Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the expression “personal law applicable to her” in the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 refers to the law in force on the date of the female Bhumidhar’s death (when succession opens). It does not refer to the law in force when the 1954 Act became operative or when the interest was originally inherited.

The Reversioners are male descendants from the family of a woman’s first marriage. She inherited a limited life estate when her first husband and son died. When the 1954 Act came into force, she was declared Bhumidhar and after enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 her limited interest was transformed into absolute ownership. Following her death in 1973, male descendants from her second marriage were granted mutation of the revenue records in their favour. The petitioners challenged the mutation, contending that the property reverted to the last male proprietor’s heir as per Section 50 of the 1954 Act. A single judge of the High Court ruled in their favour but this was set aside by the Division Bench which restored the mutation. The Reversioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Division Bench decision. It held that while the acquisition of interest under the 1954 Act is in the past tense, the trigger point “dies” is in the simple present tense. Thus, the nature of the female Bhumidhar’s right must be evaluated under the personal law applicable on the exact date of her death.

The Supreme Court held that Government employees appointed in accordance with due procedure must rank senior to those who were appointed on a temporary or exceptional basis. Among the latter, seniority must be based on their date of regularisation.

Three different categories of recruits to the Tamil Nadu public services challenged the rules determining their inter se seniority. Direct Recruits contended that candidates selected through competitive examinations cannot rank below “back-door appointees”, particularly when their appointments were delayed due to occupation of posts by those hired on a temporary basis. Special appointees challenged the Special Absorption Rules, 1987 to seek recognition of their service pre-regularisation. Compassionate appointees relied on a 1984 executive order to be placed among Direct Recruits on the basis of their date of joining. The Madras High Court held that date of appointment may form the basis for determining seniority of Compassionate appointees but will not be considered for Special appointees who rank below other employees irrespective of their date of joining.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision regarding Special appointees but set aside the holding on Compassionate appointees as they form a separate class of exception to Articles 14 and 16. It found that delay in appointment of Direct Recruits was adequately explained and affirmed that the employer has a right to frame rules on seniority which cannot then be challenged merely to be framed differently.

The Supreme Court directed the constitution of a three-member Committee to examine existing regulations on pharmaceutical marketing and their adequacy for curbing unethical practices.

In 2021, the petitioner trade union approached the Supreme Court through Article 32 petition, seeking a binding statutory framework to curb unethical marketing and promotional practices adopted by pharmaceutical companies to influence the prescriptions of drugs. Referring to the Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP), 2015, the petitioners argued that the existing framework is in the nature of guidelines which lack binding statutory and regulatory mechanisms. In 2022, a High-Level Committee dismissed the need for a new statutory framework and recommended strengthening the existing code, which was then formulated as the UCPMP 2024. In 2026, the Union proposed the constitution of a three-member committee.

The Supreme Court noted that while the matter falls in the legislative and executive domain, the Court cannot remain indifferent to a public health concern. Exercising its powers under Article 142, it directed that the Committee be constituted within two weeks and submit its final recommendation within two months of its meeting.

The Supreme Court reiterated that an election petitioner must personally present the petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Non-compliance is incurable and mandates dismissal at the threshold.

Pon. Paneerselvam challenged S. Regupathy’s election from Tamil Nadu’s Thirumayam Assembly constituency in 2026, alleging that Regupathy had concealed his spouse’s assets. The Madras High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was presented by his counsel. It relied on Rule 7 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions Rules, 1967, which requires personal presentation. Paneerselvam filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, claiming personal presentation on the basis of his entry pass and CCTV footage.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court found that the evidence only established Paneerselvam’s presence on the premises, not his personal presentation of the petition. It held that the High Court is empowered to authorise an officer to receive election petitions.

The Supreme Court held that the nature of a good is determined by its form at the time of taxable event and sale, and not by the manner in which it may later be consumed.

The respondents had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh against a commercial tax order which classified “GRD Powder” and “GRD Mix” as “Non-Alcoholic Drinks and Beverages” under Entry 20(ii), Part IV, Schedule II of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994, attracting a 10 per cent tax. When the High Court held that the goods fall under the residuary entry and attract an eight per cent tax, the appellants filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision and dismissed the appeal. It held that since the goods existed in the form of powder and biscuit at the time of taxable event, they cannot be considered ‘beverages’. It reiterated the principle of strict interpretation for taxing statutes and applied the rule of ejusdem generis to hold that beverages must be in liquid form.

