Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that compassionate appointment is a concession intended to relieve immediate financial distress and does not confer a vested right. Once a dependent accepts appointment to a particular post on compassionate grounds they cannot seek appointment to a higher post on the basis of qualification or parity.

Jayabal and another respondent were appointed as sweepers on compassionate grounds following the death of their fathers, who were also sweepers. Several years after joining service, they approached the Madras High Court seeking appointment as Junior Assistants, contending that they possessed the requisite qualifications at the time of their initial appointment. A Single Judge allowed the writ petitions, and the Division Bench affirmed the decision, holding that the applicable Government Orders permitted appointment to a higher post.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment. It held that compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal rule of public employment and is meant only to help the family tide over a sudden financial crisis. Once the appointment is accepted, the object of the scheme is fulfilled and no second option can be exercised. The Court further held that eligibility for a higher post does not create a right to compassionate appointment at that level.

The Supreme Court held that complainants under the POSH Act 2013 can approach the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of their own workplace to lodge complaints against harassment by an employee of a different workplace.

An aggrieved woman filed a complaint against the appellant before the ICC of her workplace. The ICC summoned the appellant, who challenged its jurisdiction at the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The appellant argued that the ICC lacks jurisdiction under Section 9 of the POSH Act, and the ICC constituted by his department can hear the case. The CAT and the Delhi High Court dismissed the challenge. He appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that “workplace” under Section 2(o) has a wide meaning, including any place visited by an employee, whether out of or during the course of employment. Noting that the definition does not require the respondent to be an employee of the same workplace as the aggrieved, the Court ruled that the ICC of the aggrieved’s workplace has the power to conduct a fact-finding inquiry under the POSH Act.

The Supreme Court held that deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is confined to profits derived from the business of providing long-term finance and excludes income lacking a direct nexus with that business.

The National Cooperative Development Corporation claimed deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) on dividend income from redeemable preference shares, interest earned on short-term bank deposits, and service charges received while acting as a nodal agency under the Sugar Development Fund. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, holding that the income was not derived from long-term finance. This view was affirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as the Delhi High Court, which held that the expression “derived from” requires a direct link with the business of providing long-term finance.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision while noting that after the Finance Act, 1995, Section 36(1)(viii) was amended to restrict the deduction to profits derived from long-term finance, defined as loans or advances repayable over a period of not less than five years. It observed that dividend income flows from shareholding, interest on short-term deposits from parking of funds and service charges from administrative functions, and therefore do not constitute profits derived from the business of providing long-term finance.

The Supreme Court held that the right to liberty under Article 21 cannot be the sole ground of consideration for granting bail in cases where security or integrity of the nation is called into question.

The case concerned the 2010 derailment of the Jnaneshwari Express which killed 148 people. The accused were charged for murder (Section 302) under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, terrorist acts (Section 16) under Unlawful Activities (Protection) Act and many other provisions. They were accused of conspiring to damage the railway tracks to protest anti-Moist operations carried out by the Government in the region. The Calcutta High Court had granted bail to the accused in 2022 and 2023 citing prolonged incarceration. It also relied on Section 436-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) which deals with the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed appeals in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgements to the extent that they relied on an erroneous legal premise. It held that the High Court should not have extended the benefit of Section 436-A as it bars its application to offences carrying the punishment of death (Section 302 of IPC and Section 16 of UAPA). Further, the High Court’s reliance on Article 21 was fallacious. It did not cancel the bail of the accused noting that the CBI had failed to show that they had misused their liberty, tampered with witnesses or caused delays to trial.

The Supreme Court held that the powers of judicial review in public interest litigation cannot be invoked to interfere with economic policy decisions or reforms sought to be undertaken by the government.

The Bombay High Court had quashed revised property tax rates imposed by the appellant corporation in a writ petition filed by the respondent. The respondent claimed that the revised tax rates were illegal and procedurally improper. The appellant corporation appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that revision of property taxes was within its jurisdiction, and the High Court cannot exercise judicial review and interfere in policy decisions.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court overstepped its bounds of judicial review by interfering with the economic policy decision of the corporation to increase property taxes. It held that the corporation was under a statutory obligation to revise taxes. Further, an interference in the economic policy is only valid if there is a clear violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.

