Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that special criminal laws cannot be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons on the basis of completely incredulous material.

An FIR was filed after a complaint by the Vice-President of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad alleging mass religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (UPPUCRA). This triggered subsequent FIRs and resulted in multiple writ petitions at the Allahabad High Court seeking that they be set aside. The Allahabad High Court quashed the first FIR stating that the person was not competent to register it under Section 4 of the UPPUCRA. However, it refused to quash any subsequent FIRs that were filed in relation to that incident.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgements and stated that the subsequent FIRs for the same offence were impermissible in light of T.T. Antony v State of Kerala (2001), which held that any complaints related to an incident covered in an FIR will be treated as a statement under Section 162 of the CrPC, not an FIR. Therefore, any consequent proceedings were held to be quashed and impermissible.

The Supreme Court constituted a committee to frame an equal opportunity policy for transgender persons, in light of the legislative shortcomings in the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. The Committee’s policy will be binding until the government frames its own.

A teacher approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging discriminatory termination and denial of employment opportunities by two private schools in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. The Court found insufficient grounds to establish discrimination by the first school but held the second school guilty of denying opportunity on the basis of gender identity.

It noted that both schools had failed to comply with the 2019 Act and held state authorities responsible for their lack of strict implementation. The Court further observed that the lack of grievance redressal mechanisms, Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells had left the petitioner with no means to redress or remedy the violation of her rights.

The Supreme Court held that a conviction cannot be sustained if the genesis and manner of the incident in a criminal case cannot be corroborated beyond doubt. The Court exercised its powers under Article 142 to release convicts who were not parties to the case.

Kannaiya, the appellant and three others were convicted of murder under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. An FIR alleged that Kannaiya and nine others were damaging a hut when Ramesh intervened to stop them. Ramesh was beaten by the assailants and later succumbed to his injuries. The Trial Court convicted Kannaiya and three others. Their appeal was dismissed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Kannaiya appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and the Trial Court’s verdict. It found that the witness had provided contradictory statements in their testimony. Moreover, the witnesses failed to identify each other’s presence at the spot where the incident took place. Further, the witnesses contradicted the location of the crime. The Bench noted that such “conflicting versions cannot co-exist within a credible narrative”, and all four co-accused were entitled to be released. As Kannaiya was the only appellant, the Bench exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 to release the other accused.

The Supreme Court held that a court must exercise its discretion when ordering a CBI probe in cases where allegations have been levelled against the integrity of the investigation conducted by the police. A mere complaint concerning the independence of the investigation does not invoke the CBI’s involvement.

The Karur stampede claimed the lives of 41 people in September 2025. Multiple petitions were filed before the Madras High Court’s Principal and Madurai Benches, seeking an impartial probe conducted by the CBI, citing the influence of the ruling party on the police. The Madras High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the investigation is still in its early stages and that the investigation by the local police was “not flawed”.

The Supreme Court held that a complaint concerning the fairness and independence of the police investigation does not automatically qualify the case to be investigated by the CBI. However, the Court exercised its discretion to hold that the circumstances surrounding the Karur stampede gave justifiable reason to initiate the CBI’s investigation.

The Supreme Court held that a formal, separate suit under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is not mandatory if a minor (upon attaining majority) repudiates a sale of their immovable property made by their guardian without the permission of the Court.

A father sold a property purchased in the names of his three sons without seeking permission of the court. After attaining majority, the sons sold the same property to K.S. Shivappa within the limitation period stipulated under the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby repudiating their father’s sale. Neelamma, who had purchased the property that was initially sold by the father, filed a suit for declaration and possession. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding that the earlier sale had been effectively repudiated by the sale initiated by the sons. The first appellate court and the Karnataka High Court both held that a decree of cancellation was necessary to effectively repudiate the sale initiated by the father.

The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court’s decree, and held that repudiation need not take the form of a separate suit. It may be inferred from conduct such as a subsequent sale or open assertion of ownership. If the repudiation occurs within the limitation period, the earlier transaction becomes void and conveys no title to subsequent purchasers. The Court also noted that Neelam had failed to prove her title, having not entered the witness box herself.

The Supreme Court held that an unexecuted agreement to sell cannot exclude immovable property from a “matruka”—property left behind without a will in Mohammedan law. It stated that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, confers no rights nor vests any interest in another party unless an agreement to sell is executed during the owner’s lifetime.

