Supreme Court Observer Law Reports (SCO.LR)

The Supreme Court held that land transfers restricted under Section 154 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 are voidable and not void ab initio i.e. void from the beginning.

In 1991, the appellants were granted mutation of 15 bighas of land in Haridwar on the basis of a 1957 sale deed. The mutation was subsequently set aside by the Consolidating Officer after the seller-respondents raised objections. When their application for restoration was rejected, the appellants preferred a civil writ before the Allahabad High Court. The writ was rejected on the grounds that the sales deed was rendered void under Section 154. The appellant moved the Supreme Court, contending that provision merely renders the transfer voidable at the discretion of Gaon Sabha. The respondents claimed that the 1981 amendment to the Act rendered the transfer void ab initio.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgement and held that transfers restricted under Section 154 were not void but merely voidable. It denied retrospective operation of the 1981 amendment as it would create new disabilities and obligations.

The Supreme Court upheld the power of courts to condone a late appeal due to sufficient cause, even beyond the deadline set by a special law.

The appellant was externed from the Balodabazar-Bhatapara district for one year under the Chhattisgarh (Madhya Pradesh) Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990. He challenged the order by way of a writ petition, alleging violation of Articles 19 and 21. The High Court of Chhattisgarh dismissed the appeal as it was filed around 20 days after the 30-day statutory limitation period under the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Supreme Court held that Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not bar the application of Section 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act which permit condonation of delay. It restored the appeal to be decided on its own merits.

The Supreme Court held that a corporate insolvency resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is binding and irrevocable. The applicant cannot withdraw from the plan after consenting to it.

The CoC approved the applicant’s resolution plan by a 99.9 per cent majority and issued three successive Letters of Intent (LoI) subject to pending third-party applications for resolution. When the applicant refused to accept the LoIs, his one crore earnest money deposit was forfeited, and the creditors voted to liquidate the debtor. The National Company Law Tribunal and the appellate tribunal dismissed his appeals.

The Supreme Court upheld the tribunal decisions and found that the stipulations did not render the LoIs conditional. It applied the principle of estoppel and confirmed the validity of the forfeiture and liquidation.

The Supreme Court held that the selection of an employee cannot be cancelled on grounds of moral turpitude if the prosecution has led no evidence.

Provisionally selected as a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constable, the appellant disclosed criminal antecedents involving charges of cheating and fraud. When asked to show cause, he submitted that the case was compounded before a Lok Adalat. He approached the Telangana High Court after his explanation was rejected and selection cancelled. A Single Judge set aside the cancellation. The cancellation was later restored by the Division Bench.

The Supreme Court found the cancellation arbitrary and restored the Single Judge’s order. It held that the parties had settled the matter as consenting adults without placing any material to prove commission of the alleged offence. It clarified that a compromise is not an admission of guilt.

The Supreme Court held that a sentence below the statutory minimum is illegal. Raising it to the prescribed minimum is not barred by Section 386(b)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, even in the accused’s own appeal.

The appellants were convicted by the Sessions Court under Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for committing gang rape. They were sentenced only for 12 years rigorous imprisonment despite the provision mandating a minimum 20-year sentence. On appeal, the High Court of Sikkim confirmed the conviction and, in suo motu revision, raised the sentence to 20 years.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court corrected a patent illegality rather than enhancing a lawful sentence. It added that an accused gains no vested right to retain a sentence the law forbids. The appeals were dismissed.

The Supreme Court formally declared the “right to walk” on safe demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, integral to Articles 19(1)(d) and 21.

A five-year-old child was killed in a road accident after a tanker struck the boy. The father of the child sought a compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT awarded Rs. 7,82,000/-. On appeal the High Court reduced it to Rs. 4,70,000/-.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error in reducing the compensation. It enhanced the compensation to Rs. 11,44,628/-. It noted that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) is inherently a legislation for “vehicles” and treats “human” interests as incidental. Remedies for restitution and compensation will be independent of the remedies available under the MVA.

The Supreme Court held that a constitutional court has the power to test the validity of a subordinate legislation, even in absence of a specific challenge, provided the issuing authority receives a fair opportunity to defend it.

