Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that undue delay which materially affects the finding of the award may vitiate the award on ground of public policy or patent illegality under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The dispute stemmed from an agreement under which a developer was to construct a building and hand over 50 percent of the built-up area to the landowners in return for an equal share. The developer obtained a Completion Certificate in November 2008 and offered possession. Disagreement arose on whether the construction was completed in accordance with the agreement. Arbitration commenced in 2009 and in 2010, the arbitrator passed an interim order directing return of part of the deposits and possession for the landowners. This order altered the parties’ positions irreversibly and the final award in favour of the landowners, passed 3 years 8 months after the hearings concluded, proved unworkable. The award was challenged in the Madras High Court where a Single Judge partially set aside the award, only for it to be restored by a Division Bench.

On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the award for patent illegality and held that the delay in delivering the award undermined the credibility of the arbitral process. The Court clarified that while delay alone is insufficient for invalidation, the delay in the present case resulted in a “rudderless” award which failed to finally resolve the disputes. Using its power under Article 142, the Court took an ‘equitable’ view and held that the developer would be entitled to take 50 percent possession after paying the landowner ₹10 crores.

The Supreme Court held that an investigating officer (IO) cannot directly summon a lawyer to extract details of a case in which their client is involved. The IO can summon under the exceptions of Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which protects professional communications. The Bench held that such protection will not be available for in-house counsel as they do not fall within the definition of an “Advocate” under the Advocates Act, 1961.

A summons was issued to an advocate of the Gujarat High Court under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The advocate approached the High Court, which dismissed the petition. On appeal, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court referred two questions to a larger Bench. The Chief Justice of India set up a Bench which heard the case under its suo moto jurisdiction.

The Court set aside the summons notice and held that an IO can only issue a summons within the exceptions, if it is approved by a hierarchical superior. Further, the power to issue such a summon is not an absolute or blanket power. Moreover, the summons will be subject to judicial review. The Bench clarified that its holding will not apply to in-house counsel as they have full-time salaried employment and are likely to be influenced by the commercial and business strategies pursued by their employer.

The Supreme Court held that a fire intentionally started by another person, without the insured agreeing to it, is to be treated as an accidental fire.

The Preliminary Surveyor attributed fire to a short circuit, while the Final Surveyor concluded it was not accidental. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission assessed the loss at Rs. 61,39,539, and directed the insurance company to pay the amount, along with simple interest at 9 percent per annum from the date of claim repudiation.

On appeal, the Supreme Court found the National Commission’s view of the policy not providing for coverage of FFF (furniture, fixtures and fittings) as incorrect. Therefore, the Court held that the insured party is entitled to the amounts claimed under the heads of Building, Plant and Machinery, Showroom, Electric Fittings, furniture and fixtures. The Court noted that the cause of the fire was immaterial for it to fall within the policy’s ambit, as long as there was no allegation or finding of fraud on the part of the insured.

The Supreme Court applied the ‘pay and recover’ principle while holding that denying compensation to an accident victim on the ground that it fell outside the purview of an insurance policy would be offensive to the sense of justice.

On 7 October 2014, a bus collided with a motorcycle, killing the rider on the spot. The dependents of the deceased filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Aggrieved by the amount of compensation, the dependents appealed the order of the Tribunal in the Karnataka High Court. A second appeal was filed by the insurance company, contending that the bus driver had deviated from the route covered by the policy. The High Court directed the insurance company to compensate the victim and recover dues from the driver or owner of the bus.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s verdict. The Court observed that the accident was no fault of the victim and the High Court correctly balanced the needs of the deceased’s family and the interest of the insurance company. At the same time, it noted that insurance policies operate within four corners of a contract and payments to third parties outside the bounds of the agreement are liable to be made good by the party at fault.

The Supreme Court held that IP suits requiring urgent relief are not required to have a compulsory pre-institution mediation as mandated under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The urgency must be determined from the nature of the relief and the continuing harm caused by the alleged infringement.

The appellant, a Danish manufacturer of industrial fans, alleged that its Indian distributor was using its patented design to manufacture and market identical fans, in breach of their dealership agreement. A Single Judge and a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court rejected their petition for non-compliance with Section 12A, holding that the delay of several months before filing the suit negated urgency and made mediation mandatory.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders, and held that infringement of intellectual property rights is a wrong that causes recurring harm to goodwill, reputation and consumer trust. The Court noted that the exception for urgent interim relief under Section 12A must be applied pragmatically.

