Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a joint trial in distinct offences hinges on the discretion of the Court and is the exception, not the norm. It emphasised that this discretion may be exercised only when such offences form a part of the same transaction and satisfy requirements under Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

The accused were taken into custody in 2020 for assaulting the appellant and his friend, the deceased. Pending investigation, they were enlarged on bail by the Special Court for Protection of Civil Rights, Madurai. While on bail, they murdered the deceased, leading to their arrest under a second FIR. Subsequently, the Trial Court granted bail to the accused in the latest murder case. This was cancelled on appeal by the High Court, after which the accused filed a second application for bail, which was rejected by the Trial Court.. The accused then approached the Madras High Court, which in turn granted bail and directed a joint trial of both cases.

The Supreme Court, on appeal, cancelled bail and set aside the Order for joint trial. It held that a joint trial is not a compulsion but rather hinges on the Court’s judicial discretion, even after the requirements under Section 219 are satisfied. The Court added that in directing a joint trial, two factors are to be considered: 1) whether a joint trial may cause prejudice to the accused, and 2) whether it will lead to wastage of judicial time.

The Supreme Court held that forest land cannot be leased or continued to be used for non-forest purposes such as agriculture without prior approval of the Central Government. It emphasised that any such lease cannot be legitimised through post-facto representations or extensions.

The State of Karnataka had granted a ten-year agricultural lease over 134 acres of forest land to the Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-operative Society in the 1970s. After the lease expired, the State refused renewal and terminated the arrangement. Multiple writ petitions filed by the Society failed. Civil suits and appeals resulted only in protection against forcible dispossession without due process. Eventually, forest authorities initiated eviction proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act and took possession in January 2007. Despite this, the Karnataka High Court directed that the Society be allowed to make a representation to the Central Government for continuation of the lease.

Allowing the State’s appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions, and held that the Society was not entitled to further extension of lease as it had enjoyed 10 continuous years of possession. It ordered restoration of the forest land through plantation of indigenous species within twelve months.

The Supreme Court held that forcing a couple to remain legally married is a mere “legal fiction” as it serves no purpose and only perpetuates misery. It is in the best interest of parties if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time.

The parties had married in August 2000, but the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home in November 2001. The Trial Court in Shillong granted divorce in 2010 based on grounds of desertion under 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on a suit filed by the appellant-husband. The Gauhati High Court set aside the divorce decree in 2011, holding that the husband failed to prove that his wife intended to permanently desert him

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the marriage had irretrievably broken down due to 24 years of separation and failed attempts at mediation. It added that prolonged estrangement without reconciliation constitutes mental cruelty to both spouses. The Court exercised its power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage and ensure complete justice.

The Supreme Court held that once the mandate of an arbitrator has terminated by operation of law under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the continuation of the same arbitrator is impermissible. It clarified that the Court is both empowered and obligated to substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A(6) while extending time for completion of arbitral proceedings.

The appeals arose from arbitral proceedings between parties to a partnership deed which contained an arbitration clause. In March 2020 the Delhi High Court appointed a sole arbitrator who repeatedly directed deposit of administrative expenses. Petitions seeking termination of his mandate under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act were dismissed in January 2022. Upon expiry of the statutory period for making the award, the appellant moved the High Court under Section 29A(6) seeking substitution of the arbitrator and extension of time. The High Court declined substitution but extended the mandate by four months.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting an extension. It noted that after excluding the period affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, the sole arbitrator remained under an obligation to pass the award within the stipulated time and failed to do so without any extension under Section 29A(3) or Section 29A(4). The Court held that the arbitrator therefore became functus officio under Section 29A(4). It further held that Section 29A(6) empowers and obligates the Court to substitute the arbitrator.

The Supreme Court held that the police and criminal courts must be wary of framing charges in matters where no strong suspicion is made out. It expressed strong disapproval of their failure to take cognizance of a pending civil dispute between the parties.

In March 2020, the appellant-accused was charged with offences of wrongful restraint, voyeurism and criminal intimidation. He was the co-owner of a property under a civil dispute to which the complainant was also a party. The accused’s application for discharge and revision petition were dismissed by the Trial Court and the Calcutta High Court respectively. He approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court found that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained essential ingredients of any of the offences alleged. It also found that a prior injunction had been issued in the pending civil dispute and took note of the complainant’s refusal to make a judicial statement. The Court held that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction and quashed the criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that reserve category candidates who score above the cut-off mark for open category candidates cannot be denied equality of treatment merely on account of their caste or community.

