 47 on 10 September 2002. The Union appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the notification exempted the application of Section 47, and that Ram had waived its protection by accepting pension.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held the invalidation ultra vires Section 47 read with Articles 14 and 21. It added that an exemption notification, being prospective, cannot efface a breach already committed. As he had reached superannuation age, the Court awarded Rs 1,25,00,000, inclusive of back wages, interest and costs, in place of reinstatement.