Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article 21 encompasses rehabilitative justice and dignity for prisoners. Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) are constitutionally mandated instruments for decongesting prisons and facilitating social reintegration, with cost-effectiveness deemed secondary to human dignity.

In 2018, the Supreme Court in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons directed States to implement Model Uniform Rules for OCIs. Human rights activist, Suhas Chakma filed the present writ petition in 2020 highlighting chronic prison overcrowding and seeking permanent decongestion mechanisms. Prisoners are selected for transfer to open prisons on the basis of seniority, conduct and physical and mental ability to work, subject to the completion of a stipulated portion of sentence awarded to them. Inmates are permitted to reside with their families, cultivate land, prepare their own meals and earn wages at rates significantly higher than those in closed prisons.

The Court directed all States to fill existing OCI vacancies within two months, establish new facilities where absent, and constitute Monitoring Committees headed by State Legal Services Authority Chairpersons. A High-Powered Committee under Justice S. Ravindra Bhat was directed to formulate Common Minimum Standards within six months. States were directed to revise eligibility criteria to prioritise reformative potential over incarceration duration and ensure gender-inclusive access by amending exclusionary rules within three months.

The Supreme Court held that “Sharbat Rooh Afza” is classifiable as a fruit drink under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UPVAT) and is taxable at four percent VAT, and not under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5 percent.

The dispute is related to the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 March 2012. The appellant paid four percent VAT, treating the product as falling under Entry 103, which covers processed or preserved vegetables and fruits including fruit jams, jelly, pickle, fruit squash, paste, fruit drink and fruit juice. The Joint Commissioner (Corporate Circle), Commercial Tax, Ghaziabad classified the product under the residuary entry in Schedule V and levied tax at 12.5 percent. The Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Commercial Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad and the Allahabad High Court affirmed that view. “Sharbat Rooh Afza” contained 10 percent fruit juice along with invert sugar syrup and herbal distillates. The Revenue relied upon the clarification dated 31 July 2009 under the Fruit Products Order, 1995 that a fruit syrup must contain a minimum of 25 percent fruit juice.

The Supreme Court held that regulatory enactments operate in a distinct domain and are neither determinative nor conclusive for purposes of fiscal classification. It noted that the expression “fruit drink” not being defined under the Act must be understood in common parlance. The Court further held that where the Revenue seeks to classify a product under the residuary entry, the burden lies upon it. Applying the test of essential character, it held that invert sugar syrup functions as a carrier, sweetening medium and preservative base and does not determine the commercial or beverage identity of the product. The Court allowed the appeals and directed payment of consequential relief including refund or adjustment of excess tax paid, in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court held that each member in an unlawful assembly is equally liable for acts committed in furtherance of a common unlawful object. It emphasised that superficial application of bail parameters in grave offences undermines public faith in justice.

A prior civil dispute existed between the parties over agricultural land. The appellant’s husband was assaulted by six persons with iron rods and sticks. When she and her relatives attempted to intervene, they were attacked and subject to caste-based slurs and obscene acts. Five days later, her husband died while undergoing treatment and the post-mortem identified eight injuries and blunt trauma to the head as a probable cause of death. Charges were framed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The High Court of Bombay granted bail to two respondents, citing the pending dispute as possible motive for false implication, failure to identify individual action of each accused and the time gap between assault and death.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order. It reversed the bail granted to the accused stating that it was erroneously granted without considering the material on record and the gravity of the offence. The Court held that the prior litigation could work as a motive for the attack as well, and observed that medical evidence is a trial-stage inquiry. The accused were directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks.

The Supreme Court held the evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure remains valid and can be further examined by the Court.

The Trial Court had summoned the appellant—a qualified radiologist—and two others after a District Appropriate Authority sting operation revealed that they were illegaly determining the sex of a foetus—barred under the Pre-natal and Pre-conception Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996. While no money was recovered from the appellant, ₹25,000 was recovered from his co-accused, Dr Abdul Kadir. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the complaint arguing that he is a victim of an illegal sting operation. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petition possessed no merit. The accused approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that unless there is an express or implied provision in law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure is not to be discarded. The Court further noted that it was prima facie revealed from the sting operation that the appellant has conducted ultrasonography on the pregnant women. The question as to whether he has disclosed the sex of the foetus is a matter of trial.

