Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that psychological evaluation of a child in custody or visitation disputes cannot be ordered routinely, as it risks causing secondary trauma to the minor. Courts must record detailed reasons demonstrating the absolute necessity of such an evaluation and should ordinarily appoint a single independent expert.

In 2019, the appellant returned to India from the USA with her minor daughter, subsequently registering cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against the respondent-father, alleging domestic violence and child sexual abuse. To re-establish contact with the child, the father sought an expert psychological evaluation of the minor. The Family Court, Pune rejected the application, but the Bombay High Court subsequently directed the appointment of a four-member expert panel that included specialists suggested by the father, including one based in the USA. The appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s direction for a four-member panel and modified the order. It directed that a comprehensive psychological assessment of both parents be conducted first to evaluate their parental suitability and mental state. The matter was then remitted to the Family Court to determine the necessity of any future child evaluation based on those parental reports and the child’s best interests.

The Supreme Court held that deficiencies, omissions, or blank columns in Form F records prescribed under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) cannot be treated as trivial clerical or technical errors. A compromise in maintaining these mandatory records constitute an offence as they are vital in preventing illegal pre-natal sex determination.

Criminal charges were initiated against the appellant after a search and seizure operation by an inspecting authority at his sonography centre. The doctor challenged the order taking cognisance before the Bombay High Court, arguing that the inspecting Civil Surgeon was not the legally competent “Appropriate Authority” to file the complaint and that the uncompleted sections in Form F were merely inadvertent clerical errors lacking criminal intent. The High Court dismissed the petition, noting that a state notification explicitly designated the District Civil Surgeon as the Appropriate Authority and that record-keeping flaws constitute a substantive statutory breach. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the criminal proceedings against the doctor. It observed that any record-keeping deficiencies in Form F must be strictly scrutinised at trial rather than dismissed as clerical oversights.

The Supreme Court held that compensation for the death of a homemaker must include a new head of ‘loss of domestic care’, fixed at ₹30,000 per month and revisable by ten percent every three years. Where the homemaker has no proven income, this sum stands in as notional monthly income.

The claimant’s wife, a homemaker, died on 25 November 2001 in a road accident while travelling from Sirsa to Fatehabad. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sirsa, awarded ₹2,42,000 in December 2003. The claimants’ appeal remained pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for twenty years, the case file having been destroyed in a 2011 fire. In December 2024, a Single Judge enhanced the compensation to ₹8,43,400 with 7.5 percent interest.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and awarded ₹62,77,900, computed by taking ₹30,000 as the deceased’s notional monthly income, and directed High Courts to prioritise appeals pending beyond four years.

The Supreme Court held that a third referee judge under Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when referred a case due to a split opinion in a Division Bench, is strictly confined to the specific points of disagreement. The referee judge cannot independently reopen, re-evaluate or overturn the concurrent findings of fact or guilt unanimously reached by both judges of the original bench.

In 2001, three siblings were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow for unlawful assembly and murder. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction of two brothers but differed on one of the siblings’ guilt. A third referee judge not only agreed that the third sibling should be acquitted, but also re–evaluated the finding of guilt for the two brothers and acquitted them. The complainant moved the Supreme Court along with the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The Supreme Court set aside the referee judge’s findings on acquitting the two convicted siblings. It referred the correctness of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Sajjan Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh (1998) to a larger bench. The larger bench is expected to decide the exact limits of a referee judge, noting that Sajjan Singh had earlier held that a third judge is required to examine the whole case independently, including issues on which the Division Bench was unanimous.

The Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain writ petitions from Central Armed Police Forces.

