Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a summons under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, does not amount to the formal initiation of proceedings under the Act.

M/S Armour Security received a show cause notice under Section 73 of CGST. Subsequently, CGST conducted a search and issued two separate summons to directors of the company. The petitioner approached the Delhi High Court challenging the two summons, arguing that the SGST investigated same “subject matter”. The petitioner argued that under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, one authority is barred from initiating proceedings if the “subject matter” of that proceeding is already being handled by the other authority. The High Court dismissed the petition and held that the summons is merely a precursor to gather information.

The Court upheld the High Court Order. The Court laid down a two-fold test to determine if the subject matter is the same: whether the authority has already acted on an identical tax liability on similar facts and whether the relief sought is identical. It held that overlapping aspects of inquiries do not make “subject matter” identical unless a show cause notice specifies the liability.

The Supreme Court held that rival marks in a trademark dispute must be assessed in their entirety rather than dissecting composite trademarks into isolated components.

The appellant, Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. had sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondent, Karanveer Chhabra, on the ground that his brand “London Pride” infringed the trademark of their label, “Blenders Pride” and “Imperial Blue”. The Indore Commercial Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to grant an interim injunction. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Commercial Court and the High Court. It held that the applicable standard is that of an average consumer with imperfect recollection. No deceptive similarity was found between the marks.

The Supreme Court used its plenary powers under Article 142 to vest custody of minor children to their “adoptive parents”, even when the legality of adoption is in question. considering the existing bonding between the “adoptive parents” and the children.

On 22 May 2024, the police had taken custody of minor children from several adoptive parents based on an FIR that the adoptions were unlawful. The parents moved the Telangana High Court. A Single-Judge Bench ruled in favour of the adoptive parents having custody. A Division Bench reversed the Order, directing that the children remain in the custody of the Child Welfare Committee while proper adoption procedures were followed.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s Order under Article 142, relying on the “best interest of the child” principle. They considered the existing bond between adoptive parents and the child. The Bench further imposed safeguards by directing the State Legal Services Authority or District Legal Services Committee to obtain quarterly reports on the children’s welfare and progress, and allowing them to depute a Child Welfare Expert for home inspections.

The Supreme Court held that a convict sentenced to life imprisonment for a fixed term is entitled to immediate release upon completing the term, without having to apply for remission. Detention beyond this period violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

Sukhdev Yadav was serving a sentence of life imprisonment for 20 years without the scope of remission. In November 2024, the Delhi High Court dismissed his petition seeking furlough, i.e. release for a short term. In March 2025, he completed 20 years of his sentence, while his petition remained pending. The Supreme Court permitted him to seek immediate release based on the completion of his sentence. The State of Delhi argued that Yadav had to seek remission.

The Supreme Court held that the bar on remission was applicable while he was serving his sentence. After its completion, he was not required to seek remission. The Court directed all prisons to release prisoners whose jail terms were complete. The Registry was directed to circulate a copy of the Order to all the Home Secretaries of the States or Union Territories.

The Supreme Court held that pre-Independence documents have higher probative value in caste claim verification and that the affinity test cannot be applied as a litmus test to reject such claims.

Yogesh Madhav Makalwad’s caste certificate as “Koli Mahadev” Scheduled Tribe, was invalidated by the Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad. The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Scrutiny Committee. The High Court rejected school admission records of Makalward’s father from 1943 and other family records as unreliable. They relied on Makalwad’s inability to clear the affinity test instead.

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment. It found the 1943 school admission record as genuine. The Court relied on Anand v Committee for Scrutiny & Verification of Tribe Claims (2011), and reiterated that the affinity test is not an essential part of the process of determining the correctness of a caste or tribe claim in every case.

The Supreme Court held that a single witness’s testimony should be “wholly reliable” to form the basis of a conviction in cases where only circumstantial evidence is available.

Shail Kumari was accused of the murdering her two children by drowning, with the prosecution’s case hinging primarily on the testimony of sole witness Santosh Kumar Pandey. He claimed that he observed her unusual behaviour near a pond and later found the bodies of the children. Both the Trial Court and the High Court upheld her conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing her to rigorous imprisonment for life. She filed a Special Leave Petition at the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court quashed the judgements and acquitted Shail Kumari. The Court found that Pandey’s testimony was not “wholly reliable” and “totally contradictory,” as it showed significant “improvement” from his police statement. Given the case rested on circumstantial evidence and the key witness was unreliable, the prosecution failed to establish a complete and reliable chain of events beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court held that a court may refuse to appoint arbitrators as per a contract between two parties involving an arbitration clause only if the dispute impeaches the existence of the arbitration agreement itself, or where it involves public law questions transcending inter-party disputes. .

Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation alleged that the millers who they supplied paddy for milling had failed to deliver the agreed quantity, causing losses exceeding ₹1000 crores to the public exchequer. Around 1200 FIRs under IPC Sections 420 and 409 were filed and the Enforcement Directorate commenced investigations. Despite ongoing criminal proceedings, the millers invoked the arbitration clause in their agreements. The Patna High Court appointed arbitrators as stipulated under Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, (1996 .

The Supreme Court held that the referral court’s inquiry is strictly confined to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement. Complex issues such as non-arbitrability, allegations of “serious fraud,” limitation, or public law implications fall within the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 16 (competence-competence principle) and are not to be examined at the referral stage.

The Supreme Court held that a confessional FIR filed by an accused is inadmissible as evidence against them. Further, the Court clarified that expert witness evidence is merely advisory and cannot be the sole basis for a conviction, especially in grave charges like murder.

Narayan Yadav lodged an FIR confessing the murder of Ram Babu Sharma. The Trial Court convicted him of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Chhattisgarh High Court partly allowed his appeal, altering the conviction to ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 4 of Section 300’, noting that it was not premeditated and that it was done “in the heat of passion.” Yadav appealed against the decision.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It concluded that the confessional FIR was inadmissible and the medical evidence alone was insufficient to secure a conviction and acquitted Yadav.

The Supreme Court held that a child victim’s testimony requires no corroboration to be considered credible, and Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 creates a statutory presumption of guilt once foundational facts are established.

The victim’s father was convicted of repeated sexual assault of his daughter. Both the Trial Court and the High Court affirmed his conviction and imposed a life sentence. The father filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s judgement and seeking interim bail, claiming false implication due to domestic issues.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court stated that its judicial conscience did not permit it to entertain pleas seeking bail where the conviction has been rendered after a full-fledged trial, and where the testimony of the victim is clear, cogent, and duly corroborated. Entertaining such pleas would betray justice and the constitutional promise to children.

The Supreme Court held that Pollution Control Boards are empowered to impose and collect restitutionary or compensatory damages, including fixed sums or bank guarantees, as preventive or remedial measures for environmental harm.

The Delhi Pollution Control Committee (DPCC) sent show-cause notices to residential, commercial, and retail complexes operating without mandatory “consent to establish” or “consent to operate” under the Water and Air Acts. A Single Judge in Splendor Landbase Ltd. v DPCC held that State Boards lacked the authority to levy such damages or demand bank guarantees, viewing them as penalties without statutory backing. This view led to refund orders for amounts already collected. The Division Bench upheld these findings, reasoning that Sections 33A and 31A Water and Air Acts conferred no penalty-imposing powers.

The Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between punitive penalties, which require a criminal trial and compensatory environmental damages, which arise from the civil wrong of polluting and seek to restore the environment. The Court relied on the polluter pays principle and affirmed that Boards have wide-ranging post-1988 powers to direct payment for remedial measures. It stressed that these powers must be exercised transparently, non-arbitrarily, and through formalised subordinate legislation.