Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that when an award-debtor is restricted from unconditionally withdrawing the deposited amount, they are liable under Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to pay post-award statutory interest.

The appellant was an award-debtor in execution proceedings initiated by the respondent to enforce an arbitral award of ₹1.46 crores plus 12 per cent interest. The Delhi High Court granted an interim stay on the award’s execution, provided that the appellant deposit 50 per cent of the award to the High Court Registry. The respondent’s application seeking release of the funds was opposed by the appellant who cited a pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Eventually, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea and the Executing Court ordered unconditional release of the amount with interest. The appellant moved the High Court against the interest contending that the deposit amounts to satisfaction of the award. The appellant approached the Supreme Court after the plea was dismissed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was liable to pay interest since the payment was not made unconditionally to the respondent. It noted that since the initial deposit was made solely to obtain a stay on execution of the award, it cannot constitute unconditional deposit of the amount.

The Supreme Court held that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders while an application seeking leave to institute a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is pending. Section 92 mandates the court’s leave for instituting a suit against a public charitable or religious trust.

The appellants alleged financial and administrative mismanagement, breach of trust and irregularities in the day to day functioning of the respondent-trust. They filed a civil suit under Section 92, accompanied by an application for leave to institute it and sought urgent interim protection, asking for appointment of an ad-hoc body to manage the trust’s affairs and properties. A trial court passed an interim order constituting the ad-hoc committee. The Karnataka High Court set aside this order, holding that the Court could not pass an interim order before granting leave to institute the suit.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that Section 92 is both a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword”, protecting public trusts from vexatious litigation while allowing action against their mismanagement. It held that an application for leave is a threshold requirement without which supplemental proceedings cannot be invoked.

The Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation restricting trade is liable to be struck down if it does not bear a reasonable, proportionate nexus with its object.

The Maharashtra government introduced Rule 18A and 18B to the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972. Rule 18A required sellers to verify purchaser licences and add colourant and bitterant to methanol sold to non-drug manufacturers. Rule 18B provided for the confiscation of unlicensed methanol. Manufacturers challenged the rules arguing that they rendered methanol commercially unusable. The Bombay High Court dismissed the challenge. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court struck down Rules 18A and 18B as violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g), holding that the licensing and additive requirements failed to address diversion and pilferage while imposing a substantial, continuing burden on industry. The Bench suggested that the state adopt alternatives such as tighter licensing and stock reconciliation to prevent hooch tragedies.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) is not absolute and is rebuttable. The presumption only operates after the prosecution establishes basic foundational facts constituting an offence beyond reasonable doubt at the threshold.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced by the trial court under Section 6 of POCSO and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for penetrative sexual assault. The Delhi High Court relied on Section 29 to confirm the conviction and the sentence. The appellant approached the Supreme Court citing material contradictions between the testimonies of the victim’s mother and a private doctor she consulted. Physical examination and FSL reports found no injuries or blood.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement. It held that presumptive provisions neither dilute norms of a fair trial nor do they relieve courts from analysing evidence objectively. The Court ordered immediate release of the appellant stating that he had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption.

The Supreme Court held that rules governing disability pensions for ex-servicement are claimant-protective. Modifications made thus far do not dismantle the protective structure of the Rules.

Over 270 appeals were filed by the Union against the grant of disability pensions, on the grounds that their disability was “neither attributable to nor aggravated by” military service. The Union argued that the twin presumptions under the 1982 Entitlement Rules—good health at entry in service and; in case of discharge on medical grounds, disability caused/aggravated by military service—were modified in 2008. The respondents contended that the 2008 Rules were merely a cosmetic change.

The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals while taking note of a 2015 Ministry of Defence report that discouraged denial of disability benefits on hyper-technical grounds. It found that the 2008 Rules had no force of law while clarifying that it did not dismantle the core scheme of the 1982 Rules.

The Supreme Court held that not allowing high-performing Persons with Disabilities (PwD) an unreserved seat defeats the purpose of reservation under Section 34 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016—it denies an opportunity to a lower-scoring candidate to claim the reserved seat.

The Court had been monitoring various aspects of the implementation of disabilities legislation since 1998 when the Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation filed a writ petition seeking implementation of the 1995 Act. Most recently, the Court emphasised that reservation must reach those most disadvantaged by disability and deprivation and advanced a positive interpretation of Section 34 to protect the integrity of earmarked seats for PwD candidates.

The Court directed the Union to explain—by 14 October 2025—whether measures have been taken to provide the “upward movement” of meritorious candidates applying against the posts reserved for PwDs, when they secure more than the cut-off for the unreserved category. The Court clarified that the same principle applies to promotions.

The Supreme Court held that speculative buyers or investors cannot file corporate insolvency petitions against borrowers under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Two individuals invested ₹35 lakh and ₹25 lakh respectively in real estate projects with a buy-back clause. The project was not completed and cheques issued to them by the real estate company had bounced. Insolvency petitions under Section 7 were accepted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). On appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal set aside the NCLT judgement stating that the individuals were merely “speculative investors” who sought a lucrative return.

The Court confirmed the NCLAT’s decision. It observed that Section 7 of the IBC can only be availed by bonafide homebuyers and not speculative investors who treat real estate as a financial instrument. Possession is the primary indicator of bona fide intent.

The Supreme Court held that deception alone does not constitute cheating—a deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or loss must be established.

The case originated from a complaint by the District Fire Officer alleging that a college had obtained a Recognition Certificate by submitting a forged No-Objection Certificate (NOC). An FIR was registered and a chargesheet was filed, leading to proceedings under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court refused to quash these proceedings, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s Judgement while noting that a Fire NOC was not required for the college’s building as per the National Building Code of India, 2016. Therefore, the essential ingredient to confirm an offence of forgery was missing, as there was no “vital link” between the alleged false representation and the issuance of the Recognition Certificate.

The Supreme Court held that the migration of SC, ST and OBC candidates to unreserved posts depends on the type of relaxations availed and the relevant recruitment provisions.

In the first dispute, reserved category candidates in recruitment for the Railway Protection Force had availed relaxations in age and physical standards. Though they scored more than the general cut-off, they were denied migration. The High Court ordered their appointment to unreserved vacancies, relying on Standing Order No. 78, which allowed migration on merit. The Supreme Court set aside this view, holding that Revised Directive No. 29 had made Standing Order No. 85 applicable, and Para 14(f) expressly barred candidates who had taken concessions in age or measurements from being counted against general vacancies.

In the second dispute, involving CISF recruitment, an ST candidate with a height of 163cm (165cm was the General Category requirement) scored 366 marks, which was higher than the general cut-off of 364. His selection in the unreserved category was challenged based on a 1998 Office Memorandum. The Supreme Court upheld the selection. Applying the ejusdem generis rule, it held that the expression “etc” in the Memorandum referred to items like age, experience and qualifications, and not physical characteristics like height or chest measurements.

The Supreme Court held that a court’s power to review its own previous order is strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not to rehear or substitute a different view as if it were an appeal.

A preliminary decree for the partition of a family property was issued in 2003. Malleeswari, the daughter, sought to have it amended for a third of the share under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which grants daughters equal rights to ancestral property. The Trial Court dismissed her plea, stating that the 2005 Act would not apply “retroactively”. The Madras High Court upheld Malleeswari’s claim. However, the High Court set aside its prior Order in a review petition filed by a property purchaser. It remanded the case to the Trial Court to be heard afresh.

The Supreme Court found the High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction. Review is confined to correcting an “error apparent on the face of the record” or discovering new evidence, not to re-evaluating the case’s merits or substituting its own findings, which is akin to an appeal against its own order.