Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a legislation meant for reorganisation and revival, not debt recovery.

The respondent,a money lender, lent ₹4.5 crore to the appellant. Following defaults and dishonoured cheques, the Delhi High Court directed the appellant to pay ₹4.38 crore with interest at 24 per cent per annum. An appeal against the decree was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Without executing the money decree, the respondent initiated insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) dismissed the petition noting the appellant was solvent and functioning. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) set aside the NCLT Order and directed the admission of the Section 7 application observing that a money decree constitutes a “financial debt”.

The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT order and restored the NCLT’s original order. It held that an insolvency proceeding cannot be a substitute for civil execution. The respondent was directed to pay the appellant a cost of ₹5 lakhs within five weeks.

The Supreme Court held that foreign decrees which are not issued on merits, and are covered under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, shall not be enforceable by Indian Courts.

The appellants discharged a loan liability on behalf of the respondents and demanded reimbursement. When the respondents failed to reimburse them, the appellants moved the English Court and obtained directions for payment of the due amount. The respondents contested that the decision was not made on merits of the case and hence, was not enforceable in India. Subsequently, the appellants moved the English Court to issue a summary judgement on merits, which the Court granted. Further, they approached the Delhi High Court for the enforcement of the judgement, which the Single Judge granted. The respondents appealed before the Division Bench, which found that the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct enforcement. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the Supreme Court in a civil appeal.

The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench, noting that adjudication by the way of summary judgement resulted in a premature adjudication and ‘mini-trial’. It held that the decree of the English Court fell within Sections 13(b), (c), (d) and (f) which specify grounds for non-enforcement.

The Supreme Court held that incarceration cannot dilute constitutional guarantees of dignity and equality under Articles 14 and 21. It held that the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 applies fully in custodial settings, binding prison authorities to disability-inclusive governance.

The petitioner sought directions securing nationwide rights and institutional safeguards for prisoners with disability. The Bench relied on L. Muruganantham v State of Tamil Nadu (2025), which laid down a framework for provision of access to ramps, accessible toilets, wheelchair-friendly spaces and assistive devices. It extended application of this framework to all States and Union Territories, and applied Section 89 of the RPwD Act, which imposes fines for contravention, to prison establishments.

The Bench observed that only 12 States and UTs had filed compliance affidavits and entrusted compliance monitoring to the High-Powered Committee constituted in Suhas Chakma v. Union of India (2026). All States and UTs were directed to file affidavits before it within six weeks. The matter is listed for 1 September 2026.

The Supreme Court held that Sub-Divisional Officers (SDOs) have no statutory authority to change the category of land which falls within the prohibitory ambit of Section 132 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Pattas granted on the basis of the recategorisation were deemed void ab initio.

In 1992, the Gaon Sabha in Hardoi, U.P. resolved to change the subject land from Category 6 (barren/uncultivated) to Category 5 (cultivable) of the U.P. Land Records Manual. The SDO approved this recommendation and subsequently, pattas were granted to the appellants. In 2019, the Consolidation Officer found the land to be public utility land and expunged the name of the appellants. This Order was challenged in the High Court which dismissed the petition and held that the approval granted by the SDO was without statutory authority. The appellants moved the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It found that the Act only permits the Gaon Sabha to admit a person as the owner of land vested in it if the land does not fall within categories specified under Section 132. While Category-6 land may encompass various forms of land, the land in dispute was specifically recorded as khalihan and pasture land which falls within the ambit of Section 132. The Court clarified that only the State Government is authorised to lift the prohibition, and applied the principle: what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

The Supreme Court registered four suo moto cases and disposed of the Taj Trapezium Zone case—its oldest pending matter.

In 1984, when the marble of the Taj Mahal began to visibly yellow and blacken, the original petition sought directions to concerned authorities to reduce emissions from foundries, brick kilns, chemical units, vehicular traffic, the Mathura Refinery and the Firozabad glass industry. Over four decades, the Supreme Court applied the precautionary and polluter-pays principles and fashioned the continuing mandamus as an instrument of enforcement. More than 150 interlocutory applications accumulated in this period. Amicus Liz Matthew, opposed transfer to jurisdictional High Courts given the Zone’s cross-State geography and proposed categorisation of the IAs.