The Special Police Establishment, assisting the Madhya Pradesh Lokayukt, booked a Town Inspector at Katni in a corruption trap under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused sought records of the sanction process under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) after sanction for prosecution was granted.The Madhya Pradesh High Court directed that the information be supplied after the State Information Commission initially denied disclosure. The Establishment appealed against the decision arguing that a 2011 notification exempted it from the purview of the RTI Act Section 24(4).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and struck down the 2011 notification for being “excessive”. The Court noted that the Establishment had a statutory mandate for investigating corruption and economic offences. It does not involve itself into intelligence or security matters which are exempted under Section 24(4).

The Supreme Court held that the delay in release of a convict after an order granting permanent parole amounts to illegal detention. It affirmed that habeas corpus petitions are maintainable against any form of detention.

The appellant was convicted for four years rigorous imprisonment in 1988. He was arrested in 2021 after his appeal was dismissed by the Rajasthan High Court. In 2024, the High Court directed his release on permanent parole, subject to the payment of a personal bond and two sureties. He filed a habeas corpus petition as he was not released by the state authorities despite complying with the conditions. A Division Bench directed immediate release. The appellant then claimed compensation of Rs. 8 lakh for 24 days of illegal detention. The State of Rajasthan opposed compensation and argued that the order releasing him on permanent parole violated Rule 9 of Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958.

The Supreme Court rejected the Rajasthan government’s argument and noted that the extended custody of the appellant amounted to illegal detention. It awarded ₹11 lakhs compensation to the appellant for violation of Article 21. It found that the State ought to have applied the “obey first, appeal later” principle and clarified that operation of the parole order cannot be stayed except by judicial decree.

The Supreme Court held that a decision evidenced in writing by a majority of trustees constitutes a valid authorisation for a society to act on its behalf, affirming that it is not absolutely required to be unanimous. It further held that where rival claims exist over voting authority, the validity of a vote cannot be determined merely by which vote was cast first, but by whether the person casting it was lawfully authorised to do so.

The matter arose from internal governance disputes between three societies—Hindustan Medical Institution, Eastern India Educational Institution, and Belle Vue Clinic— registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, and held shares in Birla Corporation Limited (BCL). Disputes arose regarding the authority to act on behalf of the societies and exercise voting rights attached to those shares. The societies relied on resolutions allegedly passed by circulation by their trustees and sought directions permitting their authorised representatives to attend and vote at BCL’s annual general meeting. The Calcutta High Court declined ad interim relief. In appeal, the Division Bench held that trustees must act in consonance and that if any trustee had not joined in the decision, the same could not be treated as a decision by the board of trustees. The High Court further directed that the vote cast first by the society would be taken into consideration irrespective of whether it was cast by the Managing Committee or the Board of Trustees.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Calcutta High Court and held that Clause 24 of the societies’ by-laws expressly permits delegation by a resolution evidenced in writing under the hands of the majority of the trustees. Section 48 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 could not be applied in a manner that deprived the by-laws of their operative force. It found that the High Court erred by placing the Board of Trustees, where the properties vest, on an equal plane with the Managing Committee, which only exercises derivative power circumscribed by delegation. Finally, the Court held that Section 108 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 20 of the 2014 Rules protect an anterior valid vote against subsequent duplication but do not validate an unauthorised act merely due to temporal priority.

The Supreme Court held that criminal culpability for medical negligence under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 requires the accused to act in a manner that “no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do”.

The appellant was a senior anaesthetist accused of medical negligence for allegedly failing to discharge her responsibility of administering anaesthesia to a patient in the post-operative care unit by delegating the work to an attending nurse, resulting in the patient’s death. Both civil and criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant. The District Consumer Redressal Forum relieved the appellant from all liability. The appellant approached the High Court for her discharge from the criminal accusations. The High Court rejected her plea. The appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision and discharged the accused. It found that the appellant was off duty at the time of administration of the anaesthesia. Further, the death was due to a pre-existing coronary blockage. It also held that after exoneration in civil proceedings, continuance of a criminal prosecution constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law.