SCO.LR | 2026 | Volume 2 | Issue 2

Volume 2 Issue 2 of SCO.LR is here!

In this Issue, we look at the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on contractual employment of teachers; powers to direct further criminal investigation; presumption of properties acquired by the Karta of a Joint Hindu Family; heads of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the admissibility of photocopies as secondary evidence. 

Refer to our mindmaps for a visual breakdown of the cases and click on the cause title to access the searchable and easy-to-link HTML version of all judgements. 

Visit our SCO.LR page to access all previous issues. 

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The Supreme Court Observer Law Reports

SCO.LR | Volume 2 | Issue 2

2 – 7 February

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Payment of Honorarium to Contractual Teachers

U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v State of Uttar Pradesh

4 February 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 117 | SCO.LR 2(2)[1]

Bench: Justices Pankaj Mithal and P.B. Varale 

The Supreme Court held that employing teachers on a permanently fixed honorarium below minimum wage amounts to ‘begar’, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. It held that teachers on contract are deemed permanent employees if their employment continues beyond expiry of the contract, and if they perform duties equivalent to regular teachers while being barred from taking alternative employment. 

In furtherance of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Article 21A, several part-time instructors were appointed in Upper Primary Schools in Uttar Pradesh on contractual basis. Their monthly salary remained ₹7,000 for over a decade. A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from March 2017, but the Division Bench restricted this to 2017-18 only. The State appealed against  on grounds of financial burden while the teachers appealed against the limited period of enhanced payment.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and directed payment of ₹17,000 per month from 2017-18 onwards, with arrears to be paid within six months. It deemed the teachers to be permanent employees entitled to periodic revision at least once in three years.

Keywords/phrases:  Article 21A—Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009—Appointment of part-time teachers on contractual basis in Upper Primary Schools—Fixed honorarium—Single Judge directed for increase—Division Bench restricted increase to one year only—Minimum Wages Act—Article 23

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Further Investigation after Closure Report under CrPC

Pramod Kumar v State of U.P.

4 February 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 120 | 2026 SCO.LR 2(2)[2]

Bench: Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vijay Bishnoi

The Supreme Court held that further investigations cannot be undertaken by the police/investigating agency without obtaining the leave of the Magistrate once the final report under Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) has been submitted. 

In 2013, an FIR was registered against seven persons for alleged rape and sexual assault. Noting no offence was made out, the police filed a closure report which was accepted by the Magistrate in the absence of protest petitions. After three years, the original complainants filed a Criminal Revision Petition and a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) against the closure. In compliance with directions of the NHRC, the Under Secretary of the Government of Uttar Pradesh recommended further investigation in the same FIR under Section 173(8) of the CrPC. The accused’s appeal was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court. 

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and held that application of mind by the Magistrate/Court is indispensable to ascertain whether further investigation is to be ordered. It found that Section 173(8) confers power solely upon the Magistrate and quashed the directions for further investigation. 

Keywords/phrases: FIR—Closure report—No protest petition—Criminal Revision Petition—Further investigation ordered under Section 173(8)—Section 193(3), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—No leave of Court taken—Appeal to the High Court—High Court dismissed—Appeal to Supreme Court—No further investigation without leave of Court

Read the Judgement here. 

MIND MAP

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Presumption of Properties Acquired by Karta

Dorairaj v Doraisamy

 5 February 2026

 Citations: 2026 INSC 126 | SCO.LR 2(2)[3]

 Bench: Justices Sanjay Karol and S.C. Sharma

The Supreme Court held that where the existence of ancestral properties capable of yielding income is established, acquisitions made by the Karta during the subsistence of a Joint Hindu Family are ordinarily regarded as joint family properties. It clarified that the burden of proof lies on the coparcener asserting that such acquisitions are self-acquired.

