Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that High Courts cannot introduce an “entirely new case” and have limited powers to frame a new substantial question of law under Section 100(5) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Any new question should be based on existing pleadings and recorded reasons.

A property dispute arose among the descendants of C.R. Pius and Philomina Pius. Their joint will favoured C.P. Francis, the appellant. Other family members challenged the joint will and sought a partition. The validity of the joint will was upheld in the Munsif Court. The Kerala High Court declared the will void under Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, because one of its attesting witnesses was Francis’s wife.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement on the ground that it had erred in framing a new Section 67 question without pleadings, issues or recorded reasons, creating a new case. Since the Section 67 point was neither pleaded nor raised by witnesses, its introduction was procedurally improper.

The Supreme Court held that a general clause excluding interest on delayed payments or disputed claims cannot be construed as a prohibition to award pendente lite interest unless the prohibition is express or flows by necessary implication.

An arbitral award in favour of G&T Beckfield directed ONGC to pay $6,56,272.34 with 12 percent interest per annum until recovery. ONGC challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 relying on a contractual clause that barred interest on delayed payments. The District Judge accepted the argument and set aside the award. This decision was reversed by the Gauhati High Court.

The Supreme Court dismissed ONGC’s appeal. It found the contractual clause insufficient to curtail the tribunal’s statutory power to grant pendente lite interest. It emphasized that Section 31(7)(a) reflected the legislative intent to confer the arbitral tribunal with wide discretion to award interest, subject to clear contractual exclusion. It held that an exclusion must be in explicit terms or flow by necessary implication—it must not be a generic prohibition on interest on delayed payments.

The Supreme Court held that the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) has jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters incidental to a complaint alleging oppression and mismanagement. It also has the power to decide the validity of a gift deed.

Shailja Krishna held over 98 percent shares in Satori Global Limited, a company she co-founded with her husband. In 2010, amid marital strain, she purportedly resigned and transferred her shares to her mother-in-law via a disputed gift deed. She filed police complaints claiming coercion into signing blank documents. The NCLT ruled in her favour and restored ownership, finding the deed and transfer invalid due to fraud, overwriting and defective board meetings. On appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) found that the NCLT lacked jurisdiction to decide on the issue of fraud.

The Supreme Court reversed the NCLAT’s order and emphasised that denying the NCLT wide jurisdiction would erode its ability to provide diverse reliefs in cases of oppression and mismanagement.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court could not interfere with or expand the definition of a ‘local candidate’ for medical admissions when that definition was laid down by subordinate legislation in consonance with a Presidential Order under Article 371D.

The Telangana High Court struck down portions of the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017, holding that they were framed under the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983, rather than under Article 371D. It also held that the definition of ‘local candidate’ was arbitrary and violative of Article 14. It expanded the definition to include any student able to show permanent residence or a residence certificate in the State.

On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 2017 Rules and 2024 amendments. It clarified that the 2017 Rules drew authority from the Presidential Order and Articles 245 and 246 read with Entry 25 of List III. It noted that the 1983 Admissions Act itself referred to the Presidential Order. It found no basis for the High Court’s “reading down” of the rules, observing that similar provisions had been upheld for decades, and that policy choices in admissions could only be set aside for “gross discrimination, clear arbitrariness, patent illegality, perversity or unconstitutionality.”

The Supreme Court held that the liability to pay motor vehicle tax is compensatory. Since it is on account of the obligation of the State to maintain the roads, only those using public infrastructure are liable to pay.

The issue was whether the premises of Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, where appellant’s vehicles are exclusively used for handling and storage operations, constitute a ‘public place’ under the A.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1963. A single judge said it does not, and a Division Bench set aside this order.

The Supreme Court held that the words ‘a motor vehicle shall be deemed to be kept for use’ in Rule 12A of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963, has to be read as a ‘motor vehicle deemed to be kept for use in a public place’. The Court held that the vehicles are not liable to be taxed for the period they were kept for use within the premises of the steel plant.

