Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that jail-earned remission can only be applied to shorten the imposed life sentence and not the imprisonment period guaranteed at the time of extradition.

The appellant was extradited from Portugal on 12 October 2005 on an assurance from the Union Government that he would neither be subjected to the death penalty nor imprisonment exceeding 25 years. A Special Court at Mumbai under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 imposed concurrent life sentences on him in 2015 and 2017. The Supreme Court directed the Union to honour the assurance upon completion of 25 years, either by advising the President to commute the remaining sentence under Article 72 or by exercising its own powers under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In April 2026, the Bombay High Court dismissed the appellant’s habeas corpus petition which factored remission (pre-mature release for good conduct) to claim completion of 25 years.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court found that the overlapping periods of the appellant’s custody had been counted twice and he had yet to complete 25 years. It upheld the High Court’s refusal to apply jail-earned remission to the period arising from the extradition assurance as the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Supreme Court held that it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether a dispute falls outside its jurisdiction as an “excepted matter” under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It held that a writ appellate court cannot intervene before the matter is heard in the first instance.

The appellant’s contract with South Central Railway for doubling a railway track was terminated under the Indian Railways Standard General Conditions of Contract (GCC). The appellant challenged the termination before the Telangana High Court, alleging that it was contrary to GCC procedure. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and directed the appellants to raise the dispute before the tribunal while recording an irregularity in the termination. On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the finding and directed the tribunal to adjudicate the matter in strict accordance with the contract.

The Supreme Court held that the GCC does not exclude a court of law from determining whether a dispute is an “excepted matter” or not. It observed that the High Court should not have entered into merits, and clarified that the direction to the tribunal would not impinge upon its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that services rendered by contract/ad hoc/daily wage employees prior to their regularisation as permanent staff must be factored in the calculation of pension benefits.

Between 1993-1996, the appellant engaged the respondents on a contractual/ad-hoc basis. After the 2001 Punjab government notification to regularise contract/ad-hoc employees, the respondents moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking its implementation. The Court disposed of the petition, noting that appellant, being an autonomous body, is not bound by the notification. In 2004, the respondents were regularised by the appellants, following which they claimed pension based directly on qualifying service. The State government declined as the employees were not in continuous service. They then moved a petition before the Single-Judge Bench of the High Court which allowed the petitions. Aggrieved, the appellants engaged the Division Bench, which upheld the single-judge decision. The appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that intermittent breaks and change in the ad-hoc nature of employment is either notional or administrative. The term of engagement must be treated as continuous service for the purpose of calculation of pension. It reiterated that the payment of pension is a deferred wage earned for services rendered in the past.

The Supreme Court held that a corporate entity without natural persons alongside it can be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, provided that elements of the offence are made out.

Sanofi India was an accused in an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation for alleged criminal conspiracy under Section 120B and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Including Section 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the chargesheet further alleged that a public servant showed undue favours to Sanofi India by procuring tenders in lieu of illegal gratification. When the company’s plea to quash the charges was dismissed by the Karnataka High Court, it approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the offences could not be quashed merely because no individual employee or director of Sanofi India was co-arraigned. However, it found that the chargesheet did not establish the foundational facts required to demonstrate an offence by the corporate entity. In the absence of a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, it quashed the criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that there is a narrow scope for statutory guidelines to be legally binding even in case of non-publication in the Official Gazette. It clarified the required status of land allotment varies from stage to stage in the process of obtaining environmental clearance.

The National Green Tribunal set aside environmental clearances sought by the appellant to establish a Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF) on two plots of land in Uttar Pradesh as the plot fell short of the size required under the Revised Guidelines for CBWTFs, 2016. The appellant then secured fresh clearances after seeking a relaxation of the land area requirement from the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB). These were also set aside by the NGT on the grounds that the relaxation was not granted in accordance with the RG, 2016 and that fresh clearance cannot be granted on the basis of the original terms of reference (ToR). The appellants approached the Supreme Court arguing that the RG, 2016 were not binding in nature as they were not gazetted.