Doraisamy instituted a suit for partition claiming share in immovable properties, contending that the properties were joint Hindu family properties. Dorairaj, another coparcener, argued that several properties were his self-acquisitions, relying on sale deeds executed in his favour by the Karta and an unregistered Will. The Trial Court included the properties alleged to have been acquired by Dorairaj in its preliminary partition decree. The First Appellate Court and the Madras High Court both affirmed the decree for partition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court decision. It held that Dorairaj had failed to discharge the burden of proving self-acquisition. It further held that alienations made by the Karta in favour of one coparcener must be strictly proved and that vague recitals were insufficient. It observed that separate enjoyment, installation of irrigation facilities or individual borrowings did not establish severance of joint family status in the absence of a clear intention to divide.

Keywords/phrases: Joint Hindu Family—Ancestral nucleus—Resumption of joint family property—Burden of proof—Self acquisition—Alienation by Karta—Unregistered Will—Partition suit—Appeals dismissed

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Elements of Compensation under Motor Vehicles Act 

Pathmavathi v Bharati General Insurance

6 February 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 131 | SCO.LR 2(2)[4]

Bench: Justices Dipankar Datta and S.C. Sharma

The Supreme Court held that “loss of love and affection” is not a separate component of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but is subsumed under the head of “consortium”, which is a tort law term referring to the deprivation of the benefits of a family relationship. It further held that “future prospects” is an integral component of “just compensation” under Section 168 of the Act. 

The appeals arose from an accident where a tanker lorry collided with a two wheeler, instantly killing the victim. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai awarded compensation of ₹9.37 lakh. On appeal by the claimants, the Madras High Court modified the award to ₹10.51 lakh, increasing compensation awarded under the head of “loss of love and affection” to the victim’s two minor children. The claimants then appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the denial of future economic prospects. 

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court decision and modified the award to ₹20.8 lakh. It accepted evidence to support the claimant’s submission regarding monthly income. In view of the Constitution Bench decision in National Insurance v Pranay Sethi, it held that inclusion of “future prospects” is a binding norm under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court also considered a conceptual tension in Pranay Sethi, which recognised anticipated economic progression as a valid loss but denied inclusion of emotional deprivation. It applied United India Insurance v Satinder Kaur to include parental and filial affection under “consortium”. 

Keywords/phrases: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Just compensation—National Insurance v Pranay Sethi—Article 141—’Future prospects’ as an integral element—United India Insurance v Satinder Kaur—‘Loss of Love and Affection’ subsumed under ‘consortium’—Award modified in favour of claimants.

Read the Judgement here.

MIND MAP

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Admissibility of Photocopies as Secondary Evidence

Tharammel Peethambaran v T. Ushakrishnan

6 February 2026

Citations: 2026 INSC 134 | SCO.LR 2(2)[5]

Bench: Justices Pankaj Mithal and S.V. Bhatti

The Supreme Court held that a photocopy of a document constitutes secondary evidence and cannot be admitted or relied on unless the party seeking to produce it accounts for the non-production of the original.

The plaintiff alleged that her brother used a forged Power of Attorney (PoA) to sell her properties in Kozhikode to the defendants. The Trial Court invalidated the sale deeds noting suspicious font differences between the draft PoA and the one used for sale. The First Appellate Court reversed this decision, relying on a photocopy of the PoA used for sale. The High Court of Kerala restored the Trial Court’s decree, finding the photocopy inadmissible as secondary evidence. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court against invalidation of sale. 

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision. It found that in order to introduce secondary evidence, the party must first prove their legal right to do so under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It emphasised that the presumption of valid execution under Section 85 of the Evidence Act and Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908, cannot be triggered if the photocopy has not been legally admitted through the two-step process prescribed for secondary evidence.

Keyphrases: Secondary Evidence—Section 65 and 85 of the Indian Evidence Act—Notarised photocopy—Presumption of valid execution—Prerequisite of legal right to lead secondary evidence—Appeal dismissed.

Read the Judgement here. 

MIND MAP