The litigation began over property Chand Khan left behind when he died without a will. His brother, Imam Khan, argued that the property was a matruka; thus 3/4th of the property belonged to him and 1/4th to Zoharbee, the deceased’s surviving widow. Zoharbee contended that there was nothing to divide as all the property had been transferred to third parties. Notably, the agreement to sell was executed by her after Chand Khan’s death. A Civil Court ruled in her favour and held that the property was not divisible. A First Appellate Court reversed the verdict and stated that the property was matruka as the agreement to sell was not executed before his death. The Bombay High Court dismissed Zoharbee’s appeal.

The Supreme Court upheld the Order of the First Appellate Court and the High Court. It held that immovable property cannot be excluded from the division simply because an agreement exists. Accordingly, Zoharbee was entitled to transfer only her 1/4th share of the property.

The Supreme Court held that higher courts should exercise their power of ordering a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations.

Petitioners before the Allahabad High Court alleged favouritism against an external agency which conducted the examination for recruitment to various posts in the Legislative Council. After a Single Judge disposed of the petition, a Division Bench—suo moto—ordered preliminary investigation by the CBI.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s orders for CBI’s preliminary probe, leaving it to the discretion of the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court observed that constitutional courts must exercise some degree of judicial discretion before burdening a specialised central agency with matters that do not satisfy the threshold of an exceptional case.

The Supreme Court ruled that mere placement on the waitlist does not create a vested right to be appointed to a vacancy. It further noted that a waitlist operates for a limited period and cannot be extended after a fresh recruitment process has commenced.

In 1997, a candidate from the Scheduled Caste category was first on the waitlist for the post of technician at All India Radio (AIR). There were three candidates ahead of the aggrieved candidate, and all of them had been appointed. Owing to non-selection, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which directed the candidate’s case to be considered based on a concession by AIR that he would be absorbed as soon as there was a vacancy against the SC quota. In June 2024, the Calcutta High Court didn’t interfere with this decision.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court, on the ground that waitlisted candidates cannot claim appointment after the validity of the selection list has expired. The Court noted that upholding the appointment would extend the life of an expired list.

The Supreme Court held that mere knowledge of the victim’s caste identity is sufficient to attract liability under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Personal acquaintance with the victim raises a presumption of such knowledge.

Shivkumar was convicted by a Trial Court for sexually assaulting a minor girl belonging to a Scheduled Caste community. The incident occurred in 2017, when the victim was aged 12. Following her statement and medical examination, Shivkumar—who was her neighbour—was arrested and charged under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the SC/ST Atrocities Act. The Trial Court’s sentence of life imprisonment was upheld by the Chhattisgarh High Court. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Shivkumar contended that there was no evidence to prove he knew the victim’s caste, which was a mandatory element for conviction under Section 3(2)(v).

The Court, relying on Patan Jamal Vali v State of Andhra Pradesh (2021), clarified that post-amendment, the focus is on knowledge of caste identity rather than motive. Referring to Section 8(c) of the Atrocities Act, it held that when the accused is personally acquainted with the victim or their family, such knowledge is presumed unless rebutted. Since evidence showed that the accused frequently visited the victim’s home, the Court held that he was aware of her caste. The conviction and life sentence were affirmed.

The Supreme Court refused to extend the relief granted to cultivators in Kedar Nath Yadav v State of West Bengal (2016) to a private company. Noting that Santi Ceramics falls squarely outside the protective framework of the 2016 Judgement, it added that even procedural principles exclude their claim.

Santi Ceramics had acquired 28 bighas of agricultural land in 2001-2002 and was granted approval for its conversion to industrial use in 2003. The state of West Bengal acquired the land in 2006 for an automobile factory in Singur. Santi Ceramics accepted the compensation allotted. Later, the acquisition was quashed in Kedar Nath Yadav, which was a PIL filed by farming communities. In 2016, Santi Ceramics sought restoration of the land which was accepted by the Calcutta High Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the 2018 decision of the Calcutta High Court. It noted the remedial framework of Kedar Nath Yadav was specifically to benefit disadvantaged parties whose livelihoods faced extinction; it was not general restitution to be extended to industrial entities. The Bench added that the relief was granted in personam on the basis of objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not on fundamental grounds applicable to all. It also held the acquisition to be conclusively settled due to Santi Ceramic’s own inaction, voluntary acceptance of compensation and decade of silence.