Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a registered sale deed carries a strong presumption of validity and genuineness and cannot be casually disregarded as nominal or a sham. It clarified that registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act which imparts sanctity to the document and cannot be set aside in the absence of cogent pleadings and convincing evidence.

Tukaram had executed a registered sale deed in favour of Hemlatha for a consideration of Rs. 10,000, part of which was utilised to redeem an existing mortgage. On the same day, a registered rental agreement was executed under which Tukaram retained possession of the same property as a tenant. He paid rent for a period and admitted his liability to do so. However, after eviction proceedings were initiated, Tukaram instituted a suit seeking a declaration that the sale deed and rental agreement were nominal and a sham. He contended that the transaction was in substance a mortgage under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Trial Court dismissed the suit and the First Appellate Court affirmed the decree. The Karnataka High Court reversed the concurrent findings and held that the transaction was not an outright sale.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement and restored the decision of the First Appellate Court. It found that recitals in the registered sale deed clearly indicated an outright sale and did not embody any condition of reconveyance. The Court observed that dilution of the sanctity of registered documents encourages disputes founded on forgery and clever drafting. It recommended digitisation of registered documents and land records using secure and tamper-proof technologies such as blockchain, to prevent disputes relating to authenticity. The suit was dismissed and the registered sale deed was upheld as a genuine transaction.

The Supreme Court held that strict compliance with publication requirements is an indispensable condition precedent for the enforceability of delegated legislation. It emphasised that publication in the Official Gazette is not an empty formality but rather an act by which executive decisions are transformed into law.

In 2018, the Delhi High Court had dismissed writ petitions challenging a Union notification which introduced Minimum Import Price (MIP) for specific steel products. The central issue pertained to when the notification would take effect. The appellants contended that it was 11 February 2016, the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. The Union argued that it was 5 February, the date on which it was uploaded on the ministry website.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants were exempt from the MIP for transactions that took place before 11 February. The Court held that for a law to be binding, it must first be known to the public in a manner specified by the legislature. On a plain reading of the parent statute, the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, it found that the mode of publication was not left to executive discretion.

The Supreme Court held that compensatory allowances fall within the definition of “ordinary rate of wages” and must be included in calculation of overtime wage under Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948. It clarified that government ministries have no power to read exclusions into the statutory provision and upheld a liberal interpretation of the beneficial legislation.

Through multiple letters and Office Memorandums, different government ministries had asserted that Section 59(2) should exclude compensatory allowance from the calculation of overtime wage. In 2010, the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed applications that challenged this interpretation. In 2011, the Madras High Court ruled in favour of the petitioners with a plain and simple reading of the statute. The Union appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that calculations based on differing allowances would lead to disparity between employees. The petitioners argued that exclusion of allowances by some ministries is not permissible as it will lead to disparity of application of law in different establishments.

The Supreme Court held that government ministries had no power to issue clarifications on provisions. Further, an interpretation curtailing benefits to workers must be avoided. It upheld the High Court decision and dismissed the appeals.

The Supreme Court held that a marriage can be dissolved under Article 142 on the ground of irretrievable breakdown even without mutual consent to prevent prolonged and abusive matrimonial litigation from clogging the judicial system.

Parties to the proceeding were a married couple who shared residence for only 65 days after which they lived separately for over a decade. They filed more than 40 cases against each other in various courts, including maintenance applications, domestic violence charges, criminal complaints, execution petitions and perjury applications. The trial courts had disposed of several proceedings while many remained pending. A transfer petition before the Supreme Court triggered an application by the wife under Article 142 seeking dissolution of marriage. Mediation attempts failed and the husband opposed divorce, alleging harassment and perjury.

The Court dissolved the marriage despite lack of mutual consent. It terminated all pending matrimonial proceedings except perjury-related cases, and imposed ₹10000 as costs on each of the parties payable to the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association.

The Supreme Court held that a candidate having participated in the process of selection, without protest, cannot challenge the Rules after being declared unsuccessful.

A candidate had failed to meet the cut off criteria for the post of Professor (Plastic Engineer). She challenged the appointment process conducted under the Government Engineering Colleges Recruitment Rules, 2012 arguing that it was contrary to the All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 (AICTE Regulations). A Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition stating that the candidate had participated in the process without any protest. A Division Bench set aside the Order stating that the AICTE regulations govern direct recruitment and directed a fresh round for the candidate.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgement. It held that the AICTE regulations are applicable for the advancement of incumbent teachers who are already embedded within the academic system. The Court held that AICTE Regulations and State Rules operate in a different field. AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules. Therefore, the question of one superseding the other does not arise. The Court upheld the recruitment process.

