Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that if a woman voluntarily continues to cohabit with a man after learning of his prior marriage, she cannot claim that her consent was obtained by deceit or misconception.

The respondent was married to the appellant for seven years. Five years after their relationship ended, she filed a complaint against him under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The complaint was dismissed. During the proceedings, the appellant disclosed that he was already married with two children, a fact that his brother had informed the respondent nine months after their wedding. She then filed a private complaint accusing the appellant of repeated rape (Section 376), cheating (Section 420) and cohabitation caused by deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage (Section 493) under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court’s refusal to discharge the appellant under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was upheld by the Kerala High Court which noted sufficient material on record to constitute a prima facie case against him.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and discharged the appellant from all charges. It noted that a voluntary live-in arrangement with knowledge of the appellant’s marital status does not constitute rape or deceit. Further, Trial Courts cannot be mere mouthpieces of the prosecution and must evaluate the broad probabilities of the case at the discharge stage.

The Supreme Court reiterated that separate life sentences awarded for different offences in a single trial cannot be directed to run consecutively. Remission or commutation of one does not ipso facto extend to the other.

The appellant was convicted by a trial court in 2013 for the rape and murder of a 12 year old. Two separate life sentences were awarded for each offence, and directed to run consecutively. In 2016, this decision was affirmed by the Bombay High Court. A Division Bench then dismissed the appellant’s writ petition for concurrent sentences on the ground that it cannot review the decision of a coordinate bench. The appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.

The Supreme Court set aside the direction for sentences to run consecutively. Pointing out the impossibility of being imprisoned for the remainder of life more than once, it interpreted Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to exclude life sentences. Given the distinct nature of offences, remission/commutation will nonetheless need to be independently secured for each sentence.

The Supreme Court held that the restriction on granting bail to foreign nationals under Section 43D(7) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) does not apply to foreign nationals who entered legally but subsequently overstayed their visas. It does not override the statutory right to default bail when the prosecution fails to complete its investigation within the prescribed period.

Mohamed Rifas, accused of conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Tamil Nadu, was granted default bail by a Sessions Court in July 2018 under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after the prosecution failed to file its chargesheet within the statutory period. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over the investigation in 2019 and discovered that Rifas was allegedly a Sri Lankan national who had overstayed his visa. In 2022, an NIA Special Court cancelled his bail, a decision the Madras High Court later reversed in 2023. The Union government appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgement. It held that the prosecution had failed to establish that Rifas entered India illegally, as the subsequent FIR itself indicated that he had entered on a valid visa. The Court clarified that Section 43D(7) overrides only subsections (5) and (6) of Section 43D, leaving the right to default bail under Section 43D(2) intact.

The Supreme Court held that the Committee of Creditors (CoC) cannot withdraw its approval of a resolution plan once it has approved it and submitted it under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

The appellants—members of the CoC—filed an application to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 12A of IBC to withdraw their approval of the Resolution Plan (RP) under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). They explained that there was a delay in the implementation of the CIRP during which the Corporate Debtor’s cash balance grew significantly. Resultantly, the respondent—the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) stands to gain unfairly. The NCLT approved the withdrawal. The respondent moved the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), arguing that once the CoC approves and submits its resolution to NCLT, it cannot be withdrawn due to changes in financial status of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLAT set aside the Order of NCLT. The appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT order, noting that the CoC has no jurisdiction to withdraw from its approval. Further, the Court held that Regulation 30A of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016 restricts withdrawal by the CoC and must be read with Section 12A of the IBC.

The Supreme Court held that a co-operative bank cannot deny a member access to its records on the ground that the information is personal to the society. Section 2(f) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 covers information relating to private bodies that a public authority is legally entitled to access.

A member of Muppathadam Service Co-operative Bank sought two documents from the Joint Registrar (General) of Co-operative Societies: the agreement for construction of a building between the bank and a Labour Co-operative Society, and the minutes of the bank’s last General Body Meeting. The request was rejected. This led to proceedings before the State Chief Information Commissioner and the Kerala High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court upheld the member’s right to information. The bank challenged that decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that it was not a “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.

The Supreme Court rejected the bank’s argument. The Court held that neither the exemption for commercial confidence nor that for personal information justified withholding the documents from the bank’s member. It clarified that a request from an unrelated third party might warrant a different consideration. The Court directed the Joint Registrar to obtain both documents and provide them to the member within two weeks.