The Supreme Court set aside the NGT decision and restored the fresh clearances. While emphasising that the RG, 2016 is binding in nature, it held that the relaxation was granted in compliance with the guidelines. Further, the quashing of the initial clearance did not invalidate the ToR leaving it intact as a basis for the fresh clearances.

The Supreme Court held that High Courts cannot create an “entirely new case” while framing a new substantial question of law under Section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

A property dispute arose among the descendants of C.R. Pius and Philomina Pius. Their joint will favoured C.P. Francis, the appellant. Other family members challenged the joint will and sought a partition. The validity of the joint will was upheld in the Munsif Court. The Kerala High Court declared the will ‘void’ under Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, because one of its attesting witnesses was Francis’s wife.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Judgement on the ground that it had erred by framing a new question under Section 67 without pleadings, issues or recorded reasons, creating a new case. The introduction of a new provision that neither party relied on was procedurally “improper”.

The Supreme Court held that a general clause excluding interest on delayed payments or disputed claims cannot be construed as a prohibition to award pendente lite interest.

An arbitral award in favour of G&T Beckfield directed ONGC to pay $6,56,272.34 with 12 percent interest per annum until recovery. ONGC challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, relying on a contractual clause that barred interest on delayed payments. The District Judge accepted the argument and set aside the award. This decision was reversed by the Gauhati High Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. It found the contractual clause insufficient to curtail the tribunal’s statutory power to grant pendente lite interest. It emphasised that an exclusion must be in explicit terms or flow by necessary implication—it must not be a generic prohibition on interest on delayed payments.

The Supreme Court held that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) has jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters incidental to a complaint alleging oppression and mismanagement. It also has the power to decide the validity of a gift deed.

Shailja Krishna held over 98 percent shares in Satori Global Limited, a company she co-founded with her husband. In 2010, amid marital strain, she purportedly resigned and transferred her shares to her mother-in-law via a disputed gift deed. She filed police complaints claiming coercion into signing blank documents. The NCLT ruled in her favour and restored ownership, finding the deed and transfer invalid due to fraud, overwriting and defective board meetings. On appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) found that the NCLT lacked jurisdiction to decide on the issue of fraud.

The Supreme Court reversed the NCLAT’s order and emphasised that denying the NCLT wide jurisdiction would erode its ability to provide diverse reliefs in cases of oppression and mismanagement.

The Supreme Court held that teachers with more than five years of service remaining must clear the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) to continue in their jobs. It referred to a larger Bench the question of whether the Right to Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act), applies to Minority Educational Institutions (MEI).

Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust, an MEI, challenged the authorities’ refusal to allow the recruitment of teachers who had not cleared the TET. It relied on a 2014 Constitution Bench ruling in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v Union of India, which held that the RTE Act (the TET was notified under Section 23) does not apply to either aided or unaided MEIs. Teachers who had joined before the RTE Act were also unhappy, as they now needed to pass the TET to continue in service or be promoted.

The Supreme Court invoked its powers under Article 142 to relax the TET requirement for teachers with less than five years of service remaining. However, they will not be eligible for promotion unless they pass the test. Further, the Court questioned the correctness of Pramati Education and referred it to a larger Bench, observing that exempting MEIs from the RTE Act would amount to a violation of students’ rights under Article 21A.

The Supreme Court held that a High Court could not interfere with or expand the definition of a ‘local candidate’ for medical admissions when the definition was laid down by subordinate legislation in accordance with the Presidential Order under Article 371D.

The Telangana High Court struck down portions of the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017, holding that they were framed under the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983, rather than under Article 371D. It held that the definition of ‘local candidate’ was arbitrary and violative of Article 14. It expanded the definition to include any student able to show permanent residence or a residence certificate in the state.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Order and upheld the validity of the 2017 Rules and 2024 amendments. It clarified that the 2017 Rules drew authority from a Presidential Order and Articles 245 and 246 read with Entry 25 of List III. Observing that the 1983 Admissions Act itself referred to the Presidential Order, it found no basis for the High Court’s “reading down” of the rules. It noted that policy choices in admissions could only be set aside for “gross discrimination, clear arbitrariness, patent illegality, perversity or unconstitutionality.”