The Rajasthan High Court had advertised 2756 vacancies for Junior Judicial Assistants, involving a written test followed by a typewriting test. Several reserved candidates outscored general candidates. The reserved candidates were excluded because their marks were lower than their specific reserved category’s cut-off. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the general category list for qualifying examination should include meritorious candidates of the reserved categories to avoid discrimination against them.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It held that the “Open” category was not a quota and was accessible to all based on merit. Exclusion of such candidates violates the principles of equality, as merit remains the primary benchmark for unreserved posts.

The Supreme Court held that the benchmark for adjudging medical negligence is the lowest standard of professional skill and competence expected of a medical practitioner. It clarified that “deficiency in service” in patient care is distinct from “medical negligence” and that the two concepts must not be enmeshed.

The case involved an appellant who alleged negligence and deficiency in diagnosis at the respondent hospital. The West Bengal Clinical Establishment Regulatory Commission awarded ₹20 lakh in compensation, noting that an unqualified doctor had performed critical procedures. While a Single Judge upheld this, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court reversed the decision, holding that negligence and deficiency are intertwined and require a specialised body for assessment.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s ruling, confirming that the doctor lacked minimum qualifications. The Court held that the Commission acted within its authority under Section 38 of the West Bengal Clinical Establishments (Registration, Regulation and Transparency) Act, 2017 by focusing on deficiencies in patient care. It held that under Sections 29 and 33 of the Act, hospitals are liable to pay compensation where their actions cause imminent danger, injury or death.

The Supreme Court held that timelines imposed by High Courts to conclude investigations are the exception rather than the norm. It held that Courts must respect the practical realities of investigations and should only impose deadlines in situations where inaction would lead to adverse consequences.

In this case, three individuals approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 seeking to quash accusations of forging documents and filing false affidavits to procure arms licenses under the Arms Act, 1959, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Relying on Shobhit Nehra v State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), the Allahabad High Court directed investigative agencies to conclude the probe within 90 days and granted the accused protection from arrest until the court took cognisance. The State appealed, arguing that the timeline was unjustified, risked prejudicing a serious criminal investigation and ignored the distinct factual context of Shobhit Nehra.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order. It noted that Shobhit Nehra arose from a family dispute, unlike the present case involving allegations of serious criminal conduct. The Court held that directions for time-bound investigation must not be issued routinely or as a matter of course. It clarified that relying on judicial precedent is not a mechanical exercise; it must reflect an application of mind to the specific facts of the case.

The Supreme Court held that a cheque bounce case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) cannot be quashed at the pre-trial stage by carrying out an enquiry on the disputed question of fact.

The appellant corporation lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the NIA, alleging that the cheque of Rs 20,00,000 issued by the respondent was declined owing to insufficient funds. After legal notice was issued, the respondent denied having issued the cheque and refused to make the payment. Subsequently, the trial court took cognisance of the complaint. Aggrieved by the summoning order of the trial court, the respondent appealed to the Patna High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceeding, holding that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of debt or any other liability.

The Supreme Court held that at the pre-trial stage, the Court is only required to examine whether the material placed on record make out a prima facie case. It cannot carry out a detailed inquiry into the nature of debt or liability. Further, the Court stated that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 by conducting an inquiry at the pre-trial stage.

The Supreme Court held that a cheque bounce case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NIA) cannot be quashed at the pre-trial stage by carrying out an enquiry on the disputed question of fact.

The appellant-corporation lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the NIA, alleging that the cheque of Rs 20,00,000 issued by the respondent was declined owing to insufficient funds. After legal notice was issued, the respondent denied having issued the cheque and refused to make the payment. Subsequently, the trial court took cognisance of the complaint. Aggrieved by the summoning order of the trial court, the respondent appealed to the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 where the High Court quashed the entire criminal proceeding, holding that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of debt or any other liability.

The Supreme Court stated that at the pre-trial stage, the Court is only required to examine whether the material placed on record make out a prima facie case. It cannot carry out a detailed inquiry into the nature of debt or liability. Further, the Court stated that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 by conducting an inquiry at the pre-trial stage.