Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that the power to award just and reasonable compensation in a deficient housing service flows from the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and cannot be curtailed by a one-sided clause in a builder-buyer agreement.

The disputes involved delays by a builder to hand over flats to three investors in a Gurugram project. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) directed the developer to complete construction and deliver possession. It also awarded interest compensation at eight percent per annum until possession, extended rebate, awarded costs and fastened post-cut-off stamp duty increases on the developer. The developer appealed, relying on the builder-buyer agreement clause which provided nominal compensation for delays and obligated buyers to pay stamp duty.

The Supreme Court upheld the NCDRC’s directions and dismissed the appeals. Further, it held that the award must be reasonable and proportionate to the delay and hardship caused. It granted the developer six months to secure the Occupancy Certificate and hand over possession in two matters. It clarified interest computation and issued directions for the supply of an Occupancy Certificate in the third.

The Supreme Court held that it is illegal to terminate services of an employee on the ground that their university degree was declared invalid after their graduation.

In 2004, the appellants graduated from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur, Chhattisgarh with a Bachelors of Library Science degree. The University was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Viswavidyalaya Act 2002. The statute was declared invalid by the Supreme Court in 2005, on the ground that the legislative assembly was not competent to enact it. In 2009, the appellants were recruited as librarians by the Bihar government. The challenge to their recruitment was dismissed by the Patna High Court. However, the government terminated their employment in 2015. After a writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, a civil appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reinstated employment, noting that the appellants cannot be at fault merely for studying in a university established under an Act subsequently declared ultra vires.

The Supreme Court held that failed restructuring proposals do not replace or novate original loan agreements. It clarified that the Adjudicating Authority only checks for debt and default at the stage of initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It doesn’t need to determine financial viability or existence of disputes at this stage.

Power Trust took a loan of around ₹2000 crore from the creditor to set up a thermal power plant in Haldia, West Bengal. The loan was classified as a Non-Performing Asset in 2018. Loan restructuring plans were approved subject to fulfilment of pre-conditions. When Power Trust failed to fulfil these conditions, the creditor filed an application to initiate CIRP which was admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata and upheld by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Power Trust moved the Supreme Court, contending that the date of first default fell within the pandemic period barred under Section 10A.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed for the CIRP to continue. It found that the first default was made on the original contract, prior to the pandemic period and held that restructuring plans did not novate the original contract as they were underpinned to preconditions that were not fulfilled. Distinguishing between financial and operational creditors, the Court clarified that applications filed by the former do not provide for a demand notice or determination of dispute. It emphasised that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors cannot be second-guessed by a court.

The Supreme Court held that compensation cannot always be treated as a substitute for a reduced sentence. Sentences cannot be reduced mechanically and should have a visible application of mind.

The accused persons were convicted for offences of attempt to murder (Section 307), voluntarily causing hurt (Section 324) and grievous hurt (Section 326) under the India Penal Code, 1860. The Trial Court had ordered three years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5000 each. The High Court upheld the convictions and remitted the sentence to the period already undergone, with an enhanced compensation of ₹50,000 each to the victim’s wife.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Judgement and observed that such compensation was a kind of “blood money”. The Court recognised that Section 395 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 granted monetary compensation to the victim, but only in addition to the sentence awarded and not as an alternative. The Court culled out proportionality, facts and circumstances, societal impact, and aggravating and mitigating factors as basic considerations to be kept in mind when imposing a sentence.

The Supreme Court held that a recovery statement made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not admissible if the accused is not in formal custody of the police when the information was provided.

On 5 October 2018, the appellant engaged in a physical altercation with his second wife, resulting in her hospitalisation. An FIR was subsequently filed against him but conflicting evidence made it unclear whether he was arrested on 5 October or 6 October. A neighbor alleged that the appellant had left on a motorcycle with his stepdaughter following the incident. However, a missing persons report was only registered for the daughter on 11 October. An oral report claimed she disappeared at 9:00 PM on 6 October. On 13 October, the accused provided a Section 27 statement regarding the location of the child’s remains. From that site, the police recovered bones, ashes, a skull and teeth fragments. The vertebrae and teeth matched the child’s biological parents. The police then arrested the accused for murder that same day, and the High Court later upheld his conviction based on the neighbour’s statement and the DNA match.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgement and acquitted the appellant stating that there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence. The claim that the appellant had left on a motorcycle could not be corroborated as he was in police custody when the child went missing. Moreover, the neighbour’s statement was recorded seven days after the altercation. The Court did not consider the Section 27 statement as the accused was not in formal custody when it was recorded and was only arrested after the remains were found. It clarified that such statements will be admissible under Section 8 of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that district cricket associations are not bound by the mandate that 75 per cent of their members and all key office-bearer positions be held by eminent sports persons.