The Supreme Court held that contracts for booking guest speakers for an event do not amount to “event management service” under the Finance Act, 1994. Further, laying down the modalities of their participation does not constitute planning, promotion, organisation or presentation of an event within the meaning of the statutory definition.

HT Media organised the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit and entered into contracts with overseas booking agencies to secure the participation of international speakers. Show cause notices were issued proposing levy of service tax by classifying the payments made to the booking agencies as event management service under Section 65(105)(zu) read with Sections 65 (40) and 65 (41) of the Finance Act, for the period from October 2009 to March 2012, by invoking the extended period of limitation on the allegation of suppression. The Commissioner confirmed the demand. The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), New Delhi, set aside the invocation of the extended period of limitation but sustained the demand for the normal period.

The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s order. It held that the tenor of the contracts showed that the booking agents were engaged only to secure speakers for the event and not to manage the event itself. The Court noted that participation in an event cannot be equated with management of the event. It observed that taxing provisions must be construed strictly and the statutory definition of event management service could not be extended to cover contracts for booking speakers.

The Supreme Court held that a Joint Committee of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha can be constituted only p if the motion for the removal of a judge, filed on the same day, is admitted by both houses under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

On 21 July 2025, members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha filed motions for the removal of Justice Yashwant Varma, Allahabad High Court, after burnt currency notes were allegedly discovered in his official residence in Delhi. While the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha rejected the motion, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted it and proceeded to set up a three-member committee. Justice Varma approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Speaker’s action was unlawful and that Section 3(2) mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee when a motion is filed on the same day.

Rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court held that the mere act of filing notices in both Houses on the same day does not mandate a Joint Committee if one House refuses to admit the motion. It further clarified that where one House admits the motion and the other rejects it, the Presiding Officer of the House that admitted the motion retains the independent authority to constitute a three-member Committee.

The Supreme Court issued directions to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to address high rates of student suicides across the country. The directions were based on recommendations made by a National Task Force (NTF) constituted by the Court last year.

In March 2025, the Supreme Court directed the Delhi Police to register FIRs in the deaths of two IIT Delhi students. Family members alleged caste-based discrimination by the faculty and staff. The Court had set up an NTF led by former Supreme Court Judge S. Ravindra Bhat after noting the “disturbing pattern” of student suicides.

The Supreme Court reiterated that HEIs must mandatorily report all student suicides or unnatural deaths to the police. It mandated disbursement of all pending scholarship dues within four months. It observed that these suicides are not solely a mental and public health concern but may occur due to social, economic and other factors. It remarked that a myopic focus on quantitative expansion of higher education in India has resulted in shortcomings in provision of qualitative support systems for students.

The Supreme Court held that denying maintenance to a widowed daughter-in-law from the estate of her deceased father-in-law would offend her right to live with dignity.

Geeta Sharma sought maintenance from Dr. Mahendra Prasad’s estate under Section 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,1956 (HAMA). The South-East Delhi Family Court dismissed her petition, reasoning that she did not qualify as a dependant under Section 21(vii) of the HAMA as she became a widow after Prasad’s death. The Delhi High Court set aside that order, directing the Family Court to decide the claim on merits. Prasad’s family members approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view. The Supreme Court held that the phrase “any widow of his son” used in Section 21(vii) includes a widowed daughter-in-law irrespective of the time she becomes a widow, so long as she does not re-marry.

The Supreme Court held that the rights of persons with disability must be a facet of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to achieve “true” equality at the workplace.

In 2019, the appellant was selected for an interview for the post of Management Trainee at Coal India Limited (CIL) under the “Visually Handicapped” category. The appellant approached the Calcutta High Court after she was declared unfit on grounds of suffering from multiple disabilities—visual disability and residuary partial hemiparesis. The recruitment process had concluded by then. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed her to participate in the recruitment process. In an appeal by CIL, a Division Bench set aside the judgement on account that the petition was filed after the recruitment process had concluded. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgement. It held that it would be unfair to deny employment to the appellant merely because the recruitment process had concluded and the panel had expired. The Court held that persons with disabilities have to be reasonably accommodated and viewed from the prism of CSR. The Court exercised its powers under Article 142 and directed CIL to post the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields Coal India.