Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court clarified when an activity amounts to “manufacture” under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, making goods liable for excise duty. The Court highlighted two factors: whether the process produces a distinct product (Transformation Test) and whether the product is marketable (Marketability Test).

M/s Quippo Energy leased imported gas generators called Power Packs. It placed them in steel containers along with locally sourced parts such as radiators and fans to make them fully operational and easier to transport. In 2008, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise ruled that this assembly amounted to “manufacture.” Quippo’s appeal was rejected by Commissioner (Appeals) in 2009 and CESTAT, Ahmedabad in 2015. CESTAT confirmed that the process fell under Section 2(f), which includes any steps incidental or essential to producing a manufactured product.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of CESTAT and the Commissioner (Appeals), noting that the added components were essential parts, not mere accessories. The assembly created a new, distinct, and marketable product, and the company was liable to pay excise duty under Section 3. All appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that lands given up by owners during consolidation but not set aside for common use (known as Bachat land) do not automatically belong to the Gram Panchayat or the State. Taking over such unutilised land without paying compensation would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1).

The dispute arose from two laws: the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The 1992 amendment to the 1961 Act allowed lands contributed during consolidation to vest in the Gram Panchayat as common land. Landowners challenged this. In 1995, the High Court struck it down. In 1998, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for reconsideration under Article 31-A. On reconsideration, the High Court clarified that Bachat land remained with the owners but other lands reserved for common purposes vested with the state.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s approach and held that land genuinely reserved for public purposes can vest in the Panchayat but the 1992 amendment cannot transfer Bachat land. Hence, Bachat land cannot be acquired from owners without compensation, as this would violate the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1).

The Supreme Court held that a re-trial in narcotics cases cannot be ordered merely to cure procedural lapses in proving electronic evidence. When a certificate validating electronic evidence under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is furnished, electronic records are considered admissible.

The case arose from the recovery of 39 kilograms of marijuana during a raid. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), relying on oral testimony, the video recording of the raid, and the forensic report. The Bombay High Court set aside the conviction and directed a re-trial. It reasoned that the video recording was not narrated by witnesses in court, no transcript was prepared, the Chemical Examiner had not been examined and the representative samples of the seized contraband were not opened before the court.

The Supreme Court found these reasons untenable. It rejected the High Court’s view that admissibility required witnesses to narrate the video contents in their own words. The Court held that under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the analyst’s report was admissible without the Chemical Examiner’s oral testimony. With the magistrate-certified inventory and sealed samples under Section 52A of the NDPS Act, together with the forensic report, the seizure stood sufficiently proved. The Court said a re-trial is an exceptional course, justified only where there has been no real trial or grave illegality. The criminal appeals were restored before the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Supreme Court held that as per Order VIII, Rule 6A(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), a counter-claim filed by a defendant directed solely against co-defendants is not maintainable.

Rajul Manoj Shah instituted a suit in 2012 challenging her sister-in-law’s (Defendant 1) 2011 agreement to sell a portion of their jointly owned property to Defendant 2. After her sister-in-law passed away, a Nazir (court official) was appointed as her representative. In 2021, Defendant 2 applied to amend his written statement to include a counter-claim for specific performance against the Nazir and sought partition of the property. The Trial Court dismissed the counter-claim as non-maintainable against a co-defendant and impermissibly delayed, as issues were framed in 2019. The High Court reversed this, holding that the cause of action arose only after the Nazir’s appointment in 2020.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, affirming that a counter-claim cannot be solely directed against a co-defendant and is typically not permitted after issues have been framed in a suit.

The Supreme Court held that an MLA’s status alone does not justify deviation from the rule of joint trials under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Preferential segregation violates the equality principle enshrined in Article 14.

Mamman Khan, a sitting Member of the Haryana legislative assembly, was one of the accused persons in the 31 July 2023 communal violence in the Nuh district of the state. The Trial Court directed the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant citing his status as an MLA and the need for expeditious disposal of his case. The High Court upheld segregation. Khan approached the Supreme Court arguing that the offences arose from the same transaction and that joint trials are the rule in such instances

The Supreme Court set aside the Trial Court’s order as affirmed by the High Court. The Court held that while expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is desirable, it cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The top court remitted the case to the trial Court with a direction to conduct a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused.