The Supreme Court held that a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is maintainable against a trustee who signs a cheque on behalf of a trust, even though the trust itself is not made an accused.

A cheque issued by the Chairman and authorised signatory of the Orion Education Trust, which was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. A complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was filed against the Chairman in his personal capacity as the signatory of the cheque. He contended that Orion, being a juristic entity, was a necessary party and that failure to name it rendered the complaint defective. The Trial Court took cognisance and summoned him. The Meghalaya High Court quashed the complaint and the summoning order, noting that as the drawer of the cheque the trust should be arraigned as an accused. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging this finding.

The Supreme Court held that a trust is not a legal or juristic person under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 but an entity vested with the obligations attached to the ownership of property. Consequently, it cannot sue or be sued in its own name and functions only through its trustees. Since the cheque had been signed by the Chairman as an authorised representative, he was personally responsible for the transaction and fell within the ambit of Section 141 of the NI Act. The Court overruled contrary High Court rulings that had equated trusts with companies and restored the criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that couples who had commenced the surrogacy process cannot be denied their right to parenthood only because of the age bar under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.

Three couples intending to become parents had commenced the surrogacy process, prior to the commencement of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021. They were above the age-limits of 50 for women and 55 for men under Section 4(iii)(c) (I) of the Act. The couples filed a Writ Petition at the Supreme Court, challenging the propriety of the age-restrictions under the Act.

The Supreme Court held that couples intending to have a surrogate child have a constitutional right regulated by statute. The Bench exempted the petitioners from seeking certification on the qualifying age for the purpose of continuing surrogacy procedure, provided they satisfy the other conditions under the Act and the rules.

The Supreme Court held that the failure to file a written statement within the time stipulated under Rule 1(1) of Order VIII Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) cannot result in denial of the substantial right of defence through cross-examination.

M/s. Aroush Motors was appointed as a dealer and paid over ₹171,00,000 toward inventory, security, fit-out, etc. When BS-IV vehicles got banned in 2020, the Defendant-M/s. Avnita Auto Tech failed to upgrade stock, stalling business for its dealers. Aroush Motors terminated the dealership in 2020 and sued for damages. The defendant appeared when summons was served in July 2021, but failed to file a written statement within the 120 days mandated for commercial suits. The trial court rejected multiple applications filed by Avnita Auto Tech for extension of time. It excluded the written statement, recorded the examination-in-chief of PW1, and marked the defendant’s cross-examination as Nil. A decree was accordingly passed against the defendant and upheld by the High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. The Bench held that citing procedural lapses for denial of the defendant’s right to cross-examination was “absolutely perverse” and violated the defendant’s right of defence. Further, it noted that a series of Orders passed by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 (March 2020 and February 2022) excused the application of limitation period. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court.

The Supreme Court extended the doctrine of public trust, which mandates government protection of natural resources for public use, to include man-made objects that promote the environment.

The Swacch Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the Bombay High Court against constructions developed near Futala Lake, Nagpur. They argued that the lake was a wetland and construction activities in the area violated the restrictions found under Rule 4(2)(vi) of the Wetlands (Conservation & Management) Rules, 2017. The High Court disposed of the PIL holding that Futala Lake did not fall under the definition of a ‘wetland’ under Rule 2(1)(g) of the 2017 Rules, as it was man-made. However, the Court recognised the status of Futala Lake as a wetland as declared by the National Wetland Inventory and Assessment (NWIA). Further, it noted that the Supreme Court had held that wetlands recognised by the NWIA should be protected as per Rule 4 of the 2017 Rules.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It reasoned that the doctrine of public trust compels the state to protect the lake and prohibit permanent constructions, even if the Futala Lake is man-made. It observed that much of the construction in and around the Futala lake was not permanent and met the criteria set in Rule 4.

The Supreme Court held that a tender condition which required bidders to have previously supplied goods to state government agencies in Chhattisgarh was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g).

Vinishma Technologies, a supplier of sports kits to several states, challenged a clause in tender notices issued by the Chhattisgarh Government for the supply of sports kits to government school students. The condition required bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least six crores to state government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the three preceding financial years. The Chhattisgarh High Court upheld the clause, reasoning that it ensured reliable and timely delivery by suppliers familiar with the State’s geography.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision. It held that while the State has discretion to frame tender criteria, such discretion is subject to the constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom of trade. The Court observed that linking eligibility to past supply within Chhattisgarh created an artificial barrier that curtailed competition and excluded qualified bidders, contrary to the doctrine of level playing field.