Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that candidates seeking to become a Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practised as an advocate or law clerk for at least three years. The decision overruled the Court’s own Judgement from 2002.

After the 2002 Judgement, interested parties approached the Court seeking relief concerning qualification, promotion and selection in the Judicial Services. During these hearings, the Court “found it necessary to decide certain larger issues concerning the administration of justice,” which included the question of whether law graduates could be appointed as judges without practice experience.

The Court reinstated the rule that required three years of practice to become eligible to appear for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The Court also issued reservation-related directions for in-service judicial officers to avail fast-tracked promotions: (a) it introduced 10 percent reservation for the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division); (b) it increased the quota of reserved seats from 10 percent to 25 percent for posts in the Higher Judiciary. To avail these promotions, candidates appear for the Limited Departmental Competitive Examinations (LDCE).

The Supreme Court upheld the Kerala High Court’s quashing of a state order mandating the creation of a fee corpus from NRIs to subsidise fees for Below Poverty Line (BPL) students.

Kerala’s Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee directed self-financing medical colleges to create a corpus fund for BPL students by collecting ₹5 lakh from each NRI student annually. This was backed by a state government order. KMCT Medical College challenged the directive in the High Court. The High Court struck down the order but directed that the collected funds remain with the colleges for the benefit of economically weaker students.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the executive cannot impose levies or require a corpus fund without a suitable state legislation. The Court found that the Committee under the Kerala Medical Education Act, 2017, can regulate non-exploitative fees but lacks the power to mandate corpus funds or divert fees to the state without an explicit legal provision. The Court further directed that while self-financing medical colleges may retain funds collected as fees from NRIs, they must use them to substantially subsidise BPL students.

The Supreme Court held that the “One Rank, One Pension” principle should be implemented for providing retirement benefits to High Courts judges, irrespective of their role as additional or permanent judge.

The Court was considering the exclusion of district judiciary stints and breaks during transitions in the calculation of time period for pension payments. It examined whether judges appointed during the New Pension Scheme (NPS) and those who served as additional judges could be denied full or family pension. It also looked into whether Provident Fund benefits could be withheld under the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (HCJ Act).

The Court held that the OROP principle should apply to all judges, irrespective of whether they were elevated from the Bar or the district judiciary. The full pension should be provided to retired judges regardless of any break in service; the same goes for judges who joined the district judiciary after the NPS scheme came into force; family pension should be provided irrespective of whether the judges were additional or permanent; gratuity to the widow or family members should be paid by adding 10 years to the service provided by the judge; all allowances under the HCJ Act to be paid on retirement including leave encashment, Provident Fund and commutation of pensions.

The Supreme Court prioritized the interests of depositors under the Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors (MPID) Act. The Court further clarified the treatment of attached assets in relation to moratoriums under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which halt legal proceedings.

National Spot Exchange Ltd (NSEL), an electronic trading platform, was accused of payment default and fraud worth ₹5,600 crores. To repay the affected depositors, NSEL’s assets were attached under the MPID and Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Acts. The Supreme Court established a committee to oversee the recovery and distribution of funds. The Committee’s decisions on the priority of claims and the treatment of assets under different legislations were appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the Committee’s orders and ruled that assets deemed to be “proceeds of crime” under PMLA or attached under the MPID Act to protect depositors’ interests take priority over the claims of secured creditors. The Court found no inconsistency between the provisions of MPID Act and the IBC, and ruled that properties attached under the MPID before an IBC moratorium is imposed can be sold to recover money owed.

The Supreme Court emphasised the need for an impartial investigating agency in cases involving custodial deaths, citing the principle of ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ (‘no one should be a judge in his own cause’).

25-year old Deva Pardhi was taken into custody along with his uncle Gangaram Pardhi in connection with a theft investigation. Both were reportedly subjected to “intense third-degree treatment” and were brutally tortured to force a confession. Deva died in custody. A Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to transfer the investigation to the CBI and denied bail to Gangaram.

Finding that the local police investigation was not “transparent,” the Supreme Court directed the transfer of the investigation to the CBI. It also ordered the arrest of the responsible police officers within a month and completion of the investigation within 90 days. The Court also expressed concern over the safety of Gangaram as the sole eyewitness of the alleged torture, granted him liberty to apply for bail directly in the Madhya Pradesh High Court, and directed the State to provide him with witness protection.

The Court upheld the rights of senior citizens to reclaim property under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

Urmila Dixit transferred her property to her son through a gift deed with the expectation that he would care for her. When he failed to do so, she reclaimed the property. In 2020, a Tribunal court set aside the gift deed. A single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld this decision, but a Division Bench later ruled that the Tribunal lacked such jurisdiction under Section 23.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision on the jurisdictional powers of the Tribunal and quashed the gift deed. It confirmed that under Section 23, Tribunals may reverse a transfer that affects the welfare of elderly parents, order eviction and restore possession of property.

The Supreme Court clarified that High Courts can quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as well as their writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Kim Wansoo, a South Korean national, challenged criminal complaints by a sub-contractor over unpaid dues. The Allahabad High Court erred in refusing to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash the FIR.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court decision. It concluded that no offence was made out as the allegation of default was not against him or the company where he was a Project Manager. The Court observed that it was the duty of the High Court to invoke Article 226 to prevent abuse of the process and secure the ends of justice.