Finding merit in her submissions, the Supreme Court disposed of the 1984 petition. The Registry was directed to register four new suo moto writ petitions on a Vision Document, green cover, industrial regulation and water bodies. A tabulated proforma chart was mandated for fresh tree-felling petitions.

The Supreme Court held that the word “can” in an arbitration clause indicates a possibility of arbitration and does not disclose a determination and obligation to refer disputes to arbitration.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for transportation of goods for a total consideration of Rs. 2,23,550/-. A dispute arose when the respondent delivered the consignment without production of the original bill of lading, resulting in financial loss to the appellant. The bill of lading contained a clause that provided that any dispute “can be settled by arbitration”. The appellant invoked arbitration and filed an application before the Bombay High Court for appointment of a sole arbitrator. The High Court dismissed the application holding that the clause did not make it imperative for the parties to be referred to arbitration. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that arbitration is based on consent and the parties must mutually intend to refer their differences to arbitration. It held that the word “can” indicates a possibility and not a mandate. A clause which requires a further agreement between the parties does not constitute an arbitration agreement. The Court held that the impugned clause indicated merely a future possibility of referring disputes to arbitration and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the regularisation of contractual or ad hoc employees without public advertisement and interview is arbitrary and illegal.

In June 2014, the General Administration Department of the Government of Haryana, through two notifications, regularised the services of the appellants—contractual and ad hoc employees on the ground that they were deprived of the benefit of a 1996 regularisation policy. A similar notification was issued in July 2014. The Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside all three notifications after writ petitions challenged that the regularisations were done without any public advertisements and interviews. Therefore, they violated Articles 14 and 16.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court verdict in part. It held that regularisation under the June notifications was not illegal, considering that it intended to regularise employees left out in 1996. Further, the notification from July 2014 was set aside since it permitted recruitment without public advertisement. The Court used its powers under Article 142 to enable continuation of services of the employees.

The Supreme Court held that Article 21 of the Constitution includes fair legal procedures and access to legal representation.

A death-sentence appeal from 2017 demonstrated how inordinate delay afflicted legal aid filings before the Supreme Court. Over several years, deliberations took place among the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCSLC), NALSA, High Court Legal Services Committees and jail authorities. The SCLSC submitted data on pendency and delay in response to the Court’s queries. It launched a “Mission Mode” campaign in January 2025 to identify convicts who had not yet filed appeals and to expedite their legal aid applications.

The Court adopted a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the translation, transmission and monitoring of case records in legal aid matters. It set binding timelines and held that timely access to justice is part of the constitutional obligation guaranteed under Articles 21 and 39A. It directed the National Informatics Centre to create a unified digital platform within two months and designated NALSA’s Member Secretary as nodal officer for implementation.

The Supreme Court held that the term “release” includes release from payment of fines under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. It held that the Act seeks to rehabilitate offenders as reformed citizens and operates on the principle that man becomes a criminal on account of his circum

Four persons were convicted for voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous weapons under Sections 323 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They were accused of harassment of a 17 year old and assault upon her father. The Bombay High Court upheld their conviction and sentence of 15-30 days of imprisonment and payment of fines. The convicts approached the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal seeking benefit of release after admonition and good conduct under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act.

The Supreme Court granted the benefit of release for all appellants, subject to a year-long bond for three. It held that Section 3 could only be invoked for specific offences. Further, the appellants were directed to deposit the prescribed fines to be treated as compensation to the victim.

The Supreme Court held that an organised system which enables the Court to deal with each issue in-depth, while having a comprehensive and holistic view is the need of the hour.

M.C. Mehta’s petition, filed in 1985, targeted polluting industries in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). Orders since the mid-1990s curbed vehicular pollution and introduced Bharat Stage emission standards. The Court facilitated the Commission for Air Quality Management, statutorily entrenched in 2021 to administer the Graded Response Action Plan. By order dated 23 February 2026, the Court flagged formal closure of the matter.

The Court disposed of the writ petition and directed the Registry to register five fresh suo moto writ petitions. The Court held that the oversight of air pollution in the NCR is better served by closing the parent petition. They will cover regulatory governance, vehicular emissions, green cover, industrial and construction pollution, and solid waste with crop-residue burning.