The appeal arose against a Madras High Court decision that directed the appellant District Association to amend its composition in line with reforms established in Secretary, Tamil Nadu Olympics Association v S. Nithya (2022). These reforms mandated that 75 per cent of members should be eminent sports persons. At the Supreme Court, the amicus curiae submitted that cricket was governed instead by BCCI v Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2014), which necessitated conformity of district associations with the BCCI’s constitution.

Ruling in favour of the appellants, the Supreme Court held that S. Nithya is inapplicable to cricket while BCCI applies only to state associations, not district ones. Recognising the role of sports in embodying fraternity, it identified a constitutional duty to ensure that sports facilities flourish without being concentrated in the hands of the urban economic elite. In light of pending proceedings before the High Court, it chose not to issue directions for reforms. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order to the extent of applicability of S. Nithya, and directed that it dispose of pending appeals expeditiously.

The Supreme Court held that sovereign control over natural resources including spectrum cannot become subservient to insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The Court further observed that Telecom licensees possess only a conditional, revocable privilege to use spectrum, held by the Union as public trustee under Article 39(b) and Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885.

Aircel Group entities holding telecom licences granted in 2006 secured loans exceeding Rs 13,729 crores from State Bank of India-led lenders. When the Department of Telecommunications sought to recover unpaid licence fees totalling Rs 9,894 crores, the companies initiated voluntary insolvency proceedings under Section 10 of the IBC in March 2018. The NCLT admitted the applications and approved a resolution plan in June 2020. The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) challenged the approval before the NCLAT. The NCLAT affirmed that spectrum, being an intangible asset, can be subjected to insolvency proceedings.

The Supreme Court allowed DoT’s appeal in part and held that spectrum allocated to telecom service providers cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC. It held that the IBC includes only those tangible or intangible assets on which the debtor has ownership rights. Mere recognition of spectrum licensing rights as an intangible asset is not conclusive.

The Supreme Court held that disability pension claims of ex-servicemen are deferred compensation for past service and are neither dependent upon the grace of the State, nor barred by limitation.

The respondent, an ex-military serviceman, was granted disability pension for life for suffering 20 per cent disability while in service. In 2016, the respondent approached the Armed Forces Tribunal seeking broad banding of disability pension to 50 per cent alongside arrears on the date of discharge. The law regarding limitation on disability pension claims was not settled owing to conflicting orders passed by coordinate benches of the Tribunal. However, a year later, the Tribunal granted an order in favour of the respondent. Subsequently, a reference was made to a full bench of the Tribunal, which affirmed the Tribunal’s judgement. The Union of India filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, relying on Union of India v Ram Avtar (2014), held that pension entitlements cannot be extinguished except for the authority of law. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right and the same cannot be restricted to a limitation period of three years.

The Supreme Court held that an applicant seeking bail should make a fair, complete and candid disclosure of all material facts, including criminal antecedents and prior bail rejections. It observed that any suppression, concealment or selective disclosure of such facts amounts to abuse of the process of law and strikes at the very root of the administration of criminal justice.

The respondent was charged in a large-scale organised scam involving the fabrication and circulation of forged legal and academic qualifications. This allowed individuals, including himself, to appear before various High Courts and the Supreme Court. He was charged with cheating and forgery under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. His bail application was rejected by the Sessions Judge, Jaunpur. The High Court reversed this decision and granted him bail.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the bail granted to the respondent, directing him to surrender within two weeks. The Court observed that annulment of bail is warranted where the original order is “manifestly perverse” or founded on “suppressio veri, expressio falsi”. It noted that the High Court failed to take note of the fact that the respondent was a “history-sheeter” and had nine other FIRs registered against him in other states. The Court issued mandatory directions to all High Courts to incorporate rules requiring an exhaustive disclosure framework for bail applications to promote uniformity and transparency in criminal cases.

The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Atrocities Act) is a statutory first appeal. Therefore, High Courts cannot act merely as a revisional or supervisory court; it is a court of both fact and law and is “obliged to independently evaluate the material on record” rather than providing a “mechanical affirmation” of the Trial Court’s order.

The dispute arose from an incident in November 2022 where members of the JAYS organisation allegedly intercepted government vehicles and engaged in a scuffle with district officials during the unveiling of a statue of Bhagwan Birsa Munda. The appellant was charged under the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(v), and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. The Trial Court allowed the appellant’s discharge application only in part, framing charges under the Act despite recording that none of the witnesses or statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 specified the casteist slurs used by the accused. The High Court, in an appeal against the partial discharge, affirmed the order of the Trial Court.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and quashed the charges under the Atrocities Act. The Court observed that the High Court’s judgement did not reflect an independent application of mind. It clarified that since the prosecution material was silent on specific slurs the “prima facie” ingredients necessary to attract the Special Act were absent.