The Supreme Court held that a private complaint alleging an offence under Section 125-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 is maintainable and is not subject to the bar under Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The appellant lodged a complaint against the respondent, a member of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly, under Section 200 of the CrPC for making a false disclosure in an affidavit accompanying his nomination paper. The Karnataka High Court quashed the complaint in the respondent’s petition after noting that a voter cannot file a private complaint against an elected representative. It held that such a complaint is barred under Section 195 of the CrPC. The appellant moved the Supreme Court arguing that the bar on cognisance under Section 195 is restricted to Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and does not extend to a complaint under Section 125-A of RoPA.

The Supreme Court, while upholding the quashing of the complaint, held that omission of Section 125-A of the RoPA under Section 195 of the CrPC is deliberate and thus, the bar would not be applicable to complaints lodged by a private person.

The Supreme Court held that a borrower (buyer) in a tripartite agreement between the lender (bank) and the builder is not entitled to the refund amount except which he had paid out of his own pocket.

The appellant paid for the apartment using both his own funds and a bank loan disbursed to the builder. The builder failed to hand over the possession of the apartment for more than one year. In the meantime, the bank started debiting pre-EMI interest on the amount disbursed by it. On a consumer complaint, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi ordered the builder to refund the entire amount, including the amount paid by the Bank, to the borrower. The Bank’s review petition before the Commission was dismissed. The Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court referred to the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment and held that payment of the entire amount to the borrower would place in his hands a sum which he never paid. Therefore, the borrower is only entitled to the sum he paid himself.

The Supreme Court held that severance compensation for land acquired under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be calculated as a percentage of the market value of the remaining, unacquired land and not the acquired strip.

The Punjab government had issued notifications under Section 4 of the Act to acquire 18.42 km of land across six villages for construction of the Aspal Extension Drain. The project split agricultural holdings, rendering the remaining, unacquired land on the other side of the canal inaccessible. The Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) awarded a uniform rate of ₹2.25 lakhs per acre for irrigated land across all villages but granted nil compensation for severance charges. The Reference Court under Section 18 enhanced the market value up to ₹5 lakhs per acre and granted 50 per cent severance charges calculated on the value of the remaining unacquired land. The Punjab and Haryana High Court reduced the severance charges to 40 per cent of the acquired land. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s holding and restored the 50 per cent severance charge on the unacquired land. It held that severance charges under Section 23(1) are statutorily designed to compensate for the diminution in value of the remaining, unacquired land rendered inaccessible due to a physical barrier.

The Supreme Court directed that an independent psychiatric evaluation of the child must be considered while arresting and summoning a parent or family member accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) during a matrimonial dispute.

The Bengaluru Family Court granted custody of a daughter to her father in 2022. The Karnataka High Court upheld this decision and granted the mother visitation rights. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. When the father challenged her visitation rights, she lodged a FIR alleging that he sexually assaulted their daughter and that she was mistreated by his family. The Supreme Court transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), who found the allegations unsubstantiated after an inquiry which included an expert evaluation of the child.

The Supreme Court accepted the CBI’s findings and quashed the FIR. It directed that the father have legal custody. The Court made its safeguards applicable to investigations underway on the judgement date and to private complaints under Section 33 of the POCSO Act in which summons had yet to be issued. It permitted exceptions where the material is palpable and reasons are recorded in writing, and held that custody courts must assess the material supporting the allegations case by case.

The Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional courts i.e. High Courts and the Supreme Court have power to direct a reinvestigation as a dynamic component of judicial review, a basic feature of the Constitution.

The original petitioner’s daughter was discovered dead a day after he filed a missing persons complaint. The post-mortem report revealed rape and murder. The petitioner accused three boys in the locality as the culprits. One of the boys handed over Santosh Rao to the local police. Rao was arrested and was identified as the perpetrator by both the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The petitioner maintained that Rao was innocent and in 2023 he was acquitted by a Session Court. The petitioner filed applications for reinvestigation in the Karnataka High Court under Article 226 and 227 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court dismissed the petition while acknowledging the need for reinvestigation, and held that critical evidence was not collected during the “golden hour”. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s dismissal and directed de novo investigation by a state constituted Special Investigation Team as potential witnesses were identified and DNA analysis was still possible. It emphasised the right to a fair trial under Article 21, particularly in cases where the investigation has been conducted in a manner to “help someone escape the clutches of the law.”