The Supreme Court held that special criminal laws cannot be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons on the basis of completely incredulous material.

An FIR was filed after a complaint by the Vice-President of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad alleging mass religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (UPPUCRA). This triggered subsequent FIRs and resulted in multiple writ petitions at the Allahabad High Court seeking that they be set aside. The Allahabad High Court quashed the first FIR stating that the person was not competent to register it under Section 4 of the UPPUCRA. However, it refused to quash any subsequent FIRs that were filed in relation to that incident.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgements and stated that the subsequent FIRs for the same offence were impermissible in light of T.T. Antony v State of Kerala (2001), which held that any complaints related to an incident covered in an FIR will be treated as a statement under Section 162 of the CrPC, not an FIR. Therefore, any consequent proceedings were held to be quashed and impermissible.

The Supreme Court constituted a committee to frame an equal opportunity policy for transgender persons, in light of the legislative shortcomings in the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. The Committee’s policy will be binding until the government frames its own.

A teacher approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging discriminatory termination and denial of employment opportunities by two private schools in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. The Court found insufficient grounds to establish discrimination by the first school but held the second school guilty of denying opportunity on the basis of gender identity.

It noted that both schools had failed to comply with the 2019 Act and held state authorities responsible for their lack of strict implementation. The Court further observed that the lack of grievance redressal mechanisms, Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells had left the petitioner with no means to redress or remedy the violation of her rights.

The Supreme Court held that a conviction cannot be sustained if the genesis and manner of the incident in a criminal case cannot be corroborated beyond doubt. The Court exercised its powers under Article 142 to release convicts who were not parties to the case.

Kannaiya, the appellant and three others were convicted of murder under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. An FIR alleged that Kannaiya and nine others were damaging a hut when Ramesh intervened to stop them. Ramesh was beaten by the assailants and later succumbed to his injuries. The Trial Court convicted Kannaiya and three others. Their appeal was dismissed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Kannaiya appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and the Trial Court’s verdict. It found that the witness had provided contradictory statements in their testimony. Moreover, the witnesses failed to identify each other’s presence at the spot where the incident took place. Further, the witnesses contradicted the location of the crime. The Bench noted that such “conflicting versions cannot co-exist within a credible narrative”, and all four co-accused were entitled to be released. As Kannaiya was the only appellant, the Bench exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 to release the other accused.

The Supreme Court held that a court must exercise its discretion when ordering a CBI probe in cases where allegations have been levelled against the integrity of the investigation conducted by the police. A mere complaint concerning the independence of the investigation does not invoke the CBI’s involvement.

The Karur stampede claimed the lives of 41 people in September 2025. Multiple petitions were filed before the Madras High Court’s Principal and Madurai Benches, seeking an impartial probe conducted by the CBI, citing the influence of the ruling party on the police. The Madras High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the investigation is still in its early stages and that the investigation by the local police was “not flawed”.

The Supreme Court held that a complaint concerning the fairness and independence of the police investigation does not automatically qualify the case to be investigated by the CBI. However, the Court exercised its discretion to hold that the circumstances surrounding the Karur stampede gave justifiable reason to initiate the CBI’s investigation.

The Supreme Court held that a formal, separate suit under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is not mandatory if a minor (upon attaining majority) repudiates a sale of their immovable property made by their guardian without the permission of the Court.

A father sold a property purchased in the names of his three sons without seeking permission of the court. After attaining majority, the sons sold the same property to K.S. Shivappa within the limitation period stipulated under the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby repudiating their father’s sale. Neelamma, who had purchased the property that was initially sold by the father, filed a suit for declaration and possession. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding that the earlier sale had been effectively repudiated by the sale initiated by the sons. The first appellate court and the Karnataka High Court both held that a decree of cancellation was necessary to effectively repudiate the sale initiated by the father.

The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s decree, and held that repudiation need not take the form of a separate suit. It may be inferred from conduct such as a subsequent sale or open assertion of ownership. If the repudiation occurs within the limitation period, the earlier transaction becomes void and conveys no title to subsequent purchasers. The Court also noted that Neelam had failed to prove her title, having not entered the witness box herself.