The Supreme Court held that not allowing high-performing Persons with Disabilities (PwD) an unreserved seat defeats the purpose of reservation under Section 34 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—it denies an opportunity to a lower-scoring candidate to claim the reserved seat.

The Court had been monitoring various aspects of the implementation of disabilities legislation since 1998 when the Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation filed a writ petition seeking implementation of the 1995 Act. Most recently, the Court emphasised that reservation must reach those most disadvantaged by disability and deprivation and advanced a positive interpretation of Section 34 to protect the integrity of earmarked seats for PwD candidates.

The Court directed the Union to explain—by 14 October 2025—whether measures have been taken to provide the “upward movement” of meritorious candidates applying against the posts reserved for PwDs, when they secure more than the cut-off for the unreserved category. The Court clarified that the same principle applies to promotions.

The Supreme Court held that speculative buyers or investors cannot file corporate insolvency petitions against borrowers under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Two individuals invested ₹35 lakh and ₹25 lakh respectively in real estate projects with a buy-back clause. The project was not completed and cheques issued to them by the real estate company had bounced. Insolvency petitions under Section 7 were accepted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). On appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal set aside the NCLT judgement stating that the individuals were merely “speculative investors” who sought a lucrative return.

The Court confirmed the NCLAT’s decision. It observed that Section 7 of the IBC can only be availed by bonafide homebuyers and not speculative investors who treat real estate as a financial instrument. Possession is the primary indicator of bona fide intent.

The Supreme Court held that deception alone does not constitute cheating—a deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or loss must be established.

The case originated from a complaint by the District Fire Officer alleging that a college had obtained a Recognition Certificate by submitting a forged No-Objection Certificate (NOC). An FIR was registered and a chargesheet was filed, leading to proceedings under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court refused to quash these proceedings, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Judgement while noting that a Fire NOC was not required for the college’s building as per the National Building Code of India, 2016. Therefore, the essential ingredient to confirm an offence of forgery was missing, as there was no “vital link” between the alleged false representation and the issuance of the Recognition Certificate.

The Supreme Court held that the migration of SC, ST and OBC candidates to unreserved posts depends on the type of relaxations availed and the relevant recruitment provisions.

In the first dispute, reserved category candidates in recruitment for the Railway Protection Force had availed relaxations in age and physical standards. Though they scored more than the general cut-off, they were denied migration. The High Court ordered their appointment to unreserved vacancies, relying on Standing Order No. 78, which allowed migration on merit. The Supreme Court set aside this view, holding that Revised Directive No. 29 had made Standing Order No. 85 applicable, and Para 14(f) expressly barred candidates who had taken concessions in age or measurements from being counted against general vacancies.

In the second dispute, involving CISF recruitment, an ST candidate with a height of 163cm (165cm was the General Category requirement) scored 366 marks, which was higher than the general cut-off of 364. His selection in the unreserved category was challenged based on a 1998 Office Memorandum. The Supreme Court upheld the selection. Applying the ejusdem generis rule, it held that the expression “etc” in the Memorandum referred to items like age, experience and qualifications, and not physical characteristics like height or chest measurements.

The Supreme Court held that a court’s power to review its own previous order is strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not to rehear or substitute a different view as if it were an appeal.

A preliminary decree for the partition of a family property was issued in 2003. Malleeswari, the daughter, sought to have it amended for a third of the share under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which grants daughters equal rights to ancestral property. The Trial Court dismissed her plea, stating that the 2005 Act would not apply “retroactively”. The Madras High Court upheld Malleeswari’s claim. However, the High Court set aside its prior Order in a review petition filed by a property purchaser. It remanded the case to the Trial Court to be heard afresh.

The Supreme Court found the High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction. Review is confined to correcting an “error apparent on the face of the record” or discovering new evidence, not to re-evaluating the case’s merits or substituting its own findings, which is akin to an appeal against its own order.