Baksish Ahmad, an enrolled member of the Border Security Forces (BSF), was dismissed from service without pensionary benefits after an Inquiry found he had entered a second marriage without permission from the Central Government, thereby violating Rules 7 of the BSF Rules, 1969. His petition for reinstatement was rejected by the Inspector General, BSF, Jammu. Ahmad challenged his dismissal by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The petition was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, holding that no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi and that the appropriate forums were the High Courts of Calcutta or Jammu & Kashmir. Ahmad approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court and revived the appellant’s writ petition. It ruled that because the head offices of the necessary respondents are situated in New Delhi, the Delhi High Court cannot refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court directed the respondents to file their counter-affidavit within two months to facilitate an early disposal on the merits.

The Supreme Court held that judicial oversight under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 should be exercised with the welfare of the minor as a paramount consideration, as per the doctrine of parens patriae—the State takes care of those who cannot take care of themselves.

Shephali Chakraborty sought permission under Section 8 of the HMGA to transfer her minor son’s property to a developer as per a Development Agreement. The District Court of Darjeeling denied the permission due to lack of “necessity”. The Calcutta High Court upheld the District Court’s decision. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the findings made by the District Court and the High Court. It granted the appellant permission to realise the Development Agreement. It noted that a share in the built-up structure obtained under the Development Agreement would be in the best interests of the minor. However, the Court clarified that its conclusion was not a proposition of law, and similar situations would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The Supreme Court held that married daughters cannot be excluded as beneficiaries to welfare schemes merely on the ground of their marital status.

In 2024, the appellant filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Amethi for the allotment of a fair-price shop, belonging to her deceased mother, in her capacity as a dependent. The application was rejected on ground that the appellant is a married daughter, not a “dependent” under Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Order, 2016. The appellant challenged the decision in a writ petition at the Lucknow High Court, which was dismissed. Subsequently, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision, holding that exclusion of married daughters as dependents fails the test of reasonable classification, violating Articles 14 and 15(1). Further, the Court read “daughter” in the 2016 Order to include a married daughter who proves dependency and satisfies other conditions.

The Supreme Court held that when a Hindu male dies without a will, any property he owned will be divided among his own immediate heirs as personal or individual property, as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It does not become a joint family property.

Dajiba died intestate, leaving behind agricultural lands. He was survived by his four daughters, the respondents and his second wife, the appellant. Before a suit for partition was filed for the inherited property, Dajiba’s second wife sold part of the property to a third party. The appellant reasoned that the sale was necessitated by the marriage of one of the respondents and was executed in pursuance of her duties as the Karta of the family. A Civil Court ruled that the sale was invalid. On appeal, the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Civil Court. The Bombay High Court then upheld the Civil Court’s decree. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It held that, since the disputed property was the intestate’s separate property, it devolved as the inheritors’ separate property and not as coparcenary property amenable to management by a Karta.

The Supreme Court held that casual labourers granted temporary status cannot be denied pensionary benefits solely because they were never formally regularised. It held that pension is a constitutional right and a form of property protected under Article 300A.

The appellants were engaged as casual labourers and were granted temporary status under the Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991. A circular provided that employees who completed three years of service with temporary status would be treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employees. Despite having served for decades, the appellants were never formally regularised and were denied a pension upon retirement. The Central Administrative Tribunal allowed their claims. The Patna High Court reversed the decision, holding that formal regularisation was a prerequisite for pension.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement. It held that completion of three years of temporary status service entitled the appellants to the same pensionary benefits as temporary Group ‘D’ employees. This entitlement was not contingent on a formal regularisation order and could not be defeated by administrative inaction. The Court directed the release of all pensionary and family pension benefits.

The Supreme Court held that the victims of trafficking hold a fundamental right to rehabilitation under Articles 21 and 23.

A Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) moved the Supreme Court in a writ petition highlighting the inadequacy of anti-trafficking laws in India. In 2015, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with directions in light of the Organised Crime Investigation Agency being set-up as a measure to frame anti-trafficking legislation. The appellants moved a miscellaneous application alleging non-compliance to 2015 directions.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the scattered functions of the existing system and issued directions pertaining to Domestic Legal Framework on Human Trafficking and the Victim Protection Plan under Articles 32 and 142.