The Supreme Court held that the State government could not require cooperative societies to obtain an additional recommendation from the Assistant Registrar before availing stamp duty exemption under Section 9A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended in Bihar/Jharkhand). Once a society is registered, the certificate issued under Section 5(7) of the Jharkhand Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act, 1996, is conclusive proof of its existence, and no further verification can be imposed.

Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society, a housing cooperative, challenged a 2009 directive of the State of Jharkhand that conditioned the Section 9A exemption on obtaining a recommendation from the Assistant Registrar. The Jharkhand High Court upheld the directive, holding that the additional step ensured scrutiny and prevented improper claims of exemption.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement. It held that neither Section 9A of the Stamp Act nor the 1996 Cooperative Societies Act contemplates an additional certification requirement. The registration certificate is conclusive evidence of the society’s legal status, and the State cannot introduce an extra-legal condition that restricts the statutory exemption. The directive was found to be arbitrary, unsupported by statute and an impermissible administrative overreach.

The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be rendered irrelevant merely because death was not imminent at the time of recording the statement.

The appellant (brother of the deceased) was informed by his niece (daughter of the deceased) that the deceased was shot down by her husband at the instigation of his relatives. The chargesheet filed against the husband did not name the relatives in the FIR. The appellant applied to the trial court, praying for the summoning of the additional accused based on the dying declaration under Section 161 of the CrPC. The trial court dismissed the appeal, stating that Section 161 of the CrPC cannot be treated as a dying declaration since the death occurred after a substantial period from the recording of the statement. The High Court affirmed the order.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that these statements cannot be treated as a dying declaration, noting that the law does not require the declarant to be under the imminent assumption of death for a dying declaration to be considered valid. Conclusively, the Supreme Court held that, based on the dying declaration of the deceased, the remaining accused shall be summoned under the powers of Section 319.

The Supreme Court held that a rented residential dwelling does not lose its character as a residential lease merely because the lessee sub-lets the premises as a hostel for students or working professionals. The GST exemption for residential use depends on the nature of the property, not on the identity or residential status of the lessee.

Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish leased a multi-room residential property in Bengaluru to a private company that provided long-term hostel accommodation to students and working women. The Authority for Advance Ruling and the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling denied the GST exemption, treating the arrangement as commercial hostel accommodation. The Karnataka High Court reversed the orders, holding that the property retained its character as a residential dwelling and that the exemption could not be denied because the lessee was a corporate entity.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgement. It held that residential dwellings used for long-term stay continue to fall within the exemption, regardless of whether the occupant resides under a direct lease or through a sub-letting arrangement. The Court rejected the view that the lessee must personally use the premises as a residence, and clarified that a later amendment restricting the exemption cannot operate retrospectively.

The Supreme Court held that rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality, dignity, and non-discrimination under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.

Mission Accessibility filed a writ petition seeking the modification of the timeline for scribe registration in the Civil Services Examination and for permitting the use of laptops equipped with the Screen Reader Software (SRS) along with accessible digital question. The UPSC resolved to introduce the SRS for visually impaired candidates, but conceded it lacks the necessary infrastructure for implementing it.

The Court directed that the Union Public Service Commission shall include a clear provision permitting candidates eligible for a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days prior to the exam. The Court directed the UPSC to file a comprehensive compliance affidavit within a period of two months formulating uniform guidelines and protocols for the use of SRS and other assistive technologies to ensure standardisation, accessibility and security of the examination process.

The Supreme Court held that divorced Muslim women are entitled to recover gifts given to the husband at the time of marriage under The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Court held that the Act concerns securing the dignity and protection of Muslim women post-divorce, which directly aligns with the rights guaranteed under Article 21.

The appellant approached the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur, under Section 3 of the Muslim Women Act 1986, seeking the return of a total of Rs 17.67 Lacs–including 30 bhories of gold and articles that were given to the bridegroom, the respondent. The Court ordered the return of the mehr amount of Rs 1 lac alongside Rs 7 lacs, and 30 bhories of gold given as a gift to the bridegroom. Both parties preferred a revision petition, following which the matter was remanded for a fresh trial. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM) ordered the return of gifts given to the respondents. Aggrieved by the order of the ACJM, the respondent approached the High Court. The High Court set aside the ACJM’s direction. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court and held that gifts given to the bridegroom at the time of marriage are eligible to be recovered on divorce. The Court observed that the interpretation of the Muslim Women Act 1986 must keep in view the equality and autonomy of women.