The Supreme Court held that missing DNA tests do not invalidate a deceased person’s identification if witnesses who knew them personally provide credible, consistent testimony.

The victim disappeared in July 2009. Based on a Section 27 statement from the appellant under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, her body was discovered inside a well and her vehicle was found at a railway station. Medical evidence revealed homicidal strangulation as the cause of death. The Trial Court and Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for murder and the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed his appeal. The appellant argued before the Supreme Court that there was no DNA identification of the decomposed body.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. It noted that DNA confirmation was unnecessary as the face of the deceased was still recognisable because of clothing and water had preserved the body. The Court found that the prosecution had established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence. It noted the appellant spent 15 years in prison and granted him liberty to apply for remission.

The Supreme Court held that convictions in forgery cases cannot rely solely on a handwriting expert’s opinion unless the original document in question has been formally exhibited in court.

The appellant was convicted in a marksheet forgery case where the prosecution heavily relied on a handwriting expert’s opinion. The expert opinion was linked to a postal cover which bore the handwriting of the accused and contained the forged documents. The original postal cover was not presented in court. The Madras High Court upheld his conviction.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision and acquitted him. The Court emphasised that the prosecution’s failure to produce the original postal cover, critical to the expert’s analysis, rendered the conviction unsustainable. Moreover, it clarified that while an expert’s opinion is relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, it has to be corroborated with substantive evidence.

The Supreme Court held that in cases of rape under the false pretext of marriage, the act of sexual intercourse must be directly attributable to the false promise.

The respondent accused the appellant of rape, blackmail, and other offenses, alleging their 16-year relationship was based on a false promise of marriage.The FIR was filed after she discovered the appellant was marrying another woman. The Allahabad High Court refused to quash the FIR, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order. It quashed the FIR and all related proceedings. It observed that it is difficult to ascertain a false promise in instances where the woman knowingly maintains the physical relationship for a prolonged period.

The Supreme Court held that washing, cleaning, and dry-cleaning activities using power-operated machines is a “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948.

A laundry service was summoned for not complying and possessing the correct approvals and licenses under the Goa Factories Rules, 1985. The Bombay High Court quashed the summons and held that dry cleaning establishments do not involve a “manufacturing process” under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that “washing, cleaning” activities are covered within the ambit of the “manufacturing process” under the Factories Act. The Bench rejected submissions that dry cleaning services do not result in a “new usable product,” adding that welfare legislations have to be interpreted to benefit the large community of workers.

The Supreme Court held that visually impaired persons are eligible to participate in selection for the posts under the judicial service. The Court mandated that the State ensure their inclusion through affirmative action and reasonable accommodation as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The case originated from a suo motu petition following the exclusion of a visually impaired aspirant from the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service recruitment under Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 1994. The letter petitioner had argued that the rule expressly excluded visually impaired candidates from judicial services and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The Court struck down Rule 6A. It observed that equal opportunity necessitates a structured and inclusive approach. Further, the principle of reasonable accommodation mandates that accommodations be provided to PwDs as a prerequisite to assessing their eligibility. Physical disability cannot be the sole reason to deny consideration for recruitment in judicial service. It emphasized the need for separate cut-offs for PwDs and affirmed the State’s responsibility to provide suitable training and structural accommodations.

The Supreme Court held that the opinion of qualified medical experts should be given significant weight in cases determining a disabled person’s capacity to make independent decisions.

Adith Ramadoria, a 22-year-old US citizen suffering from Ataxic Cerebral Palsy, was involved in a custody battle between his parents. He was living in Chennai with his father, whereas his mother claimed guardianship in the United States. The Madras High Court found that he was capable of consenting and communicating his decision to reside with his father in India. On the Supreme Court’s direction, the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) found that Adith’s cognitive abilities were comparable to an 8-to 10-year-old and was thus incapable of making his own decisions for now.

Based on the NIMHANS report, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother.