Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that a mere technical defect in the formal framing and signing of charges does not vitiate a trial. It emphasised the importance of substantial compliance with the requirements of law over slavish adherence to technical formalities.

In March 2009, a trial court recorded that a chargesheet was “typed” in a case where nine people were accused of shooting the appellant’s father. The chargesheet lacked the signature of one accused person. After recording the charges in presence of all accused, the trial court proceeded with the examination of the accused persons. 14 years later, the Court framed a fresh chargesheet with all the signatures and continued the trial. The Allahabad High Court quashed the order and directed a fresh trial to be conducted de novo from the framing of charge stage. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order. It directed the trial to proceed from the stage of examination of the accused. It held that the defect was merely a procedural irregularity and not a fatal illegality which required a fresh trial.

The Supreme Court held that fiscal implications of compensation cannot override the substantive entitlement of persons whose land was acquired by the National Highway Authority of India.

A 1997 amendment to the National Highways Act, 1956 denied compensation for the land acquired by the NHAI. In 2015, a notification extended the applicability of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 to the NHAI acquisitions. The Court in Tarsem Singh-I declared the 1997 amendment unconstitutional and directed the payment of solatium and interest for acquisitions made between 1997 to 2015. The NHAI filed a plea seeking a clarification on the prospective application of the judgement stating that the liability amounted to Rs. 100 crores. This was dismissed by the Court. NHAI then sought a review of the judgement stating that the estimated liability was not Rs. 100 crores but was in fact Rs. 29,000 crore. They justified the reconsideration stating that this was an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Court dismissed the review. It held that the value of the fiscal liability is not a valid ground for review. It added that the constitutional right for just compensation cannot be contingent on the magnitude of the financial burden.

The Supreme Court held that persons who convert to religions other than Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism lose their Scheduled Caste status under Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.

The appellant, a Christian Pastor, originally from the Madiga community in Andhra Pradesh, alleged caste-based abuse, assault and criminal intimidation by upper-caste persons. An FIR was registered under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The FIR was quashed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court after the accused contended that the appellant could not invoke the SC/ST Act while professing Christianity.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement. It held that the appellant lost his Scheduled Caste status upon conversion and could not claim protection under the SC/ST Act. It upheld the quashing of IPC charges, finding that witness statements did not corroborate the allegations of assault, restraint or intimidation.

The Supreme Court held that women serving as Short Service Commission (SSC) officers cannot be denied Permanent Commission (PC) after qualifying eligibility.

The appellants, women SSC officers in the armed forces, approached the Principle Bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) at New Delhi, arguing that they were denied PC even after the Selection Board declared them eligible. Relying on the Ministry of Defence v Babita Puniya (2020), they argued that they should be appointed to the PC “on the same terms and criteria as their male counterparts”. The AFT dismissed their application. It held that the officers had lower comparative merit and that their evaluation was conducted without any bias. The appellants challenged the orders of the AFT in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the AFT. It noted that the inclusion of SSC women officers as PC is not a matter of discretion but of constitutional obligation. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 to grant PC to the appellants alongside pension and all consequential benefits, as a one-time measure, to officers who completed 20 years of service.

The Supreme Court held that relaxation granted to reserved category candidates in a qualifying examination merely creates a level playing field where no concession or relaxation is granted in the ultimate selection.

The appellants were candidates from the reserved category. They wrote the Teacher’s Aptitude and Intelligence Test (TAIT) and scored higher in merit than the highest scoring general category candidate. Their name was excluded from the final merit list on the grounds that they had applied for relaxation in the qualifying marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET). The TET enables the candidates to participate in the main examination i.e. the TAIT. A writ petition against the merit list was dismissed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court and directed that the appellant candidates be included in the merit list. It stated that there was no express prohibition in the Recruitment Rules. Further, the relaxation in the qualifying criteria only affects eligibility and such relaxation was not made available in the TAIT examination, where the merit was evaluated at par with the general category.

The Supreme Court held that land cannot be subsequently designated as a “deemed forest” if it was not a deemed forest at the time the Master Plan came into force.

In 2022, the Rail Land Development Authority (RLDA) issued a Request for Proposal of approximately 12.40 hectares of railway land, for mixed use development in Delhi. The land had been acquired in 1986 as agricultural land and incorporated into the Master Plan of Delhi, 2021. An application was filed before the National Green Tribunal (NGT) alleging that there were approximately 1,100 trees on the land, making it a deemed forest under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The NGT dismissed the application due to lack of concrete evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that historical character of the land must be taken into account to determine whether it classifies as “deemed forest”. The Court observed that the land had been agricultural in nature, and could not become a forest merely due to vegetation growth.

The Supreme Court held that disciplinary action initiated during service can continue after retirement, if permitted by Service Rules.

In September 2011, the appellant, a bank employee, was served a chargesheet on allegations of irregularities in disbursement on loans. On the same day, the appellant retired from service. The appellant’s pay scale was reduced on a permanent basis after the Disciplinary/Appellant Authority partly proved the charges. The appellant approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court arguing that the master-servant relationship between him and the bank ceased to exist upon retirement. Therefore, the punishment cannot continue. The Single Judge Bench held in his favour. On appeal, the Division Bench set aside the decision, allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue after retirement. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench. It held that disciplinary action initiated during service can be brought to its logical conclusion if Service Rules/ Regulations permit, despite the severance of the master-servant relationship.

The Supreme Court held that maternity benefits extend to all forms of motherhood, including adoption and are not confined to biological childbirth. It held that unjustified exclusion of adoptive mothers is discriminatory and unconstitutional under Article 14. Further, adoption constitutes an exercise of reproductive and decisional autonomy under Article 21.

The petitioner, an adoptive mother, challenged Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, which restricted maternity benefits to women adopting children below three months of age. She argued the limit bore no rational nexus to the statute’s object and was practically unworkable.

The Court struck down the three-month age limit as violating Articles 14 and 21. It read down Section 60(4) to entitle all adoptive mothers—irrespective of the child’s age—to twelve weeks of maternity benefit from the date of handover.

The Supreme Court held that it is desirable for courts to serve a notice to an accused upon appointment of an amicus curiae in the absence of a counsel.

The appellant was granted bail by the Jharkhand High Court in 2003, in a case involving alleged murder. After 20 years, the High Court appointed an amicus to represent the appellant due to absence of his counsel. On the submissions of the amicus, the Court convicted him in a case of culpable homicide with rigorous imprisonment for five years. The appellant approached the Supreme Court alleging “gross injustice” and argued that he was not provided a notice regarding appointment of the amicus. He contended that the amicus had raised a ground that was not in his memorandum of appeal, thus disabling the High Court from granting acquittal. Permission was sought to raise such grounds before the apex court.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not obligated to inform the appellant. However, it would have been desirable to do so. The Court relied on Anokhi Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh and held that attempts to expedite the process should not be at the expense of fairness and opportunity to the accused. The Court remanded the case for hearing.

The Supreme Court held that “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution includes the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS). Financial dependency on the Union government is not the only criterion to determine whether an organisation is a “state”.

Employees of the AFGIS approached the Delhi High Court after its Board of Trustees revised the pay structure and did away with any pay parity and connection with the Central Government Pay Commissions. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition stating that the AFGIS was a private and self-contained society and was not a “state” or “other authority” under Article 12. It reasoned that AFGIS lacked financial dependency and administrative domination of the Union Government. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Division Bench and held that the AFGIS carried out a public duty i.e. protection and welfare of Armed Forces personnel. This falls squarely under the collective obligation of “State” under Article 12.