Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that district cricket associations are not bound by the mandate that 75 per cent of their members and all key office-bearer positions be held by eminent sports persons.

The appeal arose against a Madras High Court decision that directed the appellant District Association to amend its composition in line with reforms established in Secretary, Tamil Nadu Olympics Association v S. Nithya (2022). These reforms mandated that 75 per cent of members should be eminent sports persons. At the Supreme Court, the amicus curiae submitted that cricket was governed instead by BCCI v Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2014), which necessitated conformity of district associations with the BCCI’s constitution.

Ruling in favour of the appellants, the Supreme Court held that S. Nithya is inapplicable to cricket while BCCI applies only to state associations, not district ones. Recognising the role of sports in embodying fraternity, it identified a constitutional duty to ensure that sports facilities flourish without being concentrated in the hands of the urban economic elite. In light of pending proceedings before the High Court, it chose not to issue directions for reforms. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order to the extent of applicability of S. Nithya, and directed that it dispose of pending appeals expeditiously.

The Supreme Court held that sovereign control over natural resources including spectrum cannot become subservient to insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The Court further observed that Telecom licensees possess only a conditional, revocable privilege to use spectrum, held by the Union as public trustee under Article 39(b) and Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885.

Aircel Group entities holding telecom licences granted in 2006 secured loans exceeding Rs 13,729 crores from State Bank of India-led lenders. When the Department of Telecommunications sought to recover unpaid licence fees totalling Rs 9,894 crores, the companies initiated voluntary insolvency proceedings under Section 10 of the IBC in March 2018. The NCLT admitted the applications and approved a resolution plan in June 2020. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) challenged the approval before the NCLAT. The NCLAT affirmed that spectrum, being an intangible asset, can be subjected to insolvency proceedings.

The Supreme Court allowed DoT’s appeal in part and held that spectrum allocated to telecom service providers cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC. It held that the IBC includes only those tangible or intangible assets on which the debtor has ownership rights. Mere recognition of spectrum licensing rights as an intangible asset is not conclusive.

The Supreme Court held that disability pension claims of ex-servicemen are deferred compensation for past service and are neither dependent upon the grace of the State, nor barred by limitation.

The respondent, an ex-military serviceman, was granted disability pension for life for suffering 20 per cent disability while in service. In 2016, the respondent approached the Armed Forces Tribunal seeking broad banding of disability pension to 50 per cent alongside arrears on the date of discharge. The law regarding limitation on disability pension claims was not settled owing to conflicting orders passed by coordinate benches of the Tribunal. However, a year later, the Tribunal granted an order in favour of the respondent. Subsequently, a reference was made to a full bench of the Tribunal, which affirmed the Tribunal’s judgement. The Union of India filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, relying on Union of India v Ram Avtar (2014), held that pension entitlements cannot be extinguished except for the authority of law. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right and the same cannot be restricted to a limitation period of three years.

The Supreme Court held that an applicant seeking bail should make a fair, complete and candid disclosure of all material facts, including criminal antecedents and prior bail rejections. It observed that any suppression, concealment or selective disclosure of such facts amounts to abuse of the process of law and strikes at the very root of the administration of criminal justice.

The respondent was charged in a large-scale organised scam involving the fabrication and circulation of forged legal and academic qualifications. This allowed individuals, including himself, to appear before various High Courts and the Supreme Court. He was charged with cheating and forgery under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. His bail application was rejected by the Sessions Judge, Jaunpur. The High Court reversed this decision and granted him bail.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the bail granted to the respondent, directing him to surrender within two weeks. The Court observed that annulment of bail is warranted where the original order is “manifestly perverse” or founded on “suppressio veri, expressio falsi”. It noted that the High Court failed to take note of the fact that the respondent was a “history-sheeter” and had nine other FIRs registered against him in other states. The Court issued mandatory directions to all High Courts to incorporate rules requiring an exhaustive disclosure framework for bail applications to promote uniformity and transparency in criminal cases.

The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Atrocities Act) is a statutory first appeal. Therefore, High Courts cannot act merely as a revisional or supervisory court; it is a court of both fact and law and is “obliged to independently evaluate the material on record” rather than providing a “mechanical affirmation” of the Trial Court’s order.

The dispute arose from an incident in November 2022 where members of the JAYS organisation allegedly intercepted government vehicles and engaged in a scuffle with district officials during the unveiling of a statue of Bhagwan Birsa Munda. The appellant was charged under the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(v), and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. The Trial Court allowed the appellant’s discharge application only in part, framing charges under the Act despite recording that none of the witnesses or statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 specified the casteist slurs used by the accused. The High Court, in an appeal against the partial discharge, affirmed the order of the Trial Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and quashed the charges under the Atrocities Act. The Court observed that the High Court’s judgement did not reflect an independent application of mind. It clarified that since the prosecution material was silent on specific slurs the “prima facie” ingredients necessary to attract the Special Act were absent.

The Supreme Court held that a photocopy of a document constitutes secondary evidence and cannot be admitted or relied on unless the party seeking to produce it accounts for the non-production of the original.

The plaintiff alleged that her brother used a forged Power of Attorney (PoA) to sell her properties in Kozhikode to the defendants. The Trial Court invalidated the sale deeds noting suspicious font differences between the draft PoA and the one used for sale. The First Appellate Court reversed this decision, relying on a photocopy of the PoA used for sale. The High Court of Kerala restored the Trial Court’s decree, finding the photocopy inadmissible as secondary evidence. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court against invalidation of sale.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. It found that in order to introduce secondary evidence, the party must first prove their legal right to do so under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It emphasised that the presumption of valid execution under Section 85 of the Evidence Act and Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908, cannot be triggered if the photocopy has not been legally admitted through the two-step process prescribed for secondary evidence.

The Supreme Court held that “loss of love and affection” is not a separate component of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but is subsumed under the head of “consortium”, which is a tort law term referring to the deprivation of the benefits of a family relationship. It further held that “future prospects” is an integral component of “just compensation” under Section 168 of the Act.

The appeals arose from an accident where a tanker lorry collided with a two wheeler, instantly killing the victim. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai awarded compensation of ₹9.37 lakh. On appeal by the claimants, the Madras High Court modified the award to ₹10.51 lakh, increasing compensation awarded under the head of “loss of love and affection” to the victim’s two minor children. The claimants then appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the denial of future economic prospects.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and modified the award to ₹20.8 lakh. It accepted evidence to support the claimant’s submission regarding monthly income. In view of the Constitution Bench decision in National Insurance v Pranay Sethi, it held that inclusion of “future prospects” is a binding norm under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court also considered a conceptual tension in Pranay Sethi, which recognised anticipated economic progression as a valid loss but denied inclusion of emotional deprivation. It applied United India Insurance v Satinder Kaur to include parental and filial affection under “consortium”.

The Supreme Court held that where the existence of ancestral properties capable of yielding income is established, acquisitions made by the Karta during the subsistence of a Joint Hindu Family are ordinarily regarded as joint family properties. It clarified that the burden of proof lies on the coparcener asserting that such acquisitions are self-acquired.

Doraisamy instituted a suit for partition claiming share in immovable properties, contending that the properties were joint Hindu family properties. Dorairaj, another coparcener, argued that several properties were his self-acquisitions, relying on sale deeds executed in his favour by the Karta and an unregistered Will. The Trial Court included the properties alleged to have been acquired by Dorairaj in its preliminary partition decree. The First Appellate Court and the Madras High Court both affirmed the decree for partition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court decision. It held that Dorairaj had failed to discharge the burden of proving self-acquisition. It further held that alienations made by the Karta in favour of one coparcener must be strictly proved and that vague recitals were insufficient. It observed that separate enjoyment, installation of irrigation facilities or individual borrowings did not establish severance of joint family status in the absence of a clear intention to divide.

The Supreme Court held that further investigations cannot be undertaken by the police/investigating agency without obtaining the leave of the Magistrate once the final report under Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) has been submitted.

In 2013, an FIR was registered against seven persons for alleged rape and sexual assault. Noting no offence was made out, the police filed a closure report which was accepted by the Magistrate in the absence of protest petitions. After three years, the original complainants filed a Criminal Revision Petition and a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) against the closure. In compliance with directions of the NHRC, the Under Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh recommended further investigation in the same FIR under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. The accused’s appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and held that application of mind by the Magistrate/Court is indispensable to ascertain whether further investigation is to be ordered. It found that Section 173(8) confers power solely upon the Magistrate and quashed the directions for further investigation.

The Supreme Court held that employing teachers on a permanently fixed honorarium below minimum wage amounts to ‘begar’, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. It held that teachers on contract are deemed permanent employees if their employment continues beyond expiry of the contract, and if they perform duties equivalent to regular teachers while being barred from taking alternative employment.

In furtherance of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Article 21A, several part-time instructors were appointed in Upper Primary Schools in Uttar Pradesh on contractual basis. Their monthly salary remained ₹7,000 for over a decade. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from March 2017, but the Division Bench restricted this to 2017-18 only. The State appealed against on grounds of financial burden while the teachers appealed against the limited period of enhanced payment.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from 2017-18 onwards, with arrears to be paid within six months. It deemed the teachers to be permanent employees entitled to periodic revision at least once in three years.