The Supreme Court held that executive instructions cannot override statutory rules in a recruitment process—they can only supplement them.

The case arose after the Tripura government issued a memorandum halting ongoing recruitment processes under both the Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 and the Tripura Civil Service Rules, 1967. The government subsequently introduced a New Recruitment Policy (NRP) to govern all new appointments. The Tripura High Court gave conflicting rulings: it upheld the government’s decision regarding the State Rifles on the grounds of “public interest,” but it held that the NRP could not supersede statutory rules in the Civil Services instance.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Judgement on the State Rifles, stating that a recruitment process “cannot be left at the whims and fancies of the State to interfere through executive orders.” The Court upheld the High Court’s Judgement on the Civil Services recruitment, on the ground that applying the NRP would amount to an illegal change of rules midway through the process.

The Supreme Court clarified that the removal of a member of the Public Service Commission under Article 317 of the Constitution requires proof of specific individual acts amounting to ‘misbehaviour’.

The reference arose from the leak of a question paper for an examination conducted by the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC). A candidate’s complaint led to an FIR and subsequent CBI investigation, which implicated the Deputy Secretary-cum-Deputy Controller of Examinations but not Bage, a member of the APPSC. A state-appointed inquiry found procedural lapses but made no personal allegations. The President referred six charges against Bage to the Supreme Court under Article 317(1).

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that ‘collective responsibility’ applies to individual members of the Public Service Commission and revoked Bage’s suspension. The Court emphasised that ‘misbehaviour’ under Article 317, though wider than ‘misconduct,’ must still be proven on the basis of cogent evidence showing conduct undermining the office.

The Supreme Court held that there must be evidence of “deliberate or sustained mistreatment” of a child to convict an accused for child abuse. In February 2013, an FIR was filed against Santosh Sahdev for hitting a child in a school with a schoolbag.

The Children’s Court, Goa, convicted him for “child abuse” under Section 8 of the Goa Children’s Act, 2003 and various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The High Court reduced his sentence under all charges, but the accused, still aggrieved by his conviction, moved the top court. The Supreme Court acquitted him of the charges of “child abuse”, noting that it cannot be invoked at every trivial instance involving a child. It must be directly correlated with the intention of cruelty and abuse.

The Supreme Court held that it can revisit the sentencing aspect of death penalty cases under Article 32 petitions, in case procedural safeguards have not been followed.

Dupare’s conviction and death sentence, initially imposed in 2010 for the sexual assault and murder of a four-year-old girl, were affirmed through appeals and review, and his mercy petitions were rejected. Subsequently, new medical records and psychological evaluations emerged, indicating Dupare suffered from major depressive disorder, psychotic features, Specific Learning Disability (SLD), low intellectual functioning and organic brain injury.

The Supreme Court set aside Dupare’s death sentence and directed that a fresh hearing be conducted in conformity with the guidelines in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2022). While affirming this extraordinary power, the Court cautioned that Article 32 is not a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters, but is reserved for cases involving a clear, specific and serious breach of procedural safeguards that undermine basic rights. The Court clarified that the finding of guilt would remain untouched.

The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a judgement once signed cannot be altered or reviewed, except to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes.

The Khosla Group filed a company petition at the Company Law Board (CLB) against the Bakshi Group after a dispute over a resort project in Kasauli. The Khosla group had filed a separate petition alleging perjury at the Delhi High Court. In 2014, the Supreme Court directed that the High Court could not hear the matter and it would be decided by the CLB/NCLT. The petition was disposed of by the High Court in 2018 after the top Court’s direction. Despite this, the Khosla group filed another perjury plea at the High Court in 2019. The High Court initially declined to intervene but later recalled its 2018 Order after learning that the petition before the NCLT had been withdrawn.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s recall was an impermissible review under Section 362 CrPC and set it aside. It stated that a recall “undermines the finality